

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

May 23, 1980

MAY 27 10:32

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II LETTER
RII:EHG 50-390/80-05-02 AND 50-391/80-04-02 - SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

In my letter to you dated April 15, 1980, TVA provided responses to the two infractions specified in the subject letter. In a letter dated May 2, 1980, from C. E. Murphy to H. G. Parris, TVA was requested to provide additional information on these infractions in accordance with an April 30, 1980, telephone conference call between the NRC and TVA.

Enclosed are TVA's responses to the NRC concerns as specified in the April 30, 1980, telephone conference call.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 854-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INFRACTION 390/80-05-02 AND 391/80-04-02

The following areas of concern were verbally expressed by the NRC-OIE Inspector, E. H. Girard, on April 30, 1980, in regard to TVA's response to the subject infraction concerning fillet weld deficiencies.

1. What has TVA done to assure that in the future nonconforming conditions of a potentially generic nature are promptly identified and investigated expeditiously?

Response

TVA believes that, in general, NCR's of a potentially generic nature are being identified and investigated to resolve QA concerns. However, TVA agrees that the generic implication of this problem were not identified expeditiously. We have investigated the time between the issue of the first NCR and CAQR M-41 (December 27, 1979) concerning socket fillet welds and our notification to NRC that we had a potentially reportable condition (February 15, 1980). This time is approximately seven weeks. During this time, three NCR's were issued for socket fillet welds, one in mid-January and two in early February. This was identified as a generic problem on February 15, 1980. During January the welding inspectors who were to make these investigations were assigned to look into welding problems in the hanger program (390/80-06-01, 391/80-05-01) which was a more crucial activity and carried a higher priority. If a similar situation occurs in the future, TVA agrees that it should be handled in a more timely fashion if possible. However, TVA's handling of this matter could not have compromised plant safety since a program was being established to completely identify all occurrences of undersized fillet welds.

TVA's Office of Engineering Design and Construction is reviewing the timeliness in the initiation and determination of significance of nonconformance reports on nonconforming conditions to assure that such matters are promptly identified and investigated expeditiously. Specific guidelines on timeliness in handling nonconformances will be identified to all organizations in OEDC.

2. How will WBN coordinate the resolution of this condition?

Response

The resolution of the fillet weld deficiency is being coordinated by the responsible system engineers and their supervisors. Overall guidance and direction are provided by the construction engineer and the assistant construction engineer (mechanical).

The handling of this matter may have appeared informal to the inspector at the time he was here, since we were still developing the extent of the problem and had just determined that the matter was significant and generic.

Normally, a formal procedure is not used to delineate responsibility for such matters other than the general assignment of QA responsibility to the construction engineer. We are evaluating this situation to determine if such a procedure is needed for conditions which may require extensive investigation. TVA plans to prepare a report covering the fillet weld problem when investigation and corrective action are complete.

3. What are WBN's plans relative to examination of areas other than socket welds?

Response

On March 24, 1980, the construction engineer formally directed the engineering unit supervisors to develop inspection programs for all safety-related features in their areas of responsibility that utilize fillet welds. These programs are ongoing now for the civil and electrical areas and will be initiated in other areas when the civil and electrical programs are completed. Progress is determined by the availability of welding inspectors. Mechanical pipe hangers had already been identified as a problem area prior to initiation of the socket weld program, and they are being reinspected 100 percent (including fillet welds) utilizing a new hanger inspection procedure.

4. What has been done about the apparent lack of knowledge of the size requirements by the weld inspectors?

Response

Retraining sessions for welding inspectors covered the sizes required by Code for socket welds and flange socket welds, the way to calculate and measure fillet welds, and the proper use of welding gauges. In addition, handouts were given to each inspector covering each of these areas, and each inspector was issued his own welding gauge. Inspector training was documented by training memorandum filed on March 27, 1980, and stored in the vault.