TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

May 6, 1985

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Ms. E. Adensam, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Ms. Adensam:

In the Matter of the Application of) Docket Nos. 50-390
Tennessee Valley Authority) 50-391

Please refer to TVA's letter dated April 17, 1985 which provided Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) changes regarding the testing of transfers to the alternate power supplies on the 6.9-kv shutdown boards.

It was recently discovered that the subject FSAR changes were incomplete. A statement regarding the basis for and intervals of testing transfers from the normal to the alternate power supplies was inadvertently omitted.

Enclosed are the correct FSAR changes which will be incorporated into the next FSAR amendment (Amendment 56).

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. B. Ellis at FTS 858-2681.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. A. Domer

J. A. Domer, Chief
Nuclear Licensing Branch

Sworn to and subscribed before me
this 6th day of May 1985.

Paulette D. White
Notary Public

My Commission Expires 8-24-88

Enclosure
cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Enclosure)
Region II
Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

A001

ENCLOSURE

boards, 6.9-kV RCP boards, and the associated 6.9-kV buses were procured in accordance with certain TVA standards and industry standards. TVA specifications require conformance of this equipment to such standards as the following. The overall construction, ratings, tests, service conditions, etc., are required to be in conformance to ANSI C37.20 and NEMA SD-5; the power circuit breakers are referenced to ANSI C37.4 through C37.9 and NEMA SG-4; associated relays are specified to conform to ANSI C37.1, instrument transformers to ANSI C57.13 and NEMA EI-2 and wiring to IPCEA S-61-402 and NEMA WC5.

The design of the equipment arrangement was also implemented to comply with GDC 3 for fire protection and with GDC 18 and Regulatory Guide 1.22 for each of periodic tests and inspections.

Criterion 18

General Design Criterion 18 requires that the offsite power circuits be designed to permit periodic inspection and testing to show:

a. 'The operability and functional performance of the components' of the circuits,

b. The operability of the circuits as whole systems, and

c. 'Under conditions as close to design as practical, the full operation sequence that brings the system into operation.'

The offsite power system has been designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing. Transfers from the normal supply to preferred (offsite) supply or between the preferred circuits may be manual or automatic. Testing of these transfers while the nuclear unit is at power could result in transients that could cause tripping of the reactor or turbine. For this reason, testing of the manual and automatic sequence will be performed ~~at intervals defined in the technical specifications~~ by causing a transfer from the normal supply to the first alternate (preferred) supply, from the normal supply to the second alternate (preferred) supply, and from the first alternate (preferred) supply to the second alternate (preferred) supply will be performed by TVA for economic reasons at intervals specified by TVA.

during shutdown conditions

8.2.2 Analysis

Each 161-kV circuit and its two associated transformers has sufficient capacity and adequate voltage to supply the essential

Transfers from the normal to the first alternate supply is required to satisfy GDC 17 and will be tested at intervals specified in the technical specifications. Testing of the transfers