UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

October 23, 2007

Florida Power and Light Company
ATTN: Mr. J. A. Stall, Senior Vice President
Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer
P. O. Box 14000
Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000335/2007004, 05000389/2007004

Dear Mr. Stall:

On September 30, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your St. Lucie Plant Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 2, 2007, with Mr. Johnston and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, one licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this report. NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it is entered into your corrective action program. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the St. Lucie facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARs) component of NRC's document

system ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Steven J. Vias, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-335, 50-389
License Nos.: DPR-67, NPF-16

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000335/2007004, 05000389/2007004
w/Attachment - Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

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☐ PUBLICLY AVAILABLE ☐ NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE ☐ SENSITIVE ☐ NON-SENSITIVE

ADAMS: ☐ Yes ACCESSION NUMBER:_____

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cc w/encls:
William E. Webster
Vice President, Nuclear Operations
South Region
Florida Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

Gordon L. Johnston
Site Vice President
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Florida Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

Christopher R. Costanzo
Plant General Manager
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution

Bill Parks
Operations Manager
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution

Terry L. Patterson
Licensing Manager
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution

Rajiv S. Kundalkar
Vice President - Nuclear Technical Services
Florida Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

Don E. Grissette
Vice President, Nuclear Training
and Performance Improvement
Florida Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

Seth B. Duston
Training Manager
St. Lucie Ocean Drive
Florida Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

M. S. Ross, Managing Attorney
Florida Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

Marjan Mashhadi, Senior Attorney
Florida Power & Light Company
Electronic Mail Distribution

William A. Passetti
Bureau of Radiation Control
Department of Health
Electronic Mail Distribution

Craig Fugate, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
Department of Community Affairs
Electronic Mail Distribution

J. Kammel
Radiological Emergency
Planning Administrator
Department of Public Safety
Electronic Mail Distribution

Douglas Anderson
County Administrator
St. Lucie County
2300 Virginia Avenue
Ft. Pierce, FL 34982

Report to J. A. Stall from Steven Vias dated October 23, 2007.

SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000335/2007004, 05000389/2007004

Distribution w/encl:
B. Mozafari, NRR
C. Evans (Part 72 Only)
L. Slack, RII EICS
OE Mail (email address if applicable)
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.:	50-335, 50-389
License Nos.:	DPR-67, NPF-16
Report Nos.:	05000335/2007004, 05000389/2007004
Licensee:	Florida Power & Light Company (FPL)
Facility:	St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2
Location:	6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957
Dates:	July 1 - September 30, 2007
Inspectors:	T. Hoeg, Senior Resident Inspector S. Sanchez, Resident Inspector G. Laska, Senior Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.2) C. Kontz, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11.2)
Approved by:	Steven J. Vias, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000335/2007-004, 05000389/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Event Followup.

The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced inspection by region based inspectors. One Green licensee-identified violation was identified. The significance of most findings is identified by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, “Significance Determination Process” (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, “Reactor Oversight Process,” Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

One violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee’s corrective action program. The violation is discussed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Both units started the inspection report period at full Rated Thermal Power (RTP). Unit 1 reduced RTP to 90 percent and 75 percent during the week of August 6 due to micro-fouling of their circulating water pump backwash system from large amounts of algae. Unit 1 also reduced RTP on August 13, to repair a leaking shaft seal injection line on the 1C condensate pump. Unit 1 returned to full RTP on August 14 where it remained throughout this inspection period. Unit 2 was forced to shutdown on August 18, due to a leak on the 2B1 seal injection line and returned to full RTP on September 1 where it operated through the remainder of this inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

During the weeks of August 6, August 13, and September 3, the inspectors reviewed and verified the status of licensee actions taken in accordance with their procedural requirements during the height of the 2007 hurricane season. The inspectors reviewed lessons learned and corrective actions taken from the 2006 hurricane season. The inspectors reviewed Administrative Procedure ADM-04.01, Hurricane Season Preparation, and performed site walkdowns to verify the licensee had made the required preparations. The inspectors performed reviews of plant exterior areas and risk significant systems vulnerable to high winds and hurricane conditions including the following:

- Unit 1 and 2 Turbine Buildings
- Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Auxiliary Building Exteriors
- Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Pump and Heat Exchanger Area

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted four partial equipment alignment verifications of the systems important to safety listed below to review the operability of required redundant trains or backup systems while the other trains were inoperable or out of service (OOS). The

inspectors looked to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system, and therefore, potentially increase risk. These inspections included reviews of applicable Technical Specifications (TS), plant lineup procedures, operating procedures, and piping and instrumentation drawings, which were compared with observed equipment configurations. The inspectors also reviewed applicable reactor control operator logs; equipment out of service and operator workaround lists; active temporary system alterations; and outstanding condition reports (CRs) regarding system alignment and operability.

