Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381

JUN 10 1994

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of the Application of	)	Docket Nos. 50-390
Tennessee Valley Authority	)	50-391

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNITS 1 AND 2 - NUREG-0737, ITEM II.B.3 - POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING - PROPOSED LICENSE CONDITION 19 (TAC NO. M77543 AND M77544)

The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC with the final plant-specific procedure for estimating the degree of core damage as required by Criterion (2) of the subject NUREG item. TVA provided the NRC with an interim procedure in a letter dated December 19, 1983. This letter supersedes that letter and should resolve Proposed License Condition 19.

Enclosure 1 is a summary of the Post Accident Core Damage Assessment Methodology (PACDAM) computer code that is used to estimate post accident core damage at WBN. The PACDAM code, along with the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)-19, "Post Accident Core Damage Assessment," provides the instructions and methodology necessary to estimate the degree of core damage following an accident. The CECC EPIP-19 was submitted to the NRC in letters dated May 11, 1989, November 7, 1989, and June 2, 1993.

Enclosure 2 provides the WBN plant specific PACDAM report that was developed utilizing the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) generic methodology for estimating post accident core damage.

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JUN 10 1994

No commitments are identified in this letter. If there are any questions, please telephone John Vorees at (615) 365-8819.

Sincerely,

Dwight E. Nunn
Vice President
New Plant Completion
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

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ENCLOSURE 1

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
POST ACCIDENT CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

The post accident core damage assessment methodology in use at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is based upon the generic Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG) guidance (References 1 and 2). This methodology estimates the magnitude of core damage through radiochemical analyses of the primary coolant and containment, evaluation of auxiliary readings of core exit thermocouple temperatures, water level within the pressure vessel, post-accident radiation monitors, and hydrogen concentration within containment. The implementing procedure for the use of this methodology at WBN is Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) - Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)-19.

The determination of core damage by analyses of fission product concentrations in the primary coolant system and containment has been automated in a FORTRAN computer code called PACDAM. This computer code correlates core damage to fission product concentration through the following process:

1. The total core source inventory for the fuel rod gap and fuel pellet for an equilibrium, end-of-life core that has been operated at 100 percent power is read from a file. These source inventories were obtained from Reference 1. The fuel rod gap source inventory from Reference 1 was determined using the ANS/Standard 5.4 methodology. The primary fission products analyzed for clad failure are isotopes of the noble gases, iodine, and cesium. The fuel pellet source inventory from Reference 1 was determined from calculations using the Oak Ridge Isotope Generation and Depletion Code (ORIGEN) computer code. The primary fission products analyzed for fuel overheat and fuel melt are isotopes of the noble gases, iodine, cesium, strontium, barium, and tellurium.

2. The total core source inventories are adjusted for the operating power history to obtain the source inventory which exists at the time of the accident.

3. The measured individual nuclide fission product specific activities (primary coolant or containment samples) are decay corrected to the time of reactor shutdown.

4. The measured decay corrected fission product specific activities are adjusted to account for pressure and temperature differences of the samples relative to the conditions of the primary coolant system or containment.

5. The measured decay and condition corrected fission product specific activities are converted to total fission product releases after accounting for all volumes of water added via the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and other systems.

6. The total fission product release is compared to the total power corrected source inventory of the fission products at reactor shutdown to obtain a total percent of fission product released.

7. The total percent of fission product released is then correlated to the extent of core damage (clad failure, fuel overheat, and fuel melt) from the relationships presented in Reference 1.

Auxiliary indicators are also used to provide verification of the initial estimate of core damage based on the radionuclide analysis. The auxiliary indicators used for WBN are:

1. Core exit thermocouples - The thermocouples are used as an additional indicator of possible core damage by monitoring the fluid temperature at the thermocouple location above the core. Due to the heat transfer mechanisms between the fuel, steam, and thermocouples, the highest clad temperature will be higher than the thermocouple readings. If the thermocouples read greater than 1300°F, clad failure may have occurred.

2. Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) - The RVLIS measures vessel level or relative void content of the circulating primary coolant. This system is used as an additional indicator of possible core damage by determining if the core has been uncovered. If the RVLIS indicates that the collapsed liquid level is less than 3.5 feet in the core, then the core has uncovered and core damage may have occurred depending on the time after trip, length and depth of uncovery.

3. Post accident radiation monitors - An analysis has been made to correlate the post accident monitor readings in R/hr with core damage types. This analysis assumes that the radionuclides released from the fuel are all released to containment.

4. Containment hydrogen concentration - A relationship between hydrogen concentration in containment and percentage of zirconium water reaction has been developed. This relationship, which is an indication of potential clad damage/failure, is then correlated to the severity of core damage present.

References:

1. Letter from J. J. Sheppard to Jan Norris dated March 23, 1984, "Westinghouse Owner's Group NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3 Post Accident Core Damage Assessment Methodology," OG-118

2. Westinghouse Owner's Group Mitigating Core Damage Training Program, Lesson 2 Core Damage Assessment, WOGMCD.3.2, dated 1991

50-390 TVA WATTS BAR 1

NUREG-0737, ITEM II.B.3 POST ACCIDENT CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

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ENCLOSURE 2

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
NUREG-0737, ITEM II.B.3
POST ACCIDENT CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

POST ACCIDENT

CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

PACDAM - WBN - 001

REVISION LOG

Title: **POST ACCIDENT CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY**

Document Number: PACDAM - WBN - 001

REVISION NO.	DESCRIPTION OF REVISION	DATE ISSUED
0	Initial Issue	November 1984
1	Updated to reflect changes in Source Term Calculations	May 1994
2	Added figure 2-17; revised table 4-1 to change Sr-B_e percent to 0.2 -14 % for 0-50% fuel melt and to > 14 for 50-100% fuel melt; corrected minor typographical errors.	June 1994

TABLE OF CONTENTS

5.0 EXAMPLE OF CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY (continued)

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

In March 1982 the NRC issued a "Post Accident Sampling Guide for Preparation of a Procedure to Estimate Core Damage" as a supplement to the post accident sampling criteria of NUREG-0737[1]. The stated purpose of this guide was to aid utilities in preparation of a methodology for relating post accident core damage with measurements of radionuclide concentrations. The primary interest of the NRC was, in the event of an accident, to have some means of realistically differentiating between four major fuel conditions: no damage, cladding failure, fuel overheating, and core melt. The methodology developed is intended to enable qualified personnel to provide an estimate of this damage.

This report is cognizant of NRC's initial intention. Additionally, the report reflects input by NRC and various representatives of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) provided during several meetings held on this subject.

This report has been arranged to present the technical basis for the methodology (Section 1 through 4), and to provide a step-by-step example (Section 5).

1.1 METHODOLOGY

The approach utilized in this methodology of core damage assessment is measurement of fission product concentrations in the primary coolant system, and containment when applicable, obtained with the post accident sampling system. Greater release of fission products into the primary coolant can occur if insufficient cooling is supplied to the fuel elements. Those fission products contained in the fuel pellet - fuel cladding interstices are presumed to be completely released upon failure of cladding. Additional fission products from the fuel pellet are assumed to be released during overtemperature and fuel melt conditions. Measurement of these radionuclides, together with auxiliary readings of core exit thermocouple temperatures, water level within the pressure vessel, containment radiation monitors, and hydrogen production are used to develop an estimate of the kind and extent of fuel damage.

1.2 LIMITATIONS

The emphasis of this methodology is on radiochemical analysis of appropriate liquid and gaseous samples. The assumption has been made that appropriate post-accident systems are in place and functional and that representative samples are obtained.

Having obtained a representative sample, radiochemical analyses via gamma spectrometry are used to calculate the specific activity of various fission products released from the fuel.

Radiochemical analyses of fission products under normal plant operating conditions are accurate to +/-10 percent. Radiochemical analyses of post accident samples which may be much more concentrated, and which must be performed expeditiously may have an error band of 20 to 50 percent.

Having obtained specific activity analysis, the calculation of total release requires knowledge of the total water volume from which the samples were taken. Care must thus be exercised in accounting for volumes of any water added via ECCS and spray systems, accumulators, chemical addition tanks, and melting ice in ice condenser plants. Additionally, estimates of total sump water volumes have to be determined with data from sump level indicators. The Watts Bar Sump level instrumentation is accurate to +/- 20 percent.

The specific activity also requires a correction to adjust for the decay of the nuclide in which the measured specific activity is decay corrected to time of reactor shutdown. For some nuclides, precursor effects must be considered in the decay correction calculations. The precursor effect is limited to parent-daughter relationships for this methodology. A major assumption is made that the release percentages of the parent and daughter are equal. For overtemperature and melt releases, this assumption is consistent with the technical basis presented in Sections 2.5 and 2.6.

The models used for estimation of fission product release from the gap activity are based on the ANS 5.4 standard. Background material for this report indicate the model, though empirical, is believed to have an accuracy of 20-25 percent. In our application of these models to core wide conditions, the core has arbitrarily been divided into three regions of low, intermediate, and high burnup. This representation predicted nominal values of release with minimum and maximum values that approach +/-100 percent of the nominal value. Therefore, these estimates of core damage should only be considered accurate to a factor of 2.

From these considerations, it is clear that the combined uncertainties are such that core damage estimates using this methodology are sufficient only to establish major categories of fuel damage. This categorization, and confirmation of subcategorization will require extensive additional analysis for some several days past the accident date.

2.0 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

2.1 CHARACTERISTIC FISSION PRODUCTS

Depending on the extent of core damage, characteristic fission products are expected to be released from the core. An evaluation was conducted to select the fission product isotopes which characterize a mechanism of release relative to the extent of core damage. Nuclides were selected to be associated with the core damage states of clad damage, fuel overheat, and fuel melt. The selection of nuclides for this methodology was based on half-life, energy, yield, release characteristics, quantity present in the core, and practicality of measurement using standard gamma spectrometry techniques.

