



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381

APR 28 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:


In the Matter of the Application of) Docket Nos. 50-390
Tennessee Valley Authority) 50-391

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO.
390, 391/94-88 - REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The purpose of this letter is provide additional information based upon recent discussions with NRC personnel and NRC letter of April 13, 1995. Enclosure 1 provides this additional information.

Enclosure 2 provides a list of commitments made as a result of providing additional information. If you should have any questions, contact P. L. Pace at (615)-365-1824.

Sincerely,



Raul R. Baron
Nuclear Assurance
and Licensing Manager (Acting)

Enclosures
cc: See page 2

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Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

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ENCLOSURE 1

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
REPLY TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
TVA MARCH 17, 1995, LETTER TO NRC
NRC VIOLATION 390/94-88-01

Based upon recent discussions with NRC personnel and NRC letter of April 13, 1995, TVA provides the following response to NRC questions with respect to Examples 1 and 2:

Example 1 concerned the improper support of Class 1E field cable 1PS117A and additional Class 1E field cables using 1PS117A as support.

Information Requested: Address the conditions of additional Class 1E cables secured to cable 1PS117A which were also inadequately supported. Provide a specific completion date.

TVA RESPONSE

The additional cables being supported were identified as 1PS116A, 1PS118A, and 1PS119A. The field inspector noted that other cables were attached to the cable bundle consisting of the four cables noted above; however, a lifting check showed that they were not relying on the bundle for support. Thirty-five cables were reworked by Work Order 95-02647-00 in order to provide correct training and support within the panel. The work order documents there was no damage found to any of the reworked cables. The cables were installed during various time periods. Therefore, TVA has not been able to identify a specific cause for the improper attachment. TVA agrees that attaching additional cables, including spared and abandoned cables to a point beyond the last proper support is an isolated example of poor workmanship. Current procedures clarify the methods and practice of cable training and support.

The other corrective actions previously provided in the initial response will be completed by July 28, 1995.

Information Requested: Provide information as to why only vendor wired panels which have not been previously inspected will be inspected for cable support conditions. Identify other panel inspection programs and describe types of panels/boards which have not been inspected under the panel inspection program.

TVA RESPONSE

Panels/boards where field cables are routed for termination are all vendor supplied (wired), meaning the field cables terminate in order to interface with the vendor equipment through the vendor internal wiring. Therefore, the inspection of field cable supports outlined in PER WBP950025 corrective actions which inspects all safety-related panels/boards required for Unit 1 operation fulfills all inspection requirements for the selected panels. Panels excluded from the corrective actions of PER WBP950025 are being evaluated during the "R" panel walkdowns of PER WBP940305 for improperly taped field cables. Improper field cable supports or any other out of scope items found during the "R" panel walkdown will be identified.

Example 2 concerns an instance of Raychem heat shrink tubing at Class 1E outboard containment electrical penetration 1-PENT-293-0052-B not being installed in accordance with vendor manual instructions. The observed condition was that there was no visible flow of sealant at the repair sleeve end thereby indicating inadequate sealing.

Information Requested: Identify the Problem Evaluation Report which documents the Example 2 cited condition and the expected date of closure.

TVA RESPONSE

Example 2 is documented by PER WBP950047. Correction was performed by Work Order 94-20914-07 which was completed on April 8, 1995. PER WBP950047 is expected to be closed by May 13, 1995. However, continued inspection for similar problems continues under the revised corrective actions of WBSA950002.

ENCLOSURE 2

LIST OF COMMITMENTS

1. TVA expects the overall completion date for the inspection by PER WBP950025 of all safety-related panels required for Unit 1 operation to be July 28, 1995.
2. TVA expects closure of PER WBP950047 by May 13, 1995.