- 2A Component Cooling Water (CCW) system during 2B CCW system maintenance
- 2B High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) system during 2A HPSI maintenance
- 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) during 2A EDG maintenance
- 1B and 1C charging pumps during 1A charging pump maintenance

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Fire Protection - Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the nine areas listed below to verify they conformed with licensee procedure AP-1800022, Fire Protection Plan. The inspectors specifically examined any transient combustibles in the areas and any ongoing hot work or other potential ignition sources to assure compliance with the licensee's procedure that assured defense-in-depth. The inspectors also assessed whether the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of portions of the fire protection systems, equipment and features were in accordance with the Fire Protection Plan. Furthermore, the inspectors evaluated the use of any compensatory measures being performed in accordance with the licensee's procedures and Fire Protection Plan.

- Unit 1 Charging Pump Area
- Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room
- Unit 1 Piping Penetration Room
- Unit 1 and 2 Big Mud Creek Ultimate Heat Sink Valve Rooms
- Unit 2 CCW Heat Exchanger Building
- Unit 1 A Vital Switchgear Room
- Unit 1 B Vital Switchgear Room
- Unit 2 Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System Room
- Unit 1 Engineered Safety Features Pump Room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

On September 5, 2007, the inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator actions during a simulated station loss of offsite power followed by a loss of coolant accident event to verify that operator performance was adequate and that evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems. The inspectors also reviewed simulator physical fidelity and specifically evaluated the following attributes related to the operating crews' performance:

- Clarity and formality of communication
- Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms
- Control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions
- Oversight and direction provided by operations supervision, including ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions, regulatory reporting requirements, and emergency plan actions and notifications
- Effectiveness of the post-evaluation critique

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Biennial Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the facility operating history and associated documents in preparation for this inspection. During the periods of August 21-23 (in office) and August 27-30 (on site), 2007, the inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the administration of simulator operating tests and Job Performance Measures (JPMs) associated with the licensee's operator requalification program. Each of the activities performed by the inspectors was done to assess the effectiveness of the licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in 10 CFR 55, "Operators' Licenses." The evaluations were also performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines as established by their Systems Approach to Training (SAT) based INPO approved program. The inspectors also reviewed and evaluated the licensee's simulation facility for adequacy for use in operator licensing examinations. The inspectors observed two crews during the performance of the operating tests. Documentation reviewed included written examinations, JPMs, simulator scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records,

simulator modification request records and performance test records, the feedback process, licensed operator qualification records, remediation plans, watchstanding, and medical records. The records were inspected against the criteria listed in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Quarterly Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the reliability and deficiencies associated with the two systems listed below, including associated CRs shown in the list of documents reviewed. The inspectors verified the licensee's maintenance effectiveness efforts met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 and licensee Administrative Procedure ADM-17.08, Implementation of 10 CFR 50.65, Maintenance Rule. The inspectors focused on the licensee's system functional failure determination, a(1) and a(2) classification determination, corrective actions, and the appropriateness of established performance goals and monitoring criteria. The inspectors also attended applicable expert panel meetings, and interviewed responsible engineers. The inspectors reviewed associated system health reports, and the licensee's goal setting and monitoring requirements.

- Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System
- Unit 1 Reactor Protection System

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the risk assessments for the following six systems, structures, and components (SSCs), or a combination thereof, that were non-functional due to planned and/or emergent work. The inspectors also walked down and/or reviewed the scope of work to evaluate the effectiveness of licensee scheduling, configuration control, and management of online risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and applicable licensee program procedure ADM-17.16, Implementation of the Configuration Risk Management Program. The inspectors interviewed responsible senior reactor operators on-shift, verified actual system configurations, and specifically evaluated

results from the online risk monitor for the combinations of OOS risk significant SSCs listed below:

- 2A CCW System OOS While 2A Containment Air Cooler OOS
- 2B CCW System OOS While 2B Containment Air Cooler OOS
- 2B Battery Charger OOS While 2B Charging Pump OOS
- 2B Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Train OOS While Valves HCV-3515 and HCV-3625 OOS
- 2A Instrument Air Compressor OOS While 2A Intake Cooling Water (ICW) Pump OOS
- 2A Battery Charger OOS While 2A ICW Pump and 2C Instrument Air Compressor OOS

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following nine CR interim dispositions and operability determinations to ensure that operability was properly supported and the affected SSCs remained available to perform its safety function with no increase in risk. The inspectors reviewed the applicable UFSAR, and associated supporting documents and procedures, and interviewed plant personnel to assess the adequacy of the interim disposition.

