

October 26, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dennis Schrader  
Deputy Administrator  
National Preparedness Directorate  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

ATTENTION: Vanessa Quinn  
Acting Director  
Technological Hazards Division  
National Preparedness Directorate  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

FROM: Harry E. Sherwood /RA/  
Section Chief  
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program  
Oakland Field Office

SUBJECT: Disaster Initiated Review  
FEMA 1731 DR-CA  
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station

**Background:**

The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) shut down Unit #2 on October 21, 2007. The action was the result of findings during the routine mid cycle outage of Unit #3, which the utility determined could be addressed on Unit #2.

Following the shut down of Unit #2, numerous wildfires broke out over a large area of Southern California. Many of these fires continue to burn, have destroyed several thousand structures and forced the evacuation of more than one million residents.

On October 24, one fire complex burned to within one half mile of the site, requiring extensive firefighting activity and evacuations within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), disrupting evacuation routes and communications on the Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated Monitoring Mode from its Response Center.

Other wildfires in the region required major staff and resource commitments by several emergency services associated with the EPZ. This included firefighting by Orange and San Diego Counties and Camp Pendleton, services and support to evacuees in a constantly changing environment and the periodic closure of evacuation routes and support facilities.

On October 24, 2007, The Oakland Field Office initiated coordination with the State of California, Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) to determine whether

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) remained capable of supporting a possible restart of Unit #2. That afternoon, NRC was advised by the utility that it would possibly be ready to seek approval to take Unit #2 to criticality on October 25.

Based on the earlier coordination with OES and the OROs, a conference call was held with NRC, Oakland Field Office and Headquarters Technological Hazards Division. It was decided that the ongoing coordination be elevated to a Disaster Initiated Review.

The Review was conducted jointly on October 25, 2007 by the Oakland Field Office, OES, SONGS, the Offsite Response Organizations individually, and collectively through the Interjurisdictional Planning Committee (IPC).

**Assessment:**

1. Emergency Response Facilities

All Emergency Response Facilities are operational, structurally safe and operating on primary power.

2. Communications

All primary and backup communications for all jurisdictions are fully operational at this time. MCB Camp Pendleton had reported slightly degraded capability while operating on standby power. This has been reported as resolved.

3. Emergency Response Organizations

All designated elected officials and decisionmakers are available to all jurisdictions. All key emergency response organization personnel are available in all jurisdictions. Schools in the EPZ are open and operational.

4. Public Alert and Notification

Three Community Alert Sirens in the active fire area of MCB Camp Pendleton are not operational. The areas served by these sirens have been evacuated. All other alert and notification facilities are fully operational, EAS stations and other broadcast facilities are operating on primary power.

5. Special Needs and Transportation Resources

All schools and special needs facilities are operational in all jurisdictions, with the exception of school district closures due to air quality and fire concerns. The respective school districts will resume classes as conditions permit. The disaster event has not impacted the ability to provide transportation resources.

6. Evacuation Routes

All primary evacuation routes from the EPZ are open, with the exception of Basilone Road on MCB Camp Pendleton. This area has been evacuated due to the fires. The route is open to emergency vehicles and will reopen when the resident population is permitted reentry.

No populations are affected by evacuation route closures.

7. Accident Assessment

All monitoring and assessment personnel are available to all jurisdictions; equipment and locations are operational.

8. Support Services

All planned reception centers are available for use and not affected by the fire emergency. Staff is available to operate the facilities and equipment is available.

9. Catastrophic Impact

No catastrophic impacts resulted from the fire event.

10. Supporting Documentation

All supporting documentation gathered by the Review Team will be on file at the Oakland Field Office

**Conclusions:**

The Review was conducted jointly by the Oakland Field Office, OES, SONGS, the IPC and individual jurisdictions. Many of the findings resulted from continual monitoring of their status during the course of the disaster event. Others, wherever possible, were verified by field observation or interjurisdictionally

Based on the information furnished by this review, the Oakland Field Office makes a positive recommendation for providing a Statement of Reasonable Assurance to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in support of the proposed restart of SONGS Unit #2.