



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II  
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER  
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

April 23, 2007

NMED FC070008  
NRC Event No. 43090

Mr. D. B. Ferguson, Jr.  
President & CEO  
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.  
P. O. Box 337, MS 123  
Erwin, TN 37650

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70-143/2007-002

Dear Mr. Ferguson:

This refers to the inspection conducted from February 11, through March 24, 2007, at the Nuclear Fuel Services facility. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether activities authorized by the license were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report.

Areas examined during the inspection included: safety operations, facility support, emergency preparedness, BPF restart review, and post-strike recovery. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress. Within the scope of the inspection, no violations or deviations were identified.

Also, based on the results of this and previous inspections, Confirmatory Action Letter No. 02-06-003, dated March 18, 2006, is now considered closed. The remaining long-term commitments made by your staff will be tracked separately in future inspections.

By letter dated April 11, 2007, we received your reply to Notice of Violation 70-143/2007-001-01, which was issued on March 12, 2007. The reply met the requirements of 10 CFR 2.201, and your corrective actions will be reviewed during a future inspection.

This letter and the enclosed report contain sensitive unclassified information and will not be available for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS).

D. Ferguson

2

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

*/RA/*

David J. Hartland, Acting Chief  
Fuel Facility Inspection Branch 1  
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Docket No. 70-143  
License No. SNM-124

Enclosure : NRC Inspection Report

cc w/encl:  
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Vice President  
Safety and Regulatory Management  
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Distribution w/encl: (See page 3)

D. Ferguson

3



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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No.: 70-143

License No.: SNM-124

Report No.: 70-143/2007-002

Licensee: Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.

Facility: Erwin Facility

Location: Erwin, TN 37650

Dates: February 11, through March 24, 2007

Inspectors: S. Burris, Senior Resident Inspector  
G. Smith, Resident Inspector  
M. Crespo, Senior Fuel Facilities Inspector  
A. Gooden, Senior Fuel Facilities Inspector

Approved by: D. Hartland, Acting Chief  
Fuel Facility Inspection Branch 1  
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Enclosure

[REDACTED]



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.  
NRC Inspection Report No. 70-143/2007-002

This inspection included observations conducted by the resident and region-based inspectors during normal and off-normal shifts in the area of safety operations, facility support, emergency preparedness, and blended low-enriched uranium (BLEU) preparation facility (BPF) operations restart review followup activities.


### Safety Operations

- All operations activities observed were performed safely and in accordance with approved procedures (Paragraph 2.a).
- The licensee responded appropriately to a potential failure of an item relied on for safety and provided adequate basis for retracting the event notification (Paragraph 2.b).
- A minor fire/flame was discovered and subsequently extinguished. Fire brigade response was prompt and effective (Paragraph 2.c).

### Facility Support

- One unresolved item was identified to evaluate deficiencies identified during 302 equipment and 306 diesel generator/UPS/ABT maintenance activities for enforcement (Paragraph 3.a.).

### Emergency Preparedness

- Based on documentation reviews and interviews with members of the licensee's staff, program changes made since the last inspection did not reduce the effectiveness of the program. The independent audit was a detailed and critical assessment of the program (Paragraph 4.a).
  - The revised emergency procedures continued to effectively implement the Emergency Plan (Paragraph 4.b).
  - Key emergency response personnel were trained in accordance with the Plan. The combination of drills and instructions pertaining to the Plan provided an adequate level of training to maintain the proficiency of emergency personnel regarding response to postulated site accidents (Paragraph 4.c).
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- Based on documentation and interviews with the site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator and the Unicoi County Emergency Management Director, the licensee maintained frequent contact with offsite support organizations on matters involving emergency preparedness (Paragraph 4.d).
- The scenarios used for drills and exercises provided good training opportunities and sufficient challenges to evaluate the emergency organization's state of readiness. Offsite organizations were afforded an opportunity to participate during biennial exercises (Paragraph 4.e).
- Based on operability checks and a review of surveillance documentation, the emergency response equipment, instrumentation, and supplies were maintained in sufficient quantities and a satisfactory state of operational readiness (Paragraph 4.f).

BPF Operations Restart Review Followup


- Operations in the BPF areas were conducted adequately by approved procedures (Paragraph 5.a).
- The inspectors verified that the implementation of remaining open items on the BPF restart commitment matrix was in progress and on schedule (Paragraph 5.b).

Post Strike Recovery Operations

- No reduction in safety or negative findings have been identified regarding the retraining of workers returning from the strike (Paragraph 6).

