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To: DR. SHIRLEY JACKSON
FAX # 301-415-1757

From: Jeannine Honicker
fax # 615-333-2879

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362 Binkley Dr.
Nashville, Tn. 37211
October 26, 1995

Mr. Peter B. Tam, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DENIAL OF "TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
DOCKET NO 50-390 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE" License No. NPF-20

Dear Mr. Tam:

According to the Draft dated March 1995 of TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-390 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT I
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE, License No NPF 20, section 1
states: "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission
or the NRC) has found that:

G. The issuance of this license will not be
inimical to the common defense and security or
to the health and safety of the public."

TVA has failed to consider the use of the Watts Bar Nuclear
Plant containment building for a more pressing national
security need. Fuel loading and low power testing will
foreclose this option, and so must be denied until full
consideration is given this better use of the facility.
If a better national security use for a facility can be
instituted instead of the originally planned use, then to
not use the more pressing national security use can make the
originally planned use of the facility inimical to national
security.

The U. S. and the Soviet Union have a treaty that stipulates
that each country will dismantle 2,000 nuclear weapons for
the next five years, for a combined total of 20,000 weapons.

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Oak Ridge is the storage site for this highly enriched uranium. The buildings serving as repositories are not structurally sound. On September 22, 1994, an inspection by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board found 1,348 criticality violations that resulted in a cold stand-down for one year, except for the receipt of HEU from the former Soviet Union in what is called "Project Saffire."

The Watts Bar Containment Building has been built to much higher standards than the buildings at the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge currently housing the HEU.

Therefore, I respectfully request that the operating license for Watts Bar be denied, that TVA decommission the plant before it is ever made radioactive, and that the facility be sold to DOE for a Repository for Highly Enriched Uranium. This will meet a more pressing national security need and falls within the guidelines of section 1.G of the license.

I also request that the license for Watts Bar be denied because the operation of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant will be inimical to the health and safety of the public.

The TVA and the NRC have not adequately considered the effects of a class 9 accident (rapid reactor disassembly).

Prior to the Chernobyl accident, the occurrence of a catastrophic accident was considered so remote that the consequences of such an occurrence was not considered. Chernobyl happened. No longer can the consequences of such a recurrence be ignored.

There is no adequate evacuation route from the plant site or for the residents that live near the plant. Only a narrow two-lane road leads out from the area. A citizens group called "Earth Firsters" demonstrated effectively that traffic could be tied up in both direction on that road for more than seven hours, even in a non-emergency situation. Should there be a need for evacuation, traffic pileups would dwarf the few cars that blocked the road during that demonstration.

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The two-lane road that leads from the site runs north and south. It very likely would be the corridor for the radioactive plume. There is no safe evacuation route.

For those people who might be able to escape, the next question is, where are they to evacuate to?. Is the temporary evacuation destination itself in the path of the radioactive plume?

Once temporary evacuation is complete, what are the plans for permanent relocation?. TVA has satisfied NRC's requirements for plans for handling liability claims, but the adequacy of the estimate of financial damage that could be filed against the utility has not been documented.

Consideration was not given to the possibility of a serious accident occurring during a University of Tennessee football game in Knoxville. It's not unusual for 100,000 or more fans to swell Knoxville's population. This worsens any emergency evacuation, especially since I-40 might be made impassable. The prevailing wind usually follows the ridge, heading from Watts Bar toward Oak Ridge, and would most probably carry the radioactive contamination across I-40 between Knoxville and Nashville, making it impassable. Many of those fans are Nashvillians. They would be cut off from their homes, as would Nashville students attending UT and other Nashvillians visiting or passing through Knoxville.

Gatlinburg, Tn. and Ashville, N. C. are both east of Knoxville. They are both major tourist attractions, where tens of thousands of people swell the number of permanent residents during both the summer and winter seasons. Their added numbers should have been considered in emergency evacuation plans. Since these problems have not been dealt with, the licensing of the Watts Bar plant must be denied. The operation of the Watts Bar Plant would be inimical to the health and safety of the public.

Even barring an accident, the operation of the plant will have a deleterious effect on traffic along I-40, both east and west. The operation of the plant and the cooling towers will caused increased fog. The area suffers from inversions and stagnations holding the radioactive emissions instead

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of allowing them to be dissipated. The number of additional foggy days and nights that will be caused by the operation of the plant and the resultant accidents will be inimical to the health and safety of the public. Not only will the increased fog cause lack of visibility, it will increase the radiation dose to the public since it will now be radioactive fog.

