



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

JAN 10 1980

Report Nos. 50-390/79-43 and 50-391/79-36

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
 500A Chestnut Street
 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Facility Name: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391

License Nos. CPPR-91 and CPPR-92

Inspection at Watts Bar Site near Spring City, Tennessee

Inspector: *R. J. Cochran for*
 M. Thomas

1/10/80
 Date Signed

Approved by: *R. J. Cochran for*
 F. S. Cantrell, Section Chief, RCES Branch

1/10/80
 Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on December 3-19, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine unannounced inspection involved 52 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of storage and handling of stainless steel piping, application of sealant and silicone foam in electrical conduits and firestops, testing of a diesel generator and overall status of construction activities.

Results

Of the 4 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- ***J. E. Wilkins, Project Manager
- **H. C. Richardson, Construction Engineer (Acting Project Manager)
- *J. E. Treadway, Construction Superintendent
- **R. L. Heatherly, Supervisor, QC&R Unit
- **A. W. Rogers, Supervisor, QA
- **S. Johnson, Assistant Construction Engineer (Mech) (MEU)
- *J. M. Lamb, Supervisor, Mechanical Engineering Unit
- *J. Weinbaun, QA Engineer
- *C. O. Christopher, Assistant Construction Engineer (Civil)
- *F. W. Lawhern, Assistant Construction Superintendent
- *J. G. Shields, Assistant Construction Engineer
- D. Eidson, Supervisor, Startup Testing and Coordination Unit
- F. Smith, Supervisor, Materials Engineering Unit
- A. Leff, Mechanical Engineer, MEU
- G. Bonnie, Mechanical Engineer, MEU
- G. Vest, Mechanical Engineer, MEU

Other licensee employees included construction craftsmen, and technicians.

***Attended exit interview December 19, 1979; will assume duties as Project Manager December 30, 1979.

**Attended exit interview December 7, and December 19, 1979.

*Attended exit interview December 7, 1979.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 7, 1979, and December 19, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Independent Inspection Effort (Units 1 and 2)

a. During this inspection period the following non-programmatic construction activities were inspected, observed or witnessed:

- (1) Observed housekeeping activities in Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings and the auxiliary building.
- (2) Observed the storage of stainless steel piping in Unit 2 reactor building and outside storage areas.
- (3) Observed work activities in the Fuel Handling building.
- (4) Observed the application of RTV sealant and silicone foam in electrical conduits and firestops in the diesel generator building.
- (5) Observed the testing of diesel generator 1A-A.
- (6) Observed the handling of safety related piping in the auxiliary building.

Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Licensee Identified Items (50.55(e))

- a. (Open) Item Nos. 390/79-43-01 and 391/79-36-01, "RHR Pump Motor Service Factor" (NCR #SWP 79-W-10) TVA reported that the RHR pump motors were found to exceed their allowable service factor due to the RHR discharge piping system pressure drop being lower than that specified in the Westinghouse design criteria.
- b. (Open) Item Nos. 390/79-43-02 and 391/79-36-02, "Departure from Nucleated Boiling (DNB) Ratio" (NCR #NEB 79-7) Westinghouse notified TVA that during the transient following a single rod drop at high power levels, the DNB ratio is less conservative than stated in the FSAR.
- c. (Open) Item Nos. 390/79-43-03 and 391/79-36-03, "Operation of Safety Injection (SI) System at Westinghouse PWR's" (NEB 9-5) TVA reported that a failure in the P-4 signal circuit from the reactor trip breakers could block a valid safety injection signal or prevent a transfer from injection to recirculation mode. The redundant SI channel would initiate safety injection.
- d. (Open) Item Nos. 390/79-43-04 and 391/79-36-04, "Unauthorized Bending of Reinforcing Steel" TVA reported to RII that bending of reinforcing steel was done without proper engineering approval.