Attachment:

Partial List of Persons Contacted  
Inspection Procedures Used  
List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed





## REPORT DETAILS

### 1. Summary of Plant Status

Returning striking workers continue to be assimilated into the workforce. Fuel manufacturing, training activities, and scrap recovery processes were operated throughout the reporting period. Blended low-enriched uranium (BLEU) oxide conversion, BLEU preparation facility (BPF), and decommissioning activities were conducted normally during the inspection period.

### 2. Safety Operations

#### a. Plant Operations (Inspection Procedure (IP) 88135)


##### (1) Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors performed numerous walkdowns of the fuel process operating areas and the BPF. Operating logs and records were reviewed to verify adequate corrective action for any safety significant issues or equipment malfunctions. The inspectors verified adequate staffing was available and evaluated attentiveness of operators in carrying out their assigned duties. Communications were monitored between supervision and line operators. Sufficient oversight was provided by supervision. The inspectors verified that procedural controls were being utilized within the operating areas.

The operating area observations included a verification that nuclear criticality safety precautions were being properly implemented. Station limit cards were clearly posted on equipment, storage racks, and process stations. Unfavorable geometry containers were either appropriately controlled or precluded from the operating areas.

On March 16, 2007, a caustic transfer was made from the high enriched uranium to the low enriched uranium (LEU) side of the BPF facility with an elevated uranium (U) content. The concentration of this caustic batch was greater than the normal limit, 0.05 grams of U per liter. The subsequent transfer was authorized by Letter of Authorization (LOA)-1877I-205.

The inspectors reviewed this LOA, as well as the nuclear criticality safety evaluations (NCSEs) for the BPF liquid waste discharge system and the water treatment facility. The LOA ensured criticality safety by limiting the volume of material transferred to the LEU portion of the facility rather than relying on the limit set for concentration. The inspectors verified that the LOA did not change the design basis as described in the above NCSEs. The LOA authorized a one-time transfer and raised the setpoint for the associated in-line (radiation) monitor from 0.0566 grams U per liter to 0.13 grams U per liter. The operation was completed without incident.



(2) Conclusions

All of the operations activities observed were performed safely and in accordance with approved procedures.

b. Event Followup (IP 88135)

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

On March 1, 2007, an operational upset resulted in an excessive amount of fissile material to accumulate in a portion of a glove box located in Area 800. The material was suspected to be in excess of the value described in the nuclear criticality safety evaluation. The material was promptly placed into a safe geometry following inspection of the system as required by the station limit card. Although the applicable management measures were followed to preclude this event, the unusual amount of material found in an unexpected portion of the process was still considered a potential failure of an item relied on for safety (IROFS), and a 24-hour notification (no. 43204) was made to the NRC per Appendix A of 10 CFR 70.

Further sample analyses revealed that the quantity of material was less than the limit described in the NCSE, and the event was retracted on March 3, 2007. The inspectors interviewed various licensee personnel regarding this event and performed a detailed walkdown of the system. The inspectors also reviewed the Area 800 NCSE to verify the validity of the licensee's assumptions. No issues were identified.

(2) Conclusions

The licensee responded appropriately to a potential failure of an item relied on for safety and provided adequate basis for retracting the event notification.

c. Fire Protection (IP 88135)

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors evaluated the fire brigade's response to a reported fire in Area 800 on February 22, 2007. A small flame was noted in a process area device that was unexpected and was reported to the Central Alarm Station. The fire brigade was assembled and sent to the scene. The brigade properly donned the turnout gear as well as self-contained breathing apparatus equipment.

The brigade team promptly reported to the scene and established communications with the brigade leader. The flame was extinguished and the brigade stood down following a walkdown of the process equipment. The inspectors observed clear and concise communications between the brigade members at the scene and the brigade leader.



[REDACTED]

No release of radioactive material occurred and no personnel were injured as a result of the fire.

(2) Conclusions

The fire brigade demonstrated sufficient readiness and skill level in response to the small fire. The safe operation of the facility was ensured by the performance of the brigade team.

3. Facility Support

a. Maintenance/Surveillance (IP 88135)

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors observed the modifications/repairs of equipment for various areas of the facility. The inspectors reviewed the documentation and controls used to support these modifications/repairs to verify that work documents reflected the proper reviews and approvals of the proposed activities, personnel were properly implementing these changes as designed, and management oversight was evident during the work activities. Verification included that proper controls (work request (WR), lockout/tagout, special work permits (SWPs), etc.) were in place and being implemented during the work activities. The inspectors evaluated the following activities:

