Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

APR 17 1995

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CDR-50-390 10 CFR 50.55(e)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of the Application of) Docket Nos. 50-390
Tennessee Valley Authority)

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - INADEQUATE CONDUIT SEPARATION - CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY REPORT (CDR) 390/95-03

The purpose of this letter is to provide a report to address the subject deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). The subject deficiency identified as Significant Corrective Action Report (SCAR) WBSCA950003 was initially reported to the NRC Operations Center on March 17, 1995.

Enclosure 1 to this submittal contains the report for this deficiency. Enclosure 2 provides the list of commitments made in this submittal. If you have any questions, please telephone P. L. Pace at (615) 365-1824.

Sincerely,

O. J. Zeringue

Enclosures
cc: See page 2

JE27

APR 17 1995

cc (Enclosures):
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ENCLOSURE 1

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - UNIT 1
INADEQUATE CONDUIT SEPARATION
CDR 390/95-03
FINAL REPORT

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY

During a Nuclear Assurance Assessment, TVA identified various types of conduit deficiencies on completed areas which include the following deficiencies: loose flex conduits, no conduit ID, minimum bend radius violations, inadequate support for marinite board, various support deficiencies (shanked out bolts, proper torque cannot be achieved, no IDs, etc.), and separation violations. Of these deficiencies, TVA determined that the conduit separation deficiencies (involving cables having various safety functions) have the potential to create a significant safety hazard.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Certain of these individual deficiencies would obviously not result in an adverse impact to plant safety in specific applications. However, based on the number of safety-related cables involved with the separation deficiencies identified, TVA concluded that these deficiencies could represent an indeterminate safety condition had they remained uncorrected. Therefore, in light of this indeterminate condition, TVA has chosen to report this issue under 10 CFR 50.55(e).

CAUSE OF THE DEFICIENCY

The cause of these deficiencies was a combination of improperly trained personnel and a procedure inadequacy. The Class 1E conduit walkdown program was established as a means to implement various corrective actions. Early in its implementation, the program was very successful and appeared to be functioning adequately. However, as additional walkdown personnel increased, these individuals were not given the level of training as were the initial personnel. In addition, Walkdown Procedure WD-039 did not specifically require the use of the "go, no-go" gauge previously established as a measuring device. This combination of causes resulted in the deficiencies described above.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

TVA has retrained the walkdown field engineers to ensure they fully understand the walkdown requirements and provide them examples of the possible situations that they may encounter in the field. This training also stressed that the only allowable method for measuring train separation is by the use of an approved "go, no-go" gauge. In addition, Walkdown Procedure WD-039 has been

revised to ensure the proper measuring technique for separation is maintained for the duration of the walkdown.

TVA has reviewed other corrective action documents referenced in WD-039 to verify that their corrective actions are being adequately addressed by WD-039. The review confirmed that WD-039 adequately addressed these other corrective actions.

Upon implementation of the above corrective actions, the Nuclear Assurance organization performed Nuclear Assessment 95-066 which did not identify any additional deficiencies. Therefore, no further recurrence control actions are considered necessary.

To address the previous conditions, TVA will walkdown the previously completed rooms to identify and to correct or evaluate the conditions found. This action will be completed by August 18, 1995.

ENCLOSURE 2

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - UNIT 1

LIST OF COMMITMENTS

1. TVA will walkdown the previously completed rooms to identify and to correct or evaluate the conditions found. This action will be completed by August 18, 1995.