

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

January 29, 1981 P12:16

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE LETTER RII:JAM 50-390/
80-30, 50-391/80-23 - SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

The subject letter dated November 21, 1980, cited TVA with an infraction. TVA's response was provided on January 14, 1981. The following supplemental information addresses other areas of corrective action.

TVA's inspector observed activities at the vendor's shop, including oversize dummy drag testing of the first five fuel racks (Nos. 22, 26, 21, 25, and 28). He noted that the drag force monitor experienced excessive vibrations. Later tests, including retest of rack No. 28, were observed by the inspector, and he noted that the excessive vibration had been corrected. TVA allowed racks 21, 22, 25, and 26 to be shipped to Watts Bar even though, apparently, the racks were not retested. Based upon the inspector's judgement, with the concurrence of the technical engineer, there was adequate confidence that the racks were acceptable. Later, when the issue was raised, TVA placed the four racks in a hold status. Final disposition has not been decided, but tentative plans are to retest the racks onsite with an oversize dummy. In addition, the Division of Engineering Design (EN DES) Quality Assurance Branch is investigating the matter to determine what, if any, additional improvements may be needed in the QA program in regard to source inspection.

Oversize dummy drag tests were performed at the Watts Bar site at the instructions of EN DES employees. After a closer look at the Westinghouse F-8 specification, it was determined that the oversize dummy drag tests were not required after installation. These tests are required to be done at the fabricator's shop. However, it was discovered that the dummy used at the site had physical defects. The nonconforming condition to the dummy used at the site has been identified by EN DES on nonconformance report WBNQAB8101. Investigation of this nonconformance includes a determination as to what other testing may have been performed with this deficient dummy.

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director

January 29, 1981


The original procurement specification was patterned after the Westinghouse F-8 specification. In regard to cell verticality, the specification requires the top and bottom to be within 1/8" of vertical. Testing indicated that a number of cells exceeded this limit. The vendor and TVA agreed, after evaluation of the impact of this condition, to relax this limit to 0.4". Westinghouse (the fuel supplier) approval was not required; however, TVA has reevaluated this position and we are now submitting the appropriate data to Westinghouse for their review and approval. Testing performed after installation indicated that a number of cells did not meet levelness criteria. The cells were nonconformed, reworked, and retested. The same process will be followed on future construction.

Discussions have been held between Quality Assurance, Licensing, and the responsible design employees in regard to handling identification of nonconformances and reporting on matters involving repetitive deficiencies. Instructions were given that, when conditions occurred where a number of related nonconformances were experienced or expected (and it cannot be assured that the matter, taken in total, will not be significant), an additional, significant nonconformance report should be written to cover the overall QA program aspects. This would be used as the identifying document for both QA program implications and reporting to NRC. In addition, trend analysis programs are being implemented in both design and construction. QA organizations will help ensure that these situations are properly identified.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director
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