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

ESBWR Design Control Document

Tier 2

Chapter 16B

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B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)

B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs

BASES

BACKGROUND

GDC 10 (Ref. 1) requires, and SLs ensure, that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during steady state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs).

Because fuel damage is not directly observable, a stepback approach is used to establish the SL specified in Specification 2.1.1.2. The fuel cladding is one of the physical barriers that separate the radioactive materials from the environs. The integrity of this cladding barrier is related to its relative freedom from perforations or cracking. Although some corrosion or use related cracking may occur during the life of the cladding, fission product migration from this source is incrementally cumulative and continuously measurable. Fuel cladding perforations, however, can result from thermal stresses, which occur from reactor operation significantly above design conditions.

While fission product migration from cladding perforation is just as measurable as that from use related cracking, the thermally caused cladding perforations signal a threshold beyond which still greater thermal stresses may cause gross, rather than incremental, cladding deterioration. These conditions represent a significant departure from the condition intended by design for planned operation. Since the parameters that result in fuel damage are not directly observable during reactor operation, the thermal and hydraulic conditions that result in the onset of transition boiling have been used to mark the beginning of the region in which fuel damage could occur.

Operation above the boundary of the nucleate boiling regime could result in excessive cladding temperature because of the onset of transition boiling and the resultant sharp reduction in heat transfer coefficient. Inside the steam film, high cladding temperatures are reached, and a cladding water (zirconium water) reaction may take place. This chemical reaction results in oxidation of the fuel cladding to a structurally weaker form. This weaker form may lose its integrity, resulting in an uncontrolled release of activity to the reactor coolant.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The fuel cladding must not sustain damage as a result of normal operation and AOOs. To ensure damage does not occur, the Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit (FCISL) is established as greater than 99.9% of the fuel rods in the core would be expected to avoid boiling transition. The Reactor Protection System setpoints (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), in combination with other LCOs, are designed to prevent any anticipated combination of transient conditions for Reactor Coolant System water level, pressure, and THERMAL POWER level that would result in reaching the FCISL limit.

2.1.1.1 Fuel Cladding Integrity

GE critical power correlations are applicable for all critical power calculations at pressures ≥ { } MPaG ({ } psig) and core flows ≥ { }% of rated flow. For operation at low pressures or low flows, another basis is used, as follows:

{ }

2.1.1.2 FCISL

The FCISL is set such that no significant fuel damage is calculated to occur for AOOs. Although it is recognized that the onset of transition boiling would not result in damage to BWR fuel rods, a calculated fraction of rods expected to avoid boiling transition has been adopted as a convenient limit. The steady-state and transient uncertainties and the uncertainties in monitoring and simulating the core operating state are incorporated by the statistical model that calculates the fraction of rods. Therefore, an operating limit MCPR is defined such that the FCISL is not violated during normal operations and AOOs, considering the power distribution within the core and all uncertainties.

The probability of the occurrence of boiling transition is determined using the approved General Electric Critical Power correlations. Details of the FCISL calculation process are given in References 2, 3, 4, and 5. Reference 5 also describes the methodology for determining the transient uncertainties and the process for calculating the operating limit MCPR, and the steady state uncertainties used in the statistical analysis.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

2.1.1.3 Reactor Vessel Water Level

During MODES 1 and 2, the reactor vessel water level is required to be above the top of the active fuel to provide core cooling capability. With fuel in the reactor vessel during periods when the reactor is shut down, consideration must be given to water level requirements due to the effect of decay heat. If the water level should drop below the top of the active irradiated fuel during this period, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced. This reduction in cooling capability could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation in the event that the water level drops below the top of the active irradiated fuel. The reactor vessel water level SL has been established at the top of the active irradiated fuel to provide a point that can be monitored.

SAFETY LIMITS

The reactor core SLs are established to protect the integrity of the fuel clad barrier to the release of radioactive materials to the environs. SL 2.1.1.1 and SL 2.1.1.2 ensure that the core operates within the fuel design criteria. SL 2.1.1.3 ensures that the reactor vessel water level is greater than the top of the active irradiated fuel in order to prevent elevated clad temperatures and resultant clad perforations.

APPLICABILITY

SLs 2.1.1.1, 2.1.1.2, and 2.1.1.3 are applicable in all MODES.

SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATIONS

Exceeding a SL may cause fuel damage and create a potential for radioactive releases in excess of 10 CFR 100, "Reactor Site Criteria," limits (Ref. 6). Therefore, it is required to insert all insertable control rods and restore compliance with the SL within 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time ensures that the operators take prompt remedial action and the probability of an accident occurring during this period is minimal.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10.

2. NEDE-10958A, "General Electric BWR Thermal Analysis Basis (GETAB): Data, Correlation and Design Application", January 1977.

3. NEDE-33083PA, Class III (proprietary),"TRACG Application for ESBWR", Revision 0, March 2005.

4. NEDC-32601PA, "Methodology and Uncertainties for Safety Limit MCPR Evaluations", August 1999.

5. NEDC-33237P, Class III (proprietary), GE14 for ESBWR - Critical Power Correlation, Uncertainty, and OLMCPR Development, March 2006.

6. 10 CFR 100.

B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)

B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL

BASES

BACKGROUND

The SL on reactor steam dome pressure protects the RCS against overpressurization. In the event of fuel cladding failure, fission products are released into the reactor coolant. The RCS then serves as the primary barrier in preventing the release of fission products into the atmosphere. Establishing an upper limit on reactor steam dome pressure ensures continued RCS integrity. According to 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 14, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary," and GDC 15, "Reactor Coolant System Design" (Ref. 1), the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) shall be designed with sufficient margin to ensure that the design conditions are not exceeded during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs).

During normal operation and AOOs, RCS pressure is limited from exceeding the design pressure by more than 10%, in accordance with Section III of the ASME Code (Ref. 2). To ensure system integrity, all RCS components are hydrostatically tested at 125% of design pressure, in accordance with ASME Code requirements, prior to initial operation when there is no fuel in the core. Any further hydrostatic testing with fuel in the core may be done under LCO 3.10.1, "Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic (ISLH) Testing Operation." Following inception of unit operation, RCS components shall be pressure tested in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 3).

Overpressurization of the RCS could result in a breach of the RCPB, reducing the number of protective barriers designed to prevent radioactive releases from exceeding the limits specified in 10 CFR 100, "Reactor Site Criteria" (Ref. 4). If this occurred in conjunction with a fuel cladding failure, the number of protective barriers designed to prevent radioactive releases from exceeding the limits would be reduced.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The RCS safety/relief valves and the Reactor Protection System Scram settings are established to ensure that the RCS pressure SL will not be exceeded.

The RCS pressure SL has been selected such that it is at a pressure below which it can be shown that the integrity of the system is not endangered. The reactor pressure vessel is designed to ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, {1974 Edition}, including Addenda

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

through {2003} (Ref. 5), which permits a maximum pressure transient of 110%, 9.480 MPaG (1375 psig), of design pressure 8.618 MPaG (1250 psig). The SL of {9.211} MPaG ({1336} psig), as measured in the reactor steam dome, is equivalent to 9.480 MPaG (1375 psig) at the lowest elevation of the RCS. The RCS pressure SL is selected to be the lowest transient overpressure allowed by the applicable codes.

SAFETY LIMITS

The maximum transient pressure allowable in the RCS pressure vessel under the ASME Code, Section III, is 110% of design pressure. The maximum transient pressure allowable in the RCS piping, valves, and fittings is 110% of design pressures of 8.618 MPaG (1250 psig). The most limiting of these allowances is the 110% of the RCS design pressure; therefore, the SL on maximum allowable RCS pressure is established at {9.211} MPaG ({1336} psig) as measured at the reactor steam dome.

APPLICABILITY

SL 2.1.2 applies in all MODES.

SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATIONS

Exceeding the RCS pressure SL may cause immediate RCS failure and create a potential for radioactive releases in excess of 10 CFR 100, "Reactor Site Criteria," limits (Ref. 4). Therefore, it is required to insert all insertable control rods and restore compliance with the SL within 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time ensures that the operators take prompt remedial action and also assures that the probability of an accident occurring during this period is minimal.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 14 and GDC 15.

2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Article NB-7000.

3. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Article IW-5000.

4. 10 CFR 100.

5. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, {1974 Edition}, Addenda, {2003}.

B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY

BASES

LCOs	LCO 3.0.1 through LCO 3.0.7 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.
LCO 3.0.1	LCO 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual Specification as the requirement for when the LCO is required to be met (i.e., when the unit is in the MODES or other specified Conditions of the Applicability statement of each Specification).
LCO 3.0.2	LCO 3.0.2 establishes that upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the associated ACTIONS shall be met. The Completion Time of each Required Action for an ACTIONS Condition is applicable from the point in time that an ACTIONS Condition is entered. The Required Actions establish those remedial measures that must be taken within specified Completion Times when the requirements of an LCO are not met. This Specification establishes that: a. Completion of the Required Actions within the specified Completion Times constitutes compliance with a Specification; and b. Completion of the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met within the specified Completion Time, unless otherwise specified. There are two basic types of Required Actions. The first type of Required Action specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. This time limit is the Completion Time to restore an inoperable system or component to OPERABLE status or to restore variables to within specified limits. If this type of Required Action is not completed within the specified Completion Time, a shutdown may be required to place the unit in a MODE or condition in which the Specification is not applicable. (Whether stated as a Required Action or not, correction of the entered Condition is an action that may always be considered upon entering ACTIONS.) The second type of Required Action specifies the remedial measures that permit continued operation of the unit that is not further restricted by the Completion Time. In this case, compliance with the Required Actions provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation.

BASES

LCO 3.0.2 (continued)

Completing the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met or is no longer applicable, unless otherwise stated in the individual Specifications.

The nature of some Required Actions of some Conditions necessitates that, once the Condition is entered, the Required Actions must be completed even though the associated Conditions no longer exist. The individual LCO's ACTIONS specify the Required Actions where this is the case. An example of this is in LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits."

The Completion Times of the Required Actions are also applicable when a system or component is removed from service intentionally. The reasons for intentionally relying on the ACTIONS include, but are not limited to, performance of Surveillances, preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, or investigation of operational problems. Entering ACTIONS for these reasons must be done in a manner that does not compromise safety. Intentional entry into ACTIONS should not be made for operational convenience. Additionally, if intentional entry into ACTIONS would result in redundant equipment being inoperable, alternatives should be used instead. Doing so limits the time both subsystems/divisions/trains of a safety function are inoperable and limits the time conditions exist which may result in LCO 3.0.3 being entered. Individual Specifications may specify a time limit for performing an SR when equipment is removed from service or bypassed for testing. In this case, the Completion Times of the Required Actions are applicable when this time limit expires, if the equipment remains removed from service or bypassed.

When a change in MODE or other specified condition is required to comply with Required Actions, the unit may enter a MODE or other specified condition in which another Specification becomes applicable. In this case, the Completion Times of the associated Required Actions would apply from the point in time that the new Specification becomes applicable, and the ACTIONS Condition(s) are entered.

BASES

LCO 3.0.3

LCO 3.0.3 establishes the actions that must be implemented when an LCO is not met and

a. An associated Required Action and Completion Time is not met and no other Condition applies; or

b. The condition of the unit is not specifically addressed by the associated ACTIONS. This means that no combination of Conditions stated in the ACTIONS can be made that exactly corresponds to the actual condition of the unit. Sometimes, possible combinations of Conditions are such that entering LCO 3.0.3 is warranted; in such cases, the ACTIONS specifically state a Condition corresponding to such combinations and also that LCO 3.0.3 be entered immediately.

This Specification delineates the time limits for placing the unit in a safe MODE or other specified condition when operation cannot be maintained within the limits for safe operation as defined by the LCO and its ACTIONS. It is not intended to be used as an operational convenience that permits routine voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service in lieu of other alternatives that would not result in redundant systems or components being inoperable.

Upon entering LCO 3.0.3, 1 hour is allowed to prepare for an orderly shutdown before initiating a change in unit operation. This includes time to permit the operator to coordinate the reduction in electrical generation with the load dispatcher to ensure the stability and availability of the electrical grid. The time limits specified to reach lower MODES of operation permit the shutdown to proceed in a controlled and orderly manner that is well within the specified maximum cooldown rate and within the capabilities of the unit, assuming that only the minimum required equipment is OPERABLE. This reduces thermal stresses on components of the Reactor Coolant System and the potential for a plant upset that could challenge safety systems under conditions to which this Specification applies. The use and interpretation of specified times to complete the actions of LCO 3.0.3 are consistent with the discussion of Section 1.3, “Completion Times.”

A unit shutdown required in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 may be terminated and LCO 3.0.3 exited if any of the following occurs:

a. The LCO is now met;

b. A Condition exists for which the Required Actions have now been performed; or

BASES

LCO 3.0.3 (continued)

c. ACTIONS exist that do not have expired Completion Times. These Completion Times are applicable from the point in time that the Condition is initially entered and not from the time LCO 3.0.3 is exited.

The time limits of LCO 3.0.3 allow 37 hours for the unit to be in MODE 5 when a shutdown is required during MODE 1 operation. If the unit is in a lower MODE of operation when a shutdown is required, the time limit for reaching the next lower MODE applies. If a lower MODE is reached in less time than allowed, however, the total allowable time to reach MODE 5, or other applicable MODE, is not reduced. For example, if MODE 2 is reached in 2 hours, then the time allowed for reaching MODE 3 is the next 11 hours, because the total time for reaching MODE 3 is not reduced from the allowable limit of 13 hours. Therefore, if remedial measures are completed that would permit a return to MODE 1, a penalty is not incurred by having to reach a lower MODE of operation in less than the total time allowed.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, LCO 3.0.3 provides actions for Conditions not covered in other Specifications. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in MODES 5 and 6 because the unit is already in the most restrictive Condition required by LCO 3.0.3. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken.

Exceptions to LCO 3.0.3 are provided in instances where requiring a unit shutdown, in accordance with LCO 3.0.3, would not provide appropriate remedial measures for the associated condition of the unit. An example of this is in LCO 3.7.5, Fuel Pool Water Level. LCO 3.7.5 has an Applicability of “During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the associated fuel storage pool”. Therefore, this LCO can be applicable in any or all MODES. If the LCO and the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.5 are not met while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, there is no safety benefit to be gained by placing the unit in a shutdown condition. The Required Action of LCO 3.7.5 of “Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the associated fuel storage pool(s)” is the appropriate Required Action to complete in lieu of the actions of LCO 3.0.3. These exceptions are addressed in the individual Specifications.

BASES

LCO 3.0.4

LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. It allows placing the unit in a MODE or other specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g., the Applicability desired to be entered) when unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be met, in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.a, LCO 3.0.4.b, or LCO 3.0.4.c.

LCO 3.0.4.a allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. Compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a MODE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change. Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Required Actions.

LCO 3.0.4.b allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate.

The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches, and the risk assessment will be conducted using the plant program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities to be assessed and managed. The risk assessment, for the purposes of LCO 3.0.4.b, must take into account all inoperable Technical Specification equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope. The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants." Regulatory Guide 1.182 endorses the guidance in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." These documents address general guidance for conduct of the risk assessment, quantitative and qualitative guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and example risk management actions. These include actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls overall risk, increased risk awareness by shift and management personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the condition,

BASES

LCO 3.0.4 (continued)

actions to minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of backup success paths or compensatory measures), and determination that the proposed MODE change is acceptable. Consideration should also be given to the probability of completing restoration such that the requirements of the LCO would be met prior to the expiration of ACTIONS Completion Times that would require exiting the Applicability.

LCO 3.0.4.b may be used with single, or multiple systems and components unavailable. NUMARC 93-01 provides guidance relative to consideration of simultaneous unavailability of multiple systems and components.

The results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. The LCO 3.0.4.b risk assessments do not have to be documented.

The Technical Specifications allow continued operation with equipment unavailable in MODE 1 for the duration of the Completion Time. Since this is allowable, and since in general the risk impact in that particular MODE bounds the risk of transitioning into and through the applicable MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability of the LCO, the use of the LCO 3.0.4.b allowance should be generally acceptable, as long as the risk is assessed and managed as stated above. However, there is a small subset of systems and components that have been determined to be more important to risk and use of the LCO 3.0.4.b allowance is prohibited. The LCOs governing these systems and components contain Notes prohibiting the use of LCO 3.0.4.b by stating that LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable.

LCO 3.0.4.c allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met based on a Note in the Specification which states LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable. These specific allowances permit entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered do not provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time and a risk assessment has not been performed. This allowance may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification. The risk assessments performed to justify the use of LCO 3.0.4.b usually only consider systems and components. For this reason, LCO 3.0.4.c is typically applied to Specifications which describe values and parameters (e.g., Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity), and may be applied to other Specifications based on NRC plant specific approval.

BASES

LCO 3.0.4 (continued)

The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2, MODE 2 to MODE 3, MODE 3 to MODE 4, and MODE 4 to MODE 5.

Upon entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met, LCO 3.0.1 and LCO 3.0.2 require entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions until the Condition is resolved, until the LCO is met, or until the unit is not within the Applicability of the Technical Specification.

Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated inoperable equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, utilizing LCO 3.0.4 is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or SR 3.0.4 for any Surveillances that have not been performed on inoperable equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO.

LCO 3.0.5

LCO 3.0.5 establishes the allowances for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of required testing to demonstrate:

a. The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service; or

b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

BASES

LCO 3.0.5 (continued)

The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the required testing to demonstrate OPERABILITY. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment isolation valve that has been closed to comply with Required Actions and must be reopened to perform the required testing.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of required testing on another channel in the other trip system. A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of required testing on another channel in the same trip system.

LCO 3.0.6

LCO 3.0.6 establishes an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for supported systems that have a support system LCO specified in the Technical Specifications (TS). This exception is provided because LCO 3.0.2 would require that the Conditions and Required Actions of the associated inoperable supported system LCO be entered solely due to the inoperability of the support system. This exception is justified because the actions that are required to ensure the plant is maintained in a safe condition are specified in the support system LCO's Required Actions. These Required Actions may include entering the supported system's Conditions and Required Actions or may specify other Required Actions.

When a support system is inoperable and there is an LCO specified for it in the TS, the supported system(s) are required to be declared inoperable if determined to be inoperable as a result of the support system inoperability. However, it is not necessary to enter into the supported systems' Conditions and Required Actions unless directed to do so by the support system's Required Actions. The potential confusion and inconsistency of requirements related to the entry into multiple support and supported systems' LCOs' Conditions and Required Actions are

BASES

LCO 3.0.6 (continued)

eliminated by providing all the actions that are necessary to ensure the plant is maintained in a safe condition in the support system's Required Actions.

However, there are instances where a support system's Required Action may either direct a supported system to be declared inoperable or direct entry into Conditions and Required Actions for the supported system. This may occur immediately or after some specified delay to perform some other Required Action. Regardless of whether it is immediate or after some delay, when a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.

Specification 5.5.8, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)," ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other limitations, remedial actions, or compensatory actions may be identified as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Conditions and Required Actions. The SFDP implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.

Cross division/train checks to identify a loss of safety function for those support systems that support safety systems are required. The cross division/train check verifies that the supported systems of the redundant OPERABLE support system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained.

If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

This loss of safety function does not require the assumption of additional single failures or loss of offsite power. Since operations are being restricted in accordance with the ACTIONS of the support system, any resulting temporary loss of redundancy or single failure protection is taken into account.

BASES

LCO 3.0.6 (continued)

When loss of safety function is determined to exist, and the SFDP requires entry into the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists, consideration must be given to the specific type of function affected. Where a loss of function is solely due to a single Technical Specification support system (e.g., loss of automatic start due to inoperable instrumentation, or loss of pump suction source due to low tank level) the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the support system. The ACTIONS for a support system LCO adequately address the inoperabilities of that system without reliance on entering its supported system LCO. When the loss of function is the result of multiple support systems, the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the supported system.

LCO 3.0.7

There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.10 allow specified TS requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS. Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.

The Applicability of a Special Operations LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS. Compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Special Operations LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Special Operations LCO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO shall be followed. When a Special Operations LCO requires another LCO to be met, only the requirements of the LCO statement are required to be met regardless of that LCO's Applicability (i.e., should the requirements of this other LCO not be met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO apply, not the ACTIONS of the other LCO). However, there are instances where the Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the other LCOs' ACTIONS be met. The

BASES

LCO 3.0.7 (continued)

Surveillances of the other LCO are not required to be met, unless specified in the Special Operations LCO. If conditions exist such that the Applicability of any other LCO is met, all the other LCO's requirements (ACTIONS and SRs) are required to be met concurrent with the requirements of the Special Operations LCO.

B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY

BASES

SRs	SR 3.0.1 through SR 3.0.4 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.
SR 3.0.1	SR 3.0.1 establishes the requirement that SRs must be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which the requirements of the LCO apply, unless otherwise specified in the individual SRs. This Specification is to ensure that Surveillances are performed to verify the OPERABILITY of systems and components, and that variables are within specified limits. Failure to meet a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, in accordance with SR 3.0.2, constitutes a failure to meet an LCO. Surveillances may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps provided the entire Surveillance is performed within the specified Frequency. Additionally, the definitions related to instrument testing (e.g., CHANNEL CALIBRATION) specify that these tests are performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps. Systems and components are assumed to be OPERABLE when the associated SRs have been met. Nothing in this Specification, however, is to be construed as implying that systems or components are OPERABLE when: a. The systems or components are known to be inoperable, although still meeting the SRs; or b. The requirements of the Surveillance(s) are known to be not met between required Surveillance performances. Surveillances do not have to be performed when the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition for which the requirements of the associated LCO are not applicable, unless otherwise specified. The SRs associated with a Special Operations LCO are only applicable when the Special Operations LCO is used as an allowable exception to the requirements of a Specification. Unplanned events may satisfy the requirements (including applicable acceptance criteria) for a given SR. In this case, the unplanned event may be credited as fulfilling the performance of the SR. This allowance includes those SRs whose performance is normally precluded in a given MODE or other specified condition.

BASES

SR 3.0.1 (continued)

Surveillances, including Surveillances invoked by Required Actions, do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the ACTIONS define the remedial measures that apply. Surveillances have to be met and performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, prior to returning equipment to OPERABLE status.

Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is required to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 3.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not be possible in the current MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having been established. In these situations, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed to be incapable of performing its function. This will allow operation to proceed to a MODE or other specified condition where other necessary post maintenance tests can be completed. An example of this process is: Control Rod Drive maintenance during refueling that requires scram testing at reactor vessel bottom pressure ≥ 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig). However, if other appropriate testing is satisfactorily completed and the scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.3 is satisfied, the control rod can be considered OPERABLE. This allows startup to proceed to reach reactor vessel bottom pressure of 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig) to perform other necessary testing.

SR 3.0.2

SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires the periodic performance of the Required Action on a “once per...” interval.

SR 3.0.2 permits a 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency. This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the

BASES

SR 3.0.2 (continued)

25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. An example of where SR 3.0.2 does not apply is in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This program establishes testing requirements and Frequencies in accordance with the requirements of regulations. The TS cannot in and of themselves extend a test interval specified in the regulations.

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per ..." basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25% extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3

SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay period of up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater, applies from the point in time that it is discovered that the Surveillance has not been performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, and not at the time that the specified Frequency was not met.

This delay period provides adequate time to complete Surveillances that have been missed. This delay period permits the completion of a Surveillance before complying with Required Actions or other remedial measures that might preclude completion of the Surveillance.

The basis for this delay period includes consideration of unit conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the Surveillance, the safety significance of the delay in completing the required Surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of

SR 3.0.3 (continued)

any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements. When a Surveillance with a Frequency based not on time intervals, but upon specified unit conditions, operating situations, or requirements of regulations (e.g., prior to entering MODE 1 after each fuel loading, or in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions, etc.) is discovered to not have been performed when specified, SR 3.0.3 allows for the full delay period of up to the specified Frequency to perform the Surveillance. However, since there is not a time interval specified, the missed Surveillance should be performed at the first reasonable opportunity.

SR 3.0.3 provides a time limit for, and allowances for the performance of, Surveillances that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by Required Actions.

Failure to comply with specified Frequencies for SRs is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals. While up to 24 hours or the limit of the specified Frequency is provided to perform the missed Surveillance, it is expected that the missed Surveillance will be performed at the first reasonable opportunity. The determination of the first reasonable opportunity should include consideration of the impact on plant risk (from delaying the Surveillance as well as any plant configuration changes required or shutting the plant down to perform the Surveillance) and impact on any analysis assumptions, in addition to unit conditions, planning, availability of personnel, and the time required to perform the Surveillance. This risk impact should be managed through the program in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its implementation guidance, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants." This Regulatory Guide addresses consideration of temporary and aggregate risk impacts, determination of risk management action thresholds, and risk management action up to and including plant shutdown. The missed Surveillance should be treated as an emergent condition as discussed in the Regulatory Guide. The risk evaluation may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended methods. The degree of depth and rigor of the evaluation should be commensurate with the importance of the component. Missed Surveillances for important components should be analyzed quantitatively. If the results of the risk evaluation determine the risk increase is significant, this evaluation should be used to determine the safest course of action. All missed Surveillances will be placed in the licensee's Corrective Action Program.

BASES

SR 3.0.3 (continued)

If a Surveillance is not completed within the allowed delay period, then the equipment is considered inoperable or the variable is considered outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon expiration of the delay period. If a Surveillance is failed within the delay period, then the equipment is inoperable, or the variable is outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon the failure of the Surveillance.

Completion of the Surveillance within the delay period allowed by this Specification, or within the Completion Time of the ACTIONS, restores compliance with SR 3.0.1.

SR 3.0.4

SR 3.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

This Specification ensures that system and component OPERABILITY requirements and variable limits are met before entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the unit. The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

A provision is included to allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability when an LCO is not met due to a Surveillance not being met in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.

However, in certain circumstances, failing to meet an SR will not result in SR 3.0.4 restricting a MODE change or other specified condition change. When a system, subsystem, train, division, component, device, or variable is inoperable or outside its specified limits, the associated SR(s) are not required to be performed, per SR 3.0.1, which states that surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment. When equipment is inoperable, SR 3.0.4 does not apply to the associated SR(s) since the requirement for the SR(s) to be performed is removed. Therefore, failing to perform the Surveillance(s) within the specified Frequency does not result in an SR 3.0.4 restriction to changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability. However, since the LCO is not met in this instance, LCO 3.0.4 will govern any restrictions that may (or may not) apply to MODE or other specified condition changes.

BASES

SR 3.0.4 (continued)

SR 3.0.4 does not restrict changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability when a Surveillance has not been performed within the specified Frequency, provided the requirement to declare the LCO not met has been delayed in accordance with SR 3.0.3.

The provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2, MODE 2 to MODE 3, MODE 3 to MODE 4, and MODE 4 to MODE 5.

The precise requirements for performance of SRs are specified such that exceptions to SR 3.0.4 are not necessary. The specific time frames and conditions necessary for meeting the SRs are specified in the Frequency, in the Surveillance, or both. This allows performance of Surveillances when the prerequisite condition(s) specified in a Surveillance procedure require entry into the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the associated LCO prior to the performance or completion of a Surveillance. A Surveillance that could not be performed until after entering the LCO's Applicability, would have its Frequency specified such that it is not "due" until the specific conditions needed are met. Alternately, the Surveillance may be stated in the form of a Note, as not required (to be met or performed) until a particular event, condition, or time has been reached. Further discussion of the specific formats of SRs' annotation is found in Section 1.4, "Frequency."

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

BASES

BACKGROUND

SDM requirements are specified to ensure:

a. The reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, transients, and design basis events;

b. The reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits; and

c. The reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

These requirements are satisfied by the control rods, as described in GDC 26 (Ref. 1), which can compensate for the reactivity effects of the fuel and water temperature changes experienced during all operating conditions.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

SDM is an explicit assumption in several of the evaluations in Chapter 15, Safety Analyses. SDM is assumed as an initial condition for the control rod removal error during refueling accident (Ref. 2). The analysis of these reactivity insertion events assumes the refueling interlocks are OPERABLE when the reactor is in the refueling mode of operation. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod, or control rod pair, from the core during refueling. (Special consideration and requirements for multiple control rod withdrawal during refueling are covered in Special Operations LCO 3.10.6, "Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling.") The analysis assumes this condition is acceptable since the core will be shutdown with the highest worth control rod or rod pair withdrawn, if adequate SDM has been demonstrated.