The nuclides selected for this methodology have sufficient core inventories and radioactive half-lives to ensure that there will be sufficient activity for detection and analysis of the nuclides for some time following an accident. Most of the nuclides selected have half-lives which enable them to reach equilibrium quickly within the fuel cycle. The list of selected nuclides contains nuclides with half-lives of 1 day or less which are assumed to reach equilibrium in approximately 4 days. These nuclides are used to assess core damage for cores that have been operational in a given cycle for less than a month. For cores that have been operating for more than a month, the list contains nuclides with half-lives greater than 1 day which reach equilibrium at some time during the first month of operation depending on the half life of the nuclide. Both groups of nuclides are used to assess core damage for cores that have been operational in a given cycle for more than a month. Other factors considered during the selection process were the energy and yield of the nuclides along with the practicality of detecting and analyzing the nuclides.

Nuclides were chosen based on their release characteristics to be representative of the specific states of core damage. The Rogovin Report[2] noted that as the core progressed through the damage states certain nuclides associated with each damage state would be released. The volatility of the nuclides is the basis for the relationship between certain nuclides and a particular core damage state.

A list of the selected nuclides for this core damage assessment methodology is shown in Table 2-1.

2.2 CORE INVENTORIES

Implementation of the core damage assessment methodology requires an estimation of the fission product source inventory available for release. The fission product source inventory of the fuel pellet was calculated using the ORIGEN[3] computer code, based on a three-region equilibrium cycle core at end-of-life. The three regions were assumed to have operated for 300, 600, and 900 effective full power days, respectively. For use in this methodology the fission product inventory is assumed to be evenly distributed throughout the core. As such, the fission product inventory can be applicable to other equilibrium cores with different regional characteristics. The fuel pellet inventory of the selected fission products and some additional fission products of interest is shown in Table 2-2.

TABLE 2-1

SELECTED NUCLIDES FOR CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Core Damage State	Nuclide	Half-Life*	Predominant Gammas (KV) Yield (%)*
Clad Failure	Kr-85m**	4.48 h	151(75), 305(14)
	Kr-87	76.3 m	403(50), 845(7), 2555(9), 2558(4)
	Kr-88**	2.84 h	196(26), 835(13), 1530(11), 2196(13) 2392(35)
	Xe-131m	11.84 d	164(2)
	Xe-133	5.25 d	81(37)
	Xe-133m**	2.19 d	233(10)
	Xe-135**	9.11 h	250(90), 608(3)
	I-131	8.05 d	364(81)
	I-132	2.30 h	523(16), 630(14), 668(99), 773(76), 955(18), 1399(7)
	I-133	20.8 h	530(86), 875(4)
	I-135	6.61 h	1132(23), 1260(29), 1457(9), 1678(10), 1791(8)
	Rb-88	17.8 m	898(14), 1836(21)
Fuel Overheat	Cs-134	2.06 yr	569(15), 605(98), 796(85)
	Cs-137	30.17 yr	662(90)
	Te-129	69.6 m	460(7)
	Te-132	78.2 h	228(88)
Fuel Melt	Ba-140	12.8 d	537(25)
	La-140	40.22 h	329(21), 487(46), 816(24), 1596(95)
	La-142	95.4 m	641(53), 1901(9), 2398(16), 2543(11)
	Pr-144	17.28 m	696(1.5)

* Values obtained from Radioactive Decay Data Tables, David C. Kocher, DOE/TIC-11026 (1981)

** These nuclides are marginal with respect to selection criteria for candidate nuclides; they have been included on the possibility that they may be detected and thus utilized in a manner analogous to the candidate nuclides.

TABLE 2-2

FUEL PELLET INVENTORY*

Inventory, Curies

Nuclide	4-Loop (3565 Mwt)[1]
Kr 85m	2.2(7)**
Kr 87	4.0(7)
Kr 88	5.7(7)
Xe 131m	6.3(5)
Xe 133	2.0(8)
Xe 133m	2.8(7)
Xe 135	3.7(7)
I-131	9.8(7)
I-132	1.4(8)
I-133	2.0(8)
I-135	1.8(8)
Rb 88	5.8(7)
Cs 134	2.3(7)
Cs 137	1.1(7)
Te 129	3.3(7)
Te 132	1.4(8)
Ba 140	1.7(8)
La 140	1.8(8)
La 142	1.5(8)
Pr 144	1.2(8)

* Inventory based on ORIGEN run for equilibrium, end-of-life core.

** 2.2(7) = 2.2×10^7

1. Power is consistent with Westinghouse Generic Methodology and is approximately 104% of the nominal design Watts Bar power level.

2.3 POWER CORRECTION FOR CORE INVENTORIES

The source inventory shown in Table 2-2 presents inventories for an equilibrium, end-of-life core that has been operated at 100 percent power. For this methodology a source inventory at the time of an accident that accounts for the power history is needed. For those cases where the core has reached equilibrium, a ratio of the steady state power level to the rated power level is applied. Within the accuracy of this methodology, a period of four half-lives of a nuclide is sufficient to assume equilibrium for that nuclide. For nuclides with half-lives less than one day the power ratio based on the steady-state power level of the prior four days to reactor shutdown can be used to determine the inventory. To use a simple power ratio to determine the inventories of the isotopes with half-lives greater than 1 day, the core should have operated at a constant power for at least 30 days prior to reactor shutdown. The assumption is made that constant power exists when the power level does not vary more than +/-10 percent of the rated power level from the time averaged value. For transient power histories where a steady state power condition has not been obtained, a power correction factor has been developed to calculate the source inventory at the time of the accident.

There are a few selected nuclides with half-lives around one year or longer which in most instances do not reach equilibrium during the life of the core. For these few nuclides and within the accuracy of the methodology, a power correction factor which compares the effective full power days of the core to the total number of calendar days of cycle operation of the core is applied.

Due to the production characteristics of Cesium-134, special consideration must be used to determine the power correction factor for Cs-134. This power correction factor can be obtained from Figure 2-1.

A) Steady state power prior to shutdown.

1) Half-life of nuclide < 1 day

$$\text{Power Correction Factor} = \frac{\text{Average Power Level (Mwt) for prior 4 days}}{\text{Rated Power Level (Mwt)}}$$

2) Half-life of nuclide > 1 day

$$\text{Power Correction Factor} = \frac{\text{Average Power Level (Mwt) for prior 30 days}}{\text{Rated Power Level (Mwt)}}$$

3) Half life of nuclide = 1 year

$$\text{Power Correction Factor} \quad \frac{\text{Average Power Level (Mwt) for prior 1 year}}{\text{Rated Power Level (Mwt)}}$$

Steady state power condition is assumed where the power does not vary by more than +/-10 percent of rated power level from time averaged value.

B) Transient power history in which the power has not remained constant prior to reactor shutdown.

For the majority of the selected nuclides, the 30-day power history prior to shutdown is sufficient to calculate a power correction factor.

$$\text{Power Correction Factor}_i = \frac{\sum_j P_j (1-e^{-\lambda_i t_j})\, e^{-\lambda_i t^\circ_j}}{RP(1-e^{\lambda_i \sum t_j})}$$

where:

P_j = average power level (Mwt) during operating period t_j

RP = rated power level of the core (Mwt)

t_j = operating period in days at power P_j where power does not vary more than +/-10 percent power of rated power level from time averaged value (P_j)

λ_i = decay constant of nuclide i in inverse days.

t°_j = time between end of period j and time of reactor shutdown in days.

If the total period of operation is greater than four half-lives of the nuclide being considered, the power correction is as follows: This is within the accuracy of this methodology.

$$\sum_j T_j \geq 4 \times \frac{0.693}{\lambda_i}$$

$$\text{Power Correction Factor}_i = \frac{\sum_j P_j (1-e^{-\lambda_i t_j})\, e^{-\lambda_i t^\circ_j}}{RP}$$

For the few nuclides with half-lives around one year or longer, a power correction factor which ratios effective full power days to total calendar days of cycle operation is applied.

$$\text{Power Correction Factor} = \frac{\text{EFPD}}{\text{total calendar days of cycle operation}}$$

C) For Cs-134 Figure 2-1 is used to determine the power correction factor. To use Figure 2-1, the average power during the entire operating period is required.

POWER CORRECTION FACTOR
Cesium 134



Figure 2-1
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

2.4 ADJUSTMENTS TO DETERMINE ACTIVITY RELEASED

When analyzing a sample for the presence of nuclides, the isotopic concentration of the sample medium is expressed as the specific activity of the sample in either Curies per gram of liquid or Curies per cubic centimeter of atmosphere. The specific activity of the sample should then be adjusted to determine the total activity of that medium. The measured activity of the sample needs to be adjusted to account for the decay from the time the sample was analyzed to the time of reactor shutdown and adjusted to account for pressure and temperature difference of the sample relative to temperature and pressure conditions of the medium. Also, the mass (liquid) or volume (gas) of the sample medium is required to calculate the isotopic activity of that medium. The following sections discuss the required adjustments.

2.4.1 *DILUTION OF SAMPLE MEDIUM*

The distribution of the total water inventory should be known to determine the water amount that is associated with each sample medium. If a sample is taken from the primary system, an approximation of the amount of water in the primary system is needed and a similar approximation is required for a sump sample. For the purposes of this methodology the water is assumed to be distributed within the primary system and the sump. However, consideration should be taken if a significant primary system to secondary system leak rate is noted as in the case of a steam generator tube rupture. The amount of water that is available for distribution is the initial amount of primary system water and the amount of water that has been discharged from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). Also, an adjustment must be made for water added via the containment spray systems, accumulators, chemical addition tanks, and ice condensers. To approximate the distribution of water, the monitoring systems of the reactor vessel, pressurizer, sump, and RWST can be employed. If not all of the monitoring systems are available, the monitoring systems which are working can be used by assuming that the total water inventory is distributed in the sump and the primary system with consideration given if a significant primary system to secondary system leak rate is noted. The approximate total activity of the liquid samples can then be calculated.

