



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
230 PEACHTREE STREET, N.W. SUITE 818  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303  
NOV 24 1976

*Central File*  
*50-390*  
*391*

In Reply Refer To:  
IE:II:NRC  
50-438 50-328  
50-439 50-390  
50-327 50-391

Tennessee Valley Authority  
ATTN: Mr. Godwin Williams, Jr.  
Manager of Power  
830 Power Building  
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Circular No. 76-06 which is forwarded to you for information. No action is required of you if you do not have a PWR power reactor facility with an operating license.

Should you have questions regarding this circular, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Norman C. Moseley  
Director

Enclosure:  
IE Circular 76-06

*alof*

STRESS CORROSION CRACKS IN STAGNANT, LOW PRESSURE STAINLESS PIPING  
CONTAINING BORIC ACID SOLUTION AT PWR's

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES:

DURING THE PERIOD November 7, 1974 to November 1, 1975 several incidents of through-wall cracking have occurred in the 10-inch, schedule 10 type 304 stainless steel piping of the Reactor Building Spray and Decay Heat Removal Systems at Arkansas Nuclear Plant No. 1.

On October 7, 1976, Virginia Electric and Power also reported through-wall cracking in the 10-inch schedule 40 type 304 stainless discharge piping of the "A" recirculation spray heat exchanger at Surry Unit No. 2. A recent inspection of Unit 1 Containment Recirculation Spray Piping revealed cracking similar to Unit 2.

On October 8, 1976 another incident of similar cracking in 8-inch schedule 10 type 304 stainless piping of the Safety Injection Pump Suction Line at the Ginna facility was reported by the licensee.

Information received on the metallurgical analysis conducted to date indicates that the failures were the result of intergranular stress corrosion cracking that initiated on the inside of the piping. A commonality of factors observed associated with the corrosion mechanism were:

1. The cracks were adjacent to and propagated along weld zones of the thin-walled low pressure piping, not part of the reactor coolant system.
2. Cracking occurred in piping containing relatively stagnant boric acid solution not required for normal operating conditions.
3. Analysis of surface products at this time indicate a chloride ion interaction with oxide formation in the relatively stagnant boric acid solution as the probable corrodant, with the state of stress probably due to welding and/or fabrication.

The source of the chloride ion is not definitely known. However, at ANO-1 the chlorides and sulfide level observed in the surface tarnish film near welds is believed to have been introduced into the piping during testing of the sodium thiosulfate discharge valves, or valve leakage. Similarly, at Ginna the chlorides and potential oxygen availability were assumed to have been present since original construction of the borated water storage tank which is vented to atmosphere. Corrosion attack at Surry is attributed to in-leakage of chlorides through recirculation spray heat exchange tubing, allowing buildup of contaminated water in an otherwise normally dry spray piping.

**ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY LICENSEE:**

1. DESCRIPTION OF YOUR PROGRAM FOR ASSURING CONTINUED INTEGRITY OF THOSE SAFETY-RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS WHICH ARE NOT FREQUENTLY FLUSHED, OR WHICH CONTAIN NON-FLOWING LIQUIDS. This program should include consideration of hydrostatic testing in accordance with ASME Code Section XI rules (1974 Edition) for all active systems required for safety injection and containment spray, including their recirculation modes, from source of water supply up to the second isolation valve of the primary system. Similar tests should be considered for other safety-related piping systems.
2. Your program should also consider volumetric examination of a representative number of circumferential pipe welds by nondestructive examination techniques. Such examinations should be performed generally in accordance with Appendix I of Section XI of the ASME Code, except that the examined area should cover a distance of approximately six (6) times the pipe wall thickness (but not less than 2 inches and need not exceed 8 inches) on each side of the weld. Supplementary examination techniques, such as radiography, should be used where necessary for evaluation or confirmation of ultrasonic indications resulting from such examination.
3. A report describing your program and schedule for these inspections should be submitted within 30 days after receipt of this Circular.

4. The NRC Regional Office should be informed within 24 hours, of any adverse findings resulting during nondestructive evaluation of the accessible piping welds identified above.
5. A summary report of the examinations and evaluation of results should be submitted within 60 days from the date of completion of proposed testing and examinations.

This summary report should also include a brief description of plant conditions, operating procedures or other activities which provide assurance that the effluent chemistry will maintain low levels of potential corrodants in such relatively stagnant regions within the piping.

Your responses should be submitted to the Director of this office, with a copy to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Inspection Programs, Washington, D.C. 20555.

Approval of NRC requirements for reports concerning possible generic problems has been obtained under 44 U.S.C 3152 from the U.S. General Accounting Office.  
(GAO Approval B-180255 (R0062), expires 7/31/77).