



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381

AUG 02 1994

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of the Application of ) Docket Nos. 50-390  
Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-391

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT  
NO. 50-390, 391/94-24 - REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION

The purpose of this letter is to provide a reply to Notice of Violations 390/94-24-01, -02, and -03 cited in the subject inspection report dated July 1, 1994. The notices of violation are associated with the NRC team inspection of the 75 percent milestone for the Instrument Line Corrective Action Program.

Enclosures 1, 2, and 3 provide TVA's response to Violations 94-24-01, -02, and -03 respectively.

Enclosure 4 provides a summary of commitments made for these violations:

The revised submittal date for these violations was coordinated with the Region II staff. If you should have any questions, contact P. L. Pace at (615) 365-1824.

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Enclosures

cc: See page 2

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ENCLOSURE 1  
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1  
RESPONSE TO NRC'S JULY 1, 1994, LETTER TO TVA  
NRC VIOLATION 390/94-24-01

DESCRIPTION OF VIOLATION

"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality such as deficiencies, deviations and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.

TVA Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Revision 3, paragraph 10.2.2, Corrective Action for Adverse Conditions, requires that adverse conditions be dispositioned by organizations with defined responsibility and authority and shall be corrected with documented plans. Further, the cause ... shall be determined and corrective action taken to preclude recurrence.

Contrary to the above, corrective actions were not adequate to preclude recurrence for adverse conditions. These adverse conditions, deficient slope and separation for safety-related or important to safety instrument sense lines, were identified in previous NRC violations. During NRC inspections which took place during the period of April 25 through May 6, and May 16 through May 20, 1994, 10 instrument sense line slope deficiencies and a separation deficiency for safety-related or important to safety instrument sense lines were identified."

TVA RESPONSE

TVA agrees with the violation as stated.

REASON FOR THE VIOLATION (Slope Deficiencies)

The sense line slope deficiencies were caused by plant personnel working in normally inaccessible or cramped areas on other activities. These sense lines were originally reworked to meet slope requirements under the corrective action scope of NCR6172SCA. Subsequently, Significant Corrective Action Report (SCAR) WBN910112SCA was initiated to document deficiencies identified in maintaining required slope values.

CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

Ten sense lines slope deficiencies were cited. Five were on standard sense line applications and five were on flex hoses. The sense line slope deficiencies identified by NRC are being evaluated and reworked, as required, to meet engineering requirements.

A final plant walkdown is being developed to evaluate sense lines for proper slope using visual examination and/or measurement to determine slope deficiencies. The scope of the sense lines to be considered in this walkdown will be the instrument lines identified in the corrective action for NCR6172SCA and any safety-related sense lines installed after the NCR6172SCA scope was established. The walkdown is to identify and evaluate susceptible

sense line (segments) which meet any of the following general criteria: (1) flex hose installations, (2) sense line segments that are installed in areas that are subject to normal plant modification activities and are installed at minimum slope values, and (3) those sense line segments that have experienced problems maintaining proper slope. The walkdown will be performed after construction activities are reduced and before Unit 1 fuel load.

#### CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION

To resolve issues associated with localized slope anomalies, Project Specification N3E-934 has been revised to provide additional engineering instructions for measuring slope values on sense line segments. The slope orientation on short sense line segments (e.g., segments  $\leq 6$ -inches or those which contain in-line components) are of lesser significance. These minor slope discontinuities may cause small air pockets but will not affect instrument accuracy or performance.

A periodic inspection of selected instrument flex hoses will be implemented to ensure proper orientation is maintained. The frequency of the inspection performed may vary based upon successful results.

A WBN site notice was issued July 15, 1994, to remind plant personnel of their accountability when performing work activities related to vulnerable and sensitive components.

#### DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

The ten instrument sense line slope deficiencies identified by NRC will be evaluated and reworked as required by December 31, 1994.

The sense line slope walkdown, evaluations, and required corrective actions will be completed by December 31, 1994.

The periodic inspection document for the inspection of instrument flex hoses will be completed by December 31, 1994.

#### REASON FOR THE VIOLATION (Separation Deficiency)

The reason for this portion of the violation was inadequate work controls related to the installation and verification of the sense lines under Workplan E-6792-64, which was performed prior to the issuance of TVA's construction stoppage in 1990.

#### CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

Sense line 1-SENL-067-0800A associated with 1-FT-067-61(L) was reworked under Work Order (WO) 94-12327-00 to meet the 18-inch separation requirement.

#### CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION

This deficiency was the only separation problem found based on an inspection of 66 sense lines. This is documented in Quality Control (QC) Inspection Report (IR) WBN-SWEC-I-94-02069. Additionally, twelve other sense lines that were installed prior to the 1990 construction stoppage were reinspected with no separation deficiencies.