- Replacement of leaking pump AD-0E04 for the 302-E work area. The work was performed in accordance with maintenance procedures and work documents. Work documentation reviewed included WR # 113477 and SWP # 07-06-004. The work was performed satisfactorily and the documentation was properly closed out.
- Modification to the in-line monitors of the effluent systems (condensate, caustic and raffinate) in Building 333. This modification involved the installation of a degraded voltage monitor for the DC power supply associated with each radiation detector. The inspectors also reviewed the modification to the BPF downblending in-line monitor. This modification relocated the control valve isolation function from the local computer to the safety-related programmable logic controller. The work was performed satisfactorily and the documentation was properly closed out.
- Repair of 302 equipment and vent line. Work documentation reviewed included Minor 1 Work Order #114026, SWP #11837, and Lockout/Tagout # P-2596. The licensee performed troubleshooting and repairs to the 600 area equipment because of malfunctioning problems with the operations of the feed system. The workers were to look for possible leaks, blockages, and door operations problems.

[REDACTED]

The licensee found that the vent line was partially blocked, and there was a small amount of waste and debris in the door channel, preventing it from properly sealing. Maintenance personnel removed and cleaned the blocked line and removed the debris from the door channel. Post-maintenance testing found that all components were operating as designed. The equipment was returned to service and appeared to be operating normally.

All of the documentation was properly reviewed, approved, and signed off as required by procedures, with the exception of the lockout/tagout documentation. Review of the lockout/tagout permit found that there were several anomalies noted in the documentation including lockout/tagout reference isolations which were not signed off and signatures for removal of items that were not completed as required prior to permit closure.

In response, the licensee documented this issue in its Problem Identification, Resolution and Corrective Action System (PIRCS # 9590) and initiated an investigation.

- Scheduled annual maintenance activities on the 306 diesel generator, uninterruptible power supply (UPS), and automatic bus transfer (ABT) device. These tests were being performed on March 10, 2007, to verify that the diesel generator, UPS, and ABT would perform their intended function.

Prior to starting the test, the inspectors obtained a copy of the procedure used to perform the testing and reviewed it for accuracy and effectiveness in controlling the activities associated with these tests. After reviewing this document, the inspectors could not determine that there were any officially approved procedures and documents at the test site.

As an example, Procedure NFS-SOP-205, "Procedure for Maintenance, Operations and Testing of UPS/Generator Building 306," Rev. 11, required that Attachment IV be completed as the test was being performed. However, it was not evident that this document was available to the system engineer at the time of the testing.

The system engineer did have a prepared document at the test area which was being used to perform and verify the activities. However, this was an informal check-sheet that he had made up to help him control/perform the different phases of the test. The inspectors were informed that this particular document had not been evaluated, reviewed, and/or approved by anyone other than the system engineer.

[REDACTED]

In addition, numerous components were locked out and tagged out to assist in the performance of the test. However, it was not evident that the lockout/tagout control sheets were being used to accomplish this activity. The inspectors discussed these issues with licensee management the following week and noted that a PIRCS item for the apparent deficiencies was not generated until four days later, after prompting by the inspectors. The initial investigation by the licensee found several issues to be resolved associated with the activities performed during this evolution.

The deficiencies identified during 302 equipment and 306 diesel generator/UPS/ABT maintenance activities are being evaluated for enforcement and will be tracked as an unresolved item (URI 70-143/2007-002-01).

(2) Conclusions

One unresolved item was identified to evaluate deficiencies identified during 302 equipment and 306 diesel generator/UPS/ABT maintenance activities for enforcement.

4. Emergency Preparedness (IP 88050)

a. Review of Program Changes (F3.01)

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

Changes to the Emergency Plan (EP), organization, facilities, and equipment were reviewed to assess the impact on the effectiveness of the program. The adequacy of the emergency preparedness audit required by Section 7.5 of the Plan was also evaluated.

Since the last inspection (May 2006), a new emergency monitoring supply center had been constructed with enhanced lighting and increased working space. In addition, an offsite alternate Emergency Control Center (ECC) had been identified for activation in response to those events preventing travel by the ECC staff to the site.

Changes were also made to the EP, equipment, and the assignment of personnel to the emergency organization. The changes did not result in a negative impact on the state of emergency preparedness. Changes incorporated as Revision 10 (dated April 2006) to the EP were reviewed and approved by NRC via letter dated November 13, 2006.

Based on the review of the audit report, the independent audit was a detailed compliance-based assessment of the program and resulted in the identification of issues needing improvement and corrective actions which were being tracked for resolution by the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator.