RCS activity (Curies) = Specific Activity (Ci/cc or Ci/gm) x RCS water volume or mass (cc or gm).

Sump activity (Curies)= Specific Activity (Ci/cc or Ci/gm) x Sump water volume or mass (cc or gm).

Total water activity = RCS activity + Sump activity + Activity leaked to Secondary System + Activities from other sources (accumulators, ice condensers, spray additive tanks, RHR Line Volume, etc.).

Note: The specific activities should be decay corrected to reactor shutdown, and the RCS amount should be corrected to account for temperature and pressure differences between sample and RCS.

The containment atmosphere activity can then be added to approximate the total activity released at time of accident.

Total Activity Released = Total Water Activity + Containment Atmosphere Activity

2.4.2 PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE ADJUSTMENT

The measurements for the containment atmosphere samples need to be adjusted if the pressure and temperature of the samples at the time of analysis are different than the conditions of containment atmosphere. The adjustments to the specific activity and the containment volume are as follows.

$$\text{Specific Activity (Atmosphere)} = \text{Specific Activity (Sample)} \times \frac{P_2}{P_1} \times \frac{T_1 + 460}{(T_2 + 460)}$$

where:

T, P = measured sample temperature (°F) and pressure (psia)
T, P = standard temperature (32°F) and pressure (14.4 psia).

The total activity released to the containment atmosphere is

Total Containment Activity = Specific Activity (Atmosphere) x Corrected Containment Volume

where the specific activity (atmosphere) has been decay corrected to time of reactor shutdown.

The specific activity of the liquid samples requires no adjustment if the specific activity is reported on a per-gram basis (μCi/gm). If the specific activity is reported on a per-volume basis (μCi/cc), an adjustment is performed to convert the per-volume specific activity to a per-gram specific activity. The conversion is performed for consistency with later calculations. If the temperature of the sample is above 200°F, an adjustment is required to the conversion. In most cases the sample temperature will be below 200°F and no adjustment is necessary. Figure 2-2 shows a relation of water density at various temperatures relative to the water density at standard temperature and pressure.

The mass of the liquid medium (RCS or sump) can be calculated from the volume of the medium. If the medium (RCS or sump) temperature at time of sample is above 200°F, an adjustment is required to the conversion.

A. RCS or sump temperature > 200°F
RCS or sump mass (gm) = RCS or Sump Volume (ft^3)

$$\times \frac{\rho}{\rho_{STP}} \times \rho_{STP} \times \frac{28.3 \times 10^3 \text{ cc}}{ft^3}$$

where:

$\frac{\rho}{\rho_{STP}}$ = water density ratio at medium (RCS or sump) temperature, Figure 2-2

ρ_{STP} = water density at STP = 1.00 gm/cc.

B. RCS or sump temperature < 200°F
RCS or Sump Mass (gm) = RCS of Sump Volume (ft^3) x ρ_{STP} x $\frac{28.3 \times 10^3 \text{ cc}}{ft^3}$

WATER DENSITY RATIO



Figure 2-2
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

where:

ρ_{STP} = water density at STP = 1.00 gm/cc.

The total activity of the RCS or sump is as follows:

RCS or Sump Activity = RCS or Sump Specific Activity (μCi/gm) x RCS or Sump Mass (gm)

where the specific activity has been decay corrected to time of shutdown.

2.4.3 DECAY CORRECTION

At Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, the specific activities of the samples are automatically decay adjusted to time of reactor shutdown. The following isotopes of interest include an adjustment made to take into account the parent daughter relationships which exist: Rb-88, Te-129, I-132, Xe-131m, Xe-133m, Xe-133, Xe-135, La-140, La-142, and Pr-144. This corrects for decay of both parent and daughter.

For the above isotopes, the specific activity is further adjusted using the following equation.

Specific activity at shutdown = Specific activity (measured) ÷ decay correction factor where the decay correction factor can be obtained from Figures 2-3 through 2-12.

2.5 RELATIONSHIP OF CLAD DAMAGE WITH ACTIVITY

2.5.1 GAP INVENTORY

During operation, volatile fission products collect in the gap. These fission products are isotopes of the noble gases, iodine, and cesium.

To determine the fission product inventory of the gap, the ANS 5.4[4] Standard formulae were used with the average temperature and burnup of the fuel rod. The average gap inventory for the entire core for this methodology was estimated by assuming the core is divided into three regions - a low burnup region, a middle burnup region, and a high burnup region. Using the ANS 5.4 Standard, the gap fraction and subsequent gap inventory were calculated for each region. Each region is assumed to represent one-third of the core. The total gap inventory was then calculated by summing the gap inventory of each region. For the purposes of this core damage assessment methodology, this gap inventory is assumed to be evenly distributed throughout the core. Table 2-3 shows the calculated gap inventories of the noble gases and iodines. Table 2-3-1 shows the minimum and maximum gap inventories. The minimum and maximum gap inventory were determined by assuming the entire core was operating at the low burnup condition and the high burnup conditions, respectively.

Decay Correction Factor

Rubidium 88

Liquid Sample



Figure 2-3
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

Decay Correction Factor

Tellurium 129



Figure 2-4
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

Decay Correction Factor

Iodine 132

Liquid Sample



Figure 2-5
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

Decay Correction Factor

Xenon 131m



Figure 2-6
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

Decay Correction Factor

Xenon 133m



Figure 2-7
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

Decay Correction Factor

Xenon 133



Figure 2-8
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

Decay Correction Factor

Xenon 135



Figure 2-9
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

Decay Correction Factor

Lanthanum 140



Figure 2-10
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

Decay Correction Factor

Lanthanum 142



Figure 2-11
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

Decay Correction Factor

Praseodymium 144

(Applies Only When Ce-144 Present in Sample)



Figure 2-12
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

TABLE 2-3

GAP INVENTORY

Gap Inventory, Curies

Nuclide	4-Loop (3565 Mwt)
Kr 85m**	3.78(3)
Kr 87	3.61(3)
Kr 88**	7.98(3)
Xe 131m	8.85(2)
Xe 133	1.76(5)
Xe 133m**	1.68(4)
Xe 135**	8.98(3)
I-131	2.84(5)
I-132	4.56(4)
I-133	1.92(5)
I-135	9.80(4)

* Total core inventory based on 3 region equilibrium core at end-of-life. Gap inventory based on ANS 5.4 Standard.

** Additional nuclides; no graphs provided.

TABLE 2-3-1

GAP INVENTORY MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM

Gap Inventory, Curies
(Minimum - Maximum)**

Nuclide	4-Loop (3565 Mwt)
Kr 85m*	6.90(2)-9.57(3)
Kr 87	6.81(2)-9.22(3)
Kr 88*	1.42(3)-1.99(4)
Xe 131m	1.58(2)-2.21(3)
Xe 133	3.33(4)-4.51(5)
Xe 133m*	1.28(3)-1.77(4)
Xe 135*	4.11(3)-5.61(4)
I-131	5.39(4)-7.35(5)
I-132	8.55(3)-1.17(5)
I-133	3.53(4)-4.90(5)
I-135	1.78(4)-2.49(5)

* Additional nuclides; no graphs provided.

** Minimum values are based on the low burnup region (5,000 MWD/MTU). Maximum values are based on the high burnup region (25,000 MWD/MTU).

2.5.2 SPIKING PHENOMENA

Reactor coolant system pressure, temperature, and power transients may result in iodine spiking. (Cesium spiking may also occur but is not considered in this methodology). Spiking is noted by an increase in reactor coolant iodine concentrations during some time period after the transient. In most cases, the iodine concentration would return to normal operating activity at a rate based on the system purification half-life. Spiking is a characteristic of the condition where an increase in the normal primary coolant activity is noted but no damage to the cladding has occurred.

For this methodology, consideration of the spiking phenomena into the radionuclide analysis is limited to the I-131 information found in WCAP-9964[5]. WCAP-9964 presents releases in Curies of I-131 due to a transient which results in spiking based on the normal primary coolant activity of the nuclides. The WCAP gives an average release and 90 percent confidence level. These values are presented in Table 2-4. The use of this data is demonstrated in Section 2.5.3.2.

2.5.3 ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH CLAD DAMAGE

Clad damage is characterized by the release of the fission products which have accumulated in the gap during the operation of the plant. The cladding may rupture during an accident when heat transfer from the cladding to the primary coolant has been hindered and the cladding temperature increases. Cladding failure is anticipated in the temperature range of 1300 to 2000°F depending upon the conditions of the fission product gas and the primary system pressure. Clad damage can begin to occur in regions of high fuel rod peak clad temperature based on the radial and axial power distribution. As the accident progresses and is not mitigated, other regions of the core are expected to experience high temperatures and possibly clad failure. When the cladding ruptures, it is assumed that the fission product gap inventory of the damaged fuel rods is instantaneously released to the primary system. For this methodology it is assumed that the noble gases will escape through the break of the primary system boundary to the containment atmosphere and the iodines will stay in solution and travel with the primary system water during the accident.