Part of the restart of construction actions included procedure revisions for the improvement of work control and attention to detail training. Therefore, any instrument lines installed after the restart of construction activities would be under the control of the improved work control process. This serves as recurrence control.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

All corrective action steps were completed by July 26, 1994. TVA is now in compliance.

ENCLOSURE 2  
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1  
RESPONSE TO NRC'S JULY 1, 1994, LETTER TO TVA  
NRC VIOLATION 390/94-24-02

DESCRIPTION OF VIOLATION

"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires that measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis is correctly translated into drawings.

TVA Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Revision 3, paragraph 7.2.1.C, requires that measures shall be established and implemented to ensure that design output documents appropriately identify engineering requirements that apply to plant activities.

Calculation WBPE0038805017, Sense Line Interface Associated W/ 1-PDT-3-122 A(L), Revision 1, identified the engineering requirement for installation of a collection chamber for safety-related low pressure sensing line 1-SENL-03B-0316A.

Electrical Control Diagram 1-47W610-77-4, Revision 12, identified safety-related instrument 0-LT-77-134A as assigned to electrical Train A.

Stress calculations 43064, Rev. 3, and 43036, Rev. 1, for thermally analyzed instrument line supports 1-043-A-048 and 1-043-BE-105, respectively, specified these supports as 2-way supports.

Contrary to the above, during inspections conducted April 25 through May 6, and May 16 through May 20, 1994, the following examples were identified:

1. The engineering requirement for installation of a collection chamber for safety-related low pressure sensing line 1-SENL-03B-0316A as required by calculation WBPE0038805017, Sense Line Interface Associated W/ 1-PDT-3-122 A(L), Revision 1, was not identified by Electrical Instruments and Control Drawing 47W600-62, Revision 22. As a result, no collection chamber was installed to collect air or gas in the instrument sense line to maintain the accuracy of the instrument during plant operation.
2. Drawing 47W600-144, Rev. H, did not correctly identify the engineering requirement that safety-related instrument 0-LT-077-134A was assigned to electrical train A. This drawing error resulted in the NRC finding that this instrument and its associated sense line were incorrectly identified as protection channel I.
3. Drawings 47W625-715E, Rev. 0. and 47W625-756D, Rev. 0, for thermally analyzed instrument line supports 1-043-AO-048 and 1-043-BE-105, respectively, did not correctly identify the engineering requirement that these supports were 2-way supports. This resulted in the incorrect installation of 3-way supports.

TVA RESPONSE

TVA agrees with the violation as stated.

REASON FOR THE VIOLATION (Example 1)

Example 1 was a result of a failure to correctly translate calculation results to design output drawings. Calculation WBPE0038805017 for 1-PDT-3-122A(L) was issued requiring the use of a high point vent (HPV) reservoir and local panel drawing 47W600-62 was not revised to reflect this requirement.

This work activity was a portion of a large repetitive task that required a comparison between various drawings and calculations to ensure all information was complete and correct. This type of activity required the involved personnel to perform self-checking. The self-checking practices were successfully applied to the remaining portion of the task.

CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

A review of all applicable sense lines covered under the scope of NCR6172SCA that were installed with HPV applications concluded that the problem is limited to the low pressure sense lines associated with instruments 1-PDT-3-122A and -132A. (These instruments monitor the differential pressure across the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps 1A-A and 1B-B).

A subsequent engineering evaluation has concluded that the HPV reservoirs associated with the low pressure sense lines for instruments 1-PDT-003-122A and -132A are not required. This conclusion is based on the maximum error attributable to the lack of a HPV reservoir (approximately 2-inches of water column), which is 0.006 percent of the operating differential pressure.

Calculations WBPE0038805017 and WBPE0038805019 were revised and an exception to Project Specification EX-N3E-934-17, Revision 1, was issued to provide justification for not using the HPV reservoirs.

Appropriate individuals have been briefed on this violation.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION

All required procedures are in place to control engineering work activities to prevent similar occurrences. No further action is required.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

All corrective action steps to correct the hardware deficiency were completed by May 27, 1994. Appropriate individuals were briefed on August 1, 1994. TVA is now in compliance.

REASON FOR THE VIOLATION (Example 2)

A drawing deviation (the incorrect electrical power assignment reference on Local Panel Drawing 47W600-144) most likely occurred in the initial design and is attributed to inattention to detail. This resulted in inconsistent drawing information between the local panel drawing and the primary (upper tier) drawing.