Prevention or mitigation of reactivity insertion events is necessary to limit energy deposition in the fuel to prevent significant fuel damage, which could result in undue release of radioactivity (see Bases for LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control"). Adequate SDM ensures inadvertent criticalities will not cause significant fuel damage.

SDM satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO

The specified SDM limit accounts for the uncertainty in the demonstration of SDM by testing. Separate SDM limits are provided for testing where the highest worth control rod or rod pair is determined analytically or by measurement. This is due to the reduced uncertainty in the SDM test when the highest worth control rod or rod pair is determined by measurement. When SDM is demonstrated by calculations not associated with a test (e.g., to confirm SDM during the fuel loading sequence), additional margin must be added to the specified SDM limit to account for uncertainties in the calculation. To assure adequate SDM, a design margin is included to account for uncertainties in the design calculations (Ref. 3).

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, SDM must be provided because subcriticality with the highest worth control rod or rod pair withdrawn is assumed in the analysis. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, SDM is required to ensure the reactor will be held subcritical with margin for a single withdrawn control rod or rod pair. SDM is required in MODE 6 to prevent an inadvertent criticality during the withdrawal of a single control rod from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies or of a control rod pair from loaded core cells during scram time testing.

ACTIONS

A.1

With SDM not within the limits of the LCO in MODE 1 or 2, SDM must be restored within 6 hours. Failure to meet the specified SDM may be caused by a control rod that cannot be inserted. The 6-hour Completion Time is acceptable considering that the reactor can still be shut down assuming no additional failures of control rods to insert, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

B.1

If the SDM cannot be restored, the reactor must be in MODE 3 within 12 hours to prevent the potential for further reductions in available SDM (e.g., additional stuck control rods). The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1

With SDM not within limits in MODE 3 and 4, the operator must immediately initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods. This action results in the least reactive condition for the core.

D.1 and D.2

With SDM not within limits in MODE 5, the operator must immediately initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods. Action must continue until all insertable control rods are fully inserted. This action results in the least reactive condition for the core. Action must also be initiated within 1 hour to provide means for control of potential radioactive releases. This includes ensuring the Reactor Building is OPERABLE. Actions must continue until the Reactor Building is OPERABLE.

E.1, E.2, and E.3

With SDM not within limits in MODE 6, the operator must immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS that could reduce SDM (e.g., insertion of fuel in the core or withdrawal of control rods). Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Inserting control rods or removing fuel from the core will reduce the total reactivity and are therefore excluded from the suspended actions.

Action must also be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Actions must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies have been fully inserted. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and therefore do not have to be inserted.

Action must also be initiated within 1 hour to provide means for control of potential radioactive releases. This includes ensuring the Reactor Building is OPERABLE. Actions must continue until the Reactor Building is OPERABLE.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.1.1

Adequate SDM is verified to ensure the reactor can be made subcritical from any initial operating condition. Adequate SDM must be demonstrated by testing before or during the first startup after fuel movement, shuffling within the reactor pressure vessel, or control rod replacement. Control rod replacement refers to the decoupling and removal of a control rod from a core location, and subsequent replacement with a new control rod or a control rod from another core location. Since core reactivity will vary during the cycle as a function of fuel depletion and poison burnup, the beginning of cycle (BOC) test must also account for changes in core reactivity during the cycle. Therefore, to obtain the SDM, the initial measured value of core reactivity must be increased by an adder, R, which is the difference between the calculated value of maximum core reactivity during the operating cycle and the calculated BOC core reactivity. If the value of R is negative (that is, BOC is the most reactive point in the cycle), no correction to the BOC measured value is required (Ref. 4). For the SDM demonstrations that rely solely on calculation of the highest worth control rod, additional margin ({0.10%} $\Delta k/k$) must be added to the SDM limit to account for uncertainties in the calculation.

The SDM may be demonstrated during an in-sequence control rod withdrawal, in which the highest worth control rod pair is analytically determined, or during local criticals, where the highest worth control rod pair is determined by testing. Local critical tests require the withdrawal of out of sequence control rods. This testing could therefore require bypassing of the Rod Pattern Control System to allow the out of sequence withdrawal, so additional requirements must be met (see LCO 3.10.7, "Control Rod Testing - Operating").

The Frequency of 4 hours after reaching criticality is allowed to provide a reasonable time to perform the required calculations and appropriate verification.

During MODE 6, adequate SDM is also required to ensure the reactor does not reach criticality during control rod withdrawals. An evaluation of each in-vessel fuel movement during fuel loading (including shuffling fuel within the core) shall be performed to ensure adequate SDM is maintained during refueling. This ensures the intermediate loading patterns are bounded by the safety analyses for the final core loading pattern. For example, bounding analyses, which demonstrate adequate SDM for the most reactive configurations during the refueling, may be performed to demonstrate acceptability of the entire fuel movement

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

sequence. For these SDM demonstrations, which rely solely on calculation, additional margin must be added to the specified SDM limit to account for uncertainties in the calculation. Spiral off-load or reload sequences inherently satisfy the SR provided the fuel assemblies are reloaded in the same configuration analyzed for the new cycle. Removing fuel from the core will always result in an increase in SDM.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
2. Section 15.3.7.
3. NEDC-33239P, Class III (proprietary), GE14 for ESBWR Nuclear Design Report, February 2006.
4. Section 4.3.3.1.

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies

BASES

BACKGROUND

In accordance with GDC 26, GDC 28, and GDC 29 (Ref. 1), reactivity shall be controllable such that subcriticality is maintained under cold conditions and acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences. Reactivity anomaly is used as a measure of the predicted versus measured core reactivity during power operation. The continual confirmation of core reactivity is necessary to ensure that safety analyses of design basis transients and accidents remain valid. A large reactivity anomaly could be the result of unanticipated changes in fuel reactivity, control rod worth, or operation at conditions not consistent with those assumed in the predictions of core reactivity, and could potentially result in a loss of SDM or violation of acceptable fuel design limits. Comparing predicted versus measured core reactivity validates the nuclear methods used in the safety analysis and supports the SDM demonstrations (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)") in ensuring the reactor can be brought safely to cold, subcritical conditions.

When the reactor core is critical or in normal power operation, a reactivity balance exists and the net reactivity is zero. A comparison of predicted and measured reactivity is convenient under such a balance since parameters are being maintained relatively stable under steady state power conditions. The positive reactivity inherent in the core design is balanced by the negative reactivity of the control components, thermal feedback, neutron leakage, and materials in the core that absorb neutrons, such as burnable absorbers, producing zero net reactivity.

In order to achieve the required fuel cycle energy output, the uranium enrichment in the new fuel loading and the fuel loaded in the previous cycles provide excess positive reactivity beyond that required to sustain steady state operation at the beginning of cycle (BOC). When the reactor is critical at RTP and operating moderator temperature, the excess positive reactivity is compensated by burnable absorbers (if any), control rods, and whatever neutron poisons (mainly xenon and samarium) are present in the fuel.

The predicted core reactivity, as represented by k-effective (k_{eff}), is calculated by a 3D core simulator code as a function of cycle exposure. This calculation is performed for projected operating states and conditions throughout the cycle. The monitored k_{eff} is calculated by the core

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

monitoring system for actual plant conditions and is then compared to the predicted value for the cycle exposure.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Accurate prediction of core reactivity is either an explicit or implicit assumption in many of the safety analyses in Chapter 15 (Ref. 2). In particular, SDM and reactivity transients, such as control rod withdrawal error events are very sensitive to accurate prediction of core reactivity. These analyses rely on computer codes that have been qualified against available test data, operating plant data, and analytical benchmarks. Monitoring reactivity anomaly provides additional assurance that the nuclear methods provide an accurate representation of the core reactivity.

The comparison between measured and predicted initial core reactivity provides a normalization for the calculational models used to predict core reactivity. If the measured and predicted k_{eff} for identical core conditions at BOC do not reasonably agree, then the assumptions used in the reload cycle design analysis or the calculation models used to predict k_{eff} may not be accurate. If reasonable agreement between measured and predicted core reactivity exists at BOC, then the prediction may be normalized to the measured value. Thereafter, any significant deviations in the measured k_{eff} from the predicted k_{eff} that develop during fuel depletion may be an indication that the assumptions of the design basis transient and accident analyses are no longer valid, or that an unexpected change in core conditions has occurred.

Reactivity Anomalies satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The reactivity anomaly limit is established to ensure plant operation is maintained within the assumptions of the safety analyses. Large differences between monitored and predicted core reactivity may indicate that the assumptions of the design basis transient and accident analyses are no longer valid, or that the uncertainties in the Nuclear Design Methodology are larger than expected. A limit on the difference between the monitored core k_{eff} and the predicted core k_{eff} of ± 1% $\Delta k/k$ has been established based on engineering judgment. A > 1% deviation in reactivity from that predicted is larger than expected for normal operation and should therefore be evaluated.

BASES

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 1, most of the control rods are withdrawn and steady-state operation is typically achieved. Under these conditions, the comparison between predicted and monitored core reactivity provides an effective measure of the reactivity anomaly. In MODE 2, control rods are typically being withdrawn during a startup. In MODES 3, 4 and 5, all control rods are fully inserted, and, therefore, the reactor is in the least reactive state where monitoring core reactivity is not necessary. In MODE 6, fuel loading results in a continually changing core reactivity. SDM requirements (LCO 3.1.1) ensure that fuel movements are performed within the bounds of the safety analyses, and a SDM demonstration is required during the first startup following operations that could have altered core reactivity (e.g., fuel movement, control rod replacement, control rod shuffling). The SDM test, required by LCO 3.1.1, provides a direct comparison of the predicted and monitored core reactivity at cold conditions, and, therefore, reactivity anomaly is not required during these conditions.

ACTIONS

A.1

Should an anomaly develop between measured and predicted core reactivity, the core reactivity difference must be restored within the limit to ensure continued operation is within the core design assumptions. Restoration to within the limit could be performed by an evaluation of the core design and safety analysis to determine the reason for the anomaly. This evaluation normally reviews the core conditions to determine their consistency with input to design calculations. Measured core and process parameters are also normally evaluated to determine that they are within the bounds of the safety analysis, and safety analysis calculational models may be reviewed to verify that they are adequate for representation of the core conditions. The required Completion Time of 72 hours is acceptable based on the low probability of a Design Basis Accident occurring during this interval and allows sufficient time to assess the physical condition of the reactor and to complete an evaluation of the core design and safety analysis.

B.1

The unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply if the core reactivity cannot be restored to within the 1% $\Delta k/k$ limit. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.2.1

Verifying the reactivity difference between the monitored and predicted core k_{eff} is within the limits of the LCO provides added assurance that plant operation is maintained within the assumptions of the design basis transient and accident analyses. The core monitoring system calculates the core k_{eff} for the reactor conditions obtained from plant instrumentation. A comparison of the monitored core k_{eff} to the predicted core k_{eff} at the same cycle exposure is used to calculate the reactivity difference. The comparison is required when the core reactivity has potentially changed by a significant amount. This may occur following a refueling in which new fuel assemblies are loaded, fuel assemblies are shuffled within the core, or control rods are replaced or shuffled. Control rod replacement refers to the decoupling and removal of a control rod from a core location, and subsequent replacement with a new control rod or a control rod from another core location. Also, core reactivity changes during the cycle. The 24 hour interval after reaching equilibrium conditions following a startup was established based on the need for equilibrium xenon concentrations in the core such that an accurate comparison between the monitored and predicted core k_{eff} values can be made. For the purposes of this SR, the reactor is assumed to be at equilibrium conditions when steady state operations (no control rod movement) at ≥ 75% RTP have been obtained. The 1000 MWD/T Frequency was developed considering the relatively slow change in core reactivity with exposure and operating experience related to variations in core reactivity. This comparison requires the core to be operating at power levels which minimize the uncertainties and measurement errors, in order to obtain meaningful results. Therefore, the comparison is only done when in MODE 1.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26, GDC 28, and GDC 29.

2. Chapter 15.

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY

BASES

BACKGROUND

Control rods are components of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System, which is the primary Reactivity Control System for the reactor. In conjunction with the Reactor Protection System (RPS), the CRD System provides the means for the reliable control of reactivity changes to ensure that under conditions of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences, specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded. In addition, the control rods provide the capability to hold the reactor core subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the CRD System. The CRD System is designed to satisfy the requirements of GDC 26, GDC 27, GDC 28, and GDC 29 (Ref. 1).

The CRD System consists of 269 fine motion control rod drive (FMCRD) mechanisms and 135 hydraulic control unit (HCU) assemblies. The FMCRD is an electro-hydraulic actuated mechanism that provides normal positioning of the control rods using an electric motor, and scram insertion of the control rods using hydraulic power. The hydraulic power for scram is provided by high pressure water stored in the individual HCU accumulators, each of which supplies sufficient volume to scram two FMCRDs. Normal control rod positioning is performed using a ball-nut and rotating ballscrew arrangement driven by an electric motor. A hollow piston, which is coupled at the upper end to the control rod, rests on the ball-nut. The ball-nut inserts the hollow piston and connected control rod into the core or withdraws them depending on the direction of rotation of the stepping motor. An electromechanical brake mechanism engages the motor drive shaft when the motor is deenergized to prevent inadvertent withdrawal of the control rod, but does not restrict scram insertion.

This Specification along with LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times," and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators," ensures that the performance of the control rods in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in the evaluations involving control rods are presented in References 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The control rods provide the primary means for rapid reactivity control (reactor scram), for maintaining the reactor subcritical, and for limiting the potential effects of reactivity insertion events caused by malfunctions in the CRD System.

The capability to insert the control rods ensures that the assumptions for scram reactivity in the design basis transient and accident analyses are not violated. Since the SDM ensures the reactor will be subcritical with the highest worth control rod or control rod pair withdrawn (assumed single failure of an hydraulic control unit (HCU)), the failure of an additional control rod or control rod pair to insert, if required, could invalidate the demonstrated SDM and potentially limit the ability of the CRD System to hold the reactor subcritical. Therefore, the requirement that all control rods be OPERABLE ensures the CRD System can perform its intended function.

The control rods also protect the fuel from damage that could result in release of radioactivity. The limits protected are the Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit (SL) (see Bases for SL 2.1.1, "Reactor Core SLs," and LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)"), the 1% cladding plastic strain fuel design limit (see Bases for LCO 3.2.1, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)"), and the fuel damage limit (see Bases for LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control") during reactivity insertion events.

The negative reactivity insertion (scram) provided by the CRD System provides the analytical basis for determination of plant thermal limits and provides protection against fuel damage limits during a Rod Withdrawal Error (RWE) event. Bases for LCO 3.1.4, LCO 3.1.5, and LCO 3.1.6 discuss in more detail how the SLs are protected by the CRD System.

Control Rod OPERABILITY satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

OPERABILITY of an individual control rod is based on a combination of factors, primarily the scram insertion times, the control rod coupling integrity, and the ability to determine the control rod position. Accumulator OPERABILITY is addressed by LCO 3.1.5. The associated scram accumulator status for a control rod only affects the scram insertion times and therefore an inoperable accumulator does not immediately require declaring a control rod inoperable.

BASES

LCO (continued)

Although not all control rods are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the intended reactivity control requirements, strict control over the number and distribution of inoperable control rods is required to satisfy the assumptions of the design basis transient and accident analyses.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, the control rods are assumed to function during a DBA or transient and are therefore required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod OPERABILITY during these conditions. Control rod requirements in MODE 6 are located in LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling."

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note that allows separate Condition entry for each control rod. This is acceptable since the Required Actions for each Condition provides appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable control rod. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable control rods governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4

A control rod is stuck if it will not insert by either FMCRD motor torque or hydraulic scram pressure. A control rod is not made inoperable by a failure of the FMCRD motor if the rod is capable of hydraulic scram. With a fully inserted control rod stuck, no actions are required as long as the control rod remains fully inserted. The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows a stuck control rod to be bypassed in the Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS) to allow continued operation. SR 3.3.2.1.7 provides additional requirements when control rods are bypassed in the RC&IS to ensure compliance with the RWE analysis.

With one withdrawn control rod stuck, the local scram reactivity rate assumptions may not be met if the stuck control rod separation criteria are not met. Therefore, a verification that the separation criteria are met must be performed immediately. {The separation criteria are not met if: a) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to two "slow" control rods, b) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

one "slow" control rod, and the one "slow" control rod is also adjacent to another "slow" control rod, or c) if the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to one "slow" control rod when there is another pair of "slow" control rods adjacent to one another.} The description of "slow" control rods is provided in LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times." In addition, the associated control rod drive must be disarmed and isolated within 2 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 2 hours is acceptable, considering the reactor can still be shut down, assuming no additional control rods fail to insert, and provides a reasonable amount of time to perform the Required Action in an orderly manner. The motor drive may be disarmed by bypassing the rod in the RC&IS or disconnecting its power supply. Isolating the control rod from scram prevents damage to the CRD and surrounding fuel assemblies should a scram occur. The control rod can be isolated from scram by isolating it from its associated HCU. Two CRDs sharing an HCU can be individually isolated from scram.

Monitoring of the insertion capability of withdrawn control rods must be performed within 24 hours from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RC&IS. SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 perform periodic tests of the control rod insertion capability of withdrawn control rods. Testing within 24 hours ensures a generic problem does not exist. This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." The Required Action A.2 Completion Time only begins upon discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the actual LPSP of the RC&IS, since the notch insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of rod pattern control (LCO 3.1.6) and the RC&IS (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation") when below the actual LPSP. The allowed Completion Time of 24 hours from discovery of Condition A, concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the LPSP of the RC&IS, provides a reasonable time to test the control rods, considering the potential for a need to reduce power to perform the tests.

To allow continued operation with a withdrawn control rod stuck, an evaluation of adequate SDM is also required within 72 hours. Should a design basis transient or accident require a shutdown, to preserve the single failure criterion, an additional control rod would have to be assumed to fail to insert when required. Therefore, the original SDM demonstration may not be valid. The SDM must therefore be evaluated (by measurement or analysis) with the stuck control rod withdrawn and

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

the highest worth control rod or control rod pair assumed to be fully withdrawn.

The allowed Completion Time of 72 hours to verify SDM is adequate considering that with a single control rod stuck in the withdrawn position, the remaining OPERABLE control rods are capable of providing the required scram and shutdown reactivity. Failure to reach MODE 5 is only likely if an additional control rod adjacent to the stuck control rod also fails to insert during a required scram. Even with the postulated additional single failure of an adjacent control rod to insert, sufficient reactivity control remains to reach and maintain MODE 3 or 4 conditions. In addition, Required Action A.3 performs a movement test on each remaining withdrawn control rod to ensure that no additional control rods are stuck. Therefore, the 72 hour Completion Time to perform the SDM verification in Required Action A.3 is acceptable.

B.1

With two or more withdrawn control rods stuck, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The occurrence of more than one control rod stuck at a withdrawn position increases the probability that the reactor cannot be shut down if required. Insertion of all insertable control rods eliminates the possibility of an additional failure of a control rod to insert. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1 and C.2

With one or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than being stuck in the withdrawn position, operation may continue, provided the control rods are fully inserted within 3 hours and disarmed (however, they do not need to be isolated from scram). Inserting a control rod ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. The control rod is disarmed to prevent inadvertent withdrawal during subsequent operations. The control rods can be disarmed by bypassing the rod in the RC&IS or disconnecting its power supply. Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note that allows control rods to be bypassed in the RC&IS if required to allow insertion of the inoperable control rods and continued operation. SR 3.3.2.1.7 provides additional requirements when the control rods are bypassed to ensure compliance with the RWE analysis.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable considering the small number of allowed inoperable control rods and provides time to insert and disarm the control rods in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1 and D.2

{During reactor startup at less than 50% control rod density, the Ganged Withdrawal Sequence Restrictions (GWSR) analysis requires inserted control rods not in compliance with GWSR to be separated by at least two OPERABLE control rods in all directions including the diagonal (Ref. 2). Out-of-sequence control rods may increase the potential reactivity worth of a control rod, or gang of control rods, during a RWE and therefore the distribution of inoperable control rods must be controlled. Therefore, if two or more inoperable control rods are not in compliance with GWSR and not separated by at least two OPERABLE control rods, actions must be taken to restore compliance with GWSR or restore the control rods to OPERABLE status.} A Note has been added to the Condition to clarify that the Condition is not applicable when > {10}% RTP since the GWSR is not required to be followed under these conditions, as described in the Bases for LCO 3.1.6.

E.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, D, or E are not met or nine or more inoperable control rods exist, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. This ensures all insertable control rods are inserted and places the reactor in a condition that does not require the active function (i.e., scram) of the control rods. The number of control rods permitted to be inoperable when operating above {10}% RTP could be more than the value specified, but the occurrence of a large number of inoperable control rods could be indicative of a generic problem, and investigation and resolution of the potential problem should be undertaken. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 in an orderly manner from full power without challenging plant systems.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.3.1

Determining the position of each control rod is required to ensure adequate information on control rod position is available to the operator for determining CRD OPERABILITY and controlling rod patterns. Control rod position may be determined by the use of OPERABLE position indicators, or by the use of other appropriate methods. The 24-hour Frequency of this SR is based on operating experience related to expected changes in control rod position and the availability of control rod position indication in the control room.

SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3

Control rod insertion capability is demonstrated by inserting each partially or fully withdrawn control rod two notches (i.e., 4 steps) and observing that the control rod moves. The control rod may then be returned to its original position. This ensures the control rod is not stuck and is free to insert on a scram signal. These surveillances are not required when below the actual LPSP of the RC&IS since the step insertions may not be compatible with the requirements of the Ganged Withdrawal Sequence Restrictions (LCO 3.1.6) and the RC&IS (LCO 3.3.2.1). The 7 day Frequency of SR 3.1.3.2 is based on experience related to changes in CRD performance and the ease of performing step testing for fully withdrawn control rods. Partially withdrawn control rods are tested with a 31 day Frequency based on the potential power reduction required to allow the control rod movement and considering the large testing sample of SR 3.1.3.2. Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency takes into account operating experience related to changes in CRD performance. At any time, if a control rod is immovable, a determination of that control rod's trippability (OPERABILITY) must be made and appropriate action taken.

SR 3.1.3.4

Verifying the scram time for each control rod to {60}% rod insertion position is less than or equal to { } seconds provides reasonable assurance that the control rod will insert when required during a DBA or transient, thereby completing its shutdown function. This SR is performed in conjunction with the control rod scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.1, SR 3.1.4.2, SR 3.1.4.3, and SR 3.1.4.4. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in LCO 3.3.1.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation," overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The associated Frequencies are acceptable, considering the more frequent testing performed to demonstrate other aspects of control rod

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

OPERABILITY and operating experience, which shows scram times do not significantly change over an operating cycle.

SR 3.1.3.5

Coupling verification is performed to confirm the integrity of the coupling between the control blade and the hollow piston and to ensure the control rod will perform its intended function when necessary. The Surveillance requires verifying that a control rod does not go to the withdrawn overtravel position when it is fully withdrawn. The overtravel position feature provides a positive check on the coupling integrity, since only an uncoupled hollow piston can reach the overtravel position. The verification is required to be performed prior to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the control rod or CRD System that could affect the coupling.

This Frequency is acceptable because of the mechanical integrity of the bayonet coupling design of the FMCRDs. The bayonet coupling can only be engaged/disengaged by performing a 45° rotation of the FMCRD mechanism relative to the control rod. This is normally performed by rotating the FMCRD mechanism 45° from below the vessel with the control rod kept from rotating by the orificed fuel support that has been installed from above. Once the coupling is engaged and the FMCRD middle flange is bolted into place, the 45° rotation required for uncoupling cannot be accomplished unless the associated orificed fuel support is removed (which would allow for the control rod to be rotated from above) or the FMCRD middle flange is unbolted (which would allow for rotation of the FMCRD mechanism from below). Therefore, after FMCRD maintenance in which the FMCRD is uncoupled and then recoupled or after the orificed fuel support has been moved, it is required to perform a coupling verification. Thereafter, it is not necessary to check the coupling integrity again until the FMCRD maintenance work has resulted in uncoupling and recoupling, or the orificed fuel support has been moved.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26, GDC 27, GDC 28, and GDC 29.

2. NEDE-33243P, Class III (proprietary), ESBWR Marathon Control Rod Nuclear Design Report, May 2006.

3. Section 4.3.3.

4. Section 4.6.1.

5. Section 5.2.2.

6. Section 15.3.

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times

BASES

BACKGROUND

The scram function of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System controls reactivity changes during abnormal operational transients to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded (Ref. 1). The control rods are scrammed by positive means, using hydraulic pressure exerted on the CRD piston.

A single hydraulic control unit (HCU) powers the scram action of one or two fine motion control rod drives (FMCRDs). When a scram signal is initiated, control air is vented from the scram valve in each hydraulic control unit (HCU), allowing it to open by spring action. High pressure nitrogen then raises the piston within the HCU accumulator and forces the displaced water through the scram piping to the connected FMCRDS. Inside each FMCRD, the high pressure water lifts the hollow piston off the ball-nut and drives the control rod into the core. A buffer assembly stops the hollow piston at the end of its stroke. Departure from the ball-nut releases spring-loaded latches in the hollow piston that engage slots in the guide tube. These latches support the control rod in the inserted position. The control rod cannot be withdrawn until the ball-nut is driven up and engaged with the hollow piston. Stationary fingers on the ball-nut then cam the latches out of the slots and hold them in the retracted position. A scram action is complete when every FMCRD has reached their fully inserted position.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the control rod scram function are presented in References 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The design basis transient and accident analyses assume that all of the control rods scram at a specified insertion rate. The resulting negative scram reactivity forms the basis for the determination of plant thermal limits (e.g., the MCPR). Other distributions of scram times (e.g., several control rods scramming slower than the average time, with several control rods scramming faster than the average time) can also provide sufficient scram reactivity. Surveillance of each individual control rod's scram time ensures that the scram reactivity assumed in the design basis transient and accident analyses can be met.

The scram function of the CRD System protects the Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit (SL) (see Bases for SL 2.1.1, "Reactor Core SLs," and LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)"), and the

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

1% cladding plastic strain fuel design limit (see Bases for LCO 3.2.1, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)"), which ensure that no fuel damage will occur if these limits are not exceeded. For reactor pressures above 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig), the scram function is designed to insert negative reactivity at a rate fast enough to prevent the Fuel Cladding Integrity SL being exceeded during the analyzed limiting power transient. For reactor pressures below 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig) the scram function is assumed to function during the Rod Withdrawal Error (RWE) event (Ref. 6) and, therefore, also provides protection against violating fuel damage limits during reactivity insertion accidents (see Bases for LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control"). For the reactor vessel overpressure protection analysis, the scram function, along with the Safety/Relief Valves, ensures that the peak vessel pressure is maintained within the applicable ASME Code limits.

Control Rod Scram Times satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The scram time limits specified in Table 3.1.4-1 (in the accompanying LCO) are required to ensure that the scram reactivity assumed in the design basis transient and accident analysis is met. To account for single failure and "slow" scramming control rods, the scram time limits specified in Table 3.1.4-1 are faster than those assumed in the design basis analysis. The scram time limits have a margin to allow up to {8} of the control rods to have scram times that exceed the specified limits (i.e., "slow" control rods) assuming a single stuck control rod (as allowed by LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY") and an additional control rod or control rod pair failing to scram per the single failure criterion. The scram time limits are specified as a function of reactor vessel bottom pressure to account for the pressure dependence of the scram times. The scram time limits are specified relative to percent insertion. The scram time limits are specified relative to measurements based on reed switch positions, which provide the control rod position indication. The reed switch closes ("pickup") when the hollow piston passes a specific location and then opens ("dropout") as the hollow piston tube travels upward. Verification of the specified scram times in Table 3.1.4-1 is accomplished through measurement of the "dropout" times.

{To ensure that local scram reactivity rates are maintained within acceptable limits, no more than two of the allowed "slow" control rods may occupy adjacent locations.