[REDACTED]

(2) Conclusions

Based on documentation reviews and interviews with members of the licensee's staff, program changes made since the last inspection did not reduce the effectiveness of the program. The independent audit was a detailed and critical assessment of the program.

b. Implementing Procedures (F3.02)

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

Select implementing procedures were reviewed to determine if procedures were revised since the last inspection and the adequacy of the revised procedures in the implementation of the EP. The inspector noted that procedures selected for review were revised since the last inspection to reflect changes to the emergency organization, the establishment of an offsite ECC, and the site physical changes. The reviewed changes did not result in a decrease in the effectiveness of the program or any inconsistencies between the EP and implementing procedures.

(2) Conclusions

The revised emergency procedures continued to effectively implement the EP.

c. Training and Staffing of Emergency Organization (F3.03)

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

Key emergency response personnel (On-Scene Coordinators and Emergency Control Director (ECD) and alternates) were trained in accordance with Section 7.2 of the EP. Documentation and interviews disclosed that training included both performance-based training via tabletop drills and instructions regarding changes to the EP and implementing procedures. In addition, improvements were made to the Radiation Technician Training Program by adding more performance-based evaluations. The current emergency response organization staffing levels for responding to routine events appeared to be adequate.

The inspectors conducted a walkthrough with an individual recently assigned to the emergency organization as an alternate ECD. Simulated accident conditions were presented to the interviewee, who was asked to evaluate conditions as the ECD regarding EP activation and event classification. No problems were noted. The interviewee classified the event correctly and was familiar with the role and responsibilities as an alternate ECD.

(2) Conclusions

Key emergency response personnel were trained in accordance with the EP. The combination of drills and instructions pertaining to the EP provided an adequate level of training to maintain the proficiency of emergency personnel regarding response to postulated site accidents.

d. Offsite Support (F3.04)

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

Licensee activities in the areas of training, agreements, and exercises were reviewed to determine if the licensee was periodically involving offsite support groups. Documentation and interviews disclosed that the licensee was contacting the offsite support groups for training, site tours, agreement updates, and participation in exercises.

The inspector met with the Unicoi County Emergency Management Director to review emergency communications equipment and tour facilities used during emergencies. In particular, the inspector was given a tour of the offsite facility available for use by the licensee as an alternate ECC. The inspector noted that the facility, as compared to the previous alternate ECC, was enhancement based on the availability of space and security measures.

The licensee's Emergency Preparedness Coordinator frequently participated in meetings involving local and regional support agencies on matters of mutual interest involving emergency preparedness. Agreement letters with the offsite support agencies described in the EP were current.

(2) Conclusions

Based on documentation and interviews with the site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator and the Unicoi County Emergency Management Director, the licensee maintained frequent contact with offsite support organizations on matters involving emergency preparedness.

e. Drills and Exercises (F3.05)

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

Section 7.3 of the EP required a biennial exercise be performed. This area was reviewed for adequacy in testing both the onsite and offsite emergency response capability, and to assess the degree of challenge posed by scenarios.

[REDACTED]

The last biennial exercise was conducted during September 2004 and, due to weaknesses that were identified, a remedial drill was held and successfully conducted on May 17, 2005. The scenarios that were used for drills and exercises provided sufficient challenges to assess the adequacy of training for response personnel. Licensee critiques were effective in the identification of areas for improvement. The next exercise to fulfill the biennial requirement will be held during Calendar Year 2007.

The inspectors discussed with the licensee the absence of an integrated drill involving the onsite fire brigade and the offsite support fire department. The inspectors were informed that an integrated drill involving the onsite and offsite fire brigades would be held during Calendar Year 2007.

(2) Conclusions

The scenarios used for drills and exercises provided good training opportunities and sufficient challenges to evaluate the emergency organization's state of readiness. Offsite organizations were afforded an opportunity to participate during the biennial exercise.

f. Emergency Equipment and Facilities (F3.06)

(1) Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspector examined several locations where emergency equipment was stored to determine whether the emergency response equipment, instrumentation, and supplies were maintained in a state of operational readiness.

All equipment operated as designed. When radiation detection instruments were exposed to a radioactive source, an appropriate response was obtained. All neutron detection equipment was properly calibrated according to calibration stickers. Calibration records were reviewed for selected detectors to assess the reliability of equipment. The inspector conducted an inventory of select equipment and supplies. No problems were noted.

Since the last inspection, two changes by the licensee viewed as program enhancements included the emergency monitoring supply center and the offsite alternate ECC location.

(2) Conclusions

Based on operability checks and a review of surveillance documentation, the emergency response equipment, instrumentation, and supplies were maintained in sufficient quantities and a state of operational readiness.

[REDACTED]

5. **BPF Operations Restart Review Followup**

a. **SRE Testing Review and Routine Operations**

(1) **Scope and Observations**

The inspectors performed the final followup review of BPF operations. The inspection involved a review of recent safety-related equipment (SRE) testing. As part of the review, the inspectors observed the testing of the nitrogen trickle flow system for uranium aluminum (UAI). The inspectors noted that the flow indicators for the trickle flow were not on a routine calibration frequency. Their calibration category required only an initial calibration prior to installation.

