



**U.S. NRC**

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*Protecting People and the Environment*

# **2007 Peach Bottom Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) Exit Meeting**

Marsha K. Gamberoni, Director  
James M. Trapp, Team Leader  
Division of Reactor Safety  
NRC Region I

## Meeting Purpose

- Inform Exelon of the results of the AIT's review of events involving inattentive security officers
- Provide opportunity for Exelon to respond to AIT results
- Conduct a public question-and-answer session



## AIT Exit Meeting

### Meeting Protocol Richard Barkley, PE Technical Communications Asst.

- The NRC will answer questions from the public following the meeting with Exelon
- Please silence all cell phones and pagers
- Please sign up for question-and-answer session



# AIT Exit Meeting

## Meeting Agenda

- Introduction
- Describe AIT Process and Objectives
- Describe AIT Inspection Results
- Provide Opportunity for Exelon to Respond to AIT Results
- Short Break
- Public Question-and-Answer Session



# AIT Exit Meeting

## Introduction

### NRC

Samuel Collins

Marsha Gamberoni

James Trapp

Region I Administrator

Director, Division of Reactor Safety – Region I

Team Leader - AIT

### Exelon

Ronald DeGregorio

Joseph Grimes

James Meister

Sr. Vice President - Mid-Atlantic Operations

Site Vice President - Peach Bottom

Vice President – Operations Support

### AIT Objectives

- Conduct timely and systematic inspection related to significant operational events
- Assess health and safety significance of the event
- Collect and analyze facts associated with the event to determine causes and circumstances

## AIT Process Overview

- Formal investigation process conducted for the purpose of gathering facts and determining findings and conclusions for significant operational events
- Implemented for significant operational events that pose an actual or potential hazard to public health and safety, property, or the environment
- Inspection teams consist of technical experts from the Regions augmented by specialists from NRC Headquarters



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## **2007 Peach Bottom Augmented Inspection Team Members**

James Trapp

Dana Caron

Brice Bickett

George Smith

Joseph Willis

Jeffrey Teator

Mark Mullen

Albert Cabrelli

Team Leader (Region I)

Assistant Team Leader (Region I)

Senior Project Engineer (Region I)

Physical Security Inspector (Region I)

Security Specialist (NSIR)

Senior Special Agent (Office of Investigations)

Senior Special Agent (Office of Investigations)

Special Agent (Office of Investigations)



### AIT Basis for Peach Bottom

Multiple occasions in which several security officers at Peach Bottom were observed to be inattentive between March and August 2007



## Event Background

- NRC made aware of videos through WCBS-TV (New York City) reporter on September 10, 2007
- NRC began enhanced oversight of security on September 10, 2007
- NRC viewed videos on September 19, 2007, which showed multiple occurrences of security officers inattentive to duty in the “ready room” of the plant between March and August 2007
- NRC commenced AIT on September 21, 2007

## Team Objectives

- Independently review the facts surrounding inattentive security officers
- Assess security plan impact
- Identify probable causes
- Assess corrective and compensatory actions
- Review extent of security officers' inattentiveness
- Assess effectiveness of management oversight
- Assess Behavioral Observation Program
- Identify generic aspects of the event

## Independent Review of Facts

- The NRC interviewed 38 security personnel total from each of the four security teams, including security supervisors, as well as maintenance personnel and Exelon management
- Multiple security officers inattentive on four separate occasions – 10 security officers total (March 12; June 9; June 20; and August 10)
- Security officers identified in videos as inattentive had not exceeded NRC work hour requirements
- Security officers in videos confirmed as inattentive to duty

## Security Plan Impact

- Security at Peach Bottom was not significantly degraded as a result of this event
- Security at the plant provided high assurance that the health and safety of the public was adequately protected at all times
- Inattentive security officers did have an adverse impact on elements of the defense-in-depth security strategy

## Probable Causes

- Adverse behavior developed on Security Team No. 1
- Ready room not accessible for adequate supervisory oversight
- Management failed to effectively communicate and reinforce station attentiveness expectations
- Security supervisors failed to address concerns involving inattentive security officers
- Management failed to address poor environmental conditions in the ready room
- Management failed to provide adequate attentiveness stimuli

## Compensatory and Corrective Actions

- Prompt compensatory and corrective actions implemented by Exelon were appropriate
- Enhanced oversight by Exelon and Wackenhut continues
- Corrective actions prior to September 2007 were ineffective for addressing unacceptable security officer behavior

## Extent of Security Officers' Inattentiveness

- All security officers were interviewed at least once by either NRC or Exelon
- Based on videos and interviews conducted, all individuals identified as inattentive were working on Security Team No. 1



# AIT Results

## Management and Supervisory Oversight

- Ineffective security supervisory oversight had a direct adverse impact on this event
- Security supervisor discouraged the bringing forward of safety concerns

## Behavioral Observation Program

- Multiple opportunities existed for security officers to report inattentive behavior
- Security organization was not effective in promoting and supporting the Behavioral Observation Program

## Generic Communications

- Exelon has shared lessons learned with the Exelon fleet and the industry
- NRC has issued a security advisory to the industry on inattentive security officer behavior

# AIT Conclusions

- Security officers were inattentive on multiple occasions
- The level of security was not significantly degraded as a result of inattentive security officers
- Supervisors failed to correct inattentive behavior
- Peach Bottom's prompt corrective actions in September 2007 were appropriate

## **NRC Actions**

- Issued a letter to Exelon on October 4, 2007, regarding inattentiveness concerns
- Issue an AIT inspection report
- Perform an AIT follow-up inspection
- Consider enforcement actions following completion of NRC review



# Exelon Response and Remarks



**END OF THE PRESENTATION**



**Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region I**  
**King of Prussia, Pennsylvania**  
**October 9, 2007**