



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

FEB 22 1980

Report Nos. 50-390/80-03 and 50-391/80-02

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
 500A Chestnut Street
 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Facility Name: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391

License Nos. CPPR-91 and CPPR-92

Inspection at Watts Bar Site near Spring City, Tennessee

Inspector: *M. Thomas* 2/21/80
 M. Thomas Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: F. S. Cantrell (January 31 through February 1, 1980)

Approved by: *F. S. Cantrell* 2/21/80
 F. S. Cantrell, Section Chief, RC&ES Branch Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on January 29 - February 1, 1980

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 27 inspector-hours on site in the areas of 10 CFR 50.55(e) items, chipping activities in the auxiliary building, vital battery rooms, Unit 1 pressurizer, and the diesel generator building.

Results

Of the 5 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *J. E. Wilkins, Project Manager
- *S. Johnson, Assistant Construction Engineer (Mech.)
- *A. W. Rogers, QA Supervisor
- *J. E. Treadway, Construction Superintendent
- *R. L. Heatherly, Supervisor, QC & R Unit
- *J. H. Perdue, Supervisor, Electrical Engineering Unit (EEU)
- *J. M. Lamb, Supervisor, Mechanical Engineering Unit (MEU)
- *C. O. Christopher, Assistant Construction Engineer (Civil)
- *J. G. Shields, Assistant Construction Engineer (Elect)
- *J. A. Nicholls, Supervisor, Civil Engineering Unit (CEU)
 - L. J. Johnson, Engineer, MEU
 - R. Washington, Engineer, MEU
 - G. Bonine, Engineer, MEU
 - T. R. Brown, Engineer, CEU
 - J. Morgan, Engineer, MEU
 - R. Anderson, Engineer, EEU
 - D. Eidson, Supervisor, Startup Testing & Coordination Unit

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians.

NRC Resident Inspector

*T. L. Heatherly

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 1, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. Inspector Follow-up item 390/80-03-04 and 391/80-02-04, Accessibility to Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valves and Instrumentation (paragraph 7), was discussed in detail.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Unresolved Item 391/79-38-03, Unavailable NDE Materials Certification. The inspector reviewed the material certification for the liquid penetrant cleaner, control No. 79G030, and verified that the subject material met requirements for halogen content.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Independent Inspection Effort (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors conducted a general walk-through inspection of Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings and the auxiliary building. Areas inspected included general housekeeping practices, chipping activities in the auxiliary building, diesel generator building, vital battery rooms and Unit 1 pressurizer. The following QA audit reports were reviewed:

- (1) WB-M-79-11, "Installation of Spent Fuel Storage Racks".
- (2) WB-M-79-12, "Inspection and Documentation Requirements for Mechanical Supports".

Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Licensee Identified Items (50.55(e))

The Region II inspector reviewed the items listed below and the supporting documentation, and discussed the items with responsible licensee staff during the inspection.

- a. (Closed) Item 390/79-43-01 and 391/79-36-01, "RHR Pump Motor Service Factor" (SWP 79-W-10). The inspector reviewed the TVA final report dated December 7, 1979, and the closed ECN 2221. The inspector verified that the flow restrictions required by ECN 2221 had been added in each RHR pump hot leg and cold leg injection header to provide the pressure drop necessary to prevent pump motor overloading.
- b. (Closed) Item 390/80-02-02 and 391/80-01-02, "Defective Gould Motor Starters" (1971R and 35-1) Gould factory representatives visited Watts Bar on November 14, 1979, and supervised the replacement of the carrier assemblies in the affected boards in accordance with Gould Field Quality Instruction 10.1. The starters with new carriers are acceptable.
- c. (Open) Item 390/80-03-01 and 391/80-02-01, "Component Cooling Water Pump Discharge Nozzle Overloading" (CEB 79-37). The licensee reported that a design error exists that results in the five component cooling water pump discharge nozzles overloading due to thermal growth combined with normal operating pressures.
- d. (Open) Item 390/80-03-02 and 391/80-02-02, "Tuf-Loc Bearings in GE Circuit Breakers" (EEB 79-17 and NCR 36-1). The licensee reported that certain GE circuit breakers with ML-13 operating mechanisms containing Tuf-Loc bearings can experience a condition that affects bearing operation.

- e. (Open) Item 390/80-03-03, "Subassembly not Bored to Specifications" (1942R). TVA reported 3/4" bosses for pressure transmitter nos. 68-66 and 68-68 on Dravo subassembly 74-RHR-64 (6795) have a 3/4" bore through the boss and pipe. Drawings specify that the boss should have a 3/8" bore.
- f. (Open) Item 391/80-02-03, "Field Welds Made Without Authorization" (1803R). TVA reported that two field welds in the CVCS system were made without field weld operation sheets to authorize or document the work.

7. Inspector Follow-up Items

- a. (Closed) Item 390/79-39-01 and 391/79-33-01, "Installation of Poison Shims in Spent Fuel Storage Racks". The inspector reviewed this item and the information provided by the licensee and found it to be acceptable.
- b. (Open) Item 390/80-03-04 and 391/80-02-04, "Accessibility to Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valves and Instrumentation". During inspection of the pressurizer the inspectors experienced some difficulty in gaining access to the safety and relief valves at the top of the pressurizer. This was due to the limited space between the pressurizer and the ladder which leads to the top of the pressurizer. During discussions with licensee site management, the inspectors expressed concern over the dose rate a person could receive during plant operation if it were necessary to gain access to the pressurizer due to the amount of time involved in gaining access.

8. IE Bulletin

(Closed) IEB 79-25, "Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety-Related Systems". TVA's investigation revealed that none of the Westinghouse BFD or Nbfd relays are in use, or are planned for use, in safety-related systems at Watts Bar.