To determine an approximation of the extent of clad damage, the total activity of a fission product released is compared to the total source inventory of the fission product at reactor shutdown. Included in the measured quantity of the total activity released is a contribution from the normal operating activity of the nuclide. An adjustment should be made to the measured quantity of release to account for the normal operating activity. Direct correlations can then be developed which describe the relationships between the percentage of total source inventory released and the extent of clad damage for each nuclide. Figures 2-13 through 2-20 present the direct correlations for each nuclide in graphical form. The contribution of the normal operating activity has been factored into the correlations shown in Figures 2-13 through 2-20. Examples of how to construct the correlations shown in Figures 2-13 through 2-15 are presented in the next two sections. Figures 2-16 through 2-20 were determined in the same fashion as described in the examples. It should be noted that not all of the fission products listed in Table 2-3 need to be analyzed but as many as possible should be analyzed to determine a reasonable approximation of clad damage.

TABLE 2-4

EXPECTED IODINE SPIKE

Average, μCi/gm	I-131 Total Release, Curies
0.5 < SA* <1.0	3400
0.1 < SA < 0.5	380
0.05 < SA < 0.1	200
0.01 < SA < 0.05	200
0.005 < SA < 0.01	100
0.001 < SA < 0.005	100
XA < 0.001	2

90/90 Upper Confidence Level, μCi/gm	
0.5 < SA < 1.0	6500
0.1 < SA < 0.5	950
0.05 < SA < 0.1	650
0.01 < SA < 0.5	650
0.005 < SA < 0.001	300
0.001 < SA < 0.005	300
SA < 0.001	10

* SA is the normal operating I-131 specific activity (μCi/gm) in the primary coolant.



Figure 2-13
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure



Figure 2-14
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure



Figure 2-15
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure



Figure 2-16
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure



Figure 2-17
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure



Figure 2-18
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure



Figure 2-19
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure



Figure 2-20
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

2.5.3.1 Xe-133

A graphical representation can be developed which describes the linear relationship of the measured release percentage of Xe-133 to the extent of clad damage. The total source inventory of Xe-133 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is 2.0×10^8 Curies (Table 2-2). For 100 percent clad damage, all of the gap inventory, which corresponds to 1.76×10^5 Curies (Table 2-3) would be released. For 0.1 percent clad damage, 1.76×10^2 Curies would be released. These two values can be used to represent two points of the linear relationship between percentage of total inventory released and the extent of clad damage. However, the normal operating activity needs to be factored into the relation. From Table 2-5 the normal operating activity of Xe-133 is 2.53 μCi/gm[6]. The average primary coolant mass is 2.45×10^8 grams. The total normal operating contribution to the total release of Xe-133 is 620 Curies. Thus, the adjusted releases are 796 Curies and 1.77×10^5 Curies for 0.1 percent clad damage and 100 percent clad damage, respectively. This corresponds to 4.0×10^{-4} percent for 0.1 percent clad damage and 8.8×10^{-2} percent for 100 percent clad damage. This relation is shown in Figure 2-13.

Figure 2-13 also shows a minimum and a maximum relation which bound the best estimate line. The minimum and maximum lines were determined by bounding the fission product gap inventory. The minimum gap inventory was determined by assuming the entire core was operating at the low burnup condition used to calculate the average gap inventory as described in Section 2.5.1. The maximum gap inventory was determined by assuming the entire core was operating at the high burnup condition of Section 2.5.1. Table 2-3-1 shows the minimum and maximum values for the gap inventories. The points of the minimum and maximum linear relations are calculated in the same manner as discussed above.

TABLE 2-5

NORMAL OPERATING ACTIVITY*

Nuclide	Specific Activity in Reactor Coolant (μCi/gm)
Kr-85m	1.71.E-01
Kr-85m	2.66E-01
Kr-87	1.61E-01
Kr-88	3.00E-01
Xe-131m	6.54E-01
Xe-133m	7.17E-02
Xe-133	2.53E+00
Xe-135m	1.39E-01
Xe-135	9.04E-01
Xe-137	3.65E-02
Xe-138	1.29E-01
I-131	4.77E-02
I-132	2.25E-01
I-133	1.49E-01
I-134	3.64E-01
I-135	2.78E-01

* Values obtained using ANS 18.1, 1984

2.5.3.2 I-131

The gap inventory for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant from Table 2-3 for I-131 is 2.84 x 10^5 Curies. The minimum and maximum gap inventory for I-131 is 5.39 x 10^4 Ci and 7.35 x 10^5 Ci, respectively. The source inventory of I-131 is 9.8 x 10^7 Curies (Table 2-2). The normal operating specific activity for I-131 from Table 2-5 is 0.0477 μCi/gm. With a primary coolant mass of 2.45 x 10^8 gm, the normal operating activity of I-131 is 12 Curies. The points of the average, minimum, and maximum relations are calculated in the same manner as described in Section 2.5.3.1. Figure 2-14 shows the percentage of I-131 activity as a function of clad damage. The percentage release of I-131 calculated from the radionuclide analysis would be compared to Figure 2-14 to estimate the extent of clad damage.

For I-131, the possibility of iodine spiking should be considered when distinguishing between no clad damage and minor clad damage. The contribution of iodine spiking is discussed in Section 2.5.2 and is estimated to be as much as 650 Curies of I-131 released to primary system with an average release of 200 Curies based on a normal operating I-131 activity of 0.0477 μCi per gram[6]. The linear relationships of Figure 2-14 are adjusted to account for the release due to iodine spiking by adding 650 Curies of I-131 to the maximum release and by adding 200 Curies of I-131 to the minimum and average release. Figure 2-15 shows the percentage of I-131 released with iodine spiking versus clad damage. Iodine spiking was not considered during the calculations of the correlations for the remaining iodines, I-132, I-133, and I-135, Figure 2-18 through 2-20, respectively.

2.5.4 GAP ACTIVITY RATIOS

Once equilibrium conditions are reached for the nuclides during operation, a fixed inventory of the nuclides exists within the fuel rod. For these nuclides which reach equilibrium, their relative ratios within the fuel pellet can be considered a constant.

Equilibrium conditions can also be considered to exist in the fuel rod gap. Under this condition the gap inventory of the nuclides is fixed. The distribution of the nuclides in the gap are not in the same proportion as the fuel pellet inventory since the migration of each nuclide into the gap is dependent on its particular diffusion rate. Since the relative diffusion rates of these nuclides under various operating conditions are approximately constant, the relative ratios of the nuclides in the gap are known.

In the presence of other indicators of a major release, the relative ratios of the nuclides can be compared with the relative ratios of the nuclides analyzed (corrected to shutdown) during an accident to determine the source of the fission product release. Table 2-6 presents the relative activity ratios for both the fuel pellet and the gap. The relative ratios for gap activities are significantly lower than the fuel pellet activity ratios. Measured relative ratios greater than gap activity ratios are indicative of more severe failures, e.g., fuel overheat.

2.6 RELATIONSHIP OF FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE WITH OVERTEMPERATURE CONDITIONS

The current concept of the mechanisms for fission product release from UO_2 fuel under accident conditions has been summarized in 2 documents, NUREG-0956[7] and IDCOR Task 11.1[8]. These documents describe five principal release mechanisms; burst release, diffusional release of the pellet-to-cladding gap inventory, grain boundary release, diffusion from the UO_2 grains, and release from molten material. The release which occurs when the cladding fails, i.e., gap release, is utilized to quantify the extent of clad failure as discussed in Section 2.5. Table 2-7 presents the expected fuel damage state associated with fuel rod temperatures.

Fission product release associated with overtemperature fuel conditions arises initially from that portion of the noble gas, cesium, and iodine inventories that was previously accumulated in grain boundaries. For high burnup rods, it is estimated that approximately 20 percent of the initial fuel rod inventory of noble gases, cesium, and halogens would be released. Release from lower burnup fuel would no doubt be less. Following the grain boundary release, additional diffusional release from UO_2 grains occurs. Estimates of the total release, including UO_2 diffusional release, vary from 20 to 40 percent of the noble gas, iodine, and cesium inventories.

Additional information on the release of fission products during overtemperature conditions was obtained from the TMI accident.[9] In this instance, opinion was that although the core had been overheated, fuel melt had not occurred. Values of core inventory fraction of various fission products released during the accident are given in Table 2-8. These values, derived from radiochemical analysis of primary coolant, sump, and containment gas samples, provide much greater releases of the noble gases, halides, and cesiums than is expected to be released solely from cladding failures. In addition, small amounts of the more refractory elements, barium-lanthanum, and strontium were released. In the particular case of TMI, the release mechanism, in addition to diffusional release from grain boundaries and UO_2 grains, is believed to arise from UO_2 grain growth in steam.

The relationship between extent of fuel damage and fission product release for several radioisotopes during overtemperature condition is depicted graphically in Figures 2-21 and 2-22. To construct the figures, the extent of fuel damage, expressed as a percentage of the core, is plotted as a function of the percentage of the source inventory released for various nuclides. The values used in constructing the graphs were obtained from Table 2-8. For example, if 100 percent of the core experienced overtemperatures, 52 percent of Xe-133 core inventory would be released. If 1-percent of the core experienced overtemperature, 0.52 percent of Xe-133 core inventory would be released. The assumption is also made that nuclides of any element, e.g., I-131 and I-133, have the same magnitude of release. In order to apply these figures to a particular plant, power, decay, and dilution corrections described earlier in this report must be applied to the concentrations of nuclides determined from analysis of radionuclide samples. The maximum and minimum estimates of release percentages are those given in Table 2-8 as the range of values: nominal values of release are simple averages of the minimum and maximum values.