The operation of the Watts Bar Plant will cause routine and accidental releases of radioactive contaminants to the environment. Pathways to man include the food chain, particularly milk. Ingested radioactive particulate matter is more of a health risk than external doses since the elements lodge in the body and continue to bombard the bone marrow and other organs of the body, rather than being a one-time pass through dose, such as is received from an x-ray. This increases the risks of cancer, leukemia, and birth defects.

The only effective monitoring program would be one that actually prevented the ingestion of radioactively contaminated food. It would have to be a continuous monitoring program, and not random spot checks. Therefore, all milk, fish, poultry, meat, fruits, vegetables, tobacco, and drinking water that might be contaminated would have to be monitored before it was sold or eaten by people who raised it.

Milk is of particular significance. It was classified as the "critical pathway to man" in the Environmental Report for the now cancelled Hartsville Nuclear Plant.

There is no monitoring plan in place or planned that would monitor milk at each dairy on a daily basis before it is released for public consumption.

Any other radiation monitoring is only an academic exercise. Since such a monitoring plan is not a part of TVA's or NRC's standards, the operation of the Watts Bar Plant is inimical to the health and safety of the public and a license to operate it must be denied.

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Many safety questions concerning the design and construction of the plant remain. On August 16, 1995 the NRC issued Inspection report #50-390/95-47 and 50-391/95-47.

This document arose out of the more than 5,000 employee complaints, of which approximately 1,800 were safety related. These were reported prior to 1986.

The conclusion as specified in paragraph 3 of the cover letter is "We have completed our inspection of your Design Baseline Verification Program Corrective Action Program (CAP) and concluded that the CAP has been adequately implemented. Three items, involving completion of the CAP source issues, evaluations of assessments, and FSAR table errors, will be reviewed further. Within the scope of the inspection, violations or deviations were not identified."

This conclusion carries the implication that TVA has fixed all the problems identified by the whistleblowers (employee concerns). The body of the report does not support this conclusion.

The following is a seven page transmittal that I sent to Dr. Shirley Jackson, dated October 11, 1995, in reference to this inspection report. I am incorporating it as pages 6 - 12 of this document. Note that the fuel loading date has been pushed back but was the expected date when my report was drafted on October 11.

The balance of this page is intentionally blank.

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To: Dr. Shirley Jackson, Chairperson
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

From: Jeannine Honicker
362 Binkley Dr.
Nashville, Tn. 37211
fax # 615-333-2879

Subject NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-390/95-47
AND 50-391/95-47

Background: Prior to 1986, more than 5,000 employee concerns were communicated to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) bringing to light problems with the construction of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

TVA tentatively plans to load fuel on October 28, 1995, but first must receive a licence from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NRC inspection report No 50-390/95-47 and 50-391/95-47 intends to put to rest all of those employee concerns not covered in the previous report and clears the way for the issuance of an operating licence for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

First comment: Cover letter dated August 16, 1995

The conclusion as specified in paragraph 3 of NRC's cover letter is "We have completed our inspection of your (TVA's) Design Baseline Verification Program Corrective Action Program (CAP) and concluded that the CAP has been adequately implemented. Three items, involving completion of CAP source issues, evaluations of assessments, and FSAR table errors, will be reviewed further.

Within the scope of the inspection, violations or deviations were not identified."

This report validates my concern that the Watts Bar Plant is not safe to operate. The TVA knows it, NRC knows it, and an operating licence must be denied.

(1) More problems have been identified as a result of this inspection.

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(2) TVA resolved employee concerns that certain parts of the construction did not meet the requirements of the National Electric Code by eliminating the National Electric Code from the design criteria.

(3) Out of 230 deficiencies identified by TVA, the NRC inspected only 18. Logic says this is completely unacceptable. How can NRC in good faith state "The inspectors concluded that the DBVP CAP had been adequately implemented" when by their own admission there are 212 deficiencies remaining that they have not inspected?

The following is my critique of the inspection report:

- (1) Until these problems are solved and a complete hearing is held on the safety of this plant;
- (2) Until every employee who voiced a concern has been involved in looking at the resolution of their complaint and has agreed that the problem identified in their concern has actually been satisfactorily fixed and not just resolved by removing the rule that it violates;
- (3) Until the public is satisfied that they will suffer no monetary or health damage as a result of the operation of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant;
- (4) And until other uses for the building other than the production of electricity, specifically, the sale of the containment building to be used by DOE as a Repository of HEU from dismantled weapons, to meet a more pressing national security need, have been addressed;

I hereby request that NRC deny TVA a licence to load fuel at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

Here are my concerns specifically:

NRC's Summary: "The inspectors concluded that the DBVP CAP had been adequately implemented. However, the following unresolved item (URI) and inspector follow-up items (IFIs) related to the DBVP CAP were identified for review in a subsequent inspection"

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This is an oxymoron. The DBVP CAP can not have been adequately implemented if there are any outstanding deficiencies or unresolved items. This inspection report clearly points out that the NRC has not adequately performed its duties to adequately inspect the plant and enforce the regulations and accompanying safety codes.