BASES

LCO (continued)

Table 3.1.4-1 is modified by two Notes, which state control rods with scram times not within the limits of the Table are considered "slow" and that control rods with scram times > { } seconds to {60}% insertion are considered inoperable as required by SR 3.1.3.4, and are not considered slow.}

This LCO applies only to OPERABLE control rods since inoperable control rods will be inserted and disarmed (LCO 3.1.3). Slow scramming control rods may be conservatively declared inoperable and not accounted for as "slow" control rods.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, a scram is assumed to function during transients and accidents analyzed for these plant conditions. These events are assumed to occur during startup and power operation; therefore, the scram function of the control rods is required during these MODES. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod scram capability during these conditions. Scram requirements in MODE 6 are contained in LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling".

ACTIONS

A.1

When the requirements of this LCO are not met, the rate of negative reactivity insertion during a scram may not be within the assumptions of the safety analyses. Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

All four SRs of this LCO are modified by a Note stating that during a single control rod or control rod pair scram time Surveillance, the CRD pumps shall be isolated from the associated scram accumulator. With the CRD pump isolated (i.e., charging valve closed) the influence of the CRD pump head does not affect the single control rod or control rod pair scram times. During a full core scram, the CRD pump head would be seen by all control rods and would have a negligible effect on the scram insertion times.

SR 3.1.4.1

The scram reactivity used in design basis transient and accident analyses is based on assumed control rod scram time. Measurement of the scram times with reactor vessel bottom pressure ≥ 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig) demonstrates acceptable scram times for the transients analyzed in References 4 and 5.

Scram insertion times increase with increasing reactor pressure because of the competing effects of reactor vessel bottom pressure and stored accumulator energy. Demonstration of adequate scram times at reactor vessel bottom pressure ≥ 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig) helps to ensure that the scram times will be within the specified limits at higher pressures. Limits are specified as a function of reactor pressure to account for the sensitivity of the scram insertion times with pressure and to allow a range of pressures over which scram time testing can be performed. To ensure that scram time testing is performed within a reasonable time following a refueling or after a shutdown greater than 120 days or longer, control rods are required to be tested before exceeding 40% RTP following the shutdown. This Frequency is acceptable considering the additional surveillances performed for control rod OPERABILITY, the frequent verification of adequate accumulator pressure, and the required testing of control rods affected by work on control rods or the CRD System.

SR 3.1.4.2

Additional testing of a sample of control rods is required to verify the continued performance of the scram function during the cycle. A representative sample contains at least 10% of the control rods, the sample remains representative if no more than 7.5% of the control rods in the sample tested are determined to be "slow." If more than 7.5% of the sample is declared to be "slow" per the criteria in Table 3.1.4-1, additional control rods are tested until this 7.5% criterion (e.g., 7.5% of the sample size) is satisfied, or until the total number of "slow" control rods (throughout the core, from all Surveillances) exceeds the LCO limit. For planned testing, the control rods selected for the sample should be

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

different for each test. Data from inadvertent scrams should be used whenever possible to avoid unnecessary testing at power, even if the control rods with data were previously tested in a sample. The 200 day Frequency is based on operating experience that has shown that control rod scram times do not significantly change over an operating cycle. This Frequency is also reasonable based on the additional Surveillances done on the control rod drives at more frequent intervals in accordance with LCO 3.1.3 and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators."

SR 3.1.4.3

When work is performed on a control rod or the CRD System that could affect the scram insertion time, testing must be done to demonstrate that each affected control rod retains adequate scram performance over the range of applicable reactor pressures from zero to the maximum permissible pressure. The scram testing must be performed before declaring the control rod OPERABLE. The required scram time testing must demonstrate that the affected control rod is still within acceptable limits. The limits for reactor pressures < 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig) are established based on a high probability of meeting the acceptance criteria at reactor pressures ≥ 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig). Limits for reactor pressures ≥ 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig) are found in Table 3.1.4-1. If testing demonstrates the affected control rod does not meet these limits, but is within the limit of Table 3.1.4-1, Note 2, the control rod can be declared OPERABLE and "slow."

Specific examples of work that could affect the scram times include (but are not limited to) the following: removal of any CRD for maintenance or modification, replacement of a control rod, and maintenance or modification of a scram solenoid pilot valve, scram valve, accumulator isolation valve, or check valves in the piping required for scram.

The Frequency of once prior to declaring the affected control rod OPERABLE is acceptable because of the capability to test the control rods over a range of operating conditions and the more frequent surveillances on other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.1.4.4

After fuel movement has occurred within the affected cell or after work on control rod or CRD System has occurred that can affect scram time, the scram insertion time must be confirmed. Testing must be done to demonstrate each affected control rod is still within the limits of Table 3.1.4-1 with the reactor vessel bottom pressure ≥ 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig). Where work has been performed at high reactor pressure, the requirements of SR 3.1.4.3 and SR 3.1.4.4 will be satisfied with one test. For a control rod affected by work performed while shut down, however, a zero pressure and a high pressure test may be required. This testing ensures that the control rod scram performance is acceptable for operating reactor pressure conditions prior to withdrawing the control rod for continued operation. Alternatively, a test during hydrostatic pressure testing could also satisfy both criteria. When fuel movement within the reactor pressure vessel occurs, only those control rods associated with the core cells affected by the fuel movement are required to be scram time tested. During a routine refueling outage, it is expected that all control rods will be affected.

The Frequency of once prior to exceeding 40% RTP is acceptable because of the capability to test the control rods at the different conditions and the more frequent surveillances on other aspects of control rod OPERABILITY.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10.
2. Section 4.2.4.
3. Section 4.3.3.
4. Section 4.6.1.
5. Section 5.2.2.
6. Section 15.3.

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators

BASES

BACKGROUND	The control rod scram accumulators are part of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System and are provided to ensure that the control rods scram under varying reactor conditions. The control rod scram accumulators store sufficient energy to fully insert a single or pair of control rods associated with a specific hydraulic control unit (HCU) at any reactor vessel pressure. The accumulator is a hydraulic cylinder with a free-floating piston. The piston separates the water used to scram the control rods from the nitrogen, which provides the required energy. The scram accumulators are necessary to scram the control rods within the required insertion times of LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times."
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the control rod scram function are presented in References 1, 2, 3, and 4. The design basis transient and accident analyses assume that all of the control rods scram at a specified insertion rate. OPERABILITY of each individual control rod scram accumulator, along with LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," and LCO 3.1.4, ensures that the scram reactivity assumed in the design basis transient and accident analyses can be met. The existence of an inoperable accumulator may invalidate prior scram time measurements for the associated control rods. The scram function of the CRD System, and, therefore, the OPERABILITY of the accumulators, protects the Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit (see Bases for LCO 3.2.2 "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") and the 1% cladding plastic strain fuel design limit (see Bases for LCO 3.2.1, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)"), which ensure that no fuel damage will occur if these limits are not exceeded (see Bases for LCO 3.1.4). Also, the scram function at low reactor vessel pressure (i.e., startup conditions) provides protection against violating fuel design limits during reactivity insertion accidents (see Bases for LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control"). Control Rod Scram Accumulators satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO

The OPERABILITY of the control rod scram accumulators is required to ensure that adequate scram insertion capability exists when needed over the entire range of reactor pressures. The OPERABILITY of the scram accumulators is based on maintaining adequate accumulator pressure.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, the scram function is required for mitigation of DBAs and transients and, therefore, the scram accumulators must be OPERABLE to support the scram function. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod scram accumulator OPERABILITY under these conditions. Requirements for scram accumulators in MODE 6 are contained in LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling."

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for each control rod scram accumulator. This is acceptable since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory action for each inoperable control rod scram accumulator. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation and subsequent inoperable accumulators governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1

With one control rod scram accumulator inoperable, the scram function could become severely degraded because the accumulator is the primary source of scram force for the associated control rod or rod pair at all reactor pressures. In this event, the associated control rod or rod pair is declared inoperable and LCO 3.1.3 entered. This would result in requiring the affected control rod or rod pair to be fully inserted and disarmed, thereby satisfying its intended function in accordance with ACTIONS of LCO 3.1.3. The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is considered reasonable, based on the large number of control rods available to provide the scram function. Additionally, an automatic reactor scram function is provided on sensed low pressure in the CRD accumulator charging water header (see LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"). This anticipatory reactor trip protects against the possibility of significant pressure degradation (and thus reduced scram force) concurrently in multiple control rod scram accumulators due to a transient in the CRD hydraulic system.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

With two or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable, the scram function could become severely degraded because the accumulators are the primary source of scram force for the control rods at all reactor pressures. In this event, the associated control rods are declared inoperable and LCO 3.1.3 entered. This would result in requiring the affected control rods to be fully inserted and disarmed, thereby satisfying its intended function in accordance with ACTIONS of LCO 3.1.3.

The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour is considered reasonable, based on the ability of the accumulator to still be able to scram the associated control rod(s) and the low probability of a DBA or transient occurring while the affected accumulators are inoperable.

C.1

The reactor mode switch must be immediately placed in the shutdown position if any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met. This ensures that all insertable control rods are inserted and that the reactor is in a condition that does not require the active function (i.e., scram) of the control rods. This Required Action is modified by a Note stating that the Required Action is not applicable if all control rods associated with the inoperable scram accumulators are fully inserted, since the function of the control rods has been performed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.5.1

SR 3.1.5.1 requires that the accumulator pressure be checked every 7 days to ensure that adequate accumulator pressure exists to provide sufficient scram force. The primary indicator of accumulator OPERABILITY is the accumulator pressure. A minimum accumulator pressure is specified, below which the capability of the accumulator to perform its intended function becomes degraded and the accumulator is considered inoperable. The minimum accumulator pressure of {12.76 MPaG (1850 psig)} is well below the expected pressure of {14.82 MPaG (2150 psig)} (Ref. 2).

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Declaring the accumulator inoperable when the minimum pressure is not maintained ensures that significant degradation in scram times does not occur. The 7 day Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience and takes into account other indications available in the control room.

REFERENCES

1. Section 4.3.3.
2. Section 4.6.1.
3. Section 5.2.2.
4. Section 15.3.

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control

BASES

BACKGROUND	Control rod patterns during startup conditions are controlled by the operator and the rod worth minimizer (RWM), (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation"), so that only specified control rod sequences and relative positions are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to {10}% RTP. The sequences effectively limit the potential amount of reactivity addition that could occur during a control rod withdrawal, specifically the Rod Withdrawal Error (RWE) event.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the RWE are summarized in Reference 1. RWE analyses assume that the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. These sequences define the potential initial conditions for the RWE analysis. The RWM provides backup to operator control of the withdrawal sequences to ensure that the initial conditions of the RWE analysis are not violated. Control rod patterns analyzed in Reference 1 follow the Ganged Withdrawal Sequence Restrictions (GWSR). The GWSR is applicable from the condition of all control rods fully inserted to {10}% RTP. For GWSR, the control rods are required to be moved in groups, with all OPERABLE control rods assigned to specific groups required not to exceed an allowable maximum position difference until all OPERABLE control rods of the group have reached a defined withdrawal position. The GWSR are defined to minimize the maximum incremental control rod worths without being overly restrictive during normal plant operation. Prevention or mitigation of positive reactivity insertion events is necessary to limit energy deposition in the fuel to prevent significant fuel damage which could result in undue release of radioactivity. Analysis of the GWSR (Ref. 1) has demonstrated that the 711 J/g (170 cal/gm) limit for evaluating the radiological consequences of an RWE will not be violated. The analysis also evaluated the effect of fully inserted inoperable control rods not in compliance with the sequence to allow a limited number (i.e., eight) and distribution of fully inserted inoperable control rods. Rod Pattern Control satisfies the requirements of Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO

Compliance with the prescribed control rod sequences minimizes the potential consequences of a RWE by limiting the initial conditions to those consistent with the GWSR. This LCO only applies to OPERABLE control rods. For inoperable control rods required to be inserted, separate requirements are specified in LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," consistent with the allowances for inoperable control rods in the GWSR.

APPLICABILITY

Compliance with GWSR is required in MODES 1 and 2 when THERMAL POWER is ≤ {10}% of RTP. When THERMAL POWER is > {10}% of RTP, there is no possible control rod configuration that results in a control rod worth that could exceed the 711 J/g (170 cal/gm) limit for evaluating the radiological consequences of an RWE. In MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, since the reactor is shutdown and only a total of one control rod or control rod pair can be withdrawn from core cells containing fuel assemblies, adequate SDM ensures the reactor will remain subcritical.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

With one or more OPERABLE control rods not in compliance with the prescribed control rod sequence, actions may be taken to either correct the control rod pattern or declare the associated control rods inoperable within 8 hours. Noncompliance with the prescribed sequence may be the result of failed resolvers, or a power reduction to ≤ {10}% RTP before establishing the correct control rod pattern (i.e., a pattern that complies with the GWSR). The number of OPERABLE control rods not in compliance with the prescribed sequence is limited to eight to prevent the operator from attempting to correct a control rod pattern that significantly deviates from the prescribed sequence. When the control rod pattern is not in compliance with the prescribed sequence, all control rod movement should be stopped except for moves needed to correct the control rod pattern, or scram if warranted.

Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note which allows control rods to be bypassed in Rod Control & Information System (RC&IS) to allow the affected control rods to be returned to their correct position. This ensures that the control rods will be moved to the correct position. A control rod not in compliance with the prescribed sequence is not considered inoperable except as required by Required Action A.2. OPERABILITY of control rods is determined by compliance with LCO 3.1.3, LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times," and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators." The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is reasonable, considering the restrictions on the number of allowed out-of-sequence

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

control rods and the low probability of a RWE occurring during the time the control rods are out of sequence.

B.1 and B.2

If nine or more OPERABLE control rods are out of sequence the control rod pattern significantly deviates from the prescribed sequence. Control rod withdrawal should be suspended immediately to prevent the potential for further deviation from the prescribed sequence. Control rod insertion to correct control rods withdrawn beyond their allowed position is allowed since, in general, insertion of control rods has less impact on control rod worths than withdrawals. Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note that allows the affected control rods to be bypassed in RC&IS in accordance with SR 3.3.2.1.7 to allow insertion only. With nine or more OPERABLE control rods not in compliance with GWSR, the reactor mode switch must be placed in the shutdown position within one hour. With the reactor mode switch in shutdown, the reactor is shut down and as such does not meet the applicability requirements of this LCO. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour is a reasonable time to allow insertion of control rods to restore compliance, and is appropriate relative to the low probability of a RWE occurring with the control rods out of sequence.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.6.1

Verification that the control rod pattern is in compliance with the GWSR at a 24 hour Frequency ensures that the assumptions of the RWE analyses are met. The 24 hour Frequency of this Surveillance was developed considering that the primary check of the control rod pattern compliance with the GWSR is performed by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1). The RWM provides control rod blocks to enforce the required control rod sequence and is required to be OPERABLE when operating ≤ {10}% RTP.

REFERENCES

1. Section 15.3.8.

2. NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan," Section 15.4.1, Revision 2, July 1981.

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The SLC System is designed to provide both manual and automatically initiated capability for bringing the reactor, at any time in a fuel cycle, from full power and minimum control rod inventory (which is at the peak of the xenon transient), to a subcritical condition with the reactor in the most reactive xenon-free state without taking credit for control rod movement. The SLC System satisfies portions of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 (Ref. 1) on anticipated transient without scram (ATWS).

The SLC System contains two identical and separate trains. Each train provides 50% of the required SLC injection capacity required for ATWS. Each SLC train consists of a nitrogen pressurized accumulator containing sodium pentaborate solution (SPBS) and is connected by piping through two parallel injection squib valves to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV). The SPBS is injected into the RPV by firing squib valves. Each injection line is connected to a supply header. Each header includes spargers with a total of eight nozzles. Each nozzle penetrates the shroud and is provided with two holes that discharge the SPBS into the core. This arrangement, together with a high nozzle injection velocity, assures proper distribution of the SPBS within the core bypass region. Boron in sodium pentaborate acts as a neutron poison reducing and halting the fission process. The SLC System is passive and requires no high pressure pump or external standby AC power for SPBS injection. Power for the safety functions of the SLCS is derived from the Class 1E 120 VAC and 250 VDC electrical systems. Adequate functioning of the SLC System requires only one of the two injection valves open in each SLC train. The accumulators can be isolated manually or automatically by low accumulator level.

The SLC System is also credited in the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to provide makeup water to the RPV. The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and the SLC are designed to flood the core during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) to provide required core cooling. Each train provides 50% of the required SLC injection capacity assumed to be available for a LOCA. By providing core cooling following a LOCA, the ECCS, and SLC, in conjunction with the containment, limits the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a LOCA.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The SLC System is automatically initiated when both the average power range monitor (APRM) is not downscale and either high reactor vessel dome pressure or low reactor vessel water level (Level 2) persists for at least 3 minutes. The SLC System can be manually initiated from the main control room as directed by the emergency operating procedures if the operator believes the reactor cannot be shut down, or kept shut down, with the control rods. The SLC System is used in the event that not enough control rods can be inserted to accomplish shutdown and cooldown in the normal manner. The SLC System injects borated water into the reactor core to compensate for all of the various reactivity effects that could occur during plant operation. To meet this objective, it is necessary to inject a quantity of boron that produces a concentration of 760 ppm of natural boron in the reactor core at 20°C (68°F). The volume and concentration limits are calculated such that the required concentration is achieved accounting for dilution in the RPV with the reactor water level conservatively taken at the elevation of the bottom edge of the main steamlines. This result is then increased by a factor of 1.25 to provide a 25% general margin to discount potential nonuniformities of the mixing process within the reactor (Ref. 2). That result is then increased by a factor of 1.15 to provide a further margin of 15% to discount potential dilution by the RWCU/SDC system when activated in the shutdown cooling mode.

In addition, under conditions of a LOCA, the SLC will also be initiated to provide makeup water from both accumulators to the vessel to ensure the core is cooled.

The SLC System satisfies Criteria 3 and 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The OPERABILITY of the SLC System provides backup capability for reactivity control independent of normal reactivity control provisions provided by the control rods. In addition, the SLC System provides makeup water to the RPV to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA. For ATWS requirements, the OPERABILITY of the SLC System is based on the conditions of the borated solution in each accumulator and the availability of a pressurized accumulator and a flow path from each accumulator to the RPV, including the OPERABILITY of the instrumentation and valves. For a LOCA, the volume of water in both SLC accumulators is necessary for makeup and core cooling. Two SLC trains are required to be OPERABLE, each containing two OPERABLE

BASES

LCO (continued)

injection squib valves and associated piping, valves, and instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, the SLC System is needed for both its shutdown capability and for RPV water makeup and core cooling. In MODES 3, 4 and 5, when the reactor mode switch is in shutdown, control rods can not be withdrawn because a control rod block is applied. Otherwise, LCO 3.10.3, “Control Rod Withdrawal – Shutdown,” and LCO 3.10.4, “Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown,” in conjunction with demonstration of adequate SDM in accordance with LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN," provide adequate controls to ensure the reactor remains subcritical. Therefore, the SLC System is not required to be OPERABLE during these conditions when only a single control rod or control rod pair can be withdrawn. {In MODES 3, 4 and 5, the ECCS function of SLC System is not assumed to be available for RPV water makeup and core cooling.}

ACTIONS

[A.1

- REVIEWER’S NOTE -

Applicant may propose alternatives including examples such as:
(i) degradations and appropriate compensatory times for single versus multiple accumulators; (ii) level degradations; (iii) concentration degradations; (iv) pressure degradations. In general, degradations that impact ATWS mitigation capability, but continue to provide cold SDM capability, would be allowed Completion Times on the order of 72-hours. Similarly, degradations that impact single failure assumed post-accident flooding assumptions, but continue to provide adequate flooding support without assuming an additional single failure may propose Completion Times on the order of 7 days.

If the concentration of sodium pentaborate in solution in one or more accumulators is not within limits, the concentration must be restored to within limits in 72 hours. For ATWS mitigation the plant design also includes, alternate rod insertion (ARI), fine motion control rod drive run-in, and a feedwater runback features as described in Reference 3. These additional features provide ATWS mitigation capability when the concentration of sodium pentaborate in solution is not within limits. Because of the low probability of an ATWS event, the additional ATWS mitigation features, and the fact that SLC System capability still exists for

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

vessel injection under these conditions, the allowed Completion Time of 72 hours is acceptable and provides adequate time to restore concentration to within limits.]

B.1

With one injection squib valve flow path in one or two trains inoperable, the squib valve flow path(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE squib valve flow paths are adequate to perform the shutdown function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining OPERABLE squib valve flow paths could result in reduced SLC System capability. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the availability of OPERABLE trains capable of performing the intended SLC System function and the low probability of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient occurring during this period. .

C.1

If the SLC System is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B, at least one train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is considered acceptable, given the low probability of a DBA or transient occurring during this period.

D.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.1.7.1, SR 3.1.7.2, and SR 3.1.7.3

SR 3.1.7.1 through SR 3.1.7.3 are 24 hour Surveillances verifying certain characteristics of the SLC System (e.g., the volume of sodium pentaborate solution in the accumulator, temperature of the room with piping and valves containing boron solution, and nitrogen pressure in each accumulator), thereby ensuring the SLC System OPERABILITY without disturbing normal plant operation. These Surveillances ensure the proper SPBS volume and temperature and accumulator nitrogen

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

pressure are maintained. Maintaining a minimum specified SPBS temperature is important in ensuring that the boron remains in solution and does not precipitate in the accumulators or in the injection piping. Maintaining a minimum accumulator pressure will ensure the full injection of solution inventory at rated reactor pressure. The 24 hour Frequency of these SRs was based on operating experience that has shown that there are relatively slow variations room temperature and alarms that monitor volume and pressure.

SR 3.1.7.4 and SR 3.1.7.5

SR 3.1.7.4 verifies the continuity of the explosive charges in the injection valves to ensure proper operation will occur if required. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience that has demonstrated the reliability of the explosive charge continuity.

SR 3.1.7.4 is modified by a Note that states that SR is not required to be met for one squib charge intermittently bypassed under administrative controls. This is acceptable because a keylock bypass may be used on one of the two squibs for each valve without rendering the valve inoperable.

SR 3.1.7.5 verifies each valve in the system is in its correct position but does not apply to the squib valves. Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power-operated, and automatic valves in the SLC System flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for system operation. This Surveillance does not apply to valves which are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This verification of valve alignment does not apply to valves which cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct positions. The 31 day Frequency for SR 3.1.7.5 is appropriate because the valves are operated under procedural control and it was chosen to provide added assurance that the valves are in the correct positions.

SR 3.1.7.6

This Surveillance requires an examination of the sodium pentaborate solution by using chemical analysis to ensure the proper concentration of boron exists in the accumulator. SR 3.1.7.6 must be performed any time boron or water is added to the accumulator solution to establish that the

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

boron solution concentration is within the specified limits. This Surveillance must be performed anytime the temperature is restored to within the limits of Figure 3.1.7-1, to ensure no significant boron precipitation occurred. The 31 day Frequency of this Surveillance is appropriate because the boron solution is not expected to change concentration between surveillances.

SR 3.1.7.7

The SLC trains are required to actuate both automatically and manually to perform their design function. This Surveillance test verifies that, with a required system initiation signal (actual or simulated), the mechanical portions of the SLC operates as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated initiation signal, causing proper actuation of all the required components. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed SLC function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes squib valve actuation. This is acceptable because valve actuation is verified by SR 3.1.7.4 and the Inservice Test Program.

SR 3.1.7.8

This Surveillance ensures that there is a functioning flow path for the boron solution from the accumulator to the RPV. The Surveillance may be performed in overlapping steps, provided the entire flow path is verified within the specified Frequency. This SR includes firing of the squib valve in the flow path being verified. The replacement charge for the explosive valve shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from a batch certified by having one of that batch successfully fired. The flow path may be verified using demineralized water to prevent injecting boron into the RPV.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Each SLC train includes two parallel flow paths, each controlled by an injection squib valve. The Frequency, 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS for each flow path, ensures that the flow path tested every 24 months is alternated so that each flow path is tested every 96 months. The 24 month Frequency is necessary because of the need to perform this Surveillance during a plant outage. The 24 month Frequency is acceptable because of the low probability that the piping will be blocked due to precipitation of the boron from solution. The saturation temperature of the solution is less than 15.5°C (60°F) (Ref. 2) and the equipment room temperature is verified to be above that temperature by SR 3.1.7.2. Additionally, use of the SLC mixing pump and sample connection may be used to verify flow through the outlet of the accumulator.

SR 3.1.7.9

Enriched sodium pentaborate solution is made by mixing granular, enriched sodium pentaborate with water. Isotopic tests on the granular sodium pentaborate to verify the actual B-10 enrichment must be performed prior to addition to the SLC accumulator to ensure that the proper B-10 atom percent is being used.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.62.
2. Section 9.3.5.
3. Section 7.8.1.1.

B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

B 3.2.1 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The LHGR is a measure of the heat generation rate of a fuel rod in a fuel assembly at any axial location. Limits on the LHGR are specified to ensure that fuel design limits are not exceeded anywhere in the core during normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs). Exceeding the LHGR limit could potentially result in fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive materials. Fuel design limits are specified to ensure that fuel system damage, fuel rod failure or inability to cool the fuel will not occur during the anticipated operating conditions identified in Reference 1.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the fuel system design are presented in References 1 and 2. The fuel assembly is designed to ensure (in conjunction with the core nuclear and thermal hydraulic design, plant equipment, instrumentation and protection system) that fuel damage will not result in the release of radioactive materials in excess of the guidelines of 10 CFR, Parts 20, 50, and 100. The mechanisms that could cause fuel damage during operational transients and that are considered in fuel evaluations are:

a. Rupture of the fuel rod cladding caused by strain from the relative expansion of the UO_2 pellet; and

b. Severe overheating of the fuel rod cladding caused by inadequate cooling.

A value of 1% plastic strain of the fuel cladding has been defined as the limit below which fuel damage caused by overstraining of the fuel cladding is not expected to occur (Ref. 1). The Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit ensures that fuel damage caused by severe overheating of the fuel cladding is avoided.

Fuel design evaluations have been performed and demonstrate that the 1% fuel cladding plastic strain design limit is not exceeded during continuous operation with LHGRs up to the operating limit specified in the COLR. The analysis also includes allowances for short-term transient operation above the operating limit to account for AOOs, plus an allowance for densification power spiking.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The LHGR satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The LHGR is a basic assumption in the fuel design analysis. The fuel has been designed to operate at rated core power with sufficient design margin to the LHGR calculated to cause 1% fuel cladding plastic strain. The operating limit to accomplish this objective is specified in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY

The LHGR limits are derived from fuel design analysis that is limiting at high power level conditions. At core thermal power levels < 25% RTP, the reactor is operating with a substantial margin to the LHGR limits and, therefore, the Specification is only required when the reactor is operating at ≥ 25% RTP.

ACTIONS

A.1

If any LHGR exceeds its required limit, an assumption regarding an initial condition of the fuel design analysis is not met. Therefore, prompt action should be taken to restore the LHGR(s) to within its required limits such that the plant is operating within analyzed conditions. The 2 hour Completion Time is normally sufficient to restore the LHGR(s) to within its limits and is acceptable based on the low probability of a transient or Design Basis Accident (DBA) occurring simultaneously with the LHGR out of specification.

B.1

If the LHGR cannot be restored to within its required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 25% RTP within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 25% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.2.1.1

The LHGRs are required to be initially calculated within 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is ≥ 25% RTP and then every 24 hours thereafter. They are compared to the specified limits in the COLR to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis. The 24 hour Frequency is based on both engineering judgment and recognition of the slowness of changes in power distribution under normal conditions. The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER reaches ≥ 25% RTP is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at low power levels.

REFERENCES

1. Section 15.2.

2. Chapter 4.

B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

B 3.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)

BASES

BACKGROUND

MCPR is a ratio of the fuel assembly power that would result in the onset of boiling transition to the actual fuel assembly power. The Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit (FCISL) is established as greater than 99.9% of the fuel rods in the core would be expected to avoid boiling transition (refer to the Bases for SL 2.1.1.2). The operating limit MCPR is established to ensure that no fuel damage results during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs). Although fuel damage does not necessarily occur if a fuel rod actually experiences boiling transition (Ref. 1), the critical power at which boiling transition is calculated to occur has been adopted as a fuel design criterion.

