TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401

JAN 1 7 1978

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 1217 230 Peachtree Street, NW. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

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In the Matter of) Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket	Nos.	50-327	50-518
		50-328	50-519
	/	50-390	 50-520
		50-391	50-521
		50-438	
		50-439	

Enclosed is the remaining portion of TVA's response to IE Bulletins 77-05 and 77-05A dated November 8 and November 15, 1977, respectively. A partial response was submitted previously by my letter to you dated November 28, 1977.

Very truly yours,

9 Hilleland

J. E. Gilleland Assistant Manager of Power

Enclosure

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Enclosure) Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division of Reactor Construction Inspection Washington, D.C. 20555

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ENCLOSURE

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (50-327 and 50-328) and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (50-390 and 50-391)

Response to IE Bulletin 77-05--The design for Sequoyah and Watts Bar has been reviewed and it has been determined that electrical connector assemblies of the type tested by Sandia Laboratories, or any other type, have not been utilized in systems that are located inside containment, are subject to a LOCA environment, and are required to be operable during a LOCA.

<u>Response to IE Bulletin 77-05A</u>--The design for Sequoyah and Watts Bar has been reviewed and it has been determined that electrical connector assemblies of the type tested by Sandia Laboratories, or any other type, have not been utilized in systems which are required to function to mitigate an accident where the accident itself could adversely affect the ability of the system to perform its safety function.

Hartsville Nuclear Plant Units Al, A2, Bl, and B2 (50-518, 50-519, 50-520, and 50-521)

<u>Response to IE Bulletin 77-05--TVA has no plans to utilize electrical</u> connector assemblies of the type tested by Sandia Laboratories, or any other type, in the design of systems that are located inside containment, are subject to a LOCA environment, are required to be operable during a LOCA.

<u>Response to IE Bulletin 77-05A--</u>TVA has no plans to utilize electrical connector assemblies of the type tested by Sandia Laboratories, or any other type, in the design of systems which are required to function to mitigate an accident where the accident could adversely affect the ability of the system to perform its safety function.

Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (50-438 and 50-439)

<u>Response to IE Bulletins 77-05 and 77-05A</u>--The design for Bellefonte has been reviewed and it has been determined that Litton Precision Product connectors number CIROOTVA36A22S and CIRO6TVA36A22P (cap type connectors) are scheduled for use in local control and test stations in areas subject to LOCA or conditions where the environment during an accident has the potential to adversely affect the operation of the safety function should they fail. These connectors will be qualified to LOCA environments through type tests by an independent laboratory before preoperational testing. This type test program is in progress.