- CR 2007-21387, Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head O-ring Leakage
- CR 2007-21237, 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Radiator Expansion Tank Level
- CR 2007-20789, Unit 1 and 2 Ultimate Heat Sink Barrier Valve Test
- CR 2007-23569, Robotic Camera Left in Unit 2 Containment Building
- CR 2007-24457, 2A EDG Test
- CR 2007-27487, 1A Charging Pump Discharge Valve Stem Damage
- CR 2007-27095, Unit 2 Control Element Drive Motor Disconnect Breaker Wiring
- CR 2007-27862, 2A Charging Pump Valve Block Leakage
- CR 2007-15684, 1A Containment Spray Pump Seal Cooler Fouling

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed and reviewed Work Order (WO) post maintenance test (PMT) activities of the six risk significant SSCs listed below. The following aspects were inspected: (1) effect of testing on the plant recognized and addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) testing consistent with maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents such as TS, UFSAR, and others; (4) range, accuracy and calibration of test equipment; (5) step by step compliance with test procedures and/or work orders (WO), and applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) control of installed jumpers or lifted leads; (7) removal of test equipment; and, (8) restoration of SSCs to operable status. The inspectors also reviewed problems associated with PMTs that were identified and entered into the licensee's CAP.

- WO 36015923, 2B Battery Charger 18 Month Maintenance
- WO 37001810, Ultimate Heat Sink Valve TSA
- WO 33003752, LPSI Valve HCV-3625 Maintenance
- WO 36033250, High Pressure Safety Injection Valve HCV-3625 Maintenance
- WO 37014000, Unit 1 Feedwater Valve FCV-9011 Positioner Replacement
- WO 36018474, Unit 1 Control Element Drive Mechanism Power Switch Replacement

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Forced Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

Forced Outage Entry, Control and Risk Assessment

On August 18, 2007, Unit 2 was shutdown due to exceeding unidentified reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage inside of the containment building. The leakage was determined to be from a cracked pipe joint on the 2B1 reactor coolant pump shaft seal injection line. As a result, a reactor plant cooldown and depressurization took place to repair the leak. The cracked pipe was sent off-site to determine the cause of the failure. The inspectors examined the licensee's implementation of shutdown safety assessments as outlined in licensee procedure 0-AP-010526, "Outage Risk Assessment and Control," to verify whether a defense in depth concept was in place to ensure safe operations and avoid unnecessary risk when shutdown. Furthermore, the inspectors regularly monitored outage planning and control activities in the Outage Control Center (OCC), and interviewed responsible OCC management, during the outage to ensure SSC configurations and work scope were consistent with TS requirements, site procedures, and outage risk controls.

Monitoring of Shutdown Activities

The inspectors observed portions of the reactor plant shutdown and cooldown of Unit 2 beginning on August 18, 2007. The inspectors also monitored plant parameters and verified that shutdown activities were conducted in accordance with TS and applicable licensee operating procedures, such as: 1-GOP-123, "Turbine Shutdown - Full Load to Zero Load;" 1-GOP-203, "Reactor Shutdown;" 1-GOP-305, "Reactor Plant Cooldown - Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown;" and 1-NOP-03.05, "Shutdown Cooling."

