change and the as-built configuration were properly implemented and that TVA had properly controlled the closure of all DCNs noted above.

The team also reviewed PACR-0076 regarding the lack of interface requirements between the Instrument Line CAP and the Radiation Monitoring System SP. Specifically, the Instrument Line (IL) CAP was revised to address the relationship between the Instrument Line CAP and the Radiation Monitoring System SP. IL CAP structural issues (including thermal affects, bending, compression, fittings, and support discrepancies) affect radiation monitor lines and were included within the IL CAP. The team reviewed the thermal affects analysis methodology given in PACR-0076 and determined that it was technically adequate to ensure satisfactory implementation.

Based on the results of system walkdowns and the team's review of selected documentation related to the Radiation Monitoring System SP, it was determined that the applicable TARP commitments were properly addressed in the implementing documents and that identified discrepancies were appropriately dispositioned with adequate technical justification.

4.5 <u>Master Fuse List SP</u>

4.5.1 Scope of Review

TVA promulgated the Master Fuse List (MFL) SP to develop a Master Fuse List of safety-related fuses, to resolve the misapplication of Bussman KAZ actuator devices as fuses, and to resolve deficiencies involving electrical penetration assembly overcurrent protection fuses.

The team reviewed the following documentation to verify the adequacy of corrective actions implemented during Phases III and IV of the Master Fuse List SP. These included (1) Technical Adequacy Review Plan, 91854-TARP-PW-T-105, (2) PACR-0073, (3) PACR-0074, (4) PACR-0075, (5) PACR-0369, (6) PACR-0332, (7) Procedure EAI-3.22, (8) Procedure SSP-2.52, and (9) Procedure PAI-5.01. The team also reviewed TARP primary and secondary commitments and sampled various TVA documentation related to corrective actions to resolve issues related to the Master Fuse List. The team also conducted a walkdown of Unit 1 and Unit 2 fuse panels required for Unit 1 safe shutdown and auxiliary control air system (ACAS) fuse panels to verify that fuses were properly sized, labeled, and tagged.

4.5.2 Results

The team reviewed PACR-0369 which addressed a discrepancy identified by TVA during a walkdown of Unit 2 fuses required for Unit 1 safe shutdown. Specifically, during this walkdown, TVA identified CCS fuses needed for safe shutdown that did not have safety-related identification tagging in their associated fuse panels (i.e., panels R078, R077, R076, R075, R074, R073, and R070). The team reviewed PACR-0369 and the Master Fuse List of Unit 2 safetyrelated fuses. The team also conducted a walkdown of fuse panels to verify that TVA had taken appropriate actions to correct sizing, tagging, and labeling deficiencies of Unit 2 fuses needed for safe shutdown of Unit 1. The team inspected fuse panels R073 and R078 and found that proper safety-related orange-colored component ID labeling and tagging were installed for eight safety-related Unit 2 CCS fuses. The fuse sizes were also verified to be correct.

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