

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

830 Power Building

March 1, 1978

Confidential

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Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 77-08 - IE:RII:JPO
50-327, -328, -390, -391, -438, -439, -518, -519, -520, -521 -
SEQUOYAH, WATTS BAR, BELLEFONTE, AND HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANTS

In response to your December 28, 1977, letter which transmitted
IE Bulletin 77-08, we are enclosing the results of our investi-
gations at Sequoyah, Watts Bar, Bellefonte, and Hartsville Nuclear
Plants. Also included is a response for Phipps Bend, which is
identical to Hartsville, even though the Construction Permit was
received since the issuance of the subject IE Bulletin 77-08.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Gilleland
you

J. E. Gilleland
Assistant Manager of Power

Enclosure

*As 2
GD*

ENCLOSURE

RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN 77-08
ASSURANCE OF SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS DURING AN
EMERGENCY - LOCKING SYSTEMS

This constitutes our response for Sequoyah, Watts Bar, Bellefonte, and Hartsville Nuclear Plants to your letter of December 28, 1977, to Godwin Williams, Jr., which transmitted the subject bulletin. After reviewing IE Bulletin 77-08, we have the following comments.

ACTION ITEMS, PAGES 3 AND 4

The required survey of our projects indicates that Sequoyah, Watts Bar, Bellefonte, Hartsville, and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants all will have facilities for prompt emergency ingress into electrically locked safety-related areas by essential employees.

The survey by action item follows:

Action Item 1.a.(1) - Sequoyah and Watts Bar Nuclear Plants are being provided primary power with diesel auxiliary power to the entire electrical locking system. Bellefonte, Hartsville, and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants are being provided reliable and uninterruptible auxiliary power to the entire electrical locking systems.

Action Item 1.a.(2) - Sequoyah, Watts Bar, Bellefonte, Hartsville, and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants are being provided with electrical locking devices which will operate in the following manner:

With primary or auxiliary power: Entry by card reader or card reader and knob. Exit by mechanical or electric device, i.e., knob or pushbutton.

In the event of power failure: All electric locking devices fail in the open mode. Entry by knob or other mechanical device. Exit by knob or other mechanical device.

Selected doors are being provided with auxiliary key locks in conjunction with knobs and latches which can be secured externally by appropriate employees and exit by knob from within.

Action Item 1.a.(3) - Sequoyah, Watts Bar, Bellefonte, Hartsville, and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants are being provided with means to periodically test all electrical locking systems to confirm their operability and to periodically test the capability to switch to auxiliary power.

Action Item 1.b. - We are providing electrically locking security devices for all plants in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73.55 and which conform to life safety codes, fire protection codes, and various local building codes along with the Southern Standard Building Code.

In order to accomplish the required ingress and egress requirements, and in the event of a security system failure for any reason, the electrical locking devices will fail in the open mode. Security functions will be supplemented under such emergency conditions by the mechanical locking devices as provided and other administrative procedures.

This system represents the best solution for the security, operational, and code requirements with the equipment available. It will also preclude events such as described in IE Bulletin 77-08.

Action Item (2) - Sequoyah, Watts Bar, Bellefonte, Hartsville, and Phipps Bend emergency plans and procedures will allow emergency ingress and unimpeded egress for any postulated occurrence.