Auxiliary Building passive sump level transmitters 0-LT-077-134 and -135 are supplied electrical power from Train A and Train B sources, respectively. This power assignment is properly shown on all other design documents. (Note: The local panel drawings do not control electrical power design features. The electrical power symbols are for reference only.) Local panel drawing, 47W600-144, incorrectly identified the electrical power sources as Protection Set I and II instead of Train A and Train B. This drawing discrepancy resulted in the installation of incorrect sense line color code separator tags.

#### CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

Local panel drawing 47W600-144 was corrected by the issuance of Design Change Notice (DCN) S-31084-A to implement Drawing Deviation (DD) 94-0234. Proper sense line color code separator tags for 0-LT-077-134 and -135 have been installed.

Based on the timeframe for which the deficiency occurred, it is difficult to ascertain the responsible individual. Appropriate individuals have been briefed on this violation.

#### CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION

A review of the trending of Drawing Deviations as defined in Site Standard Practice (SSP)-2.11, "Drawing Deviation Program," will be performed to determine if this type of error has occurred with a frequency that would indicate a significant problem.

#### DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

Full compliance will be achieved by October 1, 1994.

#### REASON FOR THE VIOLATION (Example 3)

Drafting errors were made in transferring two support clamp identifiers to the design output drawings. This was due to a lack of self-checking.

Instrument Line Supports 1-043-AO-048 and 1-043-BE-105 were modeled as 2-way restraints in their respective stress analyses (43064 and 43036). However, design output drawings 47W625-715E, Revision 0, and 47W625-756D, Revision 0, were issued specifying the use of Unistrut P2010 clamps for these supports. The P2010 clamps provide 3-way restraints for the instrument tubing rather than 2-way restraints as required by the stress analyses. P2010 clamps were installed for these supports as specified on the design output drawings.

#### CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

An engineering evaluation performed for the as-installed configuration for Support 1-043-AO-048 indicated that the installation is within applicable WBN design criteria qualification limits. Calculation 43064 and related design documents will be updated to agree with the as-installed configuration.

An engineering evaluation performed for the as-installed configuration for Support 1-043-BE-105 indicated that the design axial capacity of the clamp

could be exceeded. However, this condition would not result in the failure of the instrument line to perform its (pressure boundary) design functional requirement. In order to agree with the analyzed configuration, the design output drawing will be revised and Support 1-043-BE-105 will be modified to a 2-way restraint.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION

The design output drawings that contained the transposed support information were prepared as part of a contractor task activity. Contractor personnel involved in these errors are no longer working on design activities for WBN.

A field inspection will be performed on a statistical sample of analyzed instrument line supports. The directions of restraint for the installed configurations will be compared to their respective analyzed configurations. This will be performed to determine the possibility of other occurrences in which installed instrument supports do not agree with their analyzed restraint directions and to assess any possible impact on the qualification of the instrument lines and supports.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

Calculation 43064 will be completed by November 1, 1994.

The revision of the design output drawings and the modification of Support 1-043-BE-105 will be completed by November 1, 1994.

The field inspection of a sample of instrument lines supports and associated evaluations will be completed by December 1, 1994.

ENCLOSURE 3  
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1  
RESPONSE TO NRC'S JULY 1, 1994, LETTER TO TVA  
NRC VIOLATION 390/94-24-03

DESCRIPTION OF VIOLATION

"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions or procedures and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions or procedures.

TVA NQA TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Revision 3, paragraph 6.1.1 requires that quality related activities shall be prescribed by documented procedures and instructions appropriate to the circumstances. Activities shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures and instructions.

Modifications and Addition Instruction MAI-4.2A, Piping/Tubing Supports, Revision 10, paragraph 6.1.11.G, required that locking devices shall be used on threaded fasteners as specified by manufacturer's instructions.

Engineering Specification N3E-934, Instrument and Instrument Line Installation and Inspection, Revision 4, paragraph 3.2.11, required that instrument sense lines with ends open to the atmosphere shall have the open end oriented such that it is pointing downward to prevent accumulation or introduction of contaminants.

Engineering Specification N3E-934, Revision 4, paragraph 3.25.3, required that instrument lines shall be identified by affixing tags of each applicable color to the instrument line every third support span.

Procedure MAI-4.5, Pipe and Tube Bending, Revision 4, paragraph 6.2.11, required that the hardness value shall be the arithmetic mean average of four measurements taken around the circumference at the center of the bend arc, for bend qualification samples.

