

October 24, 2007

Mr. Dale E. Young, Vice President  
Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA1B)  
ATTN: Supervisor, Licensing & Regulatory Programs  
15760 W. Power Line Street  
Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708

SUBJECT: CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING SPENT  
FUEL POOL MISSILE SHIELDS (TAC NO. MD4279)

Dear Mr. Young:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 226 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 for Crystal River Unit 3. The amendment is in response to your application dated February 8, 2007, as supplemented by letter dated August 23, 2007, requesting authorization to amend the Final Safety Analysis Report commitment to maintain missile shields over the spent fuel pool. This amendment revises the basis for protecting the fuel in the spent fuel pool from tornado missiles, such that the missile shields can be removed.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stewart N. Bailey, Senior Project Manager  
Plant Licensing Branch II-2  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-302

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 226 to DPR-72
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION  
CITY OF ALACHUA  
CITY OF BUSHNELL  
CITY OF GAINESVILLE  
CITY OF KISSIMMEE  
CITY OF LEESBURG  
CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH AND UTILITIES COMMISSION,  
CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH  
CITY OF OCALA  
ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION AND CITY OF ORLANDO  
SEMINOLE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.  
DOCKET NO. 50-302  
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT  
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 226  
License No. DPR-72

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Florida Power Corporation, et al. (the licensees), dated February 8, 2007, as supplemented by letter dated August 23, 2007, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, by Amendment No. 226, Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 is hereby amended to authorize the change to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as requested by letter dated February 8, 2007, and evaluated in the associated safety evaluation by the Commission's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The licensee shall submit the update of the FSAR authorized by this amendment in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e). Also, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 226, are hereby incorporated in the license. Florida Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Thomas H. Boyce, Chief  
Plant Licensing Branch II-2  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Change to the Operating License

Date of Issuance: October 24, 2007

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 226

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72

DOCKET NO. 50-302

Replace the following page of Facility Operating License DPR-72 with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a vertical line indicating the area of change.

Remove

4

Insert

4

of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

2.C.(1) Maximum Power Level

Florida Power Corporation is authorized to operate the facility at a steady state reactor core power level not in excess of 2568 Megawatts (100 percent of rated core power level).

2.C.(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. **226**, are hereby incorporated in the license. Florida Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

The Surveillance Requirements contained in the Appendix A Technical Specifications and listed below are not required to be performed immediately upon implementation of Amendment 149. The Surveillance Requirements shall be successfully demonstrated prior to the time and condition specified below for each.

- a) SR 3.3.8.2.b shall be successfully demonstrated prior to entering MODE 4 on the first plant start-up following Refuel Outage 9.
- b) SR 3.3.11.2, Function 2, shall be successfully demonstrated no later than 31 days following the implementation date of the ITS.
- c) SR3.3.17.1, Functions 1, 2, 6, 10, 14, & 17 shall be successfully demonstrated no later than 31 days following the implementation date of the ITS.
- d) SR3.3.17.2, Function 10 shall be successfully demonstrated prior to entering MODE 3 on the first plant start-up following Refuel Outage 9.
- e) SR 3.6.1.2 shall be successfully demonstrated prior to entering MODE 2 on the first plant start-up following Refuel Outage 9.
- f) SR 3.7.12.2 shall be successfully demonstrated prior to entering MODE 2 on the first plant start-up following Refuel Outage 9.
- g) SR 3.8.1.10 shall be successfully demonstrated prior to entering MODE 2 on the first plant start-up following Refuel Outage 9.
- h) SR 3.8.3.3 shall be successfully demonstrated prior to entering MODE 4 on the first plant start-up following Refuel Outage 9.

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 226 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72  
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET AL.  
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT  
DOCKET NO. 50-302

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 8, 2007, as supplemented by letter dated August 23, 2007, the Florida Power Corporation (the licensee) requested a change to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3). The change would authorize eliminating the commitment for maintaining the missile shields over the spent fuel pool (SFP). This requires a change to the licensing basis for protecting the spent fuel stored in the SFP.