The onset of transition boiling is a phenomenon that is readily detected during the testing of various fuel bundle designs. Based on these experimental data, correlations have been developed to predict critical bundle power (i.e., the bundle power level at the onset of transition boiling) for a given set of plant parameters (e.g., reactor vessel pressure, mass flux, and subcooling.). Because plant operating conditions and bundle power levels are monitored and determined relatively easily, monitoring the MCPR is a convenient way of ensuring that fuel failures due to inadequate cooling do not occur.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the AOOs to establish the operating limit MCPR are presented in Chapter 4. To ensure that the FCISL is not exceeded during any transient event that occurs with moderate frequency, limiting transients have been analyzed to determine the critical power ratio (CPR) transient uncertainty. The types of transients evaluated are decrease in core coolant temperature, increase in reactor pressure, increase in reactor coolant inventory, decrease in reactor coolant inventory. The steady-state and CPR transient uncertainties and the uncertainties in monitoring and simulating the core operating state are incorporated by the statistical model (Ref. 2) to determine the required operating limit MCPR.

The MCPR operating limits derived from the transient analysis are dependent on the power state ($MCPR_p$) to ensure adherence to fuel design limits during the worst transient that occurs with moderate frequency.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Power-dependent MCPR limits ($MCPR_p$) are determined for the anticipated transients that are significantly affected by power.

The MCPR satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The MCPR operating limits specified in the COLR are the result of fuel design and transient analyses.

APPLICABILITY

The MCPR operating limits are primarily derived from transient analyses that are assumed to occur at high power levels. Below 25% RTP, the moderator void ratio is very small. Surveillance of thermal limits below 25% RTP is unnecessary due to the large inherent margin that ensures that the FCISL is not exceeded even if a limiting transient occurs.

Studies of the variation of limiting transient behavior have been performed over the range of operational conditions. These studies encompass the range of key actual plant parameter values important to typically limiting transients. The results of these studies demonstrate that a margin is expected between performance and the MCPR requirements, and that margins increase as power is reduced to 25% RTP. This trend is expected to continue to the 5% to 15% power range when entry into MODE 2 occurs. When in MODE 2, the Startup Range Neutron Monitor (SRNM) provides rapid scram initiation for any significant power increase transient, which effectively eliminates any MCPR compliance concern. Therefore, at THERMAL POWER levels < 25% RTP, the reactor is operating with substantial margin to the MCPR limits and this LCO is not required.

ACTIONS

A.1

If any MCPR is outside the required limits, an assumption regarding an initial condition of the design basis transient analyses may not be met. Therefore, prompt action should be taken to restore the MCPR(s) to within the required limits such that the plant will be operating within analyzed conditions. The 2 hour Completion Time is normally sufficient to restore the MCPR(s) to within its limits and is acceptable based on the low probability of a transient occurring simultaneously with the MCPR out of specification.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

If the MCPR cannot be restored to within its required limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 25% RTP within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 25% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.2.2.1

The MCPRs are required to be initially calculated within 12 hours after THERMAL POWER is ≥ 25% RTP and then every 24 hours thereafter. They are compared to the specified limits in the COLR to ensure that the reactor is operating within the assumptions of the safety analysis. The 24 hour Frequency is based on both engineering judgment and recognition of the slowness of changes in power distribution under normal conditions. The 12 hour allowance after THERMAL POWER reaches ≥ 25% RTP is acceptable given the large inherent margin to operating limits at low power levels.

REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0562, "Fuel Rod Failure as a Consequence of Departure From Nucleate Boiling or Dryout," June 1979.

2. NEDC-33237P, Class III (proprietary), GE14 for ESBWR Critical Power Correlation, Uncertainty, and OLMCPR Development, March 2006.

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The RPS is designed to initiate a reactor scram when one or more monitored parameters exceed their specified limit, to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and minimize the energy that must be absorbed following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). This can be accomplished either automatically or manually.

The protection and monitoring functions of the RPS have been designed to ensure safe operation of the reactor. This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the RPS, as well as LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance.

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain LSSS defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions." Where LSSS is specified for a variable on which a Safety Limit (SL) has been placed, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a SL is exceeded. The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. Where LSSS is specified for a variable having a significant safety function but which does not protect SLs, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. The Design Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that these automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. These limits (i.e., Analytical Limit and Design Limit) constitute the Setting Basis specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

The actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical / Design Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur. The methodology for determining the actual settings, and the required tolerances to maintain these settings conservative to the Analytical / Design Limits, including the requirements for determining that the channel is OPERABLE, are defined in the Setpoint Control Program (SCP), in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, Setpoint Control Program (SCP)."

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical / Design Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded (i.e., for Analytical Limits), or that automatic protective actions occur consistent with the design basis (i.e., for Design Limits). As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors that may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded and that automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. As such, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS.

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." For automatic protective devices, the required safety function is to ensure that a SL is not exceeded and that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. Therefore, the NTSP is the LSSS as defined by 10 CFR 50.36. However, use of the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protective device setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule that are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded or that automatic protective actions would initiate consistent with the design basis with the "as-found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the NTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.

Use of the NTSP to define "as-found" OPERABILITY under the expected circumstances described above would result in actions required by both the rule and Technical Specifications that are clearly not warranted.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This value is specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11, in order to define OPERABILITY of the devices and is designated as the Allowable Value which is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The actual NTSP values and Allowable Values (derived from the Setting Basis specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1) and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances will be maintained in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11.

The Allowable Valuable is the least conservative value that the setpoint of the channel can have when tested such that a channel is OPERABLE if the setpoint is found conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Note that, although a channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the established "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned in the setpoint calculation. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount equal to or greater than the "as-found" tolerance value. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will ensure that a SL is not exceeded or that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value the device would be considered inoperable from a Technical Specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.

The RPS, as shown in Reference 1, is divided into four redundant divisions of sensor (instrument) channels, trip logics and trip actuators, and two divisions of manual scram controls and scram logic circuitry. The sensor channels, divisions of trip logic, divisions of trip actuators, and associated portions of the divisions of scram logic circuitry together constitute the RPS automatic scram and air header dump (backup scram) initiation logic. The divisions of manual scram controls and associated portions of the divisions of scram logic circuitry together constitute the RPS manual scram and air header dump initiation logic. The automatic and manual scram initiation logics are independent of each other and use diverse methods and equipment to initiate a reactor scram.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Instrument (Sensor) Channels

Equipment within a sensor channel consists of sensors (i.e., transducers or switches), Digital Trip Module (DTM) and multiplexers. The sensors within each channel monitor for abnormal operating conditions and send analog (or discrete) output either directly to the RPS cabinets or to Remote Multiplexer Units (RMUs) within the associated division. The RMU within each division performs analog-to-digital conversion on analog signals and sends the digital or digitized analog output values of the monitored variables to the DTM for trip determinations within the associated RPS Instrument (sensor) channel in the same division. The DTM in each sensor channel compares individual monitored variable values with trip setpoint values and for each variable sends a separate trip/no trip output signal to the functional Trip Logic Units (TLUs) in the four divisions of trip logic. Equipment within a single division is powered from the safety-related power source of the same division. OPERABILITY requirements for instrument channels are addressed in LCO 3.3.1.1.

Divisions of Trip Logic

Equipment within an RPS division of trip logic consists of TLUs, manual switches, bypass units (BPUs) and Output Logic Units (OLUs). The TLUs perform the automatic scram initiation logic, checking for two-out-of-four coincidence of trip conditions in any set of instrument channel signals coming from the four divisions of DTMs or from isolated digital inputs from the four divisions of the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS), and outputting a trip signal if any one of the two-out-of-four coincidence checks is satisfied. The automatic scram initiation logic for any trip is based on the reactor operating mode status and channel trip conditions and bypass conditions. Each TLU, besides receiving isolated digital input trip signals from the four divisions of RPS DTMs, also receives digital input signals from the BPU and other control interfaces in the same division.

The various manual switches provide the operator with the means to enforce interlocks within RPS trip logic for special operation, maintenance, testing, and system reset. The BPUs perform bypass and interlock logic for the division of channel sensors bypass. Each RPS BPU sends the TLU bypass signal to the RPS OLU in the same division. The OLUs perform division trip, seal-in, reset and trip test functions. Each OLU receives bypass inputs from the RPS BPU, trip inputs from the TLU

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

of the same division, and various manual inputs from switches within the same division. Each OLU provides trip outputs to the trip actuators.

Equipment within a division of trip logic is powered from the same division of safety-related power source. However, different pieces of equipment may be powered from separate low voltage dc power supplies in the same division. OPERABILITY requirements for the Divisions of Trip Logic are addressed in LCO 3.3.1.2, "Reactor Protections System (RPS) Actuation," with the exception of the digital trip function, which is addressed in LCO 3.3.1.1.

Divisions of Trip Actuators

Equipment within a division of trip actuators includes load drivers and controllers for automatic scram and air header dump initiation. The RPS includes two physically separate and electrically independent divisions of trip actuators that receive inputs from the four Divisions of Trip Logic. The load driver outputs are arranged in the scram logic circuitry, which is between the scram solenoids and scram solenoid 120 VAC power source. When in a tripped state, the load drivers within a division interconnect with the OLU of all other divisions to form an arrangement (connected in series and in parallel in two separate groups) that results in two-out-of-four scram logic. Reactor scram occurs if load drivers associated with any two or more divisions receive trip signals from the OLUs.

The controllers are used for back-up scram actuators, scram-follow initiation, and scram reset permissive actuators. When in a tripped state, the controllers cause the air header dump valve solenoids to energize. The controllers are arranged in a two-out-of-four configuration similar to that described above for the primary scram load drivers. Backup scram is diverse in power source and function to primary scram.

A manual switch associated with each Division of Trip Actuators provides means to reset the seal-in at the input of all trip actuators in the same division. The reset does not have any effect if the conditions that caused the division trip have not cleared when a reset is attempted. All manual resets are inhibited for ten seconds to allow sufficient time for scram completion.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

OPERABILITY requirements for the load drivers are addressed in LCO 3.3.1.2. OPERABILITY requirements for the controllers are not addressed within the Technical Specifications.

Divisions of Manual Scram Controls

OPERABILITY requirements for the Divisions of Manual Scram Controls are addressed in LCO 3.3.1.3, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Manual Trip Actuation."

Divisions of Scram Logic Circuitry

The two divisions of primary scram logic circuitry are powered from independent and separate power sources. One of the two divisions of scram logic circuitry distributes division 1 safety-related 120 VAC power to the A solenoids of the hydraulic control units (HCUs). The other division of scram logic circuitry distributes division 2 safety-related 120 VAC power to the B solenoids of the HCUs. The HCUs (which include the scram pilot valves and the scram valves, including their solenoids) are, components of the CRD system. A full scram of control rods associated with a particular HCU occurs when both A and B solenoid of the HCU are de-energized.

One scram pilot valve is located in the Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) for each control rod drive pair. Each scram pilot valve is operated by two solenoids, with both solenoids normally energized. The scram pilot valve controls the air supply to the scram inlet valve for the associated control rod drive pair. When either of two scram pilot valve solenoids is energized, air pressure holds the scram valve closed and therefore, both scram pilot valve solenoids must be de-energized to cause a control rod pair to scram. The scram valve controls the supply for the control rod drive (CRD) water during a scram.

OPERABILITY requirements for components of the Divisions of Scram Logic Circuitry are addressed in LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY."

The RPS is designed to provide reliable single-failure proof capability to automatically or manually initiate a reactor scram while maintaining protection against unnecessary scrams resulting from single failures. The RPS satisfies the single-failure criterion even when one entire division of channel sensors is bypassed and/or when one of the four automatic RPS trip logic divisions is out-of-service.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The AC electrical power required by the four divisions of RPS is supplied from four pairs of physically separate and electrically independent uninterruptible safety-related 120 VAC buses. Each RPS division uses the two independent power sources from the same division. Either source of power per division can support the associated RPS division.

Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of dependent and independent parameters. The input parameters to the scram logic are from instrumentation that monitors reactor vessel water level, reactor vessel steam dome pressure, neutron flux, main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) position, drywell pressure, control rod drive accumulator charging water header pressure, turbine stop valve position, turbine control valve closure, main condenser vacuum, bus voltage, and suppression pool temperature, as well as reactor mode switch in shutdown position and manual scram signals. The reactor mode switch in shutdown position and manual scram signal inputs to the scram logic are addressed in LCO 3.3.1.3.

All average power range monitors (APRM)/oscillation power range monitors (OPRM) and startup range neutron monitors (SRNM) trip decisions are made within the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS). This is done on a divisional basis and the results then sent directly to the RPS TLUs. Thus, each NMS division sends only two inputs to the RPS divisional TLUs, one for APRM/OPRM trip/no-trip and one for SRNM trip/no-trip. A divisional APRM/OPRM or SRNM may be tripped due to any of the monitored variables exceeding its trip setpoint. The RPS two-out-of-four trip decision is then made, not on a per variable basis, but on an APRM/OPRM tripped or SRNM tripped basis, by looking at the four divisions of APRM/OPRM and four divisions of SRNM. All bypasses of the SRNMs and APRMs/OPRMs are performed within and by the NMS. Refer to LCO 3.3.1.4, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.3.1.5, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Actuation," for the NMS specifications.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

The actions of the RPS are assumed in the safety analyses of Reference 2. The RPS initiates a reactor scram when monitored parameter values exceed predetermined values specified in the SCP to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding, preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and preserve the integrity of the containment by minimizing the energy that must be absorbed following a LOCA.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

RPS Instrumentation satisfies the requirements of Selection Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Functions not specifically credited in the accident analysis are retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

The OPERABILITY of the RPS is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual RPS instrumentation Functions specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1. Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints in accordance with the SCP, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with the SCP. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time.

The Setting Basis, from which the NTSPs and Allowable Values are derived is specified for each RPS Function, where appropriate, in Table 3.3.1.1-1. NTSPs and Allowable Values are specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11. The NTSPs are selected to ensure the actual setpoints are conservative with respect to the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the NTSP, but conservative with respect to its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is non-conservative with respect to its required Allowable Value.

NTSPs are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., DTM) changes state. For those LSSS related to variables protecting SLs, the Analytical Limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. For those LSSS related to variables having significant safety functions but which do not protect SLs, the Design Limits are those settings that must initiate automatic protective actions consistent with the design basis. The Allowable Values are derived from the Analytical / Design Limits, corrected for calibration, process and some of the instrument errors. The NTSPs are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The OPERABILITY of RPS Actuation, manual scram features, the NMS features, and scram pilot valves and associated solenoids, and backup scram valves, described in the Background section, are not addressed by this LCO.

The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES specified in the Table which may require an RPS trip to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident or transient. To ensure a reliable scram function, a combination of Functions is required in each MODE.

RPS is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and MODE 6 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. During normal operation in MODES 3, 4, and 5, all control rods are fully inserted and the Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation") does not allow any control rod to be withdrawn. In MODE 6, control rods withdrawn from a core cell containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and therefore are not required to have the capability to scram. Provided all control rods otherwise remain inserted, the RPS function is not required. In this condition the required SDM (LCO 3.1.1,"SHUTDOWN MARGIN") and refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock") ensure no event requiring RPS will occur. Under these conditions, the RPS function is not required to be OPERABLE.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function-by-Function basis.

This Specification covers the RPS instrumentation that encompasses the sensor channels up through the DTMs.

Although there are four channels of RPS instrumentation for each function, only three channels of RPS instrumentation for each function are required to be OPERABLE. The three required channels are those channels associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems - Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is met with three OPERABLE RPS instrumentation channels, and because each RPS division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

1. Neutron Monitor System Input - Startup Range Neutron Monitors

The SRNM is a part of the NMS. The NMS Functions associated with the SRNM are described in the Bases of LCO 3.3.1.4. The SRNM provides diverse protection for the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) in the Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS), which monitors and controls the movement of control rods at low power. The RWM prevents the withdrawal of an out of sequence control rod during startup that could result in an unacceptable neutron flux excursion (Ref. 3). The SRNM provides mitigation of the neutron flux excursion in the control rod withdrawal event during startup (Ref. 4).

The SRNMs are also capable of limiting other reactivity excursions during startup such as cold-water injection events although no credit is specifically assumed.

Three channels of Neutron Monitoring System Input - Startup Range Neutron Monitors are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the SRNM Functions are required.

2. Neutron Monitor System Input - Average Power Range Monitors /Oscillation Power Range Monitors (OPRMs)

The APRMs and OPRMs are a part of the NMS. The NMS Functions associated with the APRMs and OPRMs are described in the Bases of LCO 3.3.1.4.

Three channels of NMS inputs from the NMS (APRMs/OPRMs) arranged in a two-out-of-four logic are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM and OPRM Functions are required (LCO 3.3.1.4).

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

3. Control Rod Drive Accumulator Charging Water Header Pressure - Low

To maintain the continuous ability to scram, the charging water header maintains the hydraulic scram accumulators at a high pressure. The scram valves under this condition remain closed, so that no flow passes through the charging water header. Pressure in the charging water header is monitored. The Control Rod Drive Accumulator Charging Water Header Pressure - Low Function initiates a scram if a significant degradation in the charging water header pressure occurs. During a scram, the water discharge from the accumulators goes into the reactor, and thus against reactor pressure. Therefore, fully charged hydraulic control units (HCUs) are essential for assuring reactor scram. After a reactor scram, this Function can be bypassed from the operator's console to reset the RPS, allowing the scram valves to close and the HCUs to be re-pressurized.

Low charging header pressure signals are initiated from four pressure sensors located at the charging header. The Control Rod Drive Accumulator Charging Water Header Pressure—Low Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to provide sufficient margin to the capability to scram.

Three channels of Control Rod Drive Accumulator Charging Water Header Pressure - Low Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. The Function is required to be OPERABLE when the scram capability is required in MODES 1 and 2, and MODE 6 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

4. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High

An increase in the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure during reactor operation compresses the steam voids and results in a positive reactivity insertion. This causes the neutron flux and THERMAL POWER transferred to the reactor coolant to increase, which could challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding and the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary. No specific safety analysis takes direct credit for this Function. However, the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High Function initiates a scram for transients that result in a pressure increase, counteracting the pressure increase by rapidly reducing core power. For the overpressurization protection analysis, the APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function is assumed to terminate the

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

MSIV Closure event and, along with the safety relief valves, limits the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Code limits.

High reactor pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense reactor pressure. The Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to provide a sufficient margin to the ASME Section III Code limits during the event.

Three channels of Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. The Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 when the Reactor Coolant System is pressurized and the potential for pressure increase exists.

5. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3

Low Reactor Vessel (RPV) water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated at Level 3 to substantially reduce the heat generated in the fuel from fission. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function is assumed to be available in various design basis line break analyses and in loss of feedwater events, however it is a secondary scram signal to Loss of Power Generation Bus. The reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and assures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3, signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

Three channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3, Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Analytical / Design Limit is selected to ensure that for transients involving loss of all normal feedwater flow, the core will not be uncovered.

The Function is required in MODES 1 and 2 where considerable energy exists in the reactor coolant system resulting in the limiting transients and accidents.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

6. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8

High RPV water level indicates a potential problem with the feedwater level control system, resulting in the addition of reactivity associated with the introduction of a significant amount of relatively cold feedwater. Therefore, a scram is initiated at Level 8 to ensure the safety analyses are met. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function is directly assumed in the analysis of feedwater controller failure, maximum demand (Ref. 5).

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8, signals are initiated from four differential pressure transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Analytical / Design Limit is specified to ensure the safety analyses criteria are met.

Three channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8, are required to be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER is ≥ {25%} RTP to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. With THERMAL POWER < {25%} RTP, this Function is not required since MCPR is not a concern below {25%} RTP.

7. Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure (Per Steam Line)

Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure results in loss of the main turbine and the condenser as a heat sink for the nuclear steam supply system and indicates a need to shut down the reactor to reduce heat generation. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated on a MSIV closure signal before the MSIVs are completely closed in anticipation of the complete loss of the normal heat sink and subsequent overpressurization transient. However, for the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 6, the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function, along with the safety relief valves, limits the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Code limits. That is, the direct scram on position switches for MSIV closure events is not assumed in the overpressurization analysis. Additionally, MSIV closure is assumed in the transients analyzed in References 7 and 8 . The reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and, along with the actions of the Isolation Condenser System (ICS), assures that the safety analyses assumptions are met.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

MSIV closure signals are initiated from position switches located on each of the eight MSIVs. On each MSL, two position switches are mounted on the inboard MSIV and two position switches are mounted on the outboard MSIV. Each of the position switches on any one MSL is associated with a different RPS divisional sensor channel. {The logic for the Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure Function is arranged such that either the inboard or outboard valve on two or more of the main steam lines (MSLs) must close in order for a scram to occur.}

The Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure (per Steam Line) Function Analytical / Design Limit is specified to ensure that a scram occurs prior to a significant reduction in steam flow, thereby reducing the severity of the subsequent pressure transient.

Three channels of Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure (per Steam Line) Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude the scram from this Function on a valid signal. This Function is only required in MODE 1 because with the MSIVs open and the heat generation rate high, a pressurization transient can occur if the MSIVs close. In MODE 2 the heat generation rate is low enough that the other diverse RPS Functions provide sufficient protection.

8. Drywell Pressure - High

High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary. A reactor scram is initiated to minimize the possibility of fuel damage and to reduce the amount of energy being added to the coolant and to the drywell. The Drywell Pressure - High Function is assumed to be available for LOCA events inside the drywell and is credited in the inadvertent operation of a depressurization valve. High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. The Analytical / Design Limit was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside the drywell or an opened depressurization valve.

Three channels of Drywell Pressure - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. The Function is required in MODES 1 and 2 where considerable energy exists in the reactor coolant system resulting in the limiting transients and accidents.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

9. Suppression Pool Temperature - High

High temperature in the suppression pool could indicate a break in the RCS pressure boundary or an opened safety relief valve. A reactor scram is initiated to reduce the amount of energy being added to the containment. The Suppression Pool Temperature - High Function is taken credit for in the analysis of an inadvertent opening of a safety relief valve (Reference 9).

High suppression pool temperature signals are initiated from four divisions of temperature sensors located in the suppression pool. Four channels of safety-related divisional temperature signals, each formed by the average value of a group of thermocouples installed evenly inside the suppression pool, provide the suppression pool temperature data for automatic scram initiation. When the established limits of high temperature are exceeded in two of the four divisions, a scram initiation and indication signals are generated. The temperature sensors provide analog output signals to the RMU, which in turn provides the equivalent digital signal to the appropriate DTM. The temperature sensors are components of the Containment Monitoring System (CMS). The suppression pool water level signals are provided along with the suppression pool temperature signals. When water level drops below selected temperature sensors, the exposed sensors are logically bypassed such that only sensors below the water level are utilized to determine the averaged temperature signal to the RPS.

The Analytical / Design Limit was selected considering the maximum operating temperature and to be indicative of an inadvertently opened safety relief valve.

Three channels of Suppression Pool Temperature - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. There are a total of sixty-four suppression pool temperature switches that make up the four channels of Suppression Pool Temperature - High Function (sixteen suppression pool temperature switches per channel). For a channel of the Suppression Pool Temperature - High Function to be OPERABLE, {12} of the sixteen assigned Suppression Pool Temperature switches must be OPERABLE. The Function is required in MODES 1 and 2 where considerable energy exists in the reactor coolant system.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

10. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure

Closure of the turbine stop valves (TSV) results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated at the start of TSV closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves with insufficient turbine bypass valve capacity available. The Turbine Stop Valve - Closure Function is the primary scram signal for the turbine trip event analyzed in Reference 10. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and ensures that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded.

Turbine Stop Valve - Closure signals are initiated by the separate valve stem position switches on each of the four turbine stop valves. Each position switch provides open/close contact output signal through hard-wired connection to the SSLC DTM in one of the four RPS sensor channels. The logic for the Turbine Stop Valve Closure Function is such that {three or more} TSVs must be closed to produce a scram. The Function is enabled at THERMAL POWER > {40}% RTP. This is accomplished automatically by an analog simulated thermal power signal from the NMS. This Function is also automatically bypassed if sufficient turbine bypass valves are open within a preset time delay after the initiation of the trip signal. The analog simulated thermal power signal from NMS is also used to determine the required bypass capacity.

The Turbine Stop Valve - Closure Analytical / Design Limit is selected to be high enough to detect imminent TSV closure thereby reducing the severity of the subsequent pressure transient.

Three channels of Turbine Stop Valve - Closure Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function even if one TSV should fail to close. This Function is required, consistent with analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is ≥ {40% RTP. This Function is not required when THERMAL POWER is < {40}% RTP since the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High and the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Functions are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

11. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low

Fast closure of the turbine control valves (TCVs) results in the loss of a heat sink that produces reactor pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux transients that must be limited. Therefore, a reactor scram is initiated on TCV fast closure in anticipation of the transients that would result from the closure of these valves with insufficient turbine bypass valve capacity available. The Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function is the primary scram signal for the generator load rejection event analyzed in Reference 11. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and ensures that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded.

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low signals are initiated by the hydraulic trip system pressure at each control valve. There is one pressure transmitter associated with each control valve. Each pressure transmitter provides a signal through hard-wired connections to the SSLC DTM in each of the four RPS sensor channels. This Function must be enabled at THERMAL POWER ≥ {40}% RTP. This is accomplished automatically by an analog simulated thermal power signal from NMS. This Function is automatically bypassed if sufficient turbine bypass valves are open within a preset time delay after the initiation of the trip signal. The analog simulated thermal power signal from NMS is also used to determine the required bypass capacity.

The Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Analytical / Design Limit is selected high enough to detect imminent TCV fast closure.

Three channels of Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Function, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. This Function is required, consistent with the analysis assumptions, whenever THERMAL POWER is ≥ {40}% RTP. This Function is not required when THERMAL POWER is < {40}% RTP since the Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High and the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Functions are adequate to maintain the necessary safety margins.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

12. Main Condenser Pressure - High

The Main Condenser Pressure - High Function is provided to help ensure the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded by reducing the core energy in anticipation that the high condenser pressure will also trip the main turbine and prevent bypass valve operation. The Main Condenser Pressure - High Function is the primary scram signal for the loss of condenser vacuum event analyzed in Reference 12. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed by the main condenser and helps to ensure the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded by reducing the core energy prior to the fast closure of the turbine stop valves. The reactor scram at Main Condenser Pressure - High will initiate to shut off steam flow to the main condenser to protect the main turbine and to avoid the potential for rupturing the low-pressure turbine casing.

Main condenser pressure signals are derived from four pressure switches that sense the pressure in the condenser. Each pressure transmitter provides an analog output signal through hard-wired connections to the SSLC DTM in each of the four RPS sensor channels. The Analytical / Design Limit was selected to reduce the severity of a loss of main condenser vacuum event by anticipating the transient and scramming the reactor at a higher vacuum than the setpoints that close the turbine stop valves and bypass valves.

Three channels of Main Condenser Pressure - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. The Function is required in MODES 1 and 2 since, in these MODES, a significant amount of core energy can be rejected to the main condenser.

13. Power Generation Bus Loss

The plant electrical system has four redundant power generation busses that operate at 13.8 kV. These busses supply power for the feedwater pumps and circulating pumps. In MODE 1, at least three of the four busses must be powered. Power generation bus loss signals are derived from four voltage sensors. If the voltage sensor (one per division) on each bus senses a low voltage below the required level, indicating that less than three buses are operating above the requirement level, a scram is initiated after a preset delay time. This delay time is to accommodate for the auto-transfer from the UAT transformer feed to the RAT transformer feed. When the power generation busses are not operating

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

at or above the required level, the feedwater pumps would be tripped and feedwater flow would be lost. Purpose of this scram on losing feedwater flow is to mitigate the reactor water level drop to Level 1 following the loss of feedwater pump function. This scram will terminate additional steam production within the vessel before Level 3 is reached.

The Analytical / Design Limit was selected high enough to detect a loss of voltage in order to mitigate the reactor water level drop to Level 1 following the loss of feedwater pump function.

Three channels of Power Generation Bus Loss Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. The Function is required in MODE 1 where considerable energy exists in the reactor coolant system resulting in the limiting transients and accidents. During MODE 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, the core energy is significantly lower.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPS Instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPS Instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RPS Instrumentation channel.