TABLE 2-6

ISOTOPIC ACTIVITY RATIOS OF FUEL PELLET AND GAP

Nuclide	Fuel Pellet Activity Ratio	Gap Activity Ratio
Kr-85m	0.11	0.022
Kr-87	0.22	0.022
Kr-88	0.29	0.045
Xe-131m	0.004	0.004
Xe-133	1.0	1.0
Xe-133m	0.14	0.096
Xe-135	0.19	0.051
I-131	1.0	1.0
I-132	1.5	0.17
I-133	2.1	0.71
I-135	1.9	0.39

$$\text{Noble Gas Ratio} = \frac{\text{Noble Gas Isotope Inventory}}{\text{Xe-133 Inventory}}$$

$$\text{Iodine Ratio} = \frac{\text{Iodine Isotope Inventory}}{\text{I-131 Inventory}}$$

The measured ratios of various nuclides found in reactor coolant during normal operation are a function of the amount of "tramp" uranium on fuel rod cladding, the number and size of "defects" (i.e. "pin holes"), and the location of the fuel rods containing the defects in the core. The ratios derived in this report are based on calculated values of relative concentrations in the fuel or in the gap. The use of these present ratios for post accident damage assessment is restricted to an attempt to differentiate between fuel overtemperature conditions and fuel cladding failure conditions. Thus, the ratios derived here are not related to fuel defect levels incurred during normal operation.

TABLE 2-7

EXPECTED FUEL DAMAGE CORRELATIONS WITH FUEL ROD TEMPERATURE

Fuel Damage	Temperature -F*
No Damage	< 1300
Clad Damage	1300 - 2000
Ballooning of zircaloy cladding	> 1300
Burst of zircaloy cladding	1300 - 2000
Oxidation of cladding and hydrogen generation	> 1600
Fuel Overtemperature	2000 - 3450
Fission product fuel lattice mobility	2000 - 2550
Grain boundary diffusion release of fission products	2450 - 3450
Fuel Melt	> 3450
Dissolution and liquefaction of UO_2 in the Zircaloy - ZrO_2 eutectic	> 3450
Melting of remaining UO_2	5100

* These temperature are material property characteristics and are nonspecific with respect to locations within the fuel and/or fuel cladding.

TABLE 2-8

PERCENT ACTIVITY RELEASE FOR 100 PERCENT OVERTEMPERATURE CONDITIONS

Nuclide	Min *	Max.*	Nominal**	Min.***	Max.***
Kr-85	40	70			
Xe-133	42	66	52	40	70
I-131	41	55			
Cs-137	45	60			
Sr-90	*0.08****				
Ba-140	0.1	0.2	0.15	0.08	0.2

* Release values based on TMI-2 measurements.

** Nominal value is simple average of all Kr, Xe, I, and Cs measurements.

*** Minimum and maximum values of all Kr, Xe, I and Cs measurements.

**** Only value available.

2.7 RELATIONSHIP OF NUCLIDE RELEASE WITH CORE MELT CONDITIONS

Fuel pellet melting leads to rapid release of many noble gases, halides, and cesiums remaining in the fuel after overheat conditions. Significant release of the strontium, barium-lanthanum chemical groups is perhaps the most distinguishing feature of melt release conditions.

Values of the release of fission products during fuel melt conditions are derived from ex-pile experiments performed by various investigators.

These release measurements have been expressed as release rate coefficients for various temperature regimes. These release rate coefficients have been represented by a simple exponential equation in NUREG-0956. This equation has the form:

$$K(T) = Ae^{BT}$$

where

K(T)	=	release rate coefficient
A & B	=	constants
T	=	temperature

These release rate coefficients were utilized with core temperature profiles to develop fission product release estimates for various accident sequences for which core melt is postulated in draft NUREG-0956.

Fission product release percentages for three accident sequences which lead to 100 percent core melt are given in Table 2-9. The xenon, krypton, cesium, iodine, and tellurium elements have been arranged into a single group because of similarity in the expected magnitude of overtemperature release. The assumption is also made that nuclides of any element e.g., Iodine 131 and Iodine 133, have the same magnitude of release. The differences in the calculated releases of the various elements for the different accident sequences were used to determine minimum and maximum values of expected release; nominal values of release are simple averages of all release values within a group.

The percentage release of various nuclides has been correlated to percentage of core melt with the extrapolations shown in Figures 2-23 and 2-25.

2.8 SAMPLING LOCATIONS

A survey of a number of Westinghouse plants has indicated that the post accident sampling system locations for liquid and gaseous samples varies for each plant. To obtain the most accurate assessment of core damage, it is recommended to sample and analyze radionuclides from the reactor coolant system, the containment atmosphere, and the containment sump. These samples are available to be taken at WBN. Other samples can be taken dependent on the plant's capabilities. The specific sample locations to be used during the initial phases of an accident should be selected based on the type of accident in progress. If the type of accident scenario is unknown, known plant parameters (pressure, temperature, level indications, etc.) can be used as a basis to determine the prime sample locations. Consideration should be given to sampling the secondary system if a significant leak from the primary system to secondary system is noted. Table 2-10 presents a list of the suggested sample locations for different accident scenarios based on the usefulness of the information derivable from the sample.

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FUEL OVERTEMPERATURE vs. CORE INVENTORY RELEAS
Xenon/Krypton/Iodine/Cesium



FUEL OVERTEMPERATURE vs. CORE INVENTORY RELEASE
Barium/Strontium



FUEL MELT vs. CORE INVENTORY RELEASE
Xenon/Krypton/Iodine/Cesium/Tellurium



FUEL MELT vs. CORE INVENTORY RELEASE
Barium/Strontium



FUEL MELT vs. CORE INVENTORY RELEASE
Praseodymium



TABLE 2-9

PERCENT ACTIVITY RELEASE FOR 100 PERCENT CORE MELT CONDITIONS

Species	Large* LOCA	Transient*	Small* LOCA	Nominal*** Release	Min.*** Release	Max.*** Release
Xe	88.35	99.45	78.38			
Kr	88.35	99.45	78.38			
				87	70	99
I	88.23	99.44	78.09			
Cs	88.55	99.46	78.84			
Te	78.52	94.88	71.04			
Sr	10.44	28.17	14.80	24	10	44
Ba	19.66	43.87	24.08			
Pr	0.82	2.36	1.02	1.4	0.8	2.4

* Calculated releases for severe accident scenarios without emergency safeguard features, taken from draft NUREG-0956.

** Nominal release are averages of Xe, Kr, I, Cs, and Te groups, or Sr and Ba groups.

*** Minimum and maximum releases represent extremes of the groups.

TABLE 2-10

Suggested Sampling Locations

Scenario	Principal Sampling Locations	Other Sampling Locations
Small Break LOCA Reactor Power > 1%*	RCS Hot Leg, Containment Atmosphere	RCS Pressurizer
Reactor Power < 1%*	RCS Hot Leg**	RCS Pressurizer
Large Break LOCA Reactor Power > 1%*	Containment Sump, Containment Atmosphere, RCS Hot Leg	
Reactor Power <1%*	Containment Sump, Containment Atmosphere	
Steam Line Break	RCS Hot Leg,	RCS Pressurizer Containment Atmosphere
Steam Generator Tube Rupture	RCS Hot Leg, Secondary System	Containment Atmosphere
Indication of Significant Containment Sump Inventory	Containment Sump, Containment Atmosphere	
Containment Building Radiation Monitor Alarm	Containment Atmosphere, Containment Sump	
Safety Injection Actuated	RCS Hot Leg	RCS Pressurizer
Indication of High Radiation Level in RCS	RCS Hot Leg	RCS Pressurizer

* Assume operating at that level for some appreciable time.

** If a RCS hot leg sample is unavailable and a RCS cold leg sample is available, obtain a RCS cold leg sample. However, for a cold leg sample to be a good representation of the RCS, the primary water should be circulating through the system.

3. 0 AUXILIARY INDICATORS

There are plant indicators monitored during an accident which by themselves cannot provide a useful estimate but can provide verification of the initial estimate of core damage based on the radionuclide analysis. These plant indicators include containment hydrogen concentration, core exit thermocouple temperatures, reactor vessel water level, and containment radiation level. When providing an estimate for core damage, these plant indicators, if available, should confirm the results of the radionuclide analysis. For example, if the core exit thermocouple readings and reactor vessel water level indicate a possibility of clad damage and the radionuclide concentrations indicate no clad damage, then a recheck of both indications may be performed or certain indications may be discounted based on engineering judgment.

3.1 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION

An accident, in which the core is uncovered and the fuel rods are exposed to steam, may result in the reaction of the zirconium of the cladding with the steam which produces hydrogen. The hydrogen production characteristic of the zirconium water reaction is that for every mole of zirconium that reacts with water, two moles of hydrogen are produced. For this methodology, it is assumed that all of the hydrogen that is produced is released to the containment atmosphere. The hydrogen dissolved in the primary system during normal operation is considered to contribute an insignificant amount of the total hydrogen released to the containment. In the absence of hydrogen control measures, monitoring this containment hydrogen concentration during the accident can provide an indication of the extent of zirconium water reaction. The percentage of zirconium water reaction does not equal the percentage of clad damaged but it does provide a qualitative verification of the extent of clad damage estimated from the radionuclide analysis.

Figure 3-1 shows the relationship between the hydrogen concentration and the percentage of zirconium water reaction. The relationship shown in Figure 3-1 does not account for any hydrogen depletion due to hydrogen recombiners and hydrogen ignitions. The installed hydrogen recombiners are capable of dealing effectively with the relatively small amounts of hydrogen that result from radiolysis and corrosion following a design basis LOCA in addition to limited cladding oxidation.. However, they are incapable of handling the hydrogen produced in an extensive zirconium-steam reaction such as would result from severe core degradation. Current recombiners can process gas that is approximately 4 to 5 percent hydrogen or less.[10] Each WBN recombiner unit can process an input flow in the range of 100 SCFM. Within the accuracy of this methodology, it is assumed that recombiners will have an insignificant effect on the hydrogen concentration when it is indicated that extensive zirconium-steam reaction could have occurred. Uncontrolled ignition of hydrogen and deliberate ignition will hinder any quantitative use of hydrogen concentration as an auxiliary indicator. However, the oxygen amount depleted during the burn, if known, can be used to estimate the amount of hydrogen burned. If the oxygen amount depleted is not known, it can be assumed that for ignition of hydrogen to occur a minimal concentration of 4 percent hydrogen is needed. This assumption can be used qualitatively to indicate that some percentage of zirconium has reacted, but it is difficult to determine the extent of the reaction.