The missile shields are described in Section 9.3.2.2, "Reliability Considerations," of the CR-3 FSAR. There are 5 missile shields constructed of coated A-36 steel. The missile shields are closed-welded box plate girders with flange plates. The missile shields have been part of the CR-3 licensing basis since initial plant licensing. Under present FSAR requirements, the missile shields are required to protect the spent fuel from tornado-generated missiles. The licensee has determined that the volume of water in the SFP provides adequate protection of the spent fuel from credible tornado missiles, such that the tornado missiles are not limiting accidents and the consequences of a tornado missile are bounded by the consequences of a fuel-handling accident (FHA).

Postulated beyond-design-basis events regarding the SFP address the potential for a significant loss of water in the pools or a complete loss of forced cooling. These postulated events can be mitigated by the addition of cooler water to preclude fuel damage that would result in a significant release of radioactivity. With the missile shields removed, the licensee can add large quantities of water from fire service or other external sources directly into the pool with minimal risk to plant personnel. Elimination of the missile shields will facilitate mitigation strategies for SFP external events described by Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 06-12, "B.5.b. Phase 2 and 3 Submittal Guideline."

The licensee also credited the missile shields for evaluations regarding the movement of heavy loads over the SFP. These evaluations were performed in accordance with NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." For example, the missile shields are used to protect the fuel during movement of the containment tendon surveillance equipment, which the licensee performs once every 5 years. By letter dated August 23, 2007, however, the licensee stated that the missile shields would no longer be used for this purpose. The licensee committed to develop alternate means of complying with NUREG-0612 prior to moving heavy loads near the SFP.

The licensee evaluated the change to the FSAR commitment, in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Section 50.59, "Changes, tests, and experiments," and determined that utilizing a calculation to justify eliminating the CR-3 SFP missile shields is a methodology change that requires a license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit."

The supplemental information provided by letter dated August 23, 2007, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's original proposed no significant hazards considerations determination as published in the *Federal Register* on March 13, 2007 (72 FR 11381).

## 2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criterion (GDC) 2, "Design basis for protection from natural phenomena," requires structures, systems, and components important to safety to be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, including tornadoes.

GDC-4, "Environmental and dynamic effects design basis," requires, in part, systems, structures, and components important to safety to be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with accident conditions.

The Standard Review Plan (SRP, NUREG-0800) Section 3.5.1.4, "Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena," Revision 2, 1981, discusses, in part, the missiles that are to be considered in the design of the structures, systems, and components important to safety.

## 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The licensee stated that, during initial plant licensing, the FSAR was revised (Amendment No. 11) to show missile shields for the SFP. In July 1973, the NRC staff asked the licensee to describe the SFP missile shielding, including materials of construction, size, weight, shape and properties that prevent missile penetration and permit the shielding to float. The licensee developed and provided this information to the NRC, and the information was then incorporated into Amendment No. 29 of the FSAR (August 15, 1973). The missile shields were added to the CR-3 Technical Specifications (TSs). However, during the CR-3 conversion to Improved TSs in the early 1990's, the missile shield TS was relocated to the FSAR because the missile shields did not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical specifications," for being in TSs. The commitment to maintaining the missile shields was retained in the FSAR as part of the design features that qualify the SFP to meet the FSAR Section 1.4, Principal Architectural and Design Criteria - 2, "Performance Standards," for Class 1 structures.

Under present FSAR requirements, Sections 5.4.3, 9.3.2, and 9.6, the missile shields are required to protect the spent fuel from tornado-generated missiles. During refueling evolutions and other operations in the SFP, the missile shields are removed but are replaced on notification of a tornado watch in the vicinity of the plant.

The licensee proposes to change the basis for protection of spent fuel stored in the SFP to allow removal of the SFP missile shields. The licensee has determined that adequate protection from credible tornado missiles is provided by the volume of water in the SFP, such that tornado

missiles are not limiting accidents. Specifically, the consequences of a tornado missile are bounded by the consequences of an FHA. The licensee proposes to revise FSAR Sections 5.4.3, 9.3.2, and 9.6 to delete the requirements to maintain tornado missile protection for the SFP.

The licensee proposed to credit the volume of water above the fuel for adequate protection from tornado missiles. The proposed methodology assumes that the credible design basis tornado missiles enter the SFP, determines the kinetic energy of the missiles after passing through the water, and evaluates the damage caused by the missiles. This methodology has not been approved generically, but has been used at specific plants to justify not having missile shields to protect their SFP.

