

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

October 5, 1979

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II LETTER
RII:EHG 50-390/79-09, 50-391/79-07 - INSPECTION REPORT - ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION ON INFRACTION

The subject letter dated March 20, 1979, cited TVA with one infraction
in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201. Our response to that infraction was
submitted April 11, 1979.

As requested by C. E. Murphy's letters to H. G. Parris dated May 9, 1979,
and May 14, 1979, additional information was submitted on May 23, 1979.
Enclosed is our revised final response.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch
with D. L. Lambert at FTS 854-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stallo, Jr., Director (Enclosure) ✓
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
INFRACTION 390/79-09-01 AND 391/79-07-01
REVISED FINAL RESPONSE

Infraction 390/79-09-01 and 391/79-07-01

As required by criterion V of appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and implemented by FSAR, paragraph 17.1A.5, "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions"

Contrary to the above, on February 21, 1979, the weld reinforcement on both ASME section III, class 3, CVCS holdup tanks exceeded the maximum specified by ND-4426 of ASME section III.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved

An inspection of the subject tanks was made on June 6, 1979, by representatives of CBI, the tank contractor, TVA Construction, TVA Engineering Design, and Hartford Steam Boiler. It was concluded that there was excessive reinforcement both inside and outside the tanks. CBI proposed a procedure to grind areas of excessive reinforcement from the tanks and this grinding has been accomplished. The welding reinforcement has been inspected by a TVA welding inspector and is now 3/32 inch or less.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved

We are now in full compliance.

Final Response to Supplemental Questions

Inspector E. H. Girard requested TVA to provide Region II with the following additional information in regard to the subject infraction:

- a. Provide an accurate representative description of the weld surface condition on the I.D. and O.D. of the CVCS holdup tanks and the monitor tank.
- b. Review and evaluate radiographic film for the tank welds. Provide a description of the findings.
- c. Provide copies of the ASME data reports for the two holdup tanks and the monitor tank.
- d. Identify any safety-related fabrication performed by Chicago Bridge and Iron at the Watts Bar site in addition to that already identified, i.e., in addition to the monitor tank, holdup tanks, and the two steel containments.
- e. Indicate whether or not the Contractor will be contacted with regard to corrective action on the tanks. If not, why?

Final Response

- a. Examples of excessive reinforcement were found both inside and outside the CVCS holdup tanks. The outside of the monitor tank had some areas of excess reinforcement. The inside of the monitor tank was not inspected because of the possibility of damaging the tanks internal diaphragm and because welds inside the tank were ground smooth during erection according to drawing requirements. All areas of excessive reinforcement have been ground to 3/32 inch or less.
- b. A sampling of the radiographic film was inspected by CBI and TVA representatives and by the NRC resident inspector. No discrepancies were found.
- c. Copies of the data reports have been given to the NRC inspector, E. H. Girard. A signature discrepancy on one data report has been resolved, and a corrected copy is available at the site.
- d. All other CBI fabrications are nonsafety-related.
- e. CBI has inspected the tanks and performed additional grinding at the site which constitutes the corrective action. TVA and the Hartford Steam Boiler authorized nuclear inspector have witnessed the work and signed the CBI procedure to document acceptance of it.