Outage Activities

The inspectors examined outage activities to verify that they were conducted in accordance with TS, licensee procedures, and the licensee's outage risk control plan. Some of the more significant inspection activities accomplished by the inspectors were as follows:

- Walked down selected safety-related equipment clearance orders
- Verified operability of RCS pressure, level, flow, and temperature instruments during various modes of operation
- Verified electrical systems availability and alignment
- Verified shutdown cooling system operation
- Reviewed control of containment penetrations
- Examined FME controls put in place inside containment
- Verified near reduced reactor coolant system inventory controls
- Verified boric acid deposited from the seal line leak were cleaned, inspected, and evaluated by the licensee

Heatup, Mode Transition, and Reactor Startup Activities

The inspectors examined selected TS, license conditions, license commitments and verified administrative prerequisites were being met prior to mode changes. The inspectors also reviewed measured RCS leakage rates, and verified containment integrity was properly established. On August 29, the inspector performed a containment walkdown inspection while the RCS was at normal operating pressure and temperature. The results of low power physics testing were discussed with reactor engineering and operations personnel to ensure that the core operating limit parameters were consistent with the design. The inspectors witnessed portions of the RCS heatup, reactor startup and power ascension in accordance with the following plant procedures:

- Pre-operational Test Procedure (POP) 1-3200088
- Unit 2 Initial Criticality Following Refueling
- POP 0-3200092, Reactor Engineering Power Ascension Program
- 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 to Mode 1
- 2-GOP-302, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 3 to Mode 2
- 2-GOP-303, Reactor Plant Heatup - Mode 3 <1750 to Mode 3 >1750
- 2-GOP-403, Reactor Plant Heatup - Mode 4 to Mode 3

- 2-GOP-504, Reactor Plant Heatup - Mode 5 to Mode 4

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed portions of the following six surveillance tests and monitored personnel conducting the tests as well as equipment performance, to verify that testing was being accomplished in accordance with applicable operating procedures. The test data was reviewed to verify it met TS requirements, UFSAR commitments, and/or licensee procedure requirements. The inspectors also verified that the testing effectively demonstrated the systems were operationally ready, capable of performing their intended safety functions, and that identified problems were entered into the licensee's CAP for resolution. The tests included one inservice test.

- 3200051, Unit 2 Moderator Temperature Coefficient Testing
- 2-OSP-03.06A, 2A LPSI Pump Code Run
- 2-OSP-03.05A, 2A HPSI Pump Code Run
- 2-OSP-25.07C, 2C Control Room Ventilation Monthly Test
- 2-OSP-01B, 2B Charging Pump Code Run
- OP-2-0010125A, Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System Isolation Valve Testing

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors continued to periodically screen active Temporary System Alterations (TSA) for risk significant systems. The inspectors examined TSA 1-07-007, Unit 1 control room air conditioning system HVA-3A,3B,3C, including a review of the technical evaluation and its associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening. The TSA was compared to the system design basis documentation to ensure that: (1) the modification did not adversely affect operability or availability of other systems; (2) the installation was consistent with applicable modification documents; and, (3) did not affect TS or require prior NRC approval. The inspectors also observed accessible equipment related to the TSA to verify configuration control was maintained.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

On August 8, 2007, the inspectors observed a quarterly EP drill of the licensee's Emergency Response Organization (ERO) for personnel in the Technical Support Center (TSC). During this drill the inspectors assessed licensee performance to determine if proper emergency classification, notification, and protective action recommendations were made in accordance with EP procedures. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the post drill critique conducted in the TSC.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the following PIs reported to the NRC. The inspectors reviewed the PI data of both Units 1 and 2 for the previous four quarters (i.e., Second Quarter 2006 through First Quarter 2007). Monthly Operating Reports, LERs, RCO Chronological Logs, and CRs were reviewed to verify the reported PI data was complete and accurate.

- Unit 1 Safety System Functional Failures
- Unit 2 Safety System Functional Failures

The inspections were conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151, "Performance Indicator Verification." The applicable planning standard, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Revision 4, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines," was used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensee's CAP. This was accomplished by reviewing the CR summaries from daily printed reports and periodically attending CR oversight group meetings. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

.2 Semi-Annual Review to Identify Trends

a. Inspection Scope

As required by inspection procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, the inspectors performed a review of the licensee's CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on condition reports associated with human performance errors. The inspectors review nominally considered the six-month period of April through September 2007, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the condition reports were reviewed for adequacy.

b. Assessment and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors reviewed several condition reports associated with human errors and determined that there were two examples where the wrong revision to a procedure was used in the field to perform maintenance without any consequence noted. The inspectors also found that several condition reports were written by the licensee to identify a number of human error traps and precursors existing in some licensee processes which could if left uncorrected result in adverse conditions. No trends were identified by the inspectors. The inspectors determined the licensee actions taken to be appropriate and timely.