CR-3 was designed to withstand the four tornado missiles specified in Section 5.2.1.2.6, "Tornado Load," of the FSAR. The licensee evaluated the four design basis missiles with respect to the SFP as follows:

**Utility Pole:** The utility pole tornado missile described in the CR-3 FSAR is a 14-inch diameter, 35 foot long pole with a density of 50 lbs/ft<sup>3</sup> traveling at a velocity of 150 mph. As stated in SRP Section 3.5.1.4 (Revision 2, dated July 1981), a utility pole is not considered a credible tornado missile if the SFP is more than 30 feet above all grade levels within ½ mile of the plant. The licensee concluded that, since the CR-3 SFP operating deck is 43.5 feet above the berm, which itself is 20.5 feet above the surrounding grade, the utility pole missile is not a credible missile for impact in the SFP.

**Automobile:** The automobile tornado missile described in the CR-3 FSAR is a compact auto with an area of 6.25 square feet, weighing 2000 pounds, and traveling at a velocity of 150 mph. The note in SRP 3.5.1.4 (Revision 2, dated July 1981) also states automobiles do not have to be considered as a credible tornado missile if the SFP is more than 30 feet above all grade levels within ½ mile of the plant. Based on the configuration of the plant described above, the licensee concluded that the automobile is not a credible missile for impact in the SFP.

**Pipe:** The CR-3 FSAR describes the pipe as 3 inch Schedule 40, 10 feet long, weighing 75.8 lb, traveling at 100 mph. The licensee concluded that the 3 inch Schedule 40 pipe is a credible tornado missile for impact in the SFP.

**Wood Plank:** The wood plank described in the CR-3 FSAR is 4 inches thick by 12 inches wide by 12 feet long, weighing 108 lb and traveling at 300 mph. The licensee determined that the wood plank is a credible tornado missile for impact in the SFP.

The staff reviewed the licensee's evaluation of tornado missiles and the CR-3 design. Based on its review of NUREG-0800, the staff agrees with the licensee that the automobile and the utility pole described in the FSAR are not credible tornado missiles for the CR-3 SFP. Thus, the automobile and the utility pole do not have to be considered for the purposes of this analysis. The pipe and plank, however, should be considered as credible tornado missiles.

The licensee determined that, for both the 3 inch pipe and the wood plank, the maximum impact is from the object entering the SFP vertically. Any other orientation created significant drag such that maximum velocities and imparted forces are less than calculated. The licensee also determined that other missiles that may become airborne due to their aerodynamic geometry, or

non-aerodynamic objects that may be on the SFP operating deck, will not have sufficient mass and kinetic energy to cause any fuel damage.

The licensee determined that the velocity of the pipe at a pool depth of 18.5 feet was 90 ft/sec. At this speed, the impact force of the pipe imparted to the B SFP racks is less than that of a dropped fuel assembly. Also, although the initial kinetic energy for an impact to the A SFP racks is slightly higher than that previously evaluated, the rack stresses remain within allowable limits. The licensee determined the velocity of the plank at a pool depth of 18.5 feet was 55 ft/sec, due to geometry and buoyant forces, and that the impact force from the pipe bounds the impact force from the wood plank.

The existing structural evaluation of the spent fuel storage racks was approved in Amendment No. 193 to the CR-3 Facility Operating License (FOL). For that amendment, the licensee evaluated a dropped fuel assembly and handling tool combination with a combined weight of 2750 lbs, and determined that the potential deformation to the racks was minor and did not impact the functional capability of the racks. The worst case bearing loads on the SFP liner were determined to be less than the allowable bearing loads, and the punching load on the concrete was significantly less than the allowable load for punching shear. The NRC staff revisited its previous review of the structural integrity of the fuel storage racks. The staff concurs with the licensee's conclusion that the impact of a pipe is bounded by the impact from the dropped fuel assembly and handling tool, such that the structural integrity of the racks would be maintained.

The licensee evaluated the impact of the pipe tornado missile on a spent fuel assembly and determined that 69 rods could potentially be damaged. This is less than the 208 rods assumed to be damaged during an FHA; therefore, the licensee concluded that the consequences of a pipe tornado missile remain bounded by the FHA.

