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L-07-080

ATTN: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73
Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2), the Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments for the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 is provided as Attachment 1. The report covers the period of April 12, 2005, through November 12, 2006.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter. If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Thomas A. Lentz, Manager – FENOC Fleet Licensing, at (330) 761-6071.

Sincerely,



Peter P. Sena III

Attachment:

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2, Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments for the period April 12, 2005, through November 12, 2006.

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- c: Ms. N. S. Morgan, NRR Project Manager
- Mr. D. L. Werkheiser, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
- Mr. S. J. Collins, NRC Region I Administrator
- Mr. D. J. Allard, Director BRP/DEP
- Mr. L. E. Ryan (BRP/DEP)

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2
Attachment 1
Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments
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Change Title

Elimination of Post-DBA Hydrogen Control System Requirements / Abandon-In-Place BV2 Hydrogen Recombiners

Change

The change removes references to the post-Design Base Accident (DBA) hydrogen recombiners and the associated design bases from the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 (BV2) UFSAR. The UFSAR-described design function of the hydrogen recombiners was to maintain the hydrogen concentration below the 4 percent lower flammability limit, following a Loss of Cooling Accident. This change is a result of the revised 10 CFR 50.44 rule that eliminated the requirement for the system and Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 142 that deleted the associated technical specifications.

Change Title

Safety Analysis of the Radiological Consequences of a Waste Gas System Rupture DBA at BVPS Unit 2, Control Room, EAB and LPZ Doses

Change

Gaseous Waste System (GWS) rupture radiological calculations were revised to incorporate changes as a result of the Extended Power Uprate (EPU). As detailed in letter L-05-024, dated 12/30/2005, application of EPU conditions to the gaseous waste system rupture accident was evaluated under this 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. In the GWS decay tank scenario the Control Room whole body Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE) and skin doses increased. In the GWS line break scenario, Control Room whole body EDE and skin doses increased as did the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and Low Population Zone (LPZ) whole body EDE doses. All of the dose increases were less than 10% of the difference between the current licensing basis values and the 10 CFR 100 or GDC 19 limits.

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Change Title

Install Temporary Unit 2 Plant Computer System

Change

A minimum scoped temporary computer system was installed from August 22, 2006 to October 5, 2006 to support plant operations while the existing BV2 Plant Computer and Emergency Response Facility Computer systems were replaced. A temporary modification allowed the use of the temporary computer system which did not provide all of the plant monitoring capabilities as stated in the UFSAR design basis descriptions. This evaluation for the temporary modification demonstrated that the alternative methods for monitoring plant variables were acceptable.

Change Title

Implementation of the SGTR analysis

Change

The BV2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) analysis was updated to address changes as a result of the EPU analyses. These EPU analyses performed by Westinghouse used atmospheric dump and residual heat release valve capacities without accounting for the impact of the valve inlet and outlet piping. The following impacts were evaluated:

- Limiting single failure for SGTR
- Tripping of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps to isolate AFW to ruptured SG
- Crediting of 3 atmospheric steam dump valves for Reactor Cooling System (RCS) cooldown to establish RCS Subcooling
- Steam generator margin to overfill revised
- Change operator action times in response to a SGTR
- Cooldown to residual heat removal system entry temp (350°F) within 8 hours

The evaluation of the above impacts concluded that the BV2 SGTR analysis could be updated for implementation of EPU without without submittal of a license amendment request.