Drawing 47625-756, Rev. 0, required thermally analyzed support 1-043-BE-007 to be installed as a three-way support; design Change Authorization (DCA) M19666-03, Rev. 0, required interface support Number 1, 1-ISLS-997-2450, to be installed as a two-way support; Design Change Authorization M19666-04, Rev. 0, required the first support in line with root valve 1-ISV-62A-428A, to be installed as a two-way support.

Contrary to the above, during inspections conducted April 25 through May 6, and May 16, through May 20, 1994, the following examples were identified:

1. Locking devices used on threaded fasteners were not installed as specified by manufacturer's instructions as required by Procedure MAI-4.2A. Ten examples were identified where the lockwire was not installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions on bolts for 6-way friction clamps for safety-related instrument line interface support installations.

2. Low pressure connection (open to atmosphere) for instrument 1-FS-30-146 was found to be loose and the tubing was not installed pointing downward as required by Engineering Specification N3E-934.
3. Capillary tubing associated with Reactor Vessel Level Indication System instruments 1-LT-68-370, 371, and 372, and 1-PT-68-64, and capillary tubing associated with 1-LT-367, 368, 369, and 1-PT 68-63, were not correctly identified with their respective protection set identifications as required by Engineering Specification N3E-934. These two capillary tubing runs were incorrectly tagged as non-divisional at their respective containment penetrations.

Instrument sense line 1-SENL-001-0282A associated with protection set IV instrument 1-PT-1-5, was not identified with intermediate train tags applied every third support span as required by Engineering Specification N3E-934.

4. Hardness measurements were not taken around the circumference at the center of the bend arc for bend qualification samples as required by Procedure MAI-4.5. Hardness tests of bend qualification samples, conducted by quality control personnel, were not being placed on the outside of the bend arc.
5. Thermally analyzed instrument line support 1-043-BE-007 was not installed as a three-way support as required by drawing 47W625-756. Interface support number 1, 1-ISLS-997-2450, was not installed as a two-way support as required by DCA M19666-03. The first interface support in line with root valve 1-ISV-62A-428A, was not installed as a two-way support as required by DCA 19666-04."

#### TVA RESPONSE

TVA agrees with the violation as stated.

#### REASON FOR THE VIOLATION (Example 1)

The reason for the violation was the inability of field personnel to consistently adhere to complex vendor friction anchor safety wire installation instructions.

Instrument line friction anchor supports supplied by NPS Industries are required to be installed with the use of safety wires to secure the bolts and studs. These vendor instructions are contained in NPS Vendor Manual WBN-VTM-N194-0010.

#### CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

TVA issued Calculation N3-PA-74, Revision 0, which documents the "accept as is" disposition for the discrepancies.

#### CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION

To prevent further deficiencies, NPS Vendor Manual WBN-VTM-N194-0010 was revised to clarify (pictorially) installation instructions for NPS friction anchor safety wires.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

All corrective action steps were completed by June 9, 1994. TVA is now in compliance.

REASON FOR THE VIOLATION (Example 2)

The bent/loose sense line for 1-FS-030-146(L) was apparently caused by area construction activities.

CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

The low pressure sense line for 1-FS-030-146 has been repaired.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION

The implementation of Modifications/Additions Instruction (MAI)-1.9, "Walkdown Verification for Modifications System/Area Completion and Damaged, Loose, Or Missing Hardware," and the site area completion activities identify and correct loose, missing, and damaged commodities. The procedure has a specific inspection attribute (bent tubing) which addresses this type deficiency. This item was located in an area which had not yet been reviewed by this program.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

The repairs of the sense line were completed by June 5, 1994.

REASON FOR THE VIOLATION (Example 3)

The reasons for this example are misinterpretation of drawing information and failure to properly follow site implementing procedure requirements related to the installation of sense line color code separator tags as a recommended action.

CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

A field review was performed in adjacent areas and three additional lines were found with missing tags.

The incorrect color code separator tags for the capillary lines will be replaced with the proper protection set color code. Also, missing separator tags have been installed. This activity will be completed by October 1, 1994.

Sense line color separator tags are used to provide a visual aid to field personnel for ready determination of the line's functional importance. This same field information can be obtained from other sources such as the sense line identification number, root valve number, or the associated instrument's tag data. However, Specification N3E-934 will be revised to clarify the use of color code separator tags as a recommended item.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION

Revision to the specification will provide recurrence control.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

Full compliance will be achieved by October 1, 1994.

REASON FOR THE VIOLATION (Example 4)

The reason for the violation was inadequate training to site implementing procedure MAI-4.5, "Pipe/Tube Bending," for the QC Inspector conducting the hardness test. This hardness test was conducted as a bender qualification demonstration.