A.1

With one or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, the affected instrumentation division must be verified to be in trip. With the affected required instrumentation division in trip, all RPS Functions are in a one-out-of-two configuration.

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the RPS is capable of performing its trip Function in the presence of any single random failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 13.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Alternately, if the instrumentation division can not be verified to be in trip, Condition C would be entered and its Required Action taken when the Completion Time of Required Action A.1 expires.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped required channels (i.e., two or more required channels for most Functions) for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining RPS trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining RPS trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that the RPS logic will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 13.

C.1

Required Action C.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable required channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

D.1, E.1, F.1, G.1, and H.1

If the required RPS instrumentation channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status, or the affected instrumentation division is not in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In addition, the Completion Time of Required Actions D.1 and E.1 are consistent with the Completion Time provided in LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)."

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1.

SR 3.3.1.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 24 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one required channel to a similar parameter on other required channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. {Because the RPS System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a CHANNEL CHECK of all instrument channels, and because the RPS System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL CHECK may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 13. The CHANNEL CHECKs every 24 hours supplement less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.1.1.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. {Because the RPS System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a functional test of all instrument channels, and because the RPS system performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology as required by the SCP.

The Frequency of 184 days is based on the reliability of the channels and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 13.

SR 3.3.1.1.3

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the required channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the required channel adjusted to the NTSP within the "leave alone" tolerance to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the SCP.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24-month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 13.

For selected Functions, the SCP provides additional requirements for the evaluation of the performance of required channels. The selected Functions are those Functions whose instruments are not totally mechanical devices. Mechanical devices (e.g., devices which have an "on" or "off" output or an open/close position such as limit switches, float switches, and proximity detectors) are not calibrated in the traditional sense and do not have as-left or as-found conditions that would indicate drift of the component setpoint. These devices are considered not trendable and the requirements of TS 5.5.11.c.1 and TS 5.5.11.c.2 are not applicable to these mechanical components. Where a non-trendable component provides signal input to other channel components that can be trended, the remaining components must be evaluated in accordance with the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.1 evaluation of channel performance is required for the condition where the "as-found" setting for the channel is outside its "as-found" tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. For digital channel components, the "as-found" tolerance may be identical to the "leave alone" tolerance because drift may not be an expected error. In these cases, a channel "as-found" value outside the "leave alone" tolerance may be cause for component assessment. Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will continue to behave in accordance with design-basis assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for OPERABILITY. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the Allowable Values and the methodology for calculating the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.2, the as-left setting for the instrument is required to be returned to within the "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in plant surveillance procedures, the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Analytical / Design Limit is maintained. If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the "leave alone" tolerance, then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the NTSP and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP.

SR 3.3.1.1.4

This SR ensures that the individual required channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in {Reference 14}.

RPS RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.1.2.2 to ensure complete testing of instrument channels and actuation circuitry.

However, some sensors for Functions are allowed to be excluded from specific RPS RESPONSE TIME measurement if the conditions of Reference 15 are satisfied. If these conditions are satisfied, sensor response time may be allocated based on either assumed design sensor response time or the manufacturer's stated design response time. When the requirements of Reference 15 are not satisfied, sensor response time must be measured. Furthermore, measurement of the instrument loops response times is not required if the conditions of Reference 16 are satisfied.

RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four channels. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that the channels associated with each division are alternately tested. The 24 month test

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Frequency is consistent with the refueling cycle and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 13.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 7, Figure 7.2-1.
2. Chapter 15.
3. Subsection 7.7.2.
4. Subsection 15.3.8.
5. Subsection 15.3.2.
6. Subsection 5.2.2.
7. Subsection 15.3.3.
8. Subsection 15.2.2.7.
9. Subsection 15.3.13.
10. Subsection 15.2.2.5.
11. Subsection 15.2.2.3.
12. Subsection 15.2.2.8.
13. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}
14. {Reference for RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria}.
15. {NEDO-32291-A, "System Analyses For the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.
16. NEDO-32291-A, Supplement 1, "System Analyses for The Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1999.}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.1.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation

BASES

BACKGROUND	The RPS is designed to initiate a reactor scram when one or more monitored parameters exceed their specified limit, to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding, preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and preserve the integrity of the containment by minimizing the energy that must be absorbed following a LOCA. This can be accomplished either automatically or manually. A detailed description of the RPS instrumentation and RPS actuation logic is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.3.1.1, “Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation.” This Specification provides requirements for the RPS actuation circuitry that consists of the Divisions of Trip Logic (with the exception of OPERABILITY of the digital trip function, which is addressed in LCO 3.3.1.1), and the Divisions of Trip Actuators (except for OPERABILITY of the controllers which are not addressed within the Technical Specifications).
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The actions of the RPS are assumed in the safety analyses of Reference 1. The RPS initiates a reactor scram when monitored parameter values exceed the trip setpoints to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding, preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and preserve the integrity of the containment by minimizing the energy that must be absorbed following a LOCA. RPS actuation channels support the OPERABILITY of the RPS Instrumentation, “LCO 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation” and therefore is required to be OPERABLE. RPS Actuation satisfies the requirements of Selection Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO	Although there are four RPS automatic actuation divisions, only three RPS automatic actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single automatic actuation division failure will preclude a scram to occur on a valid signal. The three required divisions are those divisions associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems -

BASES

LCO (continued)

Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is still met with three OPERABLE RPS actuation divisions, and because each RPS division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions. This Specification provides requirements for the RPS actuation circuitry that consists of the Divisions of Trip Logic, and the Divisions of Trip Actuators.

The OPERABILITY of scram pilot valves and associated solenoids, and backup scram valves are not addressed by this LCO. The OPERABILITY of the RPS Instrumentation is covered in LCO 3.3.1.1.

APPLICABILITY

Three RPS automatic actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 6 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. During normal operation in MODES 3, 4 and 5, all control rods are fully inserted and the Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation") does not allow any control rod to be withdrawn. In MODE 6, control rods withdrawn from a core cell containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, are not required to have the capability to scram. Provided all other control rods remain inserted, the RPS function is not required. In this condition, the required SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN") and refuel position one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock") ensure that no event requiring RPS will occur. Under these conditions, the RPS function is not required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPS automatic actuation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPS automatic actuation divisions provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable divisions. As such, a Note has been provided which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RPS automatic actuation division.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1

With one required RPS trip automatic actuation division inoperable, the affected actuation division must be verified to be in trip. With one division in trip, the RPS is in a one-out-of-two configuration.

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the RPS is capable of performing its trip Function in the presence of any single random failure of an actuation division. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

Alternately, if the affected required actuation division can not be verified to be tripped, Condition C would be entered and its Required Action taken when the Completion Time of Required Action A.1 expires.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped required divisions of RPS actuation (i.e., two or more required divisions) result in the RPS automatic actuation capability not maintained. RPS automatic actuation capability is considered to be maintained when sufficient required actuation divisions are OPERABLE or in trip such that the RPS logic will generate a trip signal on a valid signal.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

C.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met in MODE 1 or 2, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met in MODE 6, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must immediately initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Action must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, do not have to be inserted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.1.2.1

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the RPS Actuation divisions, including the two-out-of-four function of the Trip Logic Unit (TLU), Output Logic Unit (OLU), and Load Drivers (LDs) for a specific division. {Because the RPS System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including portions of a LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and because the RPS System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, portions of the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four divisions. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that the channels associated with each division are alternately tested. The functional testing of control rods, in LCO 3.1.3, overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1.2.2

This SR ensures that the individual required division response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 3.

RPS RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.1.1.4 to ensure complete testing of instrument channels and actuation circuitry.

RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four divisions. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that each division is alternately tested. The 24 month test Frequency is consistent with the refueling cycle and has been found to be acceptable by Reference 2.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 15.

2. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

3. {Reference for RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria}.

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.1.3 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Manual Actuation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The RPS is designed to initiate a reactor scram when one or more monitored parameters exceed their specified limit, to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and minimize the energy that must be absorbed following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). This can be accomplished either automatically or manually.

Manual scram is accomplished either via two manual scram push buttons (Division 1 and Division 2 manual actuation channels) or by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. The reactor mode switch is a single switch {with independent contacts for initiating scram when the switch is in the shutdown position (Division 1 and Division 2 Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown actuation channels).} Both manual scram functions directly interrupt power in the circuits that energize the scram pilot valve solenoids such that a full scram results. This occurs upstream of the load driver groups and is completely separate from the associated automatic scram logic. They are also hardwired and therefore not reliant on the plant multiplexing system. The two manual scram pushbuttons each de-energize a separate path for the four scram groups such that when individually actuated a half-scram condition results, and when actuated together a full scram results. Placing the mode switch in shutdown immediately results in full scram by interrupting power to the circuits affected by each manual scram pushbutton. If a full scram occurs, scram reset is prevented for 10 seconds. This 10-second delay on reset ensures that the scram function will be completed.

One scram pilot valve is located in the Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) for each control rod drive pair. Each scram pilot valve is operated by two solenoids, with both solenoids normally energized. The scram pilot valve controls the air supply to the scram inlet valve for the associated control rod drive pair. When either of two scram pilot valve solenoids is energized, air pressure holds the scram valve closed and therefore, both scram pilot valve solenoids must be de-energized to cause a control rod pair to scram. The scram valve controls the supply for the control rod drive (CRD) water during a scram.

The backup scram valves, which energize on a scram signal to depressurize the scram air header, are also controlled by the RPS.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The OPERABILITY of scram pilot valves and associated solenoids is addressed in LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY." OPERABILITY of the backup scram valves is not addressed within the Technical Specifications.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

RPS Manual Actuation does not satisfy any criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), but is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

LCO

The Division 1 and Division 2 manual actuation channels and Division 1 and 2 Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown actuation channels are required to be OPERABLE to retain the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS.

APPLICABILITY

The two RPS manual actuation Functions are required to be OPERABLE whenever the RPS automatic instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"). RPS is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and MODE 6 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. During normal operation in MODES 3, 4, and 5, all control rods are fully inserted and the Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation") does not allow any control rod to be withdrawn. In MODE 6, control rods withdrawn from a core cell containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and therefore are not required to have the capability to scram. Provided all control rods otherwise remain inserted, the RPS function is not required. In this condition the required SDM (LCO 3.1.1,"SHUTDOWN MARGIN") and refuel position one-rod-out/rod- pair-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock") ensures no event requiring RPS will occur. During normal operation in MODES 3, 4, and 5, all control rods are fully inserted and the Reactor Mode Switch Shutdown position control rod withdrawal block (LCO 3.3.2.1) does not allow any control rod to be withdrawn. Under these conditions, the RPS function is not required to be OPERABLE.

BASES

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPS manual actuation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPS manual actuation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RPS manual actuation Function.

A.1

If either manual actuation channel is inoperable the capability to shutdown the unit with the manual actuation channels is lost. If either Reactor Mode Switch -Shutdown actuation channel is inoperable the manual trip capability with the Reactor Mode Switch -Shutdown channels is lost. The 12 hour Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 12 hour Completion Time is acceptable because the automatic functions and alternative manual trip methods are still available and has been found to be acceptable by Reference 1. The four RPS automatic division has manual trip capability provided by four divisional trip switches that are located in positions easily accessible for optional use by the plant operator.

B.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met in MODE 1 or 2, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems.

C.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met in MODE 6, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must immediately initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Action must continue until all

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

such control rods are fully inserted. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, do not have to be inserted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.1.3.1

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the manual actuation channels to ensure that the channels will perform the intended Function. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability of the RPS actuation logic and controls and has been found to be acceptable by Reference 1.

SR 3.3.1.3.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown channels to ensure that the channels will perform the intended Function. The 24-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.1.4 Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The NMS Instrumentation provides input to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when sufficient instrumentation channels indicate a trip condition. The RPS is designed to initiate a reactor scram when one or more monitored parameters exceed their specified limit, to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and minimize the energy that must be absorbed following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

The protection and monitoring functions of the NMS have been designed to ensure safe operation of the reactor. This is achieved by specifying limiting safety system settings (LSSS) in terms of parameters directly monitored by the RPS, as well as LCOs on other reactor system parameters and equipment performance. Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain LSSS defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions." Where LSSS is specified for a variable on which a Safety Limit (SL) has been placed, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a SL is exceeded. The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. Where LSSS is specified for a variable having a significant safety function but which does not protect the SLs, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. The Design Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety function is initiated to ensure that these automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. These limits (i.e., Analytical Limit and Design Limit) constitute the Setting Basis specified in Table 3.3.1.4-1.

The actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical / Design Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur. The methodology for determining the actual settings, and the required tolerances to maintain these settings conservative to the Analytical / Design Limits, including the requirements for determining that the channel is OPERABLE, are defined in the Setpoint Control Program (SCP), in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, "Setpoint Control Program (SCP)."

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical / Design Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded (i.e., for Analytical Limits), or that automatic protective actions occur consistent with the design basis (i.e., for Design Limits). As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors, which may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded and that automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. As such, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS.

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." For automatic protective devices, the required safety function is to ensure that a SL is not exceeded and that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. Therefore, the NTSP is the LSSS as defined by 10 CFR 50.36. However, use of the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as found" value of a protective device setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule which are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded or that automatic protective actions would initiate consistent with the design basis with the "as found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the NTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.

Use of the NTSP to define "as found" OPERABILITY under the expected circumstances described above would result in actions required by both the rule and Technical Specifications that are clearly not warranted.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This value is specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11, in order to define OPERABILITY of the devices and is designated as the Allowable Value which is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The actual NTSP values and Allowable Values (derived from the Setting Basis specified in Table 3.3.1.4-1) and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances will be maintained in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11.

The Allowable Valuable is the least conservative value that the setpoint of the channel can have when tested such that a channel is OPERABLE if the setpoint is found conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Note that, although a channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the established "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned in the setpoint calculation. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount equal to or greater than the "as-found" tolerance value. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will ensure that a SL is not exceeded or that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value the device would be considered inoperable from a Technical Specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.

The NMS is composed of the startup range neutron monitor (SRNM) and the average power range monitor (APRM). SRNM trip signals and APRM trip signals from each of the four divisions of NMS equipment are provided to the four divisions of RPS trip logic (Ref. 1).

The SRNM provides trip signals to the RPS to cover the range of plant operation from source range through startup range (i.e., more than 10% of reactor rated power). Three SRNM conditions, monitored as a function of the NMS, comprise the SRNM trip logic output to the RPS. These conditions are as follows: SRNM Neutron Flux High (high count rate when selected to the non-coincidence mode or high flux level when selected to the coincidence mode); Neutron Flux Short (fast) Period; and

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

SRNM inoperative. The three trip conditions from every SRNM associated with the same NMS division are combined into a single SRNM trip signal for that division. The specific condition that causes the SRNM trip output state is identified by the NMS and is not detectable within the RPS.

The SRNM consists of twelve fixed in-core regenerative fission chamber sensors, each with associated electronics to monitor the whole startup range (10 decades) of neutron flux. The twelve detectors are all located at fixed elevation slightly above the mid-plane of the fuel region, and are evenly distributed throughout the core. The twelve SRNM channels are divided into four NMS divisions. For each division, any one SRNM channel trip (flux high, or inoperative, or short period) will result in an SRNM division trip. Each SRNM divisional output is provided to each of the four divisions 2-out-of-4 voters (SRNM interface unit). The SRNM interface unit determines whether there are sufficient SRNM divisions in trip (two-out-of-four logic). In addition, the twelve SRNM channels are divided into four bypass groups. One SRNM channel from each bypass group may be bypassed from the operator's control console in the Main Control Room. Thus, up to four channels may be bypassed at any one time. There is no additional SRNM bypass capability at the divisional level; however, it is possible to bypass all three SRNMs within a division.

Each SRNM cabinet is redundantly powered by two uninterruptible divisional 120 VAC power sources from its associated electrical division; either source of power can support system operation.

The APRMs provide trip signals to the RPS to cover the range of plant operation from a few percent to greater than rated power. Three APRM conditions, monitored as a function of the NMS, comprise the APRM trip logic output to the RPS. These conditions are APRM Fixed Neutron Flux -High, Simulated Thermal Power - High, and APRM inoperative.

There are four APRM channels divided into four NMS divisions. For each division, any one APRM channel trip (high or inoperative) will result in a division trip. Each APRM divisional output is provided to each of the four divisions 2-out-of-4 voters (APRM interface unit). The APRM interface unit determines whether there are sufficient APRM divisions in trip (two-out-of-four logic). One APRM channel may be bypassed at any one time. When an APRM is bypassed, its associated OPRM is also bypassed.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

APRM channels receive power from its associated electrical division. Either of the two redundant uninterruptible power sources within a division can support APRM channel operation.

The OPRMs provide trip signals to the RPS to cover the range of plant operation from a few percent to greater than rated power. The OPRM trip protection includes an algorithm that detects thermal hydraulic instability (flux oscillation with unacceptable amplitude and frequency).

There are four OPRM channels divided into four NMS divisions. For each division, any one OPRM channel trip will result in a division trip. Each OPRM divisional output is provided to each of the four divisions 2-out-of-4 voters (the APRM interface unit houses the OPRM logic). The APRM interface unit, which houses the OPRM logic, determines whether there are sufficient OPRM divisions in trip (two-out-of-four logic). When an APRM is bypassed, its associated OPRM is also bypassed. The OPRM function resides in the APRM equipment and receives the same redundant APRM power.

The APRMs, OPRMs, and the SRNM are part of the NMS instrumentation. The trip decisions are made within the NMS. This is done on a divisional basis and the results then sent directly to the RPS Trip Logic Units (TLUs). Thus, each NMS division sends only two inputs to the RPS divisional TLUs, one for APRM trip/no-trip (which includes the OPRM trip) and one for SRNM trip/no-trip. A divisional APRM (OPRM) or SRNM may be tripped due to any of the monitored variables exceeding its trip setpoint. The RPS two-out-of-four trip decision is then made, not on a per variable basis, but on an APRM (OPRM) tripped or SRNM tripped basis, by looking at the four divisions of APRM (OPRM) and four divisions of SRNM. All bypasses of the SRNMs and APRMs (OPRMs) are performed within and by the NMS.

The NMS is designed to provide reliable single-failure proof capability to automatically provide a trip signal to the RPS while maintaining protection against unnecessary trip signals resulting from single failures. The NMS satisfies the single-failure criterion even when one entire division of instrumentation is bypassed and/or when one of the four automatic actuation divisions is out-of-service.

This Specification addresses OPERABILITY of the SRNM channels from the sensors to the NMS divisional interface unit and up to each of the SRNM interface units. This Specification addresses OPERABILITY of the APRM and OPRM channels from the sensors (LPRMs) to the NMS

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

divisional interface unit and up to each of the APRM interface units, which house the APRM/OPRM logic. LCO 3.3.1.5,"Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Automatic Actuation" addresses OPERABILITY requirements for NMS automatic actuation for the SRNM and the APRM/OPRM.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

The actions of the NMS in conjunction with RPS are assumed in the safety analyses of References 2 and 3.The NMS provides a trip signal to RPS when monitored parameter values exceed predetermined values specified in the SCP to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding, preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and preserve the integrity of the containment by minimizing the energy that must be absorbed following a LOCA.

NMS Instrumentation satisfies the requirements of Selection Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). Functions not specifically credited in the accident analysis are retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the NMS and RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

The OPERABILITY of the NMS and RPS is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.1.4-1. Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints in accordance with the SCP, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with the SCP. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time.

The Setting Basis from which the NTSPs and Allowable Values are derived is specified for each RPS Function, where appropriate, in Table 3.3.1.4-1. NTSPs and Allowable Values are specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11. The NTSPs are selected to ensure the actual setpoints are conservative with respect to the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the NTSP, but conservative with respect to its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is non-conservative with respect to its required Allowable Value.

NTSPs are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., digital trip module) changes state. For those

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

LSSS related to variables protecting SLs, the Analytical Limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. For those LSSS related to variables having significant safety functions but which do not protect SLs, the Design Limits are those settings that must initiate automatic protective actions consistent with the design basis. The Allowable Values are derived from the Analytical / Design Limits, corrected for calibration, process and some of the instrument errors. The NTSPs are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES specified in the Table which may require an RPS trip to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident or transient. To ensure a reliable scram function, a combination of Functions is required in each MODE.

Although there are four divisions of NMS instrumentation for each function, only three divisions of NMS instrumentation for each function are required to be OPERABLE. The three required divisions are those divisions associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems - Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is met with three OPERABLE NMS instrumentation divisions, and because each NMS division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function-by-Function basis.

1.a, 1.b. Startup Range Neutron Monitor (SRNM) Neutron Flux- High, Neutron Flux - Short Period

The SRNM subsystem is part of the NMS. The SRNMs monitor neutron flux levels from cold shutdown condition to high neutron flux range with the LPRM/APRM on scale and with sufficient overlap of flux indication between the SRNMs and the APRMs. The SRNMs monitor the power level over the range from source range to more than 10% RTP. The SRNM subsystem will generate a scram trip signal to prevent fuel

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

damage in the event of any abnormal positive reactivity insertion transients while operating in the startup power range. This trip signal is to be generated for either an excessively high neutron flux level or for an excessive neutron flux increase rate, i.e., short reactor period. The setpoints of these trips are determined such that under the worst positive reactivity insertion event, fuel integrity is always protected. The worst bypass or out of service condition of the SRNM subsystem is considered in determining the setpoints. In the startup power range, the most significant source of positive reactivity change is due to control rod withdrawal. The SRNM provides diverse protection for the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) in the Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS), which monitors and controls the movement of control rods at low power. The RWM prevents the withdrawal of an out of sequence control rod during startup that could result in an unacceptable neutron flux excursion (Ref. 4). The SRNM provides mitigation of the neutron flux excursion.

The SRNMs are also capable of limiting other reactivity excursions during startup such as cold-water injection events although no credit is specifically assumed.

The SRNM consists of twelve fixed in-core regenerative fission chamber sensors, each with associated electronics to monitor the whole startup range (10 decades) of neutron flux. The twelve detectors are all located at fixed elevation about the mid-plane of the fuel region, and are evenly distributed throughout the core. The twelve SRNM channels are divided into four NMS divisions. For each division, any one SRNM channel trip (flux high, or inoperative, or short period) will result in an SRNM division trip. Each SRNM divisional output is provided to each of the four divisions (SRNM interface unit). The SRNM interface unit determines whether there are sufficient SRNM divisions in trip (two-out-of-four logic). In addition, the twelve SRNM channels are divided into four bypass groups. One channel from each bypass group may be bypassed from the operator's control console. Thus, up to four channels may be bypassed at any one time. There is no additional SRNM bypass capability at the divisional level; however, it is possible to bypass all of the SRNMs within a division.

Three divisional channels of each SRNM Function, with three separate channels per division, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from these Functions on a valid signal.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The Analytical / Design Limit for the Startup Range Neutron Monitor (SRNM) Neutron Flux -High and Neutron Flux - Short Period Functions is set to mitigate the consequences of a rod withdrawal error.

The SRNM Neutron Flux - High and the Neutron Flux - Short Period Functions must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn and the potential for criticality exists. In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function and the automatic limit monitor (ATLM) provides protection against reactivity transients. The SRNM Neutron Flux - High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 6 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. During normal operation in MODES 3, 4, and 5, all control rods are fully inserted and the Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation") does not allow any control rod to be withdrawn. Control rods withdrawn from a core cell containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and therefore are not required to have the capability to scram. Provided all control rods otherwise remain inserted, the SRNM function is not required. In this condition the required SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN") and refuel position one-rod /rod-pair-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock") ensures no event requiring RPS will occur. Under these conditions, the SRNM Function is not required to be OPERABLE.

1.c. SRNM - Inop

This trip signal provides assurance that a minimum number of SRNMs are OPERABLE. Anytime a SRNM detector high voltage drops below a preset level or when a module is disconnected an inoperative trip signal will occur unless the SRNM is bypassed.

This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

Three divisional channels of the SRNM Inop Function, with three separate channels per division, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude a scram from these Functions on a valid signal.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE when the SRNM Neutron Flux - High and the Neutron Flux - Short Period Functions are required.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

2.a. APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High, Setdown

The APRM channels receive input signals from the LPRMs within the reactor core to provide an indication of the power distribution and local power changes. The APRM channels average these LPRM signals to provide a continuous indication of average reactor power from a few percent to greater than RATED THERMAL POWER. For operation at low power (i.e., MODE 2), the APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High Setdown Function is capable of generating a trip signal that prevents fuel damage resulting from abnormal operating transients in this power range. For most operation at low power levels, the APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Function will provide a secondary scram to the SRNM Neutron Flux - High Function because of the relative setpoints. With the SRNM near its high power range, it is possible that the APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Function will provide the primary trip signal for a core wide increase in power.

The control rod withdrawal event during startup (Ref. 4) assumes the failure of the SRNM instrumentation and shows that the APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Function is capable of maintaining the peak fuel enthalpy to within limits so that no fuel damage results. However, this Function indirectly ensures that before the reactor mode switch is placed in the run position, reactor power does not exceed {25%} RTP (Safety Limit 2.1.1.1) when operating at low reactor pressure and low core flow. It therefore indirectly prevents fuel damage during significant reactivity increases with THERMAL POWER < {25%} RTP.

Three channels of APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High, Setdown are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, at least {40} LPRM inputs are required to be OPERABLE.

The Analytical / Design Limit is based on preventing significant increases in power when THERMAL POWER is < {25%} RTP.

The APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Function must be OPERABLE during MODE 2 when control rods may be withdrawn. In MODE 1, the Average Power Range Monitor Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function and the automatic limit monitor (ATLM) provides protection against reactivity transients.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

2.b. APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High

The APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Function monitors neutron flux to approximate the thermal power being transferred to the reactor coolant. The APRM simulated thermal power signal represents the APRM flux signal through a time constant representing the actual fuel time constant. The simulated thermal power signal accurately represents core thermal (as opposed to neutron flux) power and the heat flux through the fuel. The signal is fixed at an upper limit that is always lower than the APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function Setpoint. The APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Function provides protection against transients where thermal power increases slowly (such as the Loss of Feedwater Heating event) however this Function is not credited. During these events, the thermal power increase does not significantly lag the neutron flux response and, because of a lower trip setpoint, will initiate a scram before the high neutron flux scram. For rapid neutron flux increase events, the thermal power lags the neutron flux and the APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function will provide a scram signal before the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Function setpoint is exceeded.

Three channels of APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

The Analytical / Design Limit for the APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Function is intended for the mitigation of the Loss of Feedwater Heater event, however no credit is taken for this Function.

The thermal power time constant of less than seven seconds is based on the fuel heat transfer dynamics and provides a signal proportional to the thermal power.

The APRM Simulated Thermal Power - High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 when there is the possibility of generating excessive thermal power and potentially exceeding the Safety Limit applicable to high pressure and core flow conditions (fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit). During MODES 2 and 6, other SRNM and APRM Functions provide protection for fuel cladding integrity.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

2.c. APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High

The APRM channels provide the primary indication of neutron flux within the core and respond almost instantaneously to neutron flux increases. For the overpressurization protection analysis of Reference 3, the APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function is assumed to terminate the MSIV Closure event and, along with the safety/relief valves, limits the peak Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure to less than the ASME Code limits. This Function is also credited in the pressure regulator failure event (Ref. 5)

Three channels of APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, at least {40} LPRM inputs are required to be OPERABLE.

The Analytical / Design Limit is assumed in the overpressurization and pressure regulator failure event.

The APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 where the potential consequences of the analyzed transients could result in the Safety Limit (e.g., Reactor Vessel pressure) being exceeded. In MODE 2, the APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High, Setdown Function and the SRNM trips provide adequate protection. Therefore, the APRM Fixed Neutron Flux - High Function is not required in MODE 2.

2.d. APRM - Inop

This signal provides assurance that a minimum number of APRMs are OPERABLE. {Anytime an APRM mode switch is moved to any position other than “Operate”, an APRM module is disconnected, the electronics operating voltage is low, or the APRM has too few LPRM inputs (< {40}),} an inoperative trip signal will be received by the RPS, unless the APRM is bypassed.

This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

Three channels of APRM - Inop are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

There is no Analytical / Design Limit for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required.