TABLE 4-1

CHARACTERISTICS OF CATEGORIES OF FUEL DAMAGE*

Core Damage Indicator Core Damage Category	Percent and Type of Fission Products Released	Fission Product Ratio***	Core Exit Thermocouples Readings (Deg F)	Core Uncovery Indication	Hydrogen Monitor (Vol $\%H_2$)** & Plant-Type
No clad damage	Kr-87 < $1X10^{-3}$ Xe-133 < $1x10^{-3}$ I-131 < $1X10^{-3}$ I-133 < $1x10^{-3}$	Not Applicable	< 750	No uncovery	Negligible
0-50% clad damage	Kr-87 10^{-3} - 0.01 Xe-133 10^{-3} - 0.1 1-131 10^{-3} - 0.3 1-133 10^{-3} - 0.1	Kr-87 = 0.022 I-133 = 0.71	750 - 1300	Core uncovery	2 Loop 0 - 6 3 Loop 0 - 7 4 Loop 0 - 6 Ice 0 - 13
50-100% clad damage	Kr-87 0.01 - 0.02 Xe-133 0.1 - 0.2 I-131 0.3 - 0.5 I-133 0.1 - 0.2	Kr-87 = 0.022 I-133 = 0.71	1300 - 1650	Core uncovery	2 Loop 6 - 13 3 Loop 7 - 14 4 Loop 6 - 11 ice 13 - 24
0-50% fuel pellet overtemperature	Xe-Kr,Cs,I I - 20 Sr-Ba 0 - 0.1	Kr-87 = 0.22 I-133 = 2.1	> 1650	Core uncovery	2 Loop 6 - 13 3 Loop 7 - 14 4 Loop 6 - 11 ice 13 - 24
50-100% fuel pellet over-temperature	Xe-Kr,Cs,I 20 - 40 Sr-Ba 0.1 - 0.2	Kr-87 = 0.22 I-133 = 2.1	> 1650	Core uncovery	2 Loop 6 - 13 3 Loop 7 - 14 4 Loop 6 - 11 ice 13 - 24
0-50% fuel melt	Xe,Kr.Cs,I 40 - 70 Sr-Ba 0.2 -14 Pr 0.1 - 0.8	Kr-87 = 0.22 I-133 = 2.1	> 1650	Core uncovery	2 Loop 6 - 13 3 Loop 7 - 14 4 Loop 6 - 11 ice 13 - 24
50-100% fuel melt	Xe,Kr,Cs,I,Te > 70 Sr,Ba > 14 Pr > 0.8	Kr-87 = 0.22 I-133 = 2.1	> 1650	Core uncovery	2 Loop 6 - 13 3 Loop 7 - 14 4 Loop 6 - 11 ice 13 - 24

* This table in intended to supplement the methodology outlined in this report and should not be used without referring to this report and without considerable engineering judgment.

** Ignitors may obviate these values.

*** $\frac{\text{Kr-87}}{\text{Xe-133}}$, $\frac{\text{I-133}}{\text{I-131}}$

CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION



Containment hydrogen concentrations can be obtained from the Post Accident Sampling System or the containment gas analyzers. Figure 3-1 shows the relationship between the hydrogen concentration (percent volume) and the percentage of zirconium water reaction. The hydrogen concentration shown is the result of the analysis of a dry containment sample. The curve was based on average containment volume (1.2×10^6 SCF) and the average initial zirconium mass (47,300 lbm) of the fuel rods.

Relationship between hydrogen concentration of a dry sample and fraction of zirconium water reaction is based on the following formula.

$$\% H_2 = \frac{(FZWR)(ZM)(H)}{(FZWR)(ZM)(H) + V} \times 100$$

where: FZWR= fraction of zirconium water reaction

ZM= total zirconium mass, lbm

H= conversion factor, 7.92 SCF of H_2 per pound of zirconium reacted

V= containment volume, SCF

To use the auxiliary indicator of hydrogen concentration, the assumptions were that all hydrogen from zirconium water reaction is released to containment, a well-mixed atmosphere, and ideal gas behavior in containment.

3.2 CORE EXIT TEMPERATURES AND REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVELS

Core exit thermocouples (CETC) measure the temperature of the fluid at the core exit at various radial core locations (Figure 3-2). The WBN thermocouple system is qualified to read temperatures as high as 2300°F. This is the ability of the system to measure the fluid temperatures at the incore thermocouples locations and not core temperatures.

The WBN reactor vessel level indication systems (RVLIS) use differential pressure (d/p) measuring devices to measure vessel level or relative void content of the circulating primary coolant system fluid. The system is redundant and includes automatic compensation for potential temperature variations of the impulse lines. Essential information is displayed in the main control room in a form directly usable by the operator.

RVLIS and CETC readings can be used for verification of core damage estimates in the following ways.[11]

- Due to the heat transfer mechanisms between the fuel rods, steam, and thermocouples, the highest clad temperature will be higher than the CETC readings. Therefore, if thermocouples read greater than 1300°F, clad failure may have occurred. 1300°F is the lower limit for cladding failures.

- If any RCPs are running, the CETCs will be good indicators of clad temperatures and no core damage should occur since the forced flow of the steam-water mixture will adequately cool the core.

- If RCPs are not running, the following applies:

- No generalized core damage can occur if the core has not uncovered. So, if RVLIS full range indicates that the collapsed liquid level has never been below the top of the core and no CETC has indicated temperatures corresponding to superheated steam at the corresponding RCS pressure, then no generalized core damage has occurred.

180°

	R	P	N	M	L	K	J	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	
1						T	D	T		TD						
2			DT		T	D	T	D	T		T					
3				T				DT		D		DT		DT		
4		D	DT		T			D	T				T			
5		T			D	T			D	T	D		D	T		
6	DT		DT			D	T	D			T		T	D	T	
7		T		DT			D	T		D		T	D			
8	TD		D		DT		DT		T	D		D	TD	D		270°
9		DT				T			D	T	D			T	D	
10	T		T		D		DT				T	D			T	
11	D			T	D			DT			D	T		T	D	
12			T		T	D			TD			D	T			
13			D	T	D	T		D		T		T		DT		
14			DT		T		DT		T	D	T	D				
15					D	T		DT		T						

90°

0°

T THERMOCOUPLE (65)
D MOVABLE INCORE DETECTOR (58 LOCATIONS)

Figure 3-2 Distribution of In-Core Instrumentation.

- If RVLIS indicates less than 3.5 ft. collapsed liquid level in the core or CETCs indicate superheated steam temperatures, then the core has uncovered and core damage may have occurred depending on the time after reactor trip, lenght and depth of uncovery. Best estimate small break (1 to 4 inches) analyses and the TMI[12] accident data indicate that about 20 minutes after the core uncovery clad temperatures start to reach 1200°-F and 10 minutes later they can be as high as 2200°-F. These times will shorten as the break size increases due to the core uncovering faster and to a greater depth.

- If the RVLIS indication is between, 3.5 ft. collapsed liquid level in the core and the top of the core, then. the CETCs should be monitored for superheated steam temperatures to determine if the core has uncovered.

As many thermocouples as possible should be used for evaluation of the core temperature conditions. The Emergency Response Guidelines[13] recommend that a minimum of one thermocouple near the center of the core and one in each quadrant be monitored at identified high power assemblies. Caution should be taken if a thermocouple reads greater than 2300°-F or is reading considerably different than neighboring CETCS. This may indicate that the thermocouple has failed. Caution should also be used when looking at CETCs near the vessel walls because reflux cooling from the hot legs may cool the fluid in this area. CETCs can also be used as an indicator of hot areas in the core and may be used to determine radial location of possible local core damage.

Therefore, core exit thermocouples and RVLIS are generally regarded as reliable indicators of RCS conditions that may cause core damage. They can predict the time of core uncovery to within a few minutes by monitoring the core exit thermocouples for superheat after RVLIS indicates collapsed liquid level at the top of the core. The onset and extent of fuel damage after core uncovery depend on the heat generation in the fuel and the rapidity and duration of uncovery. However, if the core has not uncovered, no generalized fuel damage has occurred. Core exit thermocouples reading 1300°-F or larger indicate the likelihood of clad damage.

3.3 CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORS AND CORE DAMAGE

Post accident radiation monitors in nuclear plants can be used to estimate the core damage classification.

An analysis has been made to correlate these monitor readings in R/hr with core damage types. For this analysis the following assumptions were made:

1. Radionuclides released from the fuel are all released to containment.

2. Accidents for radiation release to containment were considered for 100 percent fuel melt, 100 percent fuel overtemperature, 100 percent clad damage, and normal reactor coolant activity. The isotopic releases were estimated from Tables 2-9, 2-8, 2-3, and 2-5, respectively.

A relation can be developed which describes the gamma ray exposure rate of a detector with time, based on the radionuclides released. The exposure rate reading of a detector is dependent on plant specific parameters: the operating power of the core, the efficiency of the monitor, and the volume seen by the monitor. The function of time following the accident can be calculated from the instantaneous gamma ray source strengths due to radionuclide release, and the plant characteristics of the detector.