Although this inspector was qualified to perform hardness testing, he normally performs the test as a receipt inspection activity on new material such as straight tubing. The test observed during this inspection was a demonstration performed at the request of the NRC inspector. It did not involve tubing intended for installation in the plant. The test which was requested, and which TVA agreed to perform, was different than the work this inspector routinely performs. The specific requirements on where to measure hardness on the bent tube are contained in MAI-4.5. The individual did not have knowledge of the specifics of MAI-4.5.

CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

Quality Control Receipt Inspection personnel were trained to ensure work implementing document requirements and test method requirements are properly implemented. Additionally, MAI-4.5 will be revised to include a reference to Technical Hardness Test Procedure N-GP-24 by October 1, 1994.

A preliminary review performed on applicable qualification reports indicated three more benders had been qualified using the same methodology. The results of the review will be completed by October 1, 1994.

An evaluation of the questionable hardness test results has been performed and it was determined that those results are acceptable.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION

Training and revision to the MAI provide recurrence control.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

Full compliance will be achieved by October 1, 1994.

REASON FOR THE VIOLATION (Example 5)

Design drawing 47W625-756 required the installation of a Unistrut P2010 clamp for Support 1-043-BE-007. A Unistrut P2012 clamp was mistakenly installed for this support. This error resulted in Support 1-043-BE-007 acting as a 2-way support rather than a 3-way support as specified on the design drawing. This condition is a result of a personnel error made by installing the incorrect clamp.

Support 1-ISLS-997-2450 was installed as a 3-way support rather than a 2-way support as required by design output drawings. This condition resulted from

an apparent personnel error made by not reinstalling required washers when performing WO 93-08903-00.

The first interface support installed on the instrument line with Root Valve 1-ISV-62A-428A is shown on DCA M19666-04 as a 2-way support; however, this support is installed as a 3-way support. This condition is the result of an apparent personnel error made in recording the support restraint direction during a field walkdown performed prior to the analysis of the interface area.

CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

Engineering evaluations performed indicate that the design criteria limits for instrument line and support qualification are satisfied with the P2012 clamp (2-way) installed for support 1-043-BE-007. Analysis Calculation 43035 will be updated and the corresponding stress isometric will be revised to reflect the as-installed configuration.

Washers on Support 1-ISLS-997-2550 have been installed to agree with design output drawings.

The interface support associated with Valve 1-ISV-62A-428A will be modified to a 2-way support.

A review for other instances of this problem described in this violation example will be determined by the performance of the sample inspection described in the response to Violation 390/94-24-02, Example 3.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN OR PLANNED TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION

As discussed in response to Violation 390/94-24-02, Example 3, a statistically based sample will be performed.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

Analysis Calculation 43035 will be updated and the corresponding stress isometric will be revised to reflect the as-installed configuration. The scheduled completion date is October 17, 1994.

The interface support associated with Valve 1-ISV-62A-428A will be modified to a 2-way support by October 17, 1994.

ENCLOSURE 4  
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1  
RESPONSE TO NRC'S JULY 1, 1994, LETTER TO TVA  
INSPECTION REPORT 94-24

List of Commitments

(NRC Violation 390/94-24-01)

1. The ten instrument sense line slope deficiencies identified by NRC will be evaluated and reworked as required by December 31, 1994.
2. The sense line slope walkdown, evaluations, and required corrective actions will be completed by December 31, 1994.
3. The periodic inspection document for the inspection of instrument flex hoses will be completed by December 31, 1994.

(NRC Violation 390/94-24-02)

4. Calculation 43064 will be completed by November 1, 1994.
5. The revision of the design output drawings and the modification of Support 1-043-BE-105 will be completed by November 1, 1994.
6. The field inspection of a statistical sample of analyzed instrument lines supports and associated evaluations will be completed by December 1, 1994.
7. A review of the trending of Drawing Deviations will be performed to determine if this type of error has occurred with a frequency that would indicate a significant problem by October 1, 1994.

(NRC Violation 390/94-24-03)

8. Specification N3E-934 will be revised to clarify the use of color code separator tags by October 1, 1994.
9. MAI-4.5 will be revised to include a reference to Technical Hardness Test Procedure N-GP-24 by October 1, 1994.
10. The extent of condition review for bender qualifications will be completed by October 1, 1994.
11. Analysis Calculation 43035 will be updated and the corresponding stress isometric will be revised to reflect the as-installed configuration. The scheduled completion date is October 17, 1994.
12. The interface support associated with Valve 1-ISV-62A-428A will be modified to a 2-way support by October 17, 1994.
13. The incorrect color code separator tags for the capillary lines will be replaced with the proper protection set color code by October 1, 1994.