3. Oscillation Power Range Monitor {Period-Based Trip}

The Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) consists of four channels. The OPRM channel utilizes the same set of LPRM signals used by the associated APRM channel in which this OPRM channel resides and forms many OPRM cells to monitor the neutron flux behavior of all regions of the core. The LPRM signals assigned to each cell are summed and averaged to provide an OPRM signal for this cell. The OPRM trip protection algorithm detects thermal hydraulic instability (flux oscillation with unacceptable amplitude and frequency) and provides trip output to the RPS if the trip setpoint is exceeded.

Three channels of OPRM are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single failure will preclude a scram from this Function on a valid signal. In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, at least {40} LPRM inputs are required to be OPERABLE.

The Analytical / Design Limit is based on preventing safety thermal limit violation and fuel damage in response to core neutron flux oscillation conditions and thermal-hydraulic instability.

The OPRM Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 to respond to core neutron flux oscillation conditions and thermal-hydraulic instability in time to prevent safety thermal limit violation and fuel damage. In MODE 2, core neutron flux oscillation conditions and thermal-hydraulic instability is prevented by following startup procedures. In MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, core neutron flux oscillation conditions and thermal-hydraulic instability is not postulated to occur and therefore the monitors are not required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to NMS Instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

on initial entry into the condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable NMS Instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable NMS Instrumentation channel.

A.1

With one or more Functions with channel(s) inoperable in one required division, the affected channel or affected division must be verified to be in trip. For the APRM/OPRM Functions, operation with the affected required division in trip places the APRM/OPRM Functions in a one-out-of-two configuration.

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the APRM/OPRM is capable of performing its trip Functions in the presence of any single random failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 for the APRM/OPRM Functions and has been found to be acceptable by Reference 6.

For the SRNM Functions, operation with the affected required division in trip places the SRNM Functions in a one-out-of-two configuration (i.e., one channel must trip in any of the remaining two required divisions).

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the SRNM is capable of performing its trip Functions in the presence of any single random failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 for the SRNM Functions and has been found to be acceptable by Reference 6.

Alternately, if the instrumentation division can not be verified to be in trip, Condition C would be entered and its Required Action taken when the Completion Time of Required Action A.1 expires.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining NMS trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining NMS trip capability when sufficient required channels are OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated NMS division is in

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

trip), such that two divisions will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. For the SRNM Functions, this would require two SRNM divisions to have one channel OPERABLE or tripped (or the associated SRNM division in trip). For the APRM Functions, this would require two APRM/OPRM divisions to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated APRM/OPRM division in trip).

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1-hour Completion Time has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6.

C.1

Required Action C.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1.4-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

D.1 and E.1

If a channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or is not in trip as required within the allowed Completion Time, or if NMS trip capability is not restored with the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1 and F.2

If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status is not in trip within the allowed Completion Time, an alternate method to detect and suppress thermal hydraulic instability oscillations must be initiated within 12 hours and the inoperable channel(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within 120 days.

The alternate methods would adequately address detection and mitigation in the event of thermal hydraulic instability oscillations. Based on industry operating experience with actual instability oscillations, the

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

operator would be able to recognize instabilities during this time and take action to suppress them through a manual scram. In addition, the OPRM system may still be available to provide alarms to the operator if the onset of oscillations were to occur.

The 12-hour Completion Time for Required Action F.1 is based on engineering judgment to allow orderly transition to the alternate methods while limiting the period of time during which no automatic or alternate detect and suppress trip capability is formally in place and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6 . Based on the small probability of an instability event occurring at all, 12 hours is judged to be reasonable.

The 120-day Completion Time, is considered adequate because with operation minimized in regions where oscillations may occur and implementation of the alternate methods, the likelihood of an instability event that could not be adequately handled by the alternate methods during this 120-day period was negligibly small and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6.

G.1

If the channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status or is not in trip as required within the allowed Completion Time, or if NMS trip capability is not restored with the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and are, therefore, not required to be inserted. Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

As noted at the beginning of the Surveillance Requirements, the SRs for each NMS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.4.1-1.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1.4.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 24 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one required channel to the same parameter on other required channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift on one of the channels or even something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is the key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. {Because the NMS System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a CHANNEL CHECK of all instrument channels, and because the NMS System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL CHECK may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6.

SR 3.3.1.4.2

To ensure the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are calibrated to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance. The Frequency of once per 7 days is based on {minor changes in LPRM sensitivity, which could affect the APRM reading between performances of SR 3.3.1.4.4 (LPRM calibrations)} and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6.

A Note is provided which only requires performance of the SR to be met at ≥ {25%} RTP because it is difficult to accurately determine core THERMAL POWER from a heat balance when < {25%} RTP. At low power levels, a high degree of accuracy is unnecessary because of the large, inherent margin to thermal limits (MCPR). At ≥ {25%} RTP, the surveillance is required to have been satisfactorily performed within the

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

last 7 days in accordance with SR 3.0.2. A Note is provided which allows an increase in THERMAL POWER above {25%} if the 7-day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours after reaching or exceeding {25%} RTP. The 12 hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

SR 3.3.1.4.3

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function when required. {Because the NMS System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a functional test of all instrument channels, and because the NMS system performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant setpoint methodology as required by the SCP.

As noted, for Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, and 2.a, SR 3.3.1.4.3 is not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 because testing of the MODE 2 required SRNM and APRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1. This allows entry into MODE 2 if the 92 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours after entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.

A Surveillance Frequency of 92 days provides an acceptable level of system average unavailability over the Surveillance Frequency interval and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6.

SR 3.3.1.4.4

LPRM gain settings are determined from the local flux profiles measured by the automated fixed incore probe (AFIP) subsystem of NMS. This establishes the relative local flux profile for appropriate representative input to the APRM system. The 1000 MWD/T Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience with LPRM sensitivity changes.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1.4.5

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the required channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the required channel adjusted to the NTSP within the "leave alone" tolerance to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the SCP.

SR 3.3.1.4.5 is modified by two Notes. {Note 1 states, for Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, and 2.a, SR 3.3.1.4.5 is not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 because testing of the MODE 2 required SRNM and APRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1. This allows entry into MODE 2 if the Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours after entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.} Note 2 states that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.4.2) and the LPRM calibration (SR 3.3.1.4.4). The Surveillance Frequency of SR 3.3.1.4.5 is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6.

For selected Functions, the SCP provides additional requirements for the evaluation of the performance of required channels. The selected Functions are those Functions whose instruments are not totally mechanical devices. Mechanical devices (e.g., devices which have an "on" or "off" output or an open/close position such as limit switches, float switches, and proximity detectors) are not calibrated in the traditional sense and do not have as-left or as-found conditions that would indicate drift of the component setpoint. These devices are considered not trendable and the requirements of TS 5.5.11.c.1 and TS 5.5.11.c.2 are not applicable to these mechanical components. Where a non-trendable component provides signal input to other channel components that can be trended, the remaining components must be evaluated in accordance with the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.1 evaluation of channel performance is required for the condition where the "as-found" setting for the channel is outside its "as-found" tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. For digital channel components, the "as-found" tolerance may be identical to the "leave alone" tolerance because

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

drift may not be an expected error. In these cases, a channel "as-found" value outside the "leave alone" tolerance may be cause for component assessment. Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will continue to behave in accordance with design-basis assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for OPERABILITY. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the Allowable Values and the methodology for calculating the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.2, the as-left setting for the instrument is required to be returned to within the "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in plant surveillance procedures, the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Analytical / Design Limit is maintained. If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the "leave alone" tolerance, then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the NTSP and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP.

SR 3.3.1.4.6

The APRM Simulated THERMAL POWER - High Function uses time constant to generate a signal proportional to the core THERMAL POWER from the APRM neutron flux signal. This time constant is representative of the fuel heat transfer dynamics that produce the relationship between the neutron flux and the core THERMAL POWER. The time constant must be verified to ensure that the channel is accurately reflecting the desired parameter.

The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment considering the reliability of the components and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1.4.7

This SR ensures that the individual required channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 7. RPS RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.1.5.2 to ensure complete testing of instrument channels and actuation circuitry.

However, some sensors are allowed to be excluded from specific RPS RESPONSE TIME measurement if the conditions of Reference 8 are satisfied. If these conditions are satisfied, sensor response time may be allocated based on either assumed design sensor response time or the manufacturer's stated design response time. When the requirements of Reference 8 are not satisfied, sensor response time must be measured. Furthermore, measurement of the instrument loops response times for some sensors is not required if the conditions of Reference 9 are satisfied.

As noted, neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because the principles of detector operation virtually ensure an instantaneous response time.

RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four channels. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that the channels associated with each division are alternately tested. The 24 month test Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 7, Figure 7.2-1.
2. Chapter 15.
3. Subsection 5.2.2.
4. Subsection 15.3.8.
5. Subsection 15.3.4.

BASES

REFERENCES (continued)

6. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

7. { Reference for RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria}.

8. {NEDO-32291-A, "System Analyses For the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.

9. NEDO-32291-A, Supplement 1, "System Analyses for The Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1999.}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.1.5 Nuclear Monitoring Instrument (NMS) Automatic Actuation

BASES

BACKGROUND	The NMS Instrumentation provides input to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when sufficient instrumentation channels indicate a trip condition. The RPS is designed to initiate a reactor scram when one or more monitored parameters exceed their specified limit, to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and minimize the energy that must be absorbed following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). A detailed description of the NMS instrumentation and NMS actuation logic is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.3.1.4, “Nuclear Monitoring Instrumentation (NMS) Instrumentation.” This Specification addresses OPERABILITY of the NMS automatic actuation channels that include the Startup Range Neutron Monitor (SRNM) interface units, the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) interface units, which house the Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) logic, and the associated output to RPS (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"). LCO 3.3.1.4, covers SRNM and APRM (OPRM) channel inputs to the NMS interface units.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The actions of the NMS in conjunction with RPS are assumed in the safety analyses of Reference 1. The NMS provides a trip signal to RPS when monitored parameter values exceed the trip setpoints to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding, preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and preserve the integrity of the containment by minimizing the energy that must be absorbed following a LOCA. NMS Automatic Actuation satisfies the requirements of Selection Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO	Three SRNM automatic actuation channels and three APRM/OPRM automatic actuation channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single automatic actuation channel failure will preclude a scram to occur on a valid signal. The three required divisions are those divisions associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems -

BASES

LCO (continued)

Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is still met with three OPERABLE NMS actuation divisions, and because each NMS division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions. This Specification addresses OPERABILITY requirements of the NMS actuation circuitry that includes the interface units and the associated output to RPS.

APPLICABILITY

Three SRNM automatic actuation channels are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 2 and in MODE 6 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. In these conditions, the control rods are assumed to function during a DBA or transient and therefore the four SRNM automatic actuation channels are required to be OPERABLE. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. Therefore, SRNM automatic actuation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

Three APRM automatic actuation channels are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2. In these conditions, the control rods are assumed to function during a DBA or transient and therefore the APRM automatic actuation channels are required to be OPERABLE. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. Therefore, the APRM automatic actuation channels are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. In MODE 6 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, the APRM automatic actuation channels are not required to support the APRM instrumentation in LCO 3.3.1.4, therefore APRM automatic actuation channels are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

Three OPRM automatic actuation channels are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1. In this condition the power and flow relationships that contribute to power oscillations could be present. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, power oscillations are unlikely. Therefore, the OPRM automatic actuation channels are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. In MODE 6 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, the OPRM automatic actuation channels are not required to support the OPRM instrumentation

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

in LCO 3.3.1.4, therefore OPRM automatic actuation channels are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to NMS automatic actuation divisions. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable NMS automatic actuation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable NMS automatic actuation channel.

A.1

With one of more Functions with one required division inoperable, the affected division must be verified to be in trip within 12 hours. With one division in trip, the NMS is effectively in a one-out-of-two configuration.

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the NMS is capable of performing its trip Function in the presence of any single random failure of an actuation division. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

B.1

With one or more Functions with NMS actuation capability lost, NMS actuation capability must be restored within 1 hour. Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped divisions (i.e., two or more required divisions) for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining NMS trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining NMS trip capability when sufficient divisions are OPERABLE or in trip such that the NMS logic will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. For the NMS automatic actuation divisions, two divisions must be OPERABLE or in trip to maintain NMS trip capability.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of divisions.

C.1

If the Required Actions and Associated Completion Times of Condition A or B are not met, Required Action C.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1.5-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

D.1 and E.1

If the affected actuation division is not restored to OPERABLE status, is not in trip, or if NMS actuation capability is not restored, within the allowed Completion Time(s), the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.1.5.1

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the NMS automatic actuation divisions. {Because the NMS System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including portions of a LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and because the NMS System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, portions of the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four channels. The testing in LCO 3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.2, LCO 3.3.1.4, and the functional testing of control

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

rods, in LCO 3.1.3, overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

SR 3.3.1.5.2

This SR ensures that the individual required division response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 3.

RPS RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.1.4.7 to ensure complete testing of instrument channels and actuation circuitry.

RPS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four divisions. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that each division is alternately tested. The 24 month test Frequency is consistent with the refueling cycle and has been found to be acceptable by Reference 2.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 15.

2. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

3. {Reference for RPS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria}.

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.1.6 Startup Range Neutron Monitor (SRNM) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The SRNMs provide the operator with information relative to the neutron flux level at very low flux levels in the core. As such, the SRNM indication is used by the operator to monitor the approach to criticality and determine when criticality is achieved.

The SRNM subsystem of the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) consists of four divisions. Each division includes three SRNMs for a total of twelve SRNMs, each having one fixed in-core regenerative fission chamber sensor. The SRNM instrumentation is discussed in detail in LCO 3.3.1.4, Nuclear Monitoring Instrumentation System (NMS) Instrumentation." However, this LCO specifies OPERABILITY requirements only for the monitoring and indication functions of the SRNMs.

During refueling, shutdown, and low-power operations, the primary indication of neutron flux levels is provided by the SRNMs or {special movable detectors connected to the normal SRNM circuits}. The SRNMs provide monitoring of reactivity changes during fuel or control rod movement and give the control room operator early indication of unexpected subcritical multiplication that could be indicative of an approach to criticality.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling and low-power operation is provided by:

- LCO 3.1.1, “SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM);”
- LCO 3.3.1.1, “Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation;
- LCO 3.3.1.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation;”
- LCO 3.3.1.4, “Nuclear Monitoring Instrumentation System (NMS) Instrumentation;"
- LCO 3.3.1.5, “Nuclear Monitoring System (NMS) Actuation;" and
- LCO 3.3.2.1, “Control Rod Block Instrumentation,” and
- LCO 3.9.1, “Refueling Equipment Interlocks.”

The monitoring requirements of the SRNMs in the Specification have no safety function and are not assumed to function during any design basis accident or transient analysis. However, the SRNMs provide the only on

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

scale monitoring of neutron flux levels during shutdown and refueling. Therefore, they are being retained in Technical Specifications.

LCO

In MODES 3, 4, and 5, with the reactor shut down, two SRNM channels provide redundant monitoring of flux levels in the core.

{In MODE 6, during a spiral off-load or reload, an SRNM outside the fueled region will no longer be required to be OPERABLE, since it is not capable of monitoring neutron flux in the fueled region of the core. Thus, CORE ALTERATIONS are allowed in a quadrant with no OPERABLE SRNM in an adjacent quadrant, as provided in Table 3.3.1.6-1, footnote (a), requirement that the bundles being spiral reloaded, loaded or spiral off-loaded are all in a single fueled region containing at least one OPERABLE SRNM, is met. Spiral reloading and off-loading encompasses reloading or off-loading a cell on the edges of a continuous fueled region (the cell can be reloaded or off-loaded in any sequence).}

{In non-spiral routine operations, two SRNMs are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundant monitoring of reactivity changes occurring in the reactor core. Because of the local nature of reactivity changes during refueling, adequate coverage is provided by requiring one SRNM to be OPERABLE in the quadrant of the reactor core where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and the other SRNM is to be OPERABLE in an adjacent quadrant. These requirements ensure that the reactivity of the core will be continuously monitored during CORE ALTERATIONS.}

{Special movable detectors according to Table 3.3.1.6-1, footnote (b), may be used during CORE ALTERATIONS in place of the normal SRNM nuclear detectors. These special detectors must be connected to the normal SRNM circuits in the NMS such that the applicable neutron flux indication can be generated. These special detectors provide more flexibility in monitoring reactivity changes during fuel loading, since they can be positioned anywhere within the core during refueling. They must still meet the location requirements of SR 3.3.1.6.2, and all other required SRs for SRNMs.}

For an SRNM channel to be considered OPERABLE, it must be providing neutron flux monitoring indication.

BASES

APPLICABILITY

The SRNMs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, to provide for neutron monitoring. In MODE 2, the SRNMs are required to be OPERABLE in accordance with LCO 3.3.1.4, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Instrumentation." In MODE 1, the APRMs provide adequate monitoring of reactivity changes in the core; therefore, the SRNMs are not required.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

With one or more required SRNM channels inoperable in MODE 3, 4, or 5, the neutron flux monitoring capability is degraded or it may not exist. The requirement to fully insert all insertable control rods ensures that the reactor will be at its minimum reactivity level while no neutron monitoring capability is available. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position prevents subsequent control rod withdrawal by maintaining a control rod block. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour is sufficient to accomplish the Required Action and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 1.

B.1 and B.2

With one or more required SRNMs inoperable in MODE 6, the capability to detect local reactivity changes in the core during refueling is degraded. CORE ALTERATIONS must be immediately suspended, and action must be immediately initiated to insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Suspending CORE ALTERATIONS prevents the two most probable causes of reactivity changes, fuel loading and control-rod withdrawal, from occurring. Inserting all insertable control rods ensures that the reactor will be at its minimum reactivity, given that fuel is present in the core. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of the movement of a component to a safe, conservative position.

Actions (once required to be initiated) to insert control rods must continue until all insertable rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are inserted and the required SRNMs are restored to OPERABLE status.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

The SRs for each SRNM Applicable MODE or other specified condition are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.6-1.

SR 3.3.1.6.1 and SR 3.3.1.6.3

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to the same parameter indicated on other similar channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or even something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus; it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. {Because the NMS System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a CHANNEL CHECK of all instrument channels, and because the NMS System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL CHECK may be performed by review of the system self-test report}.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency of once every 12 hours for SR 3.3.1.6.1 is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. While in MODES 3, 4, and 5, reactivity changes are not expected and, therefore, the 12-hour Frequency is relaxed to 24 hours for SR 3.3.1.6.3. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.1.6.2

{To provide adequate coverage of potential reactivity changes in the core, one SRNM is required to be OPERABLE in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and the other OPERABLE SRNM must be in an adjacent quadrant.} Note 1 states that this SR is required to be met only during CORE ALTERATIONS. It is not required to be met at other times in MODE 6 since core reactivity changes are not occurring. This Surveillance consists of a review of plant logs to ensure that SRNMs required OPERABLE for given CORE ALTERATIONS are in fact

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

OPERABLE. In the event that only one SRNM is required to be OPERABLE per Table 3.3.1.6-1, footnote (a), only the part 'a' portion of this SR is required. Note 2 clarifies that the three requirements can be met by the same or different OPERABLE SRNMs. The 12 hour Surveillance Frequency is based upon operating experience and supplements operational controls over refueling activities, which include steps to ensure the SRNMs required by the LCO are in the proper quadrant.

SR 3.3.1.6.4

This Surveillance consists of a verification of the plant SRNM instrument readout to ensure that the SRNM reading is greater than a specified minimum count rate. This ensures that the detectors are indicating count rates indicative of neutron flux levels within the core. {Verification of the signal-to-noise-ratio also ensures that the movable detectors, if used, are inserted in the core. In a fully withdrawn condition, these movable detectors are sufficiently removed from the fueled region of the core to essentially eliminate neutrons from reaching the detector. Any count rate obtained while fully withdrawn is assumed to be "noise" only.} With few fuel assemblies loaded, the SRNMs will not have a high enough count rate to satisfy the Surveillance Requirement. Therefore allowances are made for loading sufficient "source" material, in the form of irradiated fuel assemblies, to establish the minimum count rate.

To accomplish this, the SR is modified by a Note which states that the count rate is not required to be met on an SRNM that has less than or equal to four fuel assemblies adjacent to the SRNM and no other fuel assemblies are in the associated core quadrant. With four or less fuel assemblies loaded around each SRNM and no other fuel assemblies in the associated quadrant, even with a control rod withdrawn, the configuration will not be critical.

The Frequency is based upon channel redundancy and other information available in the control room and ensures the required channels are frequently monitored while core reactivity changes are occurring. When no reactivity changes are in progress, the Frequency is relaxed from 12 hours to 24 hours.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1.6.5 and SR 3.3.1.6.6

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates that the associated channel will function properly. SR 3.3.1.6.5 is required in MODE 6, and the 7-day Frequency is to ensure that the channels are OPERABLE while core reactivity changes could be in progress. This 7 day Frequency is reasonable, based on operating experience and other Surveillances, such as a CHANNEL CHECK, that provide assurance of proper functioning between CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS.

SR 3.3.1.6.6 is required in MODES 3, 4, and 5. Since core reactivity changes do not normally take place, the Frequency has been extended from 7 days to 31 days. The 31-day Frequency is based on operating experience and on other Surveillances (such as CHANNEL CHECK) that ensure proper functioning between CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS. {Because the NMS System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a functional test of all instrument channels, and because the NMS system performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

SR 3.3.1.6.7

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION verifies the performance of the SRNM detectors and associated circuitry. The 24 month Frequency considers the unit conditions required to perform the test, the ease of performing the test, the likelihood of a change in the system or component status and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 1. The neutron detectors may be excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they cannot readily be adjusted. {The detectors are regenerative fission chambers that are designed to have a relatively constant sensitivity over the range, and with an accuracy specified for a fixed useful life.}

REFERENCES

1. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

Control rods provide the primary means for control of reactivity changes. Control rod block instrumentation includes channel sensors, software, hardware, switches, and relays that are designed to ensure that specified fuel design limits are not exceeded for postulated transients and accidents. During high power operation, the Automated Thermal Limit Monitor (ATLM) provides protection for control rod withdrawal error events. During low power operations, control rod blocks from the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) enforce specific control rod sequences designed to limit the consequences of a control rod withdrawal error (RWE). During shutdown conditions, control rod block from the Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position ensures that all control rods remain inserted to prevent inadvertent criticalities.

The purpose of the ATLM is to limit control rod withdrawal if localized neutron flux exceeds a calculated setpoint during control rod manipulations. It is assumed to function to block further control rod withdrawal to preclude a violation of the operating limit minimum critical power ratio (MCPR), the Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit (FCISL), and operating limit minimum linear heat generation rate (MLHGR). The ATLM supplies a trip signal to the Rod Action and Position Information (RAPI) subsystem of Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS) to appropriately inhibit control rod withdrawal during power operations above the low power setpoint (LPSP). There are two ATLM channels, either of which can initiate a control rod block when local neutron flux exceeds the ATLM calculated control rod block setpoint. The rod block logic circuitry in the RC&IS is arranged as two redundant and separate logic circuits. Control rod withdrawal is permitted only when the two channels agree, unless one of the channels of logic has been manually bypassed. Control rod position, local power range monitor (LPRM), and Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) data are the primary data input for the ATLM. APRM signals are used to determine when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to the LPSP to enable the ATLM rod block function (Ref. 1).

The purpose of the RWM is to ensure control rod patterns during startup are such that only specified control rod sequences and relative positions are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to just below the LPSP. The sequences enforced by the RWM effectively limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase during a RWE.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The RWM function of the RC&IS will initiate control rod withdrawal and insert blocks when the actual sequence deviates beyond allowances from the specified sequence. The rod block logic circuitry is the same as that described above. The RC&IS also uses the APRM signals to determine when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to the LPSP to enable the RWM rod block function.

With the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod withdrawal block is applied to all control rods to ensure that the shutdown condition is maintained. This function prevents criticality resulting from inadvertent control rod withdrawal during MODE 3, 4, or 5, or during MODE 6 when the reactor mode switch is required to be in the shutdown position. A rod block in either of the two channels of RC&IS will provide a control rod block to all control rods.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

1.a. Automated Thermal Limit Monitor (ATLM)

The ATLM is designed to prevent violation of the operating limit MCPR, the FCISL, and the cladding 1% plastic strain fuel design limit that may result from a RWE event. The RWE analysis during power operations is discussed in Reference 2. A statistical analysis of RWE events was performed to determine the fuel operating thermal performance response as a function of withdrawal distance and initial operating conditions. From these responses, coefficients used in the ATLM algorithms to calculate rod block setpoints were established. Each ATLM channel has two independent fuel operating thermal limit monitoring functions. One function enforces the operating limit MCPR, another function enforces the operating limit MLHGR. The rod block algorithm and setpoints of the ATLM are based on actual on line core fuel operating thermal limit information. If instantaneous LPRM data, which are fed to the ATLM, exceed the calculated rod block setpoints, a rod block signal is issued.

The Automated Thermal Limit Monitor satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Two channels of the ATLM are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude a rod block from this Function. The OPERABILITY of the ATLM depends on the OPERABILITY of the inputs and devices required to produce a rod block. The required inputs and devices are as described in Reference 1.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The ATLM is assumed to mitigate the consequences of a RWE event when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to the LPSP (≥ {30}% RTP). Below this power level, the consequences of an RWE event will not exceed the FCISL, and therefore the ATLM is not required to be OPERABLE.

1.b. Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM)

The RWM enforces the Gang Withdrawal Sequence Restrictions (GWSR) to ensure that the initial conditions of the RWE analysis are not violated. The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the RWE are summarized in Reference 3. {The GWSR requires that control rods be moved in groups, with all control rods assigned to a specific group required to be within specified banked positions.} Requirements that the control rod sequence is in compliance with GWSR are specified in LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control."

The RWM Function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

The RWM is a backup to operator control of control rod sequences, or reference rod pull sequence (RRPS) for automated or semi-automatic operation. However, the RWM is designed as a dual channel system and both channels are required to be OPERABLE for automatic operation. Required Actions of LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY" and LCO 3.1.6 may necessitate bypassing individual control rods in the RAPI subsystem to allow continued operation with inoperable control rods or to allow correction of a control rod pattern not in compliance with GWSR. The individual control rods may be bypassed as required by the conditions and the RWM is not considered inoperable provided SR 3.3.2.1.7 is met.

Compliance with the GWSR, and therefore OPERABILITY of the RWM, is required in MODES 1 and 2 when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to the LPSP (≤ {10}% RTP). Above this power level, there is no possible control rod configuration that results in a control rod worth that could exceed the 711 J/g (170 cal/gm) fuel-damage limit during a RWE. In MODES 3, 4 and 5, all control rods are required to be inserted in the core. In MODE 6, since only one or two control rods associated with the same hydraulic control unit can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies, adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that the consequences of a RWE are acceptable, since the reactor will be subcritical.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

2. Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position

During MODES 3, 4 and 5, and during MODE 6 when the Reactor Mode Switch is required to be in the shutdown position, the core is assumed to be subcritical; therefore, no positive reactivity insertion events are analyzed. The Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block ensures that the reactor remains subcritical by blocking control rod withdrawal, thereby preserving the assumptions of the safety analysis.

The Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position Function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Two channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single channel failure will preclude a rod block when required. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on reactor mode switch position.

During shutdown conditions (MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6) no positive reactivity insertion events are analyzed because assumptions are that control rod withdrawal blocks are provided to prevent criticality. Therefore, when the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, the control rod withdrawal block is required to be OPERABLE. During MODE 6 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position and RC&IS single/gang selection switch in “single”, the one rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock") provides the required control rod withdrawal blocks.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one ATLM channel inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the control rod block function; however, overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining OPERABLE channel can result in no control rod block capability for the ATLM. For this reason, Required Action A.1 requires restoration of the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. The 7 day Completion Time for restoring ATLM to OPERABLE status is based on the low probability of an event occurring coincident with a failure in the remaining OPERABLE channel.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A Note permits the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.c. This allowance permits entry into the applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS. This allowance is acceptable since the probability of an event is low during the short 7 day Completion Time, has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4, and the ability exists to restore ATLM to OPERABLE status while the plant remains at, or proceeds to power operation.