.3 Annual Sample: Review of 1B Containment Spray Seal Cooler Flow Blockage

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected CR 2007-15684, "Flow Blockage to 1B Containment Spray Seal Cooler," for a detailed review to understand how and why this blockage occurred. The inspectors reviewed the apparent cause evaluation and interviewed engineering personnel. The inspectors evaluated the CR in accordance with the licensee's corrective action process as specified in licensee procedure NAP-204, "Condition Reporting."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

4OA3 Event Followup

.1 (Closed) LER 05000335/2007-001-00, Mispositioned Containment Isolation Valves

On June 6, 2007, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power when two service air containment isolation valves were found locked opened vice locked closed. The licensee was performing a monthly valve lineup surveillance procedure when valves V18794 and V18796 were discovered to be locked open. The licensee's Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1 requires that containment vessel integrity be maintained with containment isolation valves. The licensee determined the cause of the valves being out of their TS required position to be from human error in which implementation of configuration control processes were not exercised. This licensee-identified finding involved a violation of TS 3.6.1, Containment Vessel Integrity. The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in section 4OA7. This LER is closed.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On October 2, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Gordon Johnston and other members of your staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a NCV.

Technical Specification 3.6.1 requires that containment vessel integrity be maintained with prescribed manual valves being locked closed prior to plant entering Mode 4. Contrary to this, on June 6, 2007, two Unit 1 service air manual containment isolation valves were found locked open while performing a TS surveillance at Mode 1. The valves were left locked open for approximately 3 weeks from the time when Unit 1 entered into Mode 4 until time of discovery. The finding was greater than minor because it degraded the containment and shielding building integrity. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it only affected the containment barriers cornerstone and did not present an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the containment vessel. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 2007-17363.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel
D. Albritton, Assistant Operations Manger
E. Armando, Site Quality Manager
D. Calabrese, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
D. Cecchett, Licensing Engineer
T. Cosgrove, Site Engineering Manager
C. Costanzo, Plant General Manager
M. Danford, Performance Improvement Department Supervisor
K. Frehafer, Licensing Engineer
B. Jacques, Security Manager
G. Johnston, Site Vice President
B. Kelly, System Engineer
R. McDaniel, Fire Protection Supervisor
R. Merle, Projects Manager
L. Neely, Work Control Manager
B. Neff, System Engineer
W. Parks, Operations Manager
M. Navin, Assistant Operations Manager
M. Page, Assistant Operations Manager
T. Patterson, Licensing Manager
W. Raasch, System Engineer
G. Swider, Systems Engineering Manager
J. Tucker, Maintenance Manager
R. Walker, Emergency Preparedness
D. Cecchett, Licensing
S. Wisla, Project Manager
B. Dunn, Engineering
M. Horrell, Engineering
J. Judans, Engineering
M. Moore, Radiation Protection Manager
D. Lauterbur, Turkey Point Operations Training Recovery Manager
E. Roberts, Turkey Point Project Manager of Training Material Recovery Project
W. Smith, Operations Training Supervisor
L. Porro, Simulator Engineering Group Supervisor
D. Carpenter, Licensed Operator Continuing Training Instructor
S. Duston, Training Manager

NRC Personnel
B. Mozafari, NRR Senior Project Manager
S. Ninh, Region II Senior Project Engineer

Attachment

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Closed

05000335/2007001-00 LER Mispositioned Containment Isolation Valves (4OA3)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Condition Reports

2007-22449	2007-22653	2007-21968	2007-23576
2007-22471	2007-24457	2007-22050	2007-23577
2007-2122	2007-24381	2007-22068	2007-23628
2007-2659	2007-24402	2007-28072	2007-23402
2007-14974	2007-24444	2007-28087	2007-23442
2007-15438	2007-24453	2007-28100	2007-22478
2007-30416	2007-25136	2007-28136	2007-22601
2007-30529	2007-25194	2007-27855	2007-21510
2007-30609	2007-25219	2007-27888	2007-21532
2007-30654	2007-25319	2007-23361	2007-20688
2007-30346	2007-29117	2007-23383	2007-20690
2007-29820	2007-29230	2007- 23278	2007-20712
2007-29940	2007-28964	2007-23388	2007-20727
2007-30054	2007-22492	2007-23441	2007-20971
2007-27332	2007-28994	2007-22474	2007-21137
2007-27392	2007-29002	2007-27207	2007-21150
2007-27410	2007-29051	2007-21699	2007-19925
2007-27487	2007-29066	2007-21881	2007-19981
2007-27575	2007-28599	2007-21898	2007-20141
2007-24747	2007-28253	2007-20235	
2007-24769	2007-28272	2007-27897	
2007-24786	2007-28310	2007-27931	
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Other Documents

2005-2007 LOR Program Grades.
2006 Biennal Written Exams:
0820066RB
0820066SB
0820066RE
2006 LOCT weekly Quiz 0820063C.