Unresolved deficiencies were identified, but the employee concerns were declared "resolved."

Section 2.3 page 4 defines the problem and translates the abbreviations. A CATD is a Corrective Action Tracking Document to assure completion of corrective actions for validated issues identified from employee concerns. TVA identified 27 of the CATDs as addressing deficiency items that were source or associated issue items for the DBVP CAP (Design Baseline and Verification Program, Corrective Action Plan) It discloses that a portion of the employee concerns were dealt with in document IR 390/95-46. I have requested a copy of that document. The items listed as part of section 2.3 are the other employee concerns in the DBVP CAP and their review and NRC's supposed resolution thereof.

2.3.1 10200 WBN-02 Update and Clarify FSAR (Final Safety Analysis Report)

80454-NPS-01 FSAR Commitments Not Being Met.

The layers of review are detailed and the documents that have been generated as a result of this employee concern are identified. The NRC has looked at these documents and their conclusion is "Although some discrepancies were found, in general the PAC/AQ (Program for Assurance of Completion/Assurance of Quality) review and FSAR were considered adequate. The employee concerns were resolved."

What discrepancies were found?

Who were the employees who had originally made the complaints? Have they been kept informed of the resolution of their concerns?

Have the aforementioned employee or employees reviewed the documents?

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Are they satisfied that the problems they identified in their original complaint have been fixed and not merely "reworded" away?

What has happened to each individual employee since he or she first voiced his or her original concern?

Item 2-3-2 Employee concerns involving circuit breakers.

NRC's resolution "In general, the electrical calculation program was determined to be adequate and the regenerated electrical calculation of good quality."

This answer implies that there are still some unresolved problems, that the electrical calculation program is not 100% perfect, only, "generally adequate." Specifically, what is still wrong with it?

Same employee questions as for 2.3.1

The second part of 2.3.2, that dealt with 23702-WBN-05 is even scarier than the "Is generally adequate" response. "The inspectors questioned whether the current breaker settings had been field verified during the CATD closure process to ensure that they matched the calculations. There was no indication from the lookback sheets or from the closure folders that any field verification had been performed during the CATD closure process. TVA identified that CATD 23702-WBN-06, a different CATD in the series, addressed actual hardware completion and that they had not performed a field verification. TVA immediately began a field verification sample review. During the review several problems were found and were documented on corrective action document WBPBR 950392. DCN 37538 was issued to address two thermal overloads that were found where the installed hardware matched the drawings but did not match the calculations. A breaker was found with an incorrect setting and a work request was issued to reset the breaker to the setting required by the calculation. TVA intends to reopen CATD 23702-WBN-06 to address the problems associated with the field installations. the issues involved with the 02 and 05 CATDs were resolved."

Same employee questions as 2.3.1

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Is this included in any of the three open items? Please provide proof that the problems have been fixed not merely settled by declaring them "resolved".

Item: 2.3.3 Regarding 23702-WBN-04 No Fuse Capacity Calculations for Short Circuit Settings for Motors. This item concludes with: "In general, the electrical calculation program was determined to be adequate and the regenerated electrical calculations of good quality. The employee concerns are considered resolved."

This is the same answer as given in 2.3.2. first paragraph. "In general" lacks specificity. What is wrong with the calculations if it is only "generally adequate?"

2.3.4 23702-NPS 05 Level of Conformance to National Electric Code

Of all the complaints and gobbledegook resolutions, this one really riles me the most.

There were three separate employee concerns out of the 27 that were included in the DEVP CAP that were resolved with a stroke of a pen, or should I say an eraser. CATDs 23702-WBN 02, -04, and -05. TVA's solution: "Reference to the NEC was removed from Design Standard DS-E2.3.2- - - The level of conformance in a design Standard to any invoked standard outside of the TVA system (including the NEC) that is not committed to through the FSAR or QA Plan is defined in SEP 0.5.4 Design Standards and Guides, REV. 0., Section 3.2.6. The employee concerns were resolved."