In actual practice it must be recognized that there is overlap between the regimes because of the nature in which core heating occurs. The hottest portion of the core is in the center due to flux distribution and hence greater fission product inventory. Additionally, heat transfer is greater at the core periphery due to proximity of pressure vessel wall. Thus, conditions could exist where there is some molten fuel in the center of the core and overtemperature conditions elsewhere. Similar conditions can occur which lead to overtemperature in

the central portions of the core, and clad damage elsewhere. Thus, estimation of extent of core damage with containment radiation readings must be used in a confirmatory sense as backup to other measurements of fission product release and other indicators such as pressure vessel water levels and core exit thermocouples.

The methodology of using the relationship of containment monitors readings shown in Figures 3-3 and 3-4 is:

1. Determine time lapse between core shutdown and radiation reading.

2. Record containment monitor reading in R/hr at this time.

3. Determine core damage regime from Figure 3-3 or 3-4 at the time interval ascertained in step 1.



Figure 3-3
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure

Core Damage Assessment Curves

1-RE-90-273 and 1-RE-90-274

Figure 3-4
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Core Damage Assessment Procedure



Rx Coolant Release
Gap Release
Fuel Overtemp.
Fuel Melt

4.0 GENERALIZED CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT APPROACH

Selected results of various analyses of fission product release, core exit thermocouple readings, pressure vessel water level, containment radiation monitor readings, and hydrogen monitor readings have been summarized in Table 4-1. The intent of the summary is to provide a quick look at various criteria intended to define core damage over the broad ranges of:

	No Core Damage
0-50%	Clad failure
50-100%	Clad failure
0-50%	Fuel pellet overtemperature
50-100%	Fuel pellet overtemperature
0-50%	Fuel melt
50-100%	Fuel melt

Although this table is intended for generic applicability to most Westinghouse pressurized water reactors, except where noted, various prior calculations are required to ascertain percentage release fractions, power, and containment volume corrections. These corrections are given within the prior text of this technical basis report.

The user should use as many indicators as possible to differentiate between the various core damage states. Because of overlapping values of release and potential simultaneous conditions of clad damage, overtemperature, and/or core melt, considerable judgment needs to be applied.

5.0 EXAMPLE OF CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

The following example is presented to illustrate the use of this methodology in assessing the extent of core damage.

5.1 SAMPLING RESULTS

For this example, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant has experienced an accident where the plant's monitoring systems indicate that safety injection has initiated and a significant amount of water has accumulated in the sump. Samples are available from the primary coolant (RCS hot leg), the containment sump, and the containment atmosphere 6 hours after reactor shutdown. The results of the sampling are presented in Table 5-1.

5.2 DECAY CORRECTION

The specified activities determined by the sampling analysis are already decay corrected to the time of reactor shutdown. Some of the isotopes measured (Xe-133, I-132) must be further corrected to account for parent-daughter relationships. Table 5-2 lists the decay corrected specific activities of the sampling analysis.

TABLE 5 - 1

RESULTS OF SAMPLING ANALYSIS TAKEN
6 HOURS AFTER REACTOR SHUTDOWN
Specific Activity

Isotope	Atmosphere, μCi/cc	Sump, μCi/gm	RCS, μCi/gm
Kr 87	6.5(1)		
Xe 133	3.3(2)		
I 131		2.9(3)	7.4(3)
I 132		4.7(3)	1.2(4)
Cs 137		2.6(2)	5.8(2)
Ba 140		1.4(1)	3.5(1)

TABLE 5 - 2

DECAY CORRECTED SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES OF SAMPLING ANALYSIS

Nuclide	Location	Measured Specific Activity*	Decay Correction Factor	Decay Corrected Specific Activity*
Kr-87	Atmosphere	6.5(1)	-	6.5(1)
Xe-133	Atmosphere	3.3(2)	0.97	3.2(2)
I-131	Sump	2.9(3)	-	2.9(3)
I-131	RCS	7.4(3)	-	7.4(3)
I-132	Sump	4.7(3)	0.93	4.4(3)
I-132	RCS	1.2(4)	0.93	1.1(4)
Cs-137	Sump	2.6(2)	-	2.6(2)
Cs-137	RCS	5.8(2)	-	5.8(2)
Ba-140	Sump	1.4(1)	-	1.4(1)
Ba-140	RCS	3.5(1)	-	3.5(1)

* μCi/cc for atmosphere sample or μCi/gm for sump and RCS sample.

5.3 PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE CORRECTION

As discussed in Section 2.4.2, a correction is needed to the sample's specific activity only if the temperature and pressure of the actual sample are different than the temperature and pressure of the medium from which the sample was taken. Since the measured specific activity of the RCS and sump samples are based on 1 gram of water, no adjustment to the specific activities is required. The conditions of the medium and the sample are listed below.

Standard Atmosphere	Atmosphere Sample	Correction Factor
Pressure = 14.4 psia	Pressure = 15 psia	1.1
Temperature = 32-F	Temperature = 100-F	

Containment Sump	Sump Sample	Correction Factor
Pressure = 20 psia	Pressure = 20 psia	1.0
Temperature = 125-F	Temperature = 125-F	

Primary Coolant	RCS Sample	Correction Factor
Pressure = 1500 psia	Pressure = 500 psia	1.0
Temperature = 350-F	Temperature = 150-F	

Correction factor calculations are shown below.

For containment atmosphere sample,

Where:

$$Corrective\ Factor = \frac{P_2}{P_1} x \frac{(T_1 + 460)}{(T_2 + 460)}$$

P_1 = sample pressure = 15 psia

T_1 = sample temperature 100°F

P_2 = standard pressure 14.4 psia

T_2 = standard temperature = 32°F

$$\text{Correction Factor} = \frac{14.4}{15} \quad \frac{100 + 460}{32 + 460} = 1.1$$

Tables 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5 lists the corrected specific activities due to pressure and temperature differences.

5.4 ACTIVITY OF EACH MEDIUM

The volume of the containment atmosphere and the mass of the sump and the primary coolant need to be known to determine the amount of Curies in each medium. Tables 5-6, 5-7, and 5-8 lists the activity of each medium.

1. Containment Volume

$$V = 1.2 \times 10^6 \text{ SCF} \times \frac{28.3 \times 10^3 \text{ cc}}{\text{SCF}} = 3.4 \times 10^{10} \text{ cc}$$

2. Sump Mass

The sump water level monitor indicates the sump is 50 percent full. For the purposes of this example, this corresponds to a water volume of 50,000 ft^3. The sump temperature is below 200°F and no adjustment is necessary in converting the sump volume to sump mass.

TABLE 5-3

CONTAINMENT ADJUSTED SPECIFIC ACTIVITY
DUE TO PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE DIFFERENCES

Containment Atmosphere, μCi/cc

Isotope	Specific Activity From Table 5-2	Correction Factor	Specific Activity Adjusted
Kr 87	6.5(1)	1.1	7.1(1)
Xe 133	3.2(2)	1.1	3.5(2)
I 131			
I 132			
Cs 137			
Ba 140			
Ba 140			

TABLE 5-4

SUMP ADJUSTED SPECIFIC ACTIVITY
DUE TO PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE DIFFERENCES

Sump Sample, μCi/cc

Isotope	Specific Activity From Table 5-2	Correction Factor*	Specific Activity Adjusted
Kr 87			
Xe 133			
I 131	2.9(3)	1.0	2.9(3)
I 132	4.4(3)	1.0	4.4(3)
Cs 137	2.6(2)	1.0	2.6(2)
Ba 140	1.4(1)	1.0	1.4(1)

* No correction is necessary since the nuclide analysis was performed on a per gram basis.

TABLE 5 -5

RCS ADJUSTED SPECIFIC ACTIVITY
DUE TO PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE DIFFERENCES

Specific Activity, RCS, μCi/gm

Isotope	From Table 5-2	Correction Factor*	Adjusted
Kr 87			
Xe 133			
I 131	7.4(3)	1.0	7.4(3)
I 132	1.1(4)	1.0	1.1(4)
Cs137	5.8(2)	1.0	5.8(2)
Ba 140	3.5(1)	1.0	3.5(1)

*No correction is necessary since the nuclide analysis was performed on a per gram basis.

$$\text{Sump mass} = 50{,}000\ ft^3 \times \rho_{STP} \times \frac{28.3 \times 10^3\ cc}{ft^3}$$

$$= 1.4 \times 10^9\ gm$$

where:

$$\rho_{STP} = 1.00\ \frac{gm}{cc}$$

3) Primary Coolant Mass

The primary system monitors indicate the system is full. The volume of the primary system is 10,200 ft^3 (Example Volume).

Temperature of the RCS at time of sample (350-F)

$$\text{RCS mass} = 10{,}200\ ft^3 \times \frac{\rho}{\rho_{STP}} \times \rho_{STP} \times \frac{28.3 \times 10^3\ cc}{ft^3}$$

$$= 2.6 \times 10^8\ gm$$

where:

$\frac{\rho}{\rho_{STP}}$ = water density ratio at RCS temperature (350°F), Figure 2-2 = 0.89

ρ_{STP} = water density at STP, 1 gm/cc.

5.5 TOTAL ACTIVITY RELEASED

The total activity released is determined by adding the activity of the atmosphere, sump, and the reactor coolant system. Table 5-9 presents the total activity released.