The inspectors noted that the only verification of accuracy following installation was during the SRE testing, which required the verification of consistent indicator values between identical units in series. When this was brought to the licensee's attention, the licensee agreed that the management measures regarding this interlock were less than adequate and committed to improving them by upgrading the indicators to a routine calibration frequency. IFI 70-143/2007-002-02 will be used to track the licensee's upgrade of the SRE calibration.

The inspectors also reviewed routine BPF operations. The inspectors noted adherence with operating procedures and radiological work permits. The inspectors observed the performance of a new supervisor and found him to be knowledgeable of the systems he was supervising (UAI). The inspectors also observed radiation technicians performing a surveillance of a minor spill area. The inspector noted appropriate compliance with contamination control requirements and personal protective equipment for the area.

(2) **Conclusions**

Operations in the BPF areas were adequately conducted and in accordance with approved procedures.

b. **Previous Commitments**

(1) **Scope and Observations**

The inspectors reviewed the status of the BPF restart commitment matrix. This matrix was developed to ensure the safe operation of the BPF upon its return to service and to track the long-term corrective actions of the licensee. The inspectors discussed the remaining five long-term items with facility personnel and verified that implementation of the commitments was in progress and on schedule.

(2) **Conclusions**

The inspectors verified that the implementation of remaining open items on the BPF restart commitment matrix was in progress and on schedule.

[REDACTED]

## 6. Post Strike Recovery Activities

### a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The licensee continued to bring back former striking employees in groups of approximately 20 to 30 individuals. These personnel were being trained in the methods and procedures which had changed since the strike began in 2006. To better diversify the work force, a large majority of the returning employees have been reassigned and retrained on different jobs throughout the facility. These reassignments have required that each employee not only receive the initial site general training, but also be given job specific training for the new assignment. The inspectors have not observed any reduction in safety or negative findings associated with these changes.

### b. Conclusions

No reduction in safety or negative findings have been identified regarding the retraining of workers returning from the strike.

## 7. Follow-up on Previously Identified Issues

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions involving NRC Event #43090 (NMED FC070008). The event involved the discovery of an in-line monitor to be non-functional during a routine SRE test. The control failure was the result of a reduction of the power supply voltage. The reduction of the power supply voltage prevented the inline monitor from functioning, but it did not signal the device trouble indicator. As a corrective action, the licensee installed a voltage supply monitor on all the applicable monitors. The inspectors reviewed the modification approvals and found no issues. The regulatory significance will be evaluated in Inspection Report No. 70-143/2007-201.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee actions with regard to an SRE test failure of the downblending in-line monitor. The cause of the failure was the fusing of a critical contact, which resulted in the inability of the device to shut the appropriate valves. The licensee determined that the failure was not reportable, as other IROFS remained available. As a corrective action, the licensee implemented a software modification to replace the fused contact function. The inspectors reviewed the modification approvals and found no significant issues. This issue was considered closed.

## 8. Exit Meeting

The inspection scope and results were presented to members of the licensee management at various meetings throughout the inspection period and were summarized on March 26, 2007. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

**ATTACHMENT**

**1. PERSONS CONTACTED**

Partial List of Licensee's Persons Contacted

S. Barron, Emergency Preparedness Manager  
T. Coates, Engineering Section Manager  
R. Crowe, Corrective Actions Program Manager  
R. Droke, Licensing/Acting Safety Director  
G. Hazelwood, Engineering Director  
N. Kenner, Human Performance & Learning Director  
T. Lindstrom, Executive Vice President, HEU Operations  
M. Moore, Vice President, Safety & Regulatory  
J. Nagy, Senior Licensing & Regulatory Compliance Officer  
J. Parker, Industrial Safety Manager  
R. Shackelford, Nuclear Criticality Safety Manager  
J. Wheeler, Licensing & ISA Manager  
N. Willis, Security Compliance Manager

**2. INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED**

IP 88020	Operational Safety
IP 88025	Maintenance and Surveillance of Safety Controls
IP 88050	Emergency Preparedness
IP 88055	Fire Safety
IP 88135	Resident Inspector Program for Category 1 Fuel Cycle Facilities

**3. LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED**

70-143/2007-002-01	Open	URI	Evaluate deficiencies identified during 302 equipment and 306 diesel generator/UPS/ABT maintenance activities for enforcement.
70-143/2007-002-02	Open	IFI	Upgrade calibration of UAI flow indicators

[REDACTED]