The existing dose analysis for the FHA is reflected in Section 14.2.2.3 of the CR-3 FSAR. The NRC staff approved a revised FHA dose analysis in Amendment No. 199 to the CR-3 FOL. Amendment No. 199 allowed the use of an alternative source term pursuant to 10 CFR 50.67, "Accident source term," and the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.183 "Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors." The staff reviewed the FHA, including pertinent inputs and assumptions, as described in the CR-3 FSAR and accepted in Amendment No. 199. The significant assumptions in the FHA analysis are: (1) the drop of a fuel assembly results in damage to 208 fuel pins, and (2) no credit is taken for filtration of the released radiation. A tornado missile that reaches the SFP would be expected to penetrate the walls or ceiling of the fuel handling building, which could adversely effect the building's ventilation and filtration system. However, since the FHA dose analysis did not credit filtration, and since fewer fuel rods are damaged by the pipe tornado missile than by a dropped fuel assembly, resulting in the release of less radiation, the staff concurs with the licensee's conclusion that the consequences of an FHA bound the consequences of a tornado missile.

With respect to the SFP liner, the licensee determined that a missile will not penetrate the liner if it strikes at a depth below the top of the fuel, and that an impact with the pool walls above the fuel will not damage the pool wall sufficiently to create a significant water loss in the SFP. The staff reviewed the design of the CR-3 SFP as described in the FSAR, and previous license amendments including Amendment No. 193. As noted in FSAR Section 9.3.2.8, "Makeup Capability," makeup to the SFP can be provided from the decay heat system, the demineralized water supply system, and temporary hoses. In addition, removing the SFP missile shields will

enable the licensee to use makeup from fire service or other external sources, as discussed in the introduction to this safety evaluation. If the liner is damaged, the SFP leakage chase trench test hopper valves can be closed to isolate leakage past the SFP liner until a repair can be performed, as noted in FSAR Section 9.3.2.2. Therefore, the NRC staff concurs with the licensee's conclusion that the credible tornado missiles will not result in a significant water loss in the SFP.

With respect to the movement of heavy loads, NUREG-0612 recommends that licensees provide an adequate defense-in-depth approach to maintaining safety during the handling of heavy loads near spent fuel, and cited four major causes of accidents: operator errors, rigging failures, lack of adequate inspection, and inadequate procedures. The licensee previously credited the missile shields to protect the spent fuel from damage due to movement of heavy loads near the SFP. However, the licensee stated that alternative methods of complying with NUREG-0612 were being evaluated and that the missile shields will not be used for this purpose. In its letter dated August 23, 2007, the licensee committed to develop alternate means of complying with NUREG-0612 prior to moving heavy loads near the SFP. The staff notes that reasonable controls can be employed to address the concerns associated with the movement of heavy loads in the vicinity of the SFP. The licensee's control of heavy loads will continue to be the subject of NRC inspection and oversight activities.

The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for implementing the above regulatory commitments, and for subsequent evaluation of changes to the above regulatory commitments, are best provided by the licensee's administrative processes, including its commitment management program. The above regulatory commitments do not warrant the creation of regulatory requirements (items requiring prior NRC approval of subsequent changes).

With respect to beyond design basis events, removal of the missile shields will allow the licensee to add large quantities of water from fire service or other external sources directly into the SFP with minimal risk to plant personnel. This will facilitate mitigation strategies for events that effect the SFP, as described in NEI 06-12, and will enable the licensee to take actions committed to in response to the NRC's security-related Orders; therefore, the staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

#### 4.0 SUMMARY

Based on the licensee's evaluation, the staff finds it acceptable to credit the water in the SFP for providing adequate protection of the spent fuel from tornado missiles, and to remove the FSAR commitment to maintain the SFP missile shields.

#### 5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

Based upon a letter dated May 2, 2003, from Michael N. Stephens of the Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, to Brenda L. Mozafari, Senior Project Manager, NRC, the State of Florida does not desire notification of issuance of license amendments.

#### 6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined

that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (72 FR 11381). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

## 7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Stewart N. Bailey

Date: October 24, 2007