



Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

O. J. "Ike" Zeringue
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations

OCT 10 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of the Application of) Docket Nos. 50-390
Tennessee Valley Authority) 50-391

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC INSPECTION
REPORT NO. 50-390, 391/95-22 - REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION

The purpose of this letter is to provide a reply to Notice of
Violation 50-390/95-22-01 regarding design control. TVA's reply to
the notice of violation is provided in the enclosure to this
letter.

If you should have any questions, please contact P. L. Pace at
(423) 365-1824.

Sincerely,


O. J. Zeringue

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NOV)
NOV 50-390/95-22-01

NOTICE OF VIOLATION 50-390/95-22-01

"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires that measures shall be established to assure that the design bases are correctly translated into instructions.

This requirement is implemented in part by Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Section 7.2.2.B, which requires that design input documents shall be correctly translated into design outputs.

Contrary to the above, since April 1992, a design input had not been correctly translated into a design output. A calculation (design input), dated April 10, 1992, specified the time dial for the 51G-1932 and 51G-1728 relays be set at 2, but the Relay Setting Sheets (design output) specified a time dial setting of 1 for these relays. Consequently, the time dial setting of 1 was implemented, which resulted in the design basis of selective coordination among relays not being met."

TVA RESPONSE

TVA agrees that this violation occurred.

REASON FOR THE VIOLATION

The reason for this violation was personnel error due to lack of attention in following procedures. Paragraph 5.1, of the Customer Group (CG) and Transmission Power Supply (TPS) Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP)-2.2, "Control of Relay Setting Calculations," requires the relay engineer to be responsible for the accurate and effective development of a relay setting. CG and TPS procedure QAP-2.3, "Document Control of Relay Setting Calculations," requires the preparer to transfer relay setting information from relay setting documents to the appropriate relay setting forms. However, contrary to these requirements, the personnel involved failed to accurately transfer the correct relay time dial setting to the relay setting sheet.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

TVA has confirmed that this condition only affected the alternate power supply feeder breakers for the shutdown boards.

To address the hardware issue, TVA performed a review of the upstream calculation E31 841214301, R3 and downstream calculations E31 920108 300, R2, E31 840810 005, R1 and E31 840612 001, R2 to ensure coordination of the normal and alternate feeder breakers. As a result, TVA has revised calculation E31 850221 300 to provide margins consistent with good engineering practice to assure proper selective coordination. Design Change Notice (DCN) W-38066-A has been issued and implemented to provide these margins and to correct the above relay setting sheet errors.

In addition, TVA has reviewed a representative number of this type calculation which potentially could have transferred information errors. This review identified no additional deficiencies. It was concluded from this review that the extent of the condition was isolated to calculation E31 850221 300, R2. Therefore, no further actions are considered necessary.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS

TVA has counseled the personnel involved in this violation example regarding the verification of the accuracy of information transferred from relay calculations to relay setting sheets. In addition, a memorandum was issued to provide information concerning this violation and to remind relay engineers that in the future to verify the accuracy of the data being transferred from the calculation to the relay setting sheets.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

With respect to the cited violation, TVA is in full compliance.