B.1

With one RWM channel inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the control rod block function; however, overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining OPERABLE channel can result in no control rod block capability for the RWM. For this reason, Required Action B.1 requires restoration of the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. The 7 day Completion Time for restoring RWM to OPERABLE status is based on the low probability of an event occurring coincident with a failure in the remaining OPERABLE channel.

A Note permits the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.c. This allowance permits entry into the applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS. This allowance is acceptable since the probability of an event is low during the short 7 day Completion Time, has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4, and the ability exists to restore RWM to OPERABLE status while the plant remains at, or proceeds to power operation.

C.1

If Required Action A.1 or Required Action B.2 is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired, control rod withdrawal must be suspended immediately. In addition, if two ATLM channels or two RWM channels are inoperable, the ATLM or the RWM is not capable of performing its intended function; thus, control rod withdrawal must also be suspended immediately. This ensures erroneous control rod withdrawal does not occur.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1 and D.2

With one Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block channel inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the control rod withdrawal block function. However, since the Required Actions are consistent with the normal action of an OPERABLE Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position Function (i.e., maintaining all control rods inserted), there is no distinction between having one or two channels inoperable.

In both cases (one or both channels inoperable), suspending all control rod withdrawal and initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies will ensure that the core is subcritical with adequate SDM ensured by LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)." Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, are not required to be inserted. Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

As noted at the beginning of the Surveillance Requirements, the SRs for each Control Rod Block instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.2.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that an ATLM or a RWM channel may be placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances and entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. The allowance of this Note is based on the reliability of the channels and the average time required to perform the channel Surveillance, and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that a control rod block will be initiated when necessary.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.2.1.1

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for each ATLM channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. It includes the RC&IS inputs. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability of the channels and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

As noted in the SR, SR 3.3.2.1.1 is not required to be performed until 1 hour after THERMAL POWER is ≥ {30}% RTP. This allows THERMAL POWER to be increased to ≥ {30}% RTP to perform the required Surveillance if the 92 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour allowance is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SRs.

SR 3.3.2.1.2 and SR 3.3.2.1.3

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed for the RWM to ensure that the entire system will perform the intended function. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the RWM is performed by attempting to withdraw a control rod not in compliance with the prescribed sequence and verifying a control rod block occurs. As noted in the SR, SR 3.3.2.1.2 is not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn in MODE 2. As noted in the SR, SR 3.3.2.1.3 is not required to be performed until 1 hour after THERMAL POWER is ≤ {10}% RTP. This allows entry into MODE 2 for SR 3.3.2.1.2, and THERMAL POWER to be decreased to ≤ {10}% for SR 3.3.2.1.3, to perform the required Surveillance if the 92 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour allowance is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SRs. The Frequencies of 92 days are based on the reliability of the channels and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

SR 3.3.2.1.4

The RWM channels are automatically bypassed when power is above a specified value (LPSP). The power level is determined from the APRM signals. The RWM {automatic} bypass setpoint must be verified periodically to be > {10}% RTP (i.e., the RWM is not bypassed at or below the LPSP). If the RWM LPSP is nonconservative, then the affected RWM channel is considered inoperable. Alternately, each RWM channel associated with a nonconservative RWM LPSP can be placed in

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

the conservative condition (manually enabled). If manually enabled, the SR is met and the affected RWM channel is not considered inoperable.

SR 3.3.2.1.5

The ATLM are {automatically} bypassed when power is below a specified value (LPSP). The power level is determined from the APRM signals. The ATLM automatic bypass setpoint must be verified periodically to be < {30}% RTP (i.e., the ATLM is not bypassed at or above the LPSP). If the ATLM LPSP is nonconservative, then the affected ATLM channel is considered inoperable. Alternately, each ATLM channel associated with a nonconservative ATLM LPSP can be placed in the conservative condition (manually enabled). If manually enabled, the SR is met and the affected ATLM channel is not considered inoperable.

SR 3.3.2.1.6

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for the Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position control rod withdrawal block is performed by attempting to withdraw any control rod with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position and verifying that a control rod block occurs.

As noted in the SR, the Surveillance is only required to be performed until 1 hour after the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, since testing of this interlock with the reactor mode switch in any other position cannot be performed without using jumpers, lifted leads or moveable links. This allows entry into MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6 if the 24 month Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. The 1 hour allowance is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SRs.

The 24 month Surveillance Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.2.1.7

LCO 3.1.3 and LCO 3.1.6 may require individual control rods to be bypassed in the RC&IS cabinets to allow insertion of an inoperable control rod or correction of a control rod pattern not in compliance with GWSR. With the control rods bypassed in the RC&IS cabinets, the RWM will not control the movement of these bypassed control rods. To ensure the proper bypassing and movement of those affected control rods, a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff must verify the bypassing and movement of these control rods. Compliance with this SR allows the RWM to be OPERABLE with these control rods bypassed.

REFERENCES

1. Subsection 7.7.2.
2. Subsection 15.3.9.
3. Subsection 15.3.8.
4. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.3.1 Post-Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation is to display plant variables that provide information required by the control room operators during accident situations. The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that there is sufficient information available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess plant status and behavior following an accident. Consistent with the recommendations in Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Ref. 1), instrumentation is designated as Type A if it is needed to provide the primary information required to permit the control room operating staff to:

- Take specific preplanned manually-controlled actions for which no automatic control is provided and that are required for safety systems to perform their safety-related functions as assumed in the plant accident analysis; and

- Take the specified, preplanned, manually controlled actions for which no automatic control is provided and that are required to mitigate the consequences of an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO).

[---------- **REVIEWER'S NOTE** ----------
This plant does not include any Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation that is designated as Type A. Based on this remaining true on completion of the evaluation identified in Reference 2, this Technical Specification, and associated Administrative Controls 5.6.5, "Post Accident Monitoring Report," may be removed from the Technical Specifications.
----------]

APPLICABLE SAFETY

{Variables that satisfy the criteria as Type A variables in Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Ref. 1) meet Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) and are discussed ANALYSESin the LCO section of these Bases. Reference 2 summarizes the analysis that determined the variables or instrumentation required to monitor these variables that meet criteria for designation as Type A in accordance with Reference 1.}

BASES

LCO

LCO 3.3.3.1 requires sufficient OPERABLE channels for each Type A Function, identified in Reference 2 and associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems – Operating," to ensure no single failure prevents the operators from being presented with the information necessary to determine the status of the unit and to bring the unit to, and maintain it in, a safe condition following that accident. A minimum of two channels allows a CHANNEL CHECK during the post accident phase to confirm the validity of displayed information.

[Listed below is a discussion of the specified Type A instrument Functions listed in Reference 2, and applicable to the accompanying LCO.]

APPLICABILITY

The PAM Instrumentation LCO is applicable in MODES 1 and 2. These Type A variables are related to the diagnosis and preplanned actions required to mitigate Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). The applicable DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1 and 2. In MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, plant conditions are such that the likelihood of an event that would require PAM instrumentation is extremely low; therefore, PAM instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTIONS

A Note has been added to the ACTIONS Table. This Note modifies the ACTIONS related to PAM instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable PAM instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate Functions. As such, the Note allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable Type A PAM Function.

A.1

When one or more required Type A PAM Functions have one required channel that is inoperable, the required inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE channel, the passive nature of the

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval.

B.1

When one or more required Type A PAM Functions have two required channels inoperable, (i.e., two required channels inoperable in the same Function) one required channel in the Function must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. Continuous operation with two required channels inoperable in a Function is not acceptable because the alternate indications may not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of one inoperable channel of the Function limits the risk that the PAM function will be in a degraded condition should an accident occur.

C.1

This Required Action specifies initiating actions of Specification 5.6.5, "Post Accident Monitoring Report," which ensures appropriate corrective measures are taken when Type A PAM Instrumentation Functions are inoperable for extended time periods. Specification 5.6.5 requires a written report to be submitted to the NRC. This report discusses the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.3.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that a gross instrumentation failure has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two required instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus,

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including isolation, indication, and readability. If a required channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal-processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected channel failure is limited to 31 days.

The Frequency of 31 days is based upon plant operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one required channel of a given function in any 31 day interval is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of those displays associated with the required channels of this LCO.

SR 3.3.3.1.2

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed at every 24 months for each required channel. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycles.

REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.97, “Instrumentation for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident,” Revision 4, June 2006.

2. Section 7.5.

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Remote Shutdown System provides instrumentation and controls outside the main control room to allow prompt hot shutdown of the reactor and to maintain safe conditions during hot shutdown, which can be accomplished from either one of two remote shutdown panels. This capability is necessary to protect against the possibility of the control room becoming inaccessible. It also provides capability for subsequent cold shutdown of the reactor through the use of suitable procedures.

The operational functions needed for remote shutdown control of a system are provided on the remote shutdown panels. All parameters that can be displayed/controlled from Division 1 and Division 2 in the Main Control Room, and that are necessary to follow the status of the reactor plant, are also displayed/controlled from the corresponding divisional remote shutdown panel. The individual system equipment and instrumentation that interface with the Remote Shutdown System are listed on Table 7.4-1 (Ref. 2). The two remote shutdown panels are located in two different areas and different rooms inside the Reactor Building.

The Remote Shutdown System provides sufficient redundancy in the control and monitoring capability to accommodate a single failure in the interfacing systems and the Remote Shutdown System controls, in addition to the single-failure event that caused the control room evacuation. The Remote Shutdown System is designed to prevent degrading the capability of the interfacing systems.

Normally, the turbine bypass valves automatically control reactor pressure, and the reactor feedwater system automatically maintains vessel water level. With these functions available, reactor cooldown is achieved through the normal heat sinks. This cooldown process can be supplemented from the remote shutdown panel using the Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling (RWCU/SDC) System. The RWCU/SDC System provides the capability to bring the reactor from high pressure conditions to cold shutdown. Control of both RWCU/SDC trains is provided on the remote shutdown panel. The Reactor Closed Cooling Water (RCCW) System is aligned to provide cooling water to the RWCU/SDC non-regenerative heat exchangers, and the Plant Service Water (PSW) System is aligned to cool the RCCW heat exchangers. Control of two RCCW trains and two PSW trains is provided on the remote shutdown panel.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

If the reactor feedwater system is not available, control of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System is provided on the remote shutdown panels. Control of the high-pressure makeup injection capability of the CRD System ensures that the vessel water level remains above the Automatic Depressurization System trip setpoint and above the elevation of the RWCU/SDC mid-vessel suction line nozzle. Control of both CRD trains is provided on the remote shutdown panels. If main steam line isolation occurs, the Isolation Condenser System (ICS) automatically controls reactor pressure. Because the logic processing equipment for the ICS (or any other safety or nonsafety-related system) is not located within the Reactor Building or Control Building, but outside the Main Control Room, ICS operation is not affected by an event necessitating control room evacuation, and continued operation of the isolation condensers is assumed. If the event necessitating control room evacuation results in a loss of the pressure regulator, but does not cause main steam line isolation, the ICS would initiate on high pressure. With the ICS in operation, the isolation condensers provide initial decay heat removal, and further reactor cooldown is achieved from the remote shutdown panels using the RWCU/SDC.

In the event that the control room becomes inaccessible, the operators can establish control at either remote shutdown panel and place and maintain the plant in MODE 3. The plant automatically reaches MODE 3 following a plant shutdown and can be maintained safely in MODE 3 for an extended period of time.

The OPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown System control and instrumentation Functions ensures that there is sufficient information available on selected plant parameters to place and maintain the plant in MODE 3, from either one of two remote shutdown panels, should the control room become inaccessible.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The Remote Shutdown System is required to provide equipment at appropriate locations outside the control room with a design capability to promptly shut down the reactor to MODE 3, including the necessary instrumentation and controls, to maintain the plant in a safe condition in MODE 3.

The criteria governing the design and the specific system requirements of the Remote Shutdown System are located in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19 (Ref. 1).

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The Remote Shutdown System satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The Remote Shutdown System LCO provides the requirements for the OPERABILITY of the instrumentation and controls necessary to place and maintain the plant in MODE 3 from a location other than the control room. The instrumentation and controls required are listed in Table 7.4-1 (Ref. 2).

The controls and instrumentation are those required for:

- Decay heat removal;
- Reactor pressure vessel inventory control; and
- Safety support systems for the above functions.

The Remote Shutdown System is OPERABLE if all instrument and control channels associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems – Operating," needed to support the remote shutdown function are OPERABLE for one of the two remote shutdown panels.

This LCO is intended to ensure that the instruments and control circuits will be OPERABLE if plant conditions require that the Remote Shutdown System be placed in operation.

APPLICABILITY

The Remote Shutdown System LCO is applicable in MODES 1 and 2. This is required so that the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 for an extended period of time from a location other than the control room.

This LCO is not applicable in MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6. In these MODES, the plant is already subcritical and in a condition of reduced Reactor Coolant System energy. Under these conditions, considerable time is available to restore necessary instrument control Functions if control room instruments or control becomes unavailable. Consequently, TS do not require OPERABILITY in MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6.

BASES

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 has been provided to permit the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.c. This allowance permits entry into the applicable MODE(S) while relying on the ACTIONS. This allowance is acceptable since the Remote Shutdown System does not directly impact the operation of the plant and due to the low probability of utilizing the Remote Shutdown System.

A second Note (Note 2) has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to Remote Shutdown System Functions. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable Remote Shutdown System Functions provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate Functions. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable Remote Shutdown System Function.

A.1

Condition A addresses the situation where one or more required Functions is inoperable. This includes the controls for any required Function.

The Required Action is to restore the required Function to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The Completion Time is based on operating experience and the low probability of an event that would require evacuation of the control room.

B.1

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.3.2.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. As specified in the Surveillance, a CHANNEL CHECK is only required for those required channels that are normally energized.

The Frequency is based upon plant operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare.

SR 3.3.3.2.2

SR 3.3.3.2.2 verifies each required Remote Shutdown System control circuit performs the intended function. This verification is performed from the remote shutdown panel and locally, as appropriate. Operation of the equipment from the remote shutdown panel is not necessary. The Surveillance can be satisfied by performance of a continuity check. This will ensure that if the control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 from the remote shutdown panel and the local control stations. However, this Surveillance is not required to be performed only during a plant outage. Operating experience demonstrates that Remote Shutdown System control channels usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.3.2.3

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. The test verifies the required channel responds to measured parameter values with the necessary range and accuracy.

The 24 month Frequency is based upon operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.

2. Table 7.4-1.

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.4.1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage Detection Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

GDC 30 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A (Ref. 1), requires means for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of RCS LEAKAGE. Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Ref. 2) describes acceptable methods for selecting leakage detection systems.

Limits on LEAKAGE from the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) are required so that appropriate action can be taken before the integrity of the RCPB is impaired (Ref. 2). Leakage detection systems for the RCS are provided to alert the operators when leakage rates above normal background levels are detected and also to supply quantitative measurement of rates. The Bases for LCO 3.4.2, "RCS Operational LEAKAGE," discuss the limits on RCS LEAKAGE rates.

Systems for separating the LEAKAGE of an identified source from an unidentified source are necessary to provide prompt and quantitative information to the operators to permit them to take immediate corrective action.

LEAKAGE from the RCPB inside the drywell is detected by the drywell floor drain high conductivity water (HCW) sump monitoring system, the drywell air cooler condensate flow monitoring, and the particulate channel of the drywell fission product monitoring system. The primary means of quantifying LEAKAGE in the drywell is the HCW sump monitoring system.

The drywell floor drain HCW sump collects unidentified leakage from such sources as floor drains, valve flanges, closed component cooling water for reactor equipment, condensate from the drywell air coolers and from any leakage not connected to the drywell equipment drain sump. The sump is equipped with two pumps and special monitoring instrumentation that measures the pump's operating frequency, the sump level and flow rates. These measurements are provided on a continuous basis to the main control room. The sump instrumentation is designed to detect reactor coolant leakage of 3.8 liters/min (1.0 gpm) within one hour and alarm at flow rates in excess of 19 liters/min (5 gpm).

The condensate flow rate from the drywell air coolers is monitored for high drain flow, which could be indicative of leaks from piping or the equipment within the drywell. This flow is monitored by one instrumented channel using a bucket type flow transmitter located in the drywell. The

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

flow measurement is provided to the main control room on a continuous basis for recording and alarming.

Primary coolant leaks and radioactivity within the drywell are detected through sampling and monitoring of the drywell atmosphere by the Process Radiation Monitoring System (PRMS). The fission product monitor samples for radioactive particulates. The radiation levels are recorded in the main control room and alarmed on abnormally high concentration levels.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

A threat of significant compromise to the RCPB exists if the barrier contains a crack that is large enough to propagate rapidly. LEAKAGE rate limits are set low enough to detect the LEAKAGE emitted from a single crack in the RCPB (Ref. 3). Each of the leakage detection systems inside the drywell is designed with the capability of detecting LEAKAGE less than the established LEAKAGE rate limits and providing appropriate alarm of excess LEAKAGE in the control room.

A control room alarm allows the operators to evaluate the significance of the indicated LEAKAGE and, if necessary, shut down the reactor for further investigation and corrective action. The allowed LEAKAGE rates are well below the rates predicted for critical crack sizes (Ref. 3). Therefore, these actions provide adequate response before a significant break in the RCPB can occur.

RCS leakage detection instrumentation satisfies Criterion 1 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The drywell floor drain HCW sump monitoring system is required to quantify the unidentified LEAKAGE from the RCS. Thus, for the system to be considered OPERABLE, either the flow monitoring or the sump level monitoring portion of the system must be OPERABLE. The other monitoring systems provide early alarms to the operators so closer examination of other detection systems will be made to determine the extent of any corrective action that may be required. With the leakage detection systems inoperable, monitoring for LEAKAGE in the RCPB is degraded.

BASES

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, leakage detection systems are required to be OPERABLE to support LCO 3.4.2. This Applicability is consistent with that for LCO 3.4.2.

ACTIONS

A.1

With the drywell floor drain HCW sump monitoring system inoperable, no other form of sampling can provide the equivalent information to quantify leakage. However, the drywell air cooler condensate flow monitoring and the drywell fission product monitoring system will provide indications of changes in leakage. With the drywell floor drain HCW sump monitoring system inoperable, but with RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE being determined every 12 hours (SR 3.4.2.1), operation may continue for 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time of Required Action A.1 is acceptable, based on operating experience, considering the multiple forms of leakage detection that are still available.

B.1

With the drywell fission product monitoring system particulate channel inoperable, grab samples of the drywell atmosphere shall be taken and analyzed to provide periodic leakage information. Provided a sample is obtained and analyzed every 12 hours, the plant may continue operation since at least one other form of drywell leakage detection (i.e., air cooler condensate flow rate monitor) is available. The 12 hour interval provides periodic information that is adequate to detect LEAKAGE.

C.1

With the drywell air cooler condensate flow rate monitoring system inoperable, SR 3.3.4.1.1 is performed every 8 hours to provide periodic information of activity in the drywell at a more frequent interval than the routine Frequency of SR 3.3.4.1-1. The 8 hour interval provides periodic information that is adequate to detect LEAKAGE and recognizes that other forms of leakage detection are available. However, this Required Action is modified by a Note that allows this action to be not applicable if the drywell fission product monitoring system particulate channel is inoperable. Consistent with SR 3.0.1, Surveillances are not required to be performed on inoperable equipment.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1 and D.2

With both the drywell fission product monitoring system particulate channel and the drywell air cooler condensate flow rate monitor inoperable, the only means of detecting LEAKAGE is the drywell floor drain HCW sump monitoring system. This Condition does not provide the required diverse means of leakage detection. The Required Action is to restore either of the inoperable monitors to OPERABLE status within 30 days to regain the intended leakage detection diversity. The 30 day Completion Time ensures that the plant will not be operated in a degraded configuration for a lengthy time period.

E.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D cannot be met or if all required monitors are inoperable the plant must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 5 is followed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.4.1

This SR requires the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK of the drywell fission product monitoring system particulate channel. The check gives reasonable confidence that the channel is operating properly. The Frequency of 12 hours is based on instrument reliability and is reasonable for detecting off normal conditions.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.4.2

This SR requires the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the required RCS leakage detection instrumentation. The test ensures that the monitors can perform their function in the desired manner. The test also verifies the alarm setpoint and relative accuracy of the instrument string. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Frequency of 31 days considers instrument reliability, and operating experience has shown it proper for detecting degradation.

SR 3.3.4.3

This SR requires the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the required RCS leakage detection instrumentation channels. The calibration verifies the accuracy of the instrument string, including the instruments located inside the drywell. The Frequency of 24 months is a typical refueling cycle and considers channel reliability. Operating experience has proven this Frequency is acceptable.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 30.

2. Regulatory Guide 1.45, May 1973.

3. Section 5.2.5.

4. {NEDO-33201, “ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment.”}

5. TSTF-IG-05-02, "Implementation Guidance for TSTF-423, Revision {1}, 'Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A,'" {2007}.

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the ECCS instrumentation is to initiate appropriate responses from the ECCS to ensure that fuel is adequately cooled in the event of an anticipated operational occurrence or accident.

The ECCS instrumentation actuates the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), the Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS), and Standby Liquid Control (SLC). The equipment involved with ADS is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, “ADS - Operating.” The equipment involved with GDCS is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.2, “GDCS - Operating.” The equipment involved with SLC is described in the Bases for LCO 3.1.7, “Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System.”

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain limiting safety system settings (LSSS) defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions." Where LSSS is specified for a variable on which a Safety Limit (SL) has been placed, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a SL is exceeded. The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. Where LSSS is specified for a variable having a significant safety function but which does not protect SLs, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. The Design Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that these automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. These limits (i.e., Analytical Limit and Design Limit) constitute the Setting Basis specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

The actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical / Design Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur. The methodology for determining the actual settings, and the required tolerances to maintain these settings conservative to the Analytical / Design Limits, including the requirements for determining that the channel is OPERABLE, are defined in the Setpoint Control Program (SCP), in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, Setpoint Control Program (SCP)."

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical / Design Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded (i.e., for Analytical Limits), or that automatic protective actions occur consistent with the design basis (i.e., for Design Limits). As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors that may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded and that automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. As such, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS.

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." For automatic protective devices, the required safety function is to ensure that a SL is not exceeded and that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. Therefore, the NTSP is the LSSS as defined by 10 CFR 50.36. However, use of the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protective device setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule that are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded or that automatic protective actions would initiate consistent with the design basis with the "as-found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the NTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Use of the NTSP to define "as-found" OPERABILITY under the expected circumstances described above would result in actions required by both the rule and Technical Specifications that are clearly not warranted. However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This value is specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11, in order to define OPERABILITY of the devices and is designated as the Allowable Value which is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The actual NTSP values and Allowable Values (derived from the Setting Basis specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1) and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances will be maintained in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11.

The Allowable Valuable is the least conservative value that the setpoint of the channel can have when tested such that a channel is OPERABLE if the setpoint is found conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Note that, although a channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the established "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned in the setpoint calculation. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount equal to or greater than the "as-found" tolerance value. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will ensure that a SL is not exceeded or that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value the device would be considered inoperable from a Technical Specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.

As described in Reference 1, the Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) System controls the initiation signals and logic for ECCS. SSLC is a four-division, separated protection logic system designed to provide a very high degree of assurance to both ensure ECCS initiation when required and prevent inadvertent initiation.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

ECCS initiating instrumentation must respond to a LOCA regardless of the location of the breach in the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Reactor vessel low water level is used to initiate ECCS because water level is the only parameter completely independent of breach location.

ECCS actuates in response to a Reactor Vessel Level - Low, Level 1.0 signal.

On receipt of the ECCS trip signal and after a 10 second confirmation time delay, the ECCS actuation logic will seal in and issue an initial start signal. The initial start signal triggers the following sequence of events:

1. Both SLC trains actuate after a time delay of 50 seconds on the first DPV (third ADS timer) injection signal.

2. Five of the ten ADS SRVs open immediately to start reducing reactor pressure on the first ADS timer injection signal. The remaining five ADS SRVs open after a 10-second time delay on the second ADS timer injection signal.

3. The eight DPVs, which are divided into four groups (group 1 consists of three DPVs, groups 2 and 3 consists of two DPVs each, and group 4 consists of one DPV) open in the following sequence: The first group opens after a 50 second time delay on the first DPV (third ADS timer) injection signal. An additional DPV group opens every 50 seconds on the second through fourth DPV (fourth through sixth ADS timer) injection signals until all of the DPVs are open.

4. All eight squib-actuated valves in the GDCS injection secondary lines open after a 150 second time delay.

5. All four squib-actuated valves in the GDCS equalizing lines, which connect the suppression pool to the RPV, actuate after a 30-minute time delay if the RPV water level is below Level 0.5.

The input trip determinations for all ECCS functions are based upon two-out-of-four logic. The output trip determinations for all ECCS functions are based on a two-out-of-two confirmation logic.

Four separate multiplexed instrument channels are used to monitor RPV water level for ECCS. Four separate wide range RPV water level transmitters and four separate fuel zone water level transmitters are

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

utilized to provide input signals for ECCS logic. Signals from the wide range and fuel zone transmitters are multiplexed at the divisional level and the sensor data is then transmitted to the SSLC/ESF digital trip module (DTM) function for setpoint comparison. The DTM functions make a trip/no-trip decision by comparing a digitized analog value against a setpoint and initiating a trip condition for that variable if the setpoint is exceeded. The output of each divisional DTM function (a trip/no-trip condition) is routed to all four divisional voter logic unit (VLU) functions such that each divisional VLU function receives input from each of the four divisions of DTMs.

For maintenance purposes and added reliability, each DTM has a division of sensors bypass such that all instruments in that division will be bypassed in the trip logic at the VLU functions. Thus, each VLU function will be making its trip decision on a two-out-of-three logic basis for each variable. It is possible for only one division of sensors bypass condition to be in effect at any time.

The processed trip signal from its own division and trip signals from the other three divisions are processed in the divisional VLU function for 2-out-of-4 voting. There are two independent and redundant VLU functional channels in each division of the SSLC/ESF equipment. The vote logic trip signals from both VLU functional channels are transmitted to the remote multiplexing unit (RMU) function of the division, where a 2-out-of-2 confirmation is performed. The redundant channels within a division are necessary to prevent single failures within a division from causing a squib initiator to fire; as a result both VLU logics are required to operate to get an output. If the trip signals from each of the two VLU functions are confirmed by the RMU function, a signal is sent to the mechanical actuation devices. Trip signals are hardwired from the RMU to the equipment actuator.

For the ESF logic in the SSLC, since there is the division of sensor bypass implemented, and there are two channels of 2-out-of-4 VLU logic, no additional division trip logic bypass is implemented in the ESF logic. Each of the two VLU trip outputs is directly applied to one of the two load drivers in series. Both VLU trips are required to prevent inadvertent trip initiation of the squib valves. It is undesirable to perform the VLU logic bypass activities with the RMU electrically connected to the valve. The keylock switch that bypasses (disables) the load driver actuation provides effective bypass function required at the actuator level.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The load driver arrangement for actuation of an ADS SRV, DPV squib valve, GDCS secondary branch line squib valve, and suppression pool equalizer line squib valve are given in Reference 1.

Equipment within a single division is powered from the safety-related power source of the same division.

This Specification provides the OPERABILITY requirements for the ECCS instrumentation from the input variable sensors through the DTM function. Operability requirements for the ECCS actuation circuitry consisting of timers, VLUs, and load drivers are provided by LCO 3.3.5.2, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Actuation." Operability requirements for actuated components (i.e., squibs and solenoid valves) are addressed in LCO 3.1.7, LCO 3.5.1, and LCO 3.5.2, as appropriate.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

The actions of the ECCS are explicitly assumed in the safety analyses of Reference 2 and 3. The ECCS is initiated to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding by limiting the post-LOCA peak cladding temperature to less than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits.

ECCS Instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The OPERABILITY of the ECCS instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1. An ECCS instrumentation channel constitutes all of the components within a division of channel sensors. Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels, with setpoints in accordance with the SCP, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with the SCP. Each ECCS subsystem must also respond within its assumed response time. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is non-conservative with respect to its required Allowable Value.

The Setting Basis, from which the NTSPs and Allowable Values are derived is specified for each ECCS Function, where appropriate, in Table 3.3.5.1-1. NTSPs and Allowable Values are specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11. The NTSPs are selected to ensure the actual setpoints are conservative with respect to the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operations with a trip setpoint less conservative than the NTSP, but more conservative with respect to its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

its actual trip setpoint is non-conservative with respect to its required Allowable Value.