TABLE 5-6

CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE ACTIVITY

Adjusted Isotope	Specific Activity, μCi/cc	Atmosphere Volume, cc	Activity, Ci
Kr 87	7.1(1)	3.4(10)	2.4(6)
Xe 133	3.5(2)	3.4(10)	1.2(7)
I 131			
I 132			
Cs 137			
Ba 140			

TABLE 5 - 7

CONTAINMENT SUMP ACTIVITY

Isotope	Adjusted Specific Actity, μCi/gm	Sump Water Mass, gm	Activity, Ci
Kr 87			
Xe 133			
I 131	2.9(3)	1.4(9)	4.0(6)
I 132	4.4(3)	1.4(9)	6.2(6)
Cs 137	2.6(2)	1.4(9)	3.6(5)
Ba 140	1.4(1)	1.4(9)	1.9(4)

TABLE 5-8

RCS ACTIVITY

Isotope	Adjusted Specific Activity, μCi/gm	RCS Water Mass, gm	Activity, Ci
Kr 87			
Xe 133			
I 131	7.4(3)	2.6(8)	1.9(6)
I 132	1.1(4)	2.6(8)	2.8(6)
Cs 137	5.8(2)	2.6(8)	1.5(5)
Ba 140	3.5(1)	2.6(8)	9.0(3)

TABLE 5-9

TOTAL ACTIVITY RELEASED

Isotope	Atmosphere, Ci	Sump, Ci	RCS, Ci	Total, Ci
Kr 87	2.4(6)			2.4(6)
Xe 133	1.2(7)			1.2(7)
I 131		4.0(6)	1.9(6)	5.9(6)
I 132		6.2(6)	2.8(6)	9.0(6)
Cs 137		3.6(5)	1.5(5)	5.1(5)
Ba 140		1.9(4)	9.0(3)	2.8(4)

5.6 ACTIVITY RATIOS OF THE RELEASED FISSION PRODUCTS

The activity ratios of the released fission products are shown in Table 5-10.
The use of the ratios is demonstrated in Section 5.9.

5.7 INVENTORY AVAILABLE FOR RELEASE

To determine the total inventory of fission products available for release at reactor shutdown, the power history prior to shutdown needs to be known. For this example, the reactor has been operating continuously for 400 days with the following power history prior to shutdown.

20 days at 75% power = 2670 Mwt

10 days at 100% power = 3565 Mwt

10 days at 50% power = 1780 Mwt

5 days at 75% power = 2670 Mwt
45 days

The new inventories are calculated by applying the power correction factors discussed to the equilibrium, end-of-life core inventories. The following sections present examples in determining the power correction factor for this scenario. The corrected core inventories are listed in Table 5-11.

1) Isotopes with half-lives < 1 day

For isotopes with half-lives less than 1 day, it is assumed that they reach equilibrium in approximately 4 days. For this scenario the reactor is operating at 2670 Mwt for 5 days prior to shutdown. Thus, the power correction is as follows:

$$\text{Power Correction Factor} = \frac{2670\ \text{MWT}}{3565\ \text{MWT}} = 0.75$$

For I-132 ($t_{1/2}$ = 2 h),

$$\text{Corrected Inventory} = 1.4 \times 10^8 \text{ Curies} \times 0.75 = 1.1 \times 10^8 \text{ Curies}$$

2) Isotopes with half-lives > 1 day

Since the power is not constant during the 30-day period prior to shutdown, the transient power correction equation is applied.

$$Power\ Corrective\ Factor = \frac{\sum_j P_j (1-e^{-\lambda_i t_j})\, e^{-\lambda_i t_j^{*}}}{RP(1-e^{\lambda_i \sum t_j})}$$

$$for\ I\text{-}131\ (t_{1/2} = 8d,\ \lambda_i = 8.7\ x\ 10^{-2}\ day^{-1})$$

$$since\ \Sigma\ t_j = 45\ days > 4\ x\ \frac{0.693}{\lambda_i} = 32\ days$$

$$Power\ Corrective\ Factor = \frac{\sum_j P_j (1-e^{-\lambda_i t_j})\, e^{-\lambda_i t_j^{*}}}{RP}$$

$$= \frac{2670\ (1-e^{-(8.7E-2)x(20)})\ e^{(-8.7E-2)x(25)}}{3565}$$

$$+ \frac{3565\ (1-e^{-(8.7E-2)x(10)})\ e^{(-8.7E-2)x(15)}}{3565}$$

$$+ \frac{1780\ (1-e^{-(8.7E-2)x(10)})\ e^{(-8.7E-2)x(5)}}{3565}$$

$$+ \frac{2670\ (1-e^{-(8.7E-2)x(5)})\ e^{(-8.7E-2)x(0)}}{3565}$$

$$= \frac{2424}{3565} = 0.68$$

3) Isotopes with half-lives around 1 year

For this scenario, the core has operated for 240 effective full power days during the 400 days of cycle operation.

For Cs-137 ($t_{1/2}$ = 10 yr)

$$\text{Power Correction Factor} = \frac{240\ \text{EFPD}}{400\ \text{Days}} = 0.6$$

5.8 PERCENTAGE OF INVENTORY RELEASED

The corrected inventories are used to determine the percentage of inventory released for each isotope. The inventory released percentages are compared to Figures 2-13, 2-14, 2-16, 2-18, and 2-21 through 2-24 to estimate the extent of core damage. Table 5-12 presents the release percentages for the isotopes of this example.

5.9 CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT BASED ON RADIONUCLIDE ANALYSIS

The results of the radionuclide analysis are used to determine an estimate of the extent of core damage. Table 5-12 shows the inventory released percentages of this accident scenario. These percentages are compared to Figures 2-13, 2-14, 2-16, 2-18, and 2-21 through 2-24 to estimate the extent of core damage.

The fission products analyzed after the accident are Kr-87, Xe-133, I-131, I-133, Cs-137, and Ba-140. The noble gases, iodines, and cesium are released during all stages of core damage with Ba-140 being a characteristic fission product of fuel overtemperature and fuel melt. The calculated release of Ba-140 is used to estimate the extent of fuel temperature and fuel melt.

From figures 2-22 and 2-24 the 0.025 percent release of Ba-140 corresponds to approximately 20 percent fuel overtemperature and less than 1 percent fuel melt. Based on the Ba-140 release percentage, the fission product release is primarily due to clad damage and fuel overtemperature.

The release percentages of the noble gases, iodines, and cesium indicate from Figure 2-21 that approximately 15-25 percent of the core has experienced overtemperature conditions. The activity ratios shown in Table 5-10 compared to those in Table 2-6 indicate that the release has progressed beyond gap release to fuel pellet release.

Comparing the release percentages of the noble gases and iodines to Figures 2-13, 2-14, 2-16, and 2-18 clad damage greater than 100 percent is indicated. However, as stated previously, it is recognized that in actuality there is an overlap between the regimes of core damage states. Unfortunately, the extent of clad damage cannot be estimated from the radionuclide analysis. The release due to overtemperature dominates the release due to clad damage.

The conclusion drawn from the radionuclide analysis is that the core has experienced some clad damage (but the extent is not known from solely the radionuclide analysis), less than 50 percent fuel overtemperature, and the possibility of very minor fuel melt (less than 1 percent).

5.10 AUXILIARY INDICATORS

To verify the conclusion of the radionuclide analysis, the auxiliary indicators (containment hydrogen concentration, core exit thermocouple temperature, reactor vessel water level, and containment radiation monitor readings) are used.

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TABLE 5-10

ACTIVITY RATIOS OF RELEASED FISSION PRODUCTS

Isotope	Total Activity, Ci	Activity Ratio*
Kr 87	2.4(6)	2.0(-1)
Xe 133	1.2(7)	1.0
I 131	5.9(6)	1.0
I 132	9.0(6)	1.5

* Noble Gas Ratio = $\frac{\text{Noble Gas Activity}}{\text{Xe-133 Activity}}$

Iodine Ratio = $\frac{\text{Iodine Activity}}{\text{I-131 Activity}}$

TABLE 5-11

FISSION PRODUCT INVENTORY AT REACTOR SHUTDOWN

Isotope	Equilibrium Inventory at End-of-Life, Ci	Power Correction Factor	Corrected Inventory, Ci
Kr 87	4.0(7)	0.75	3.0(7)
Xe 133	2.0(8)	0.68	1.4(8)
I 131	9.8(7)	0.68	6.7(7)
I 132	1.4(8)	0.75	1.1(8)
Cs 137	1.1(7)	0.60	6.6(6)
Ba 140	1.7(8)	0.65	1.1(8)

TABLE 5-12

RELEASE PERCENTAGE

Isotope	Total Activity Released, Ci	Corrected Inventory, Ci	Release Percentage, %
Kr 87	2.4(6)	3.0(7)	8.0
Xe 133	1.2(7)	1.4(8)	8.3
I 131	5.9(6)	6.7(7)	8.8
I 132	9.0(6)	1.1(8)	8.2
Cs 137	5.1(5)	6.6(6)	7.8
Ba 140	2.8(4)	1.1(8)	2.5(-2)

5.10.1 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATIONS

Sensors in containment indicated that several hydrogen burns had occurred. Thus, the hydrogen concentration indicates that there is a high probability that greater than 50 percent of the clad is damaged, Table 4-1.

5.10.2 CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE READINGS AND REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL

The core exit thermocouple readings during this accident reached 1650-F for the center half of the core and ranged between 900-F to 1100-F for the outer regions of the core. The reactor vessel water level monitor indicated that the core uncovered during the accident for an extended period of time. From Table 4-1, these readings indicate a possibility of the core experiencing fuel overtemperature in the center regions and clad damage in the outer regions. Also, the high hydrogen concentration measured in the containment confirms that the core had uncovered during the accident.

5.10.3 CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITOR

The containment radiation monitor indicated a gross gamma dose rate of 1.02×10^4 R/hr at 6 hours after reactor shutdown.

From Figure 3.3, this corresponds to an overtemperature release and a significant gap release which confirms the radionuclide analysis.

5.11 SUMMARY

The combination of the radionuclide analysis and the auxiliary measurements indicated greater than 50 percent clad damage, less than 50 percent fuel overtemperature, and a possibility of very minor fuel melt.

This example was provided to illustrate the use of this core damage assessment methodology in determining the extent of core damage.

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