TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
830 Power Building

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JAN 24 1978

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mail Section

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 1217
230 Peachtree Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY - DISCREPANCY DISCOVERED IN LOCA SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF REACTOR COOLANT LOOP - NCR 11 - SECOND INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Region II, Inspector L. E. Foster, on August 15, 1977, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Our first interim report was submitted September 15, 1977, with a supplement submitted October 4, 1977. Enclosed is our second interim report.

The final report on this deficiency will be transmitted to your office on or before July 15, 1978.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Gilleland
Assistant Manager of Power

Enclosure
cc: Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY - DISCREPANCY DISCOVERED IN LOCA SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF REACTOR COOLANT LOOP - NCR 11

SECOND INTERIM REPORT

Description of Condition

Westinghouse reported to TVA and Engineering Data Systems (EDS) that in performing the final reactor coolant loop analysis they had discovered discrepancies in their previous models. For seismic response, these discrepancies included misrepresentations of the reactor coolant pump tie rods and reactor vessel support stiffnesses. The revised seismic and LOCA analyses resulted in new displacements of the reactor coolant loop branch nozzles. The displacements are used by EDS for branch piping analysis.

Interim Progress

Westinghouse has corrected the analytical representation of the reactor coolant loop system. No support changes were required in the primary system as a result of Westinghouse's reanalysis. Using the new displacements for branch nozzles, TVA is generating new response spectra for the branch piping system. This work is almost finished. When complete, the branch piping system will be reanalyzed by EDS using this data.

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JAN 16 1978

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JAN 25, 1978
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mail Section

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 1217
230 Peachtree Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY - REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF FLOOD LEVELS

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Region II, Project Section Chief, J. C. Bryant, on August 2, 1977, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). The first interim report was transmitted on September 1, 1977. Enclosed is our final report on this deficiency.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Gilleland
Assistant Manager of Power

Enclosure
cc: Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF FLOOD LEVELS

FINAL REPORT

Description of Condition

As a part of the flood analysis for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant as set forth in the Standard Review Plan, TVA reviewed the flood level at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. Preliminary analyses contained data which indicated a possibility existed that the flood level for Watts Bar could change.

The analyses have now been completed and there was no change in the flood elevation for Watts Bar.

Safety Implication Statement

Since the flood level is unchanged from the original design flood level, the safe operation of the plant would not be adversely affected.

Corrective Action

No corrective action was required as there was no change in the plant flood elevation.

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