Outrageous! I renovated my house a few years ago. The inspectors insisted that I use only an electrician that was licensed in Davidson County. If codes are strictly enforced, even for a small garage conversion in Davidson County, shouldn't National Electric Codes be enforced in the construction of a nuclear plant? TVA has clearly shown that they consider themselves above the law. If they don't like a regulation, they just eliminate it from their "standard", and the NRC has shown that they do not stand up to TVA. If the public is to have confidence in NRC, then the NRC must deny the operating licences for Watts Bar

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Nuclear Plant until TVA complies with all NRC regulations, without exemptions, including the NATIONAL ELECTRIC CODES,

Specify what the employee concerns were, send a copy of CATDs 23702-WBN- 02, - 04, and -05. Specify what section of the NEC these concerns referenced.

Who were the employees that voiced these concerns? (2.3.1. questions)

Did TVA commit to inclusion of the National Electric Codes in its construction permit? Are they eliminated from all of the Watts Bar Design Criteria, since they are NOT COMMITTED TO THROUGH FSAR OR QA PLANS?

2.3.5 21809-WBN-01 Annulus Area Clearance for Thermal Expansion

"This CATD was issued because the clearances for thermal expansion of the steel containment vessel were not sufficient. . .The outliers were potential deficiencies found by the walkdown (Inspection carried out by walking though the specified area)... Of the 181 outliers, six were still not resolved....When the remaining six outliers are resolved, the employee concerns will be resolved."

What is the worst accident that can occur based on the deficiencies as originally reported and by those discovered by the walkdown, both those that have been resolved (how were they resolved) and those still unresolved?

2.3.6 10400 WBN-02 Deficiencies in Calculations for Embedded Plates

Design & calculation errors. The NRC is reviewing this issue under another document CDR 390/86-39. When this CDR is closed, the employee concern will be resolved.

What is the status of CDR 390/86-39. It has been known for nine years as indicated by "86" in the problem number. Why is this still an outstanding problem. If it hasn't been fixed in nine years, can it ever be fixed? How much has been spent trying to resolve this problem since 1986. How much time, how many man hours has been spent on it?

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Who was the original complainer, employee concern reporter?
(same questions as in 2.3.1)

2.4 Resolution of Other Deficiency Items.

TVA identified 230 deficiency items. NRC looked at 18 of them. What about the other 212? How did NRC choose which ones to inspect and which ones to ignore?

What document details the entire 230 deficiencies?

How were the 27 CAPDs culled from 5,000 employee concerns?
What document lists all of the original concerns?

How can the NRC reach the conclusion that the DBVP CAP has been adequately implemented when they have only inspected 18 deficiencies out of 230, when 6 deficiencies are outstanding from a walkdown inspecting the clearance of the steel containment building, when it is now 1995, and an item has been outstanding since 1986 and is still not closed?


How can TVA jettison the National Electric Codes from its design criteria?

How can the NRC not follow up on what happened to the employees who brought these original complaints to light? To ask people who now have jobs to offer their concerns is ludicrous when they all know full well the history of the original "whistleblowers."

The NRC should bring these TVA employees, many of whom are now ex-TVA employees, those who offered the 5,000 concerns, to a public hearing. They should first be provided documents outlining TVA's complete handling, or lack thereof, of their original concerns. Give these employees an opportunity to say, "The problem is fixed to my satisfaction." If they do not make that statement, TVA should be denied an operating licence.

The public should also have an opportunity to voice their concerns as part of a formal operating licence hearing,

Respectfully submitted October 11, 1995



Jeannine Honicker

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The questions that were asked in this October 11 report to Dr. Jackson remain unanswered.

The problems that were pointed out remain unsolved.

The original TVA Employees who filed the original 5,000 plus complaints have not been queried as to the satisfactory resolution of their original concerns nor to the retaliation taken against them as a result of their action.


The NRC and the Department of Labor both have documentation as to the identity of these people and could summons the original employees if it were the desires of the NRC to do so.

Inspection report Nos. 50-390/95-63 and 50-391/95-63 specifically says on page 5, section 2.3.. Concern Resolution Timeliness "All pre-1995 issues had been resolved"

Mansour Guity, member of TVA's Defunct Nuclear Safety Review Staff, does not concur with this conclusion. I am herewith attaching a copy of his report: "SYNOPSIS OF WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1, NUCLEAR SAFETY PROBLEMS AND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE 10 CFR 50 APPENDIX B" and making it a part of this request for denial of operating license for Watts Bar.

To issue a low level power licence will be inimical to the health and safety of the public. I hereby request that a license for the operation of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant be denied.

Respectfully submitted.


Jeannine Honicker

CC NRC's Inspector General's Office
Dr. Shirley Jackson