Scenario 0815013, Rev. 16, LOOP With Stuck Open PORV.
Scenario 0815020, Rev. 17, SGTR With Delayed ESDE Inside Containment.
Scenario 0815007A Rev. 00 Station Blackout, Recoverable.
Badge Access Transaction Reports for Reactivation of Licenses (4).
Licensed Operator Medical Records (16).
Feedback Summaries.
Human Performance Errors.
Remedial Training Records (10)
ANSI/ANS-3.4-1983, American National Standard Medical Certification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants, April 29, 1983.
ADM-18.10 Simulator Configuration Control, Revision, 2A.
SEI-07 Simulator Engineering Instruction: Simulator operability Testing and Evaluation.
AP-0005720 Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program Revision, 58A.
Training Guide (TG)-001 Training and Qualification of the Training Department Staff, Revision,. 15.
TG-004 Written Examination Development, Administration, and Control, Revision, 17.
TG-022 Security Provisions for Licensed Operator Examinations, Revision, 9.
TG-023 Simulator Scenario Based Testing, Revision, 5.
TG-024 Conduct of Simulator Training, Revision, 8.
ANSI/ANS-3.5-1998, American Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in Operating Training and Examination, April 15, 1998.
Regulatory Guide 1.149, Nuclear Power Plant Simulation Facilities for Use in Operator Training and License Examinations.
Unit 2 Cycle 15 Core Update Notebook.
Simulator Steady State Performance Testing, 2005,2006 and portions of 2007 Steady State Tests.
Scenario-Based Test Documentation for 0815013 (TG-023, App. A) Revision, 4.
Scenario-Based Test Documentation for 0815020 (TG-023, App. A) Revision, 17.

Transient Tests:
TRN-002 Revision, 9 -Loss of Main Feed water pumps from 100% power with failure of all emergency feed water.
TRN-004 Revision, 7 -Loss of all RCP's From Full Power.
TRN-006 Revision, 9 -Turbine Trip from < 15% power (No Reactor Trip).
TRN-009 Revision, 8 -Double ended main steam line break inside containment.
TRN-011 Revision, 3 -Maximum design Load Reduction.

Simulator DR's:
2006115
2006117
2007045
2007057
2007059
2007119
2007122
2007144S

Simulator Corrective Action Reports:
CR 2007-5532 Simulator.

Training Work Requests:
Training Work Request 2007-24506 - Request for training.
Training Work Request 2007-24608 - Request for training.
Training Work Request 2007-25038 - Request for training, LOCT 07.4 end of week feedback.

Job Performance Measures JPMs:

JPM 0821135T/Rev. 11-Implement EPIP for Fuel Handling Accident.
JPM 0821199T/Rev. 00 - Implement EPIP for an Explosion.
JPM 0821054/Rev. 19 - Locally Operate 1C Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Unit 1.
JPM 0821058/Rev. 11 - Operate the Hydrogen Purge System Unit 2.
JPM 0821009A/Rev. 10 - Verify RAS Unit 1.
JPM 0821010A/Rev. 15 - Verify RAS Unit 2.
JPM 0821037A/Rev. 11- Establish Once-Through Cooling Unit 2.
JPM 0821077/Rev. 12 - Manually Actuate AFAS Unit 2.
JPM 0821075/Rev. 10 - Manually Actuate AFAS Unit 1.
JPM 0821029/Rev. 19 - Align Control Room Recirculation Unit 1.
JPM 0821114/Rev. 13 - Restoration of Electrical Equipment Room Ventilation Unit 1.
JPM 0821024/Rev. 12 - Reset 1C AFW Pump Electrical Overspeed Trip Unit 1.
JPM 0821051B/Rev. 10 - Perform Standard Post Trip Actions Unit 1.

LIST of ACRONYMS

ALARA	As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	Condition Report
DRP	Discrete Radioactive Particle
ED	electronic dosimeter
FP& L	Florida Power and Light Company
IP	Inspection Procedure
PSL	Plant St. Lucie
TS	Technical Specification