

TVA FAX COVER

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Message: 100PR50.55 (C) REPORT

From: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - TVA

Name: P.L. DACE, COMPLIANCE LICENSING MANAGER

Organization: WBN Site Licensing

Address: FSB 2K-WBN

Fax Number: (615) 365-8000

Telephone Number: (615) 365-1824

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Attachment 1
IN 89-89
December 26, 1989
Page 1 of 2

NRC FORM 381 10-89		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OPERATIONS CENTER			
EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET					
NOTIFICATION TIME 1535	FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION WATS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT	UNIT 0	CALLER'S NAME P.L. PACE (615) 365-1824		CALL BACK E: ENS or ()
EVENT TIME & ZONE UNKNOWN	EVENT DATE 09, 17, 93	1-Hr Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)		<input type="checkbox"/> (v) Lost Offsite Comm <input type="checkbox"/> (vi) Fire <input type="checkbox"/> (vii) Toxic Gas <input type="checkbox"/> (viii) Rad Release <input type="checkbox"/> (ix) Oth Hampering Safe Op.	
POWER/MODE BEFORE N/A	POWER/MODE AFTER N/A	<input type="checkbox"/> (i)(A) TS Required S/D <input type="checkbox"/> (i)(B) TS Deviation <input type="checkbox"/> (ii) Degraded Condition <input type="checkbox"/> (ii)(A) Unanalyzed Condition <input type="checkbox"/> (ii)(B) Outside Design Basis <input type="checkbox"/> (ii)(C) Not Covered by OPI/EPs <input type="checkbox"/> (iii) Earthquake <input type="checkbox"/> (iii) Flood <input type="checkbox"/> (iii) Hurricane <input type="checkbox"/> (iv) Ice/Mail <input type="checkbox"/> (v) Lightning <input type="checkbox"/> (v) Tornado <input type="checkbox"/> (v) Oth Natural Phenomenon <input type="checkbox"/> (vi) ECCS Discharge to RCS <input type="checkbox"/> (v) Loss ENS <input type="checkbox"/> (v) Lost Emerg. Assessment		<input type="checkbox"/> (v) Lost Offsite Comm <input type="checkbox"/> (vi) Fire <input type="checkbox"/> (vii) Toxic Gas <input type="checkbox"/> (viii) Rad Release <input type="checkbox"/> (ix) Oth Hampering Safe Op.	
EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS		4-Hr Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)		<input type="checkbox"/> (i) Degraded White S/D <input type="checkbox"/> (ii) RPE Actuation (scream) <input type="checkbox"/> (iii) ESF Actuation <input type="checkbox"/> (iii)(A) Safe S/D Capability <input type="checkbox"/> (iii)(B) RHM Capability <input type="checkbox"/> (iii)(C) Control of Rad Release <input type="checkbox"/> (iii)(D) Accident Mitigation <input type="checkbox"/> (iv)(A) Air Release > 2X App B <input type="checkbox"/> (iv)(B) Liq Release > 2X App B <input type="checkbox"/> (v) Offsite Medical <input type="checkbox"/> (vi) Offsite Notification	
GENERAL EMERGENCY					
SITE AREA EMERGENCY					
ALERT					
UNUSUAL EVENT					
50.72 NON-EMERGENCY					
PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71)					
TRANSPORTATION					
20.403 MATERIAL/EXPOSURE					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER 10 CFR 50.55(e)					
DESCRIPTION					
<p>NRC conducted an inspection of the Design Baseline and Verification Program Corrective Action Program 75 percent complete milestone during the week of September 13-17, 1993. The inspection team noted that the Safety Injection System configuration control drawing (1-47W811-1) showed 12 manual injection line throttle valves to be needle type, whereas the installed valves were globe type. This finding was identified in Notice of Violation 50-390, 391/93-66-02. This deficiency was documented in WBN Problem Evaluation Report (PER) WBNPER930316.</p> <p>The subject valves are used to equalize flow through the safety injection lines and to limit Safety Injection Pump (SIP) and/or Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) flow during post-LOCA accident mitigation. The valves are required to perform their intended safety function for at least 100 days following the event. They are not used for normal reactor operation or shutdown.</p> <p>These valves are throttled to such an extent that they will be subjected to high differential pressures. Cavitation and erosion are predicted using the equations of EPRI Report TR102051. Without extensive testing to quantify the extent of the erosion damage or a calculational method to determine the possible consequences, the failure scenario is postulated. Based on worst case conditions, cavitation would erode the disc and seat area to the extent that the flow resistance would decrease and allow the SIPs and/or CCPs to flow in excess of their runout limits. If the manufacturer runout limit margin was to be exceeded, one or more of the pumps could lose the ability to perform its safety function to provide cooling water to the core following a LOCA.</p> <p>If left uncorrected, the above condition could have created a substantial safety hazard and is considered to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3).</p>					
NOTIFICATIONS NRC RESIDENT	YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>	WILL BE	ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR NOT UNDERSTOOD?	YES <input type="checkbox"/> (Explain above) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
STATE(s)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		DID ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (Explain above)
LOCAL		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MODE OF OPERATION	ESTIMATE FOR RESTART DATE: N/A
OTHER GOV AGENCIES		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		UNTIL CORRECTED: N/A	ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK? N/A
MEDIA/PRESS RELEASE		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			