NTSPs are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., DTM) changes state. For those LSSS related to variables protecting the SLs, the Analytical Limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. For those LSSS related to variables having significant safety functions but which do not protect SLs, the Design Limits are those settings that must initiate automatic protective actions consistent with the design basis. The Allowable Values are derived from the Analytical / Design Limits, corrected for calibration, and some of the instrument errors. The NTSPs are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions that may require ECCS initiation to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident or transient.

Although there are four channels of ECCS instrumentation for each function, only three ECCS instrumentation channels for each function are required to be OPERABLE. The three required channels are those channels associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems - Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is met with three OPERABLE ECCS instrumentation channels, and because each ECCS instrumentation division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO and Applicability discussions for the functions in Table 3.3.5.1-1 are listed below:

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 is the primary signal for the initiation of the ECCS for a steam line break outside containment because fuel damage could result if RPV water level is too low. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS, GDCS, and SLC during the accidents analyzed in References 2 and 3. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, assures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Three channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. The Level 1 signal is initiated from four wide range level sensors and transmitters.

2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 0.5

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 0.5 signal is used in the ECCS logic as a permissive for actuation of the GDCS suppression equalizing lines valves, after a 30-minute time delay from the ECCS initial start signal. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 0.5 is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the GDCS suppression pool equalizer line valves following boil-off of reactor pressure vessel inventory during the accidents analyzed in References 2 and 3. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, assures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Level 0.5 is defined as 1 meter above the TAF.

Three channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 0.5 Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude GDCS initiation. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 0.5 signals are initiated from four fuel zone level transmitters.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to ECCS instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable ECCS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable ECCS instrumentation channel.

A.1

With one or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, one instrumentation channel must be restored to OPERABLE status, such that three required channels are OPERABLE. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

Alternately, if it is not desired to restore the instrumentation channel to OPERABLE status, Condition C would be entered and its Required Action taken when the Completion Time of Required Action A.1 expires.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels (i.e., two or more required channels for most Functions) for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining ECCS actuation capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining ECCS actuation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that the ECCS logic will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

C.1

With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the associated feature(s) may be incapable of performing the intended function and the supported feature(s) associated with the inoperable channels must be declared inoperable immediately.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

As noted at the beginning of the SRs, The SRs for each ECCS instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.1-1.

SR 3.3.5.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 24 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. Performance of this check provides confidence that a gross failure of a device in a sensor channel has not occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one required channel to a similar parameter on other required channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. {Because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a CHANNEL CHECK of all instrument channels, and because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL CHECK may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK every 24 hours supplements less formal, but more frequent checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.1.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended function. {Because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a functional test of all instrument channels, and because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Any setpoint adjustments shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant-specific setpoint methodology as required by the SCP.

The Frequency of 184 days is based on the reliability of the RPS instrumentation channels and the self monitoring capability of the RPS System.

SR 3.3.5.1.3

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the required channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the required channel adjusted to the NTSP within the "leave alone" tolerance to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the SCP.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

For selected Functions, the SCP provides additional requirements for the evaluation of the performance of required channels. The selected Functions are those Functions whose instruments are not totally mechanical devices. Mechanical devices (e.g., devices which have an "on" or "off" output or an open/close position such as limit switches, float switches, and proximity detectors) are not calibrated in the traditional sense and do not have as-left or as-found conditions that would indicate drift of the component setpoint. These devices are considered not trendable and the requirements of TS 5.5.11.c.1 and TS 5.5.11.c.2 are not applicable to these mechanical components. Where a non-trendable component provides signal input to other channel components that can be trended, the remaining components must be evaluated in accordance with the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.1 evaluation of channel performance is required for the condition where the "as-found" setting for the channel is outside its "as-found" tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. For digital channel components, the "as-found" tolerance may be identical to the "leave alone" tolerance because drift may not be an expected error. In these cases, a channel "as-found" value outside the "leave alone" tolerance may be cause for component assessment. Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

instrument will continue to behave in accordance with design-basis assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for OPERABILITY. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the Allowable Values and the methodology for calculating the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.2, the as-left setting for the instrument is required to be returned to within the "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in plant surveillance procedures, the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Analytical / Design Limit is maintained. If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the "leave alone" tolerance, then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the NTSP and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP.

SR 3.3.5.1.4

This SR ensures that the individual required channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The ECCS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 5.

ECCS RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.5.2.2 to ensure complete testing of instrument channels and actuation circuitry. However, the measurement of instrument loop response times may be excluded if the conditions of Reference 6 are satisfied.

ECCS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four channels. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that the channels associated with each division are alternately tested.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The 24 month test Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 7.
2. Chapter 15.
3. Chapter 6.
4. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}
5. {Reference for ECCS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria to be entered}
6. {NEDO-32291-A, "System Analyses For the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.5.2 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) ACTUATION

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the ECCS actuation logic is to initiate appropriate responses from the ECCS to ensure that fuel is adequately cooled in the event of a design basis event.

The ECCS logic actuates the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), the Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS), the Isolation Condenser System, and Standby Liquid Control (SLC). The equipment involved with ADS is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, “ADS - Operating.” The equipment involved with GDCS is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.2, “Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS) - Operating.” The equipment involved with SLC is described in the Bases for LCO 3.1.7, “Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System.”

A detailed description of the ECCS instrumentation and ECCS actuation logic is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.3.5.1, “Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation.”

This specification addresses OPERABILITY of the ECCS actuation circuitry from the outputs of the Digital Trip Modules (DTMs) through the load drivers (LDs) that consists of voter logic units (VLUs), the timers, and the LDs associated with the ADS safety relief valves (SRVs), the ADS depressurization valves (DPVs), the GDCS injection valves, the GDCS equalizing line valves, and the SLC squib-actuated valves. Operability requirements associated with the ECCS instrumentation channels are provided in LCO 3.3.5.1. Operability requirements for actuated components (i.e., squibs and solenoid valves) are addressed in LCO 3.1.7, LCO 3.5.1, and LCO 3.5.2, as appropriate.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO and APPLICABILITY

The actions of the ECCS are explicitly assumed in the safety analyses of Reference 1 and 2. The ECCS is initiated to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding by limiting the post-LOCA peak cladding temperature to less than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits.

ECCS Actuation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

ECCS actuation supports OPERABILITY of the ECCS Instrumentation, “LCO 3.3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation” and therefore is required to be OPERABLE. This Specification addresses

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

OPERABILITY of the ECCS actuation circuitry from the outputs of the DTMs through the LDs that consists of the VLUs the timers, and the LDs associated with the ADS safety relief valves (SRVs), the ADS depressurization valves (DPVs), the GDCS injection valves, the GDCS equalizing line valves, and the SLC squib-actuated valves.

Although there are four divisions of ECCS actuation for each function, only three ECCS actuation divisions for each function are required to be OPERABLE. The three required divisions are those divisions associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems - Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is met with three OPERABLE ECCS actuation divisions, and because each ECCS actuation division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

1. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)

The ADS actuation divisions receive input from the Reactor Vessel Level - Low, Level 1.0. ADS actuation is required to be OPERABLE in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, consistent with the requirements of LCO 3.5.1, “Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) - Operating.” Three actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single actuation failure can preclude the actuation function.

2. Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS) Injection Lines

The GDCS injection line actuation divisions receive input from the Reactor Vessel Level - Low, Level 1.0. GDCS injection line actuation is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, consistent with the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, “Gravity Driven-Driven Cooling System (GDCS) - Operating.” GDCS injection line actuation is required to be OPERABLE in Modes 5 and 6, except with the new fuel pool gate removed and water level ≥ 7.01 meters (23 feet) over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange, consistent with the requirements of LCO 3.5.3, “ECCS - Shutdown.” Three actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single actuation failure can preclude the actuation function.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

3. GDCS Equalizing Lines

The GDCS equalizing line actuation divisions receive input from the following instrumentation: Reactor Vessel Level - Low, Level 1.0 and Reactor Vessel Level - Low, Level 0.5. GDCS equalizing line actuation is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, consistent with the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, "Gravity Driven-Driven Cooling System (GDCS) - Operating." Three actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single actuation failure can preclude that actuation function.

4. Standby Liquid Control (SLC)

The SLC actuation divisions receive inputs from the Reactor Vessel Level - Low, Level 1.0. SLC actuation is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, consistent with the requirements of LCO 3.1.7, "Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System." Three actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single actuation failure can preclude that actuation function.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to ECCS divisions of actuation logic. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable ECCS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable division of ECCS actuation logic.

A.1

Condition A exists when one required ECCS actuation division is inoperable. In this Condition, ECCS actuation still maintains actuation trip capability, but cannot accommodate a single failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Alternately, if it is not desired to restore the required actuation division to OPERABLE status, Condition C would be entered and its Required Action taken when the Completion Time of Required Action A.1 expires.

B.1

Condition B exists when two or more required actuation divisions are inoperable. In this Condition, a loss of ECCS actuation capability occurs to numerous ECCS components. ECCS automatic actuation capability is considered to be maintained when sufficient actuation divisions are OPERABLE or in trip such that the ECCS logic will generate an actuation signal on a valid signal. Required Action B.1 limits the time the loss of ECCS actuation capability exists. Therefore, ECCS actuation capability must be restored to OPERABLE within one hour.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

C.1

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition A or B are not met, the associated ECCS components must be declared inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.5.2.1

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required ECCS logic for a specific channel. {Because the Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including portions of a LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, portions of the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four divisions. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that each division is alternately tested.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.5.2.2

This SR ensures that the individual required division response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The ECCS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 4.

ECCS RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total division measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.5.1.4 to ensure complete testing of instrument channels and actuation circuitry.

ECCS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four divisions. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that each division is alternately tested.

The 24 month test Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 15.

2. Chapter 6.

3. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

4. {Reference for ECCS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria.}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.5.3 Isolation Condenser System (ICS) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the ICS instrumentation is to initiate appropriate actions to ensure ICS operates following a reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation after a scram to provide adequate RPV pressure reduction to preclude safety relief valve operation, conserve RPV water level to avoid automatic depressurization caused by low water level. In addition, in the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the ICS instrumentation ensures the system operates to provide liquid inventory to the RPV. The equipment involved with ICS is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.4, “Isolation Condenser System (ICS) - Operating.”

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain limiting safety system settings (LSSS) defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions." Where LSSS is specified for a variable on which a Safety Limit (SL) has been placed, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a SL is exceeded. The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. Where LSSS is specified for a variable having a significant safety function but which does not protect SLs, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. The Design Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that these automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. These limits (i.e., Analytical Limit and Design Limit) constitute the Setting Basis specified in Table 3.3.5.3-1.

The actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical / Design Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur. The methodology for determining the actual settings, and the required tolerances to maintain these settings conservative to the Analytical / Design Limits, including the requirements for determining that the channel is OPERABLE, are defined in the Setpoint Control Program (SCP), in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, "Setpoint Control Program (SCP)."

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical / Design Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded (i.e., for Analytical Limits), or that automatic protective actions occur consistent with the design basis (i.e., for Design Limits). As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors that may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded and that automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. As such, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS.

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." For automatic protective devices, the required safety function is to ensure that a SL is not exceeded and that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. Therefore, the NTSP is the LSSS as defined by 10 CFR 50.36. However, use of the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protective device setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule that are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded or that automatic protective actions would initiate consistent with the design basis with the "as-found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the NTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Use of the NTSP to define "as-found" OPERABILITY under the expected circumstances described above would result in actions required by both the rule and Technical Specifications that are clearly not warranted. However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This value is specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11, in order to define OPERABILITY of the devices and is designated as the Allowable Value which is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The actual NTSP values and Allowable Values (derived from the Analytical / Design Limits specified in Table 3.3.5.3-1) and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances will be maintained in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11.

The Allowable Valuable is the least conservative value that the setpoint of the channel can have when tested such that a channel is OPERABLE if the setpoint is found conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Note that, although a channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the established "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned in the setpoint calculation. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount equal to or greater than the "as-found" tolerance value. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will ensure that a SL is not exceeded or that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value the device would be considered inoperable from a Technical Specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.

The ICS can be automatically or manually initiated. The ICS actuates automatically in response to signals from any of the following:

1. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High for 10 seconds;
2. RPV low water level (Level 2), with time delay;
3. RPV low low water level (Level 1);

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

4. Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure of two or more MSIVs and a MSIV in another Main Steamline (MSL) with the reactor mode switch in the run position; or
5. Loss of power generation busses.

The Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) System controls the initiation signals and logic for ICS. SSLC is a four division, separated protection logic system designed to provide a very high degree of assurance to both ensure ICS initiation when required and prevent inadvertent initiation. The input and output trip determinations for all ICS functions are based upon a two-out-of-four logic arrangement.

Four separate instrument channels are used to monitor ICS initiation parameters. Signals from sensors are multiplexed at the divisional level and the sensor data is then transmitted to the SSLC/ESF digital trip module (DTM) function for setpoint comparison. The output of each divisional DTM function (a trip/no-trip condition) is routed to all four divisional voter logic unit (VLU) functions such that each divisional VLU function receives input from each of the four divisions of DTMs.

For maintenance purposes and added reliability, each DTM has a division of sensors bypass such that all instruments in that division will be bypassed in the trip logic at the VLU functions. Thus, each VLU function will be making its trip decision on a two-out-of-three logic basis for each variable. It is possible for only one division of sensors bypass condition to be in effect at any time.

The processed trip signal from its own division and trip signals from the other three divisions are processed in the voter logic unit function (VLU) for 2-out-of-4 voting. The final trip signal is then transmitted to the Remote Multiplexing Unit (RMU) to initiate mechanical actuation devices. There are two independent and redundant VLU functional channels in each division of the SSLC/ESF equipment. The vote logic trip signals from both VLU functional channels are transmitted to the RMUs, where a 2-out-of-2 confirmation is performed to initiate the ECCS actuation signals. The redundant channels within a division are necessary to prevent single failures within a division from causing a squib initiator to fire; as a result both VLU logics are required to operate to get an output.

For the ESF logic in the SSLC, since there is the division of sensor bypass implemented, and there are two channels of 2-out-of-4 VLU logic, no additional division trip logic bypass is implemented in the ESF logic. Each of the two VLU trip outputs is directly applied to one of the two load

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

drivers in series. Both VLU trips are required to prevent inadvertent actuation of the ECCS. It is undesirable to perform the VLU logic bypass activities with the RMU electrically connected to the valve. The keylock switch that bypasses (disables) the load driver actuation provides effective bypass function required at the actuator level.

The load driver arrangement for actuation of the ICS Condensate Return Valves are such that an actuation signal from two divisions of ICS actuation logic are required to actuate a condensate return flow path.

Equipment within a single division is powered from the safety-related power source of the same division.

This Specification provides Operability requirements for the ICS instrumentation from the input variable sensors through the DTM function. Operability requirements for the ICS actuation circuitry consisting of timers, VLUs, and load drivers are provided by LCO 3.3.5.4, " Isolation Condenser System (ICS) Actuation." Operability requirements for the actuated components are addressed in LCO 3.5.4.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO and APPLICABILITY

The actions of the ICS are explicitly assumed in the safety analyses of Reference 1. The ICS is initiated to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding by limiting the post-LOCA peak cladding temperature to less than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits. Actuation of the ICS precludes actuation of safety relief valves and limits the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Section III Code limits.

The ICS Instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

The OPERABILITY of the ICS is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.3-1. Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints in accordance with the SCP, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with the SCP. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time.

The Setting Basis, from which the NTSPs and Allowable Values are derived are specified for each ICS Function, where appropriate, in Table 3.3.5.3-1. NTSPs and Allowable Values are specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11. The NTSPs are selected to ensure the actual setpoints are conservative with respect to the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

setpoint less conservative than the NTSP, but conservative with respect to its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is non-conservative with respect to its required Allowable Value.

NTSPs are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., digital trip module) changes state. For those LSSS related to variable protecting SLs, the Analytical Limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. For those LSSS related to variables having significant safety functions but which do not protect SLs, the Design Limits are those settings that must initiate automatic protective actions consistent with the design basis. The Allowable Values are derived from the Analytical / Design Limits, corrected for calibration, process and some of the instrument errors. The NTSPs are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES specified in the Table which may require an ICS actuation to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident or transient.

Although there are four channels of ICS instrumentation for each function, only three ICS instrumentation channels for each function are required to be OPERABLE. The three required channels are those channels associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems - Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is met with three OPERABLE ICS instrumentation channels, and because each ICS instrumentation division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function-by-Function basis.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

1. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High

An increase in the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure during reactor operation compresses the steam voids and results in a positive reactivity insertion. This causes the neutron flux and thermal power transferred to the reactor coolant to increase, which could challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding and the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary. Therefore, Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High Function existing for 10 seconds initiates an ICS actuation for transients that result in a pressure increase. Actuation of the ICS provides RPV pressure reduction to preclude safety relief valve operation.

High reactor pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense reactor pressure. The Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High Analytical / Design Limit provides a sufficient margin to the ASME Section III Code limits during the event.

Three channels of Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude ICS actuation.

The Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and MODES 3 and 4 when < 2 hours since the reactor was critical.

2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2

Low reactor vessel water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should reactor vessel water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, an ICS actuation is initiated at Level 2, with a 30-second time delay to provide a source of core cooling. The time delay provides an allowance for temporary transients that may reduce RPV level below the Level 2 setpoint. This Function is assumed to be available to support the transient and design basis analyses (Ref. 1).

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2, signals are initiated from four wide range level transmitters.

Three channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level Low, Level 2, Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will prevent ICS actuation from this Function on a valid signal.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

3. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1

Low Reactor Vessel Water Level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, ICS receives the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of actuating the ICS during the accidents analyzed in Reference 1. The core cooling function of the ICS along with the ECCS and the scram action of the RPS, assures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four wide range level transmitters.

Three channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 Function are required to be OPERABLE when ICS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ICS actuation, when required.

The Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

4. Main Steam Isolation Valve - Closure

Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure results in loss of the main turbine and the condenser as a heat sink for the nuclear steam supply system and indicates a need to isolate the reactor to reduce excessive steam line flow or leakage outside the containment. Therefore, an ICS actuation is initiated on an MSIV closure signal before the MSIVs are completely closed in anticipation of the complete loss of the normal heat sink and subsequent overpressurization transient. MSIV closure is assumed in the transients and accidents analyzed in Reference 1. The ICS actuation, along with the reactor scram, assures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

{MSIV closure signals are initiated from position switches located on each of the eight MSIVs. On each MSL, two position switches are mounted on the inboard isolation valve and two position switches are mounted on the outboard isolation valve.} The logic for the Main Steam Isolation Valve -

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Closure Function is arranged such that two or more MSIV valve positions must be ≤ 92% open, with a MSIV valve position on another main steam line (MSL) ≤ 92% open with the Reactor Mode Switch in run in order for an ICS initiation to occur.

The MSIV - Closure Analytical / Design Limit is specified to ensure that an ICS initiation occurs prior to a significant reduction in steam flow, thereby reducing the severity of the subsequent pressure transient.

Three channels of MSIV - Closure Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will prevent the ICS actuation from this Function on a valid signal. {There are a total of sixteen MSIV position switches that make up the four channels of MSIV - Closure Function (four MSIV position switches per channel). For a channel of the MSIV - Closure Function to be OPERABLE, its four MSIV position switches must be OPERABLE.} This Function is only required in MODE 1 because with the MSIVs open and the heat generation rate high, a pressurization transient can occur if the MSIVs close.

5. Power Generation Bus Loss (Loss of Feedwater Flow)

The plant electrical system has four redundant power generation busses that operate at 13.8 kV. These busses supply power for the feedwater pumps and other pumps. In MODE 1, at least three of the four busses must be powered. If the voltage sensor (one per division) on each bus senses a low voltage below the required level, indicating that less than three buses are operating above the requirement level, a 2-out-of-4 logic will initiate ICS after a preset delay time. This delay time is to accommodate for the auto-transfer from the UAT transformer feed to the RAT transformer feed. When the power generation busses are not operating at or above the required level, the feedwater pumps would be tripped and feedwater flow would be lost. The purpose of ICS initiation on losing feedwater flow is to provide a source of core cooling following the loss of feedwater pump function.

Power Generation Bus Loss signals are derived from four voltage sensors. A voltage sensor (one per division) on each bus senses a low voltage below the required level, indicating that less than three buses are operating above the requirement level, a 2-out-of-4 logic will initiate a scram after a preset delay time. The Analytical / Design Limit was selected high enough to detect a loss of voltage in order to mitigate the reactor water level drop to Level 1 following the loss of feedwater pump function.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Three channels of Power Generation Bus Loss Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure will prevent the ICS actuation from this Function on a valid signal. The Function is required in MODE 1 where considerable energy exists in the reactor coolant system resulting in the limiting transients and accidents. During MODES 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, the core energy is significantly lower.

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS have been modified by a Note to permit separate Condition entry for each ICS instrumentation channel. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable ICS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable ICS instrumentation channel.

A.1

With one or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, the affected instrumentation division must be verified to be in trip. With the affected required instrumentation division in trip, all ICS Functions are in a one-out-of-two configuration.

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the ICS instrumentation is capable of performing its trip Function in the presence of any single random failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

Alternately, if the instrumentation division can not be verified to be in trip, Condition C would be entered and its Required Action taken when the Completion Time of Required Action A.1 expires.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, untripped required channels (i.e., two or more required channels for most Functions) for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining ICS actuation capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining ICS actuation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that the ICS logic will generate an initiation signal from the given Function on a valid signal.

The Completion Time provides sufficient time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

C.1

With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the associated feature(s) may be incapable of performing the intended function and the supported feature(s) associated with the inoperable channels must be declared inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

The Surveillance Requirements are modified by a Note. The Note directs the reader to Table 3.3.5.3-1 to determine the correct SRs to perform for each ICS Instrumentation Function.

SR 3.3.5.3.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 24 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one required channel to a similar parameter on other required channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. {Because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a CHANNEL CHECK of all instrument channels, and because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL CHECK may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2. The CHANNEL CHECK every 24 hours supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.3.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. {Because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a functional test of all instrument channels, and because the SSLC system performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.} Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology as required by the SCP.

The Frequency of 184 days is based on the reliability and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

SR 3.3.5.3.3

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the required channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the required channel adjusted to the NTSP within the "leave alone" tolerance to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the SCP.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

For selected Functions, the SCP provides additional requirements for the evaluation of the performance of required channels. The selected Functions are those Functions whose instruments are not totally mechanical devices. Mechanical devices (e.g., devices which have an "on" or "off" output or an open/close position such as limit switches, float switches, and proximity detectors) are not calibrated in the traditional sense and do not have as-left or as-found conditions that would indicate drift of the component setpoint. These devices are considered not trendable and the requirements of TS 5.5.11.c.1 and TS 5.5.11.c.2 are not applicable to these mechanical components. Where a non-trendable component provides signal input to other channel components that can be trended, the remaining components must be evaluated in accordance with the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.1 evaluation of channel performance is required for the condition where the "as-found" setting for the channel is outside its "as-found" tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. For digital channel components, the "as-found" tolerance may be identical to the "leave alone" tolerance because drift may not be an expected error. In these cases, a channel "as-found" value outside the "leave alone" tolerance may be cause for component assessment. Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will continue to behave in accordance with design-basis assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program.

Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for OPERABILITY. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the Allowable Values and the methodology for calculating the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.2, the as-left setting for the instrument is required to be returned to within the "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in plant surveillance procedures, the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Analytical / Design Limit is maintained. If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the "leave alone" tolerance, then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the NTSP and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.5.3.4

This SR ensures that the individual required channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The ICS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 3. ICS RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements or any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.5.4.2 to ensure complete testing of instrumentation channels and actuation circuitry. However, the measurement of instrument loop response times may be excluded if the conditions of Reference 4 are satisfied.

ICS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four channels. The 24 month test Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 15.

2. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

3. {Reference for ICS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria}

4. {NEDO-32291-A, "System Analyses For the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.5.4 Isolation Condenser System (ICS) Actuation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the ICS actuation logic is to initiate appropriate actions to ensure ICS operates following a reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation after a scram to provide adequate RPV pressure reduction to preclude safety relief valve operation, conserve RPV water level to avoid automatic depressurization caused by low water level. In addition, in the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the ICS instrumentation ensures the system operates to provide liquid inventory to the RPV.

A detailed description of the ICS actuation instrumentation is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.3.5.3, “Isolation Condenser System (ICS) Instrumentation.”

This specification addresses OPERABILITY of the ICS actuation circuitry from the outputs of the Digital Trip Modules (DTMs) through the load drivers (LDs) that consists of voter logic units (VLUs), the timers and the load drivers (LDs) associated with the ICS. Operability requirements associated with ICS instrumentation channels are provided in LCO 3.3.5.3. Operability requirements for actuated components are addressed in LCO 3.5.4, "Isolation Condenser System (ICS) - Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO and APPLICABILITY

The actions of the ICS are explicitly assumed in the safety analyses of Reference 1. The ICS is initiated to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding by limiting the post-LOCA peak cladding temperature to less than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits. Actuation of the ICS also, precludes actuation of safety relief valves and limits the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Section III Code limits.

ICS actuation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Although there are four divisions of ICS actuation, only three ICS actuation divisions for each function are required to be OPERABLE. The three required divisions are those divisions associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems - Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is met with three OPERABLE ICS instrumentation divisions, and because each ICS instrumentation division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The ICS Actuation is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, to preclude actuation of safety relief valves and limit the peak RPV pressure to less than the ASME Section III Code limits. Additionally, ICS Actuation assists in preserving the integrity of the fuel cladding by limiting the post-LOCA peak cladding temperature to less than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits, and removing reactor decay heat following reactor shutdown and isolation.

ACTIONS

A.1

Condition A exists when one required ICS actuation division is inoperable. In this Condition, ICS actuation still maintains actuation trip capability but can not accommodate a single failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

Alternatively, if it is not desired to restore the required actuation division to OPERABLE status, Condition C would be entered and its Required Action taken when the Completion Time of Required Action A.1 expires.

B.1

Condition B exists when two or more required actuation divisions are inoperable. ICS automatic actuation capability is considered to be maintained when sufficient actuation divisions are OPERABLE or in trip such that the ICS logic will generate a actuation signal on a valid signal. Required Action B.1 limits the time the loss of ICS actuation capability exists. Therefore ICS actuation capability must be restored to OPERABLE within one hour.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition A or B are not met, the associated ICS train must be declared inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.5.4.1

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required ICS logic for a specific channel. {Because the Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including portions of a LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, portions of the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four divisions. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that each division is alternately tested.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.5.4.2

This SR ensures that the individual required division response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The ICS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 3.

ICS RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total division measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.5.3.4 to ensure complete testing of instrument channels and actuation circuitry.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

ICS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four divisions. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that each division is alternately tested.

The 24 month test Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 15.

2. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

3. {Reference for ICS RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria.}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.6.1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The isolation instrumentation contained in this specification provides the capability to generate isolation signals to isolate the MSIVs. The function of the MSIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain limiting safety system settings (LSSS) defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions." Where LSSS is specified for a variable on which a Safety Limit (SL) has been placed, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a SL is exceeded. The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. Where LSSS is specified for a variable having a significant safety function but which does not protect SLs, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. The Design Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that these automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. These limits (i.e., Analytical Limit and Design Limit) constitute the Setting Basis specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

The actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical / Design Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur. The methodology for determining the actual settings, and the required tolerances to maintain these settings conservative to the Analytical / Design Limits, including the requirements for determining that the channel is OPERABLE, are defined in the Setpoint Control Program (SCP), in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, Setpoint Control Program (SCP)."

The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical / Design Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded (i.e., for Analytical Limits), or that automatic protective actions occur consistent with the design basis (i.e.,

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

for Design Limits). As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors that may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded and that automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. As such, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS.

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." For automatic protective devices, the required safety function is to ensure that a SL is not exceeded and that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. Therefore, the NTSP is the LSSS as defined by 10 CFR 50.36. However, use of the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protective device setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule that are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded or that automatic protective actions would initiate consistent with the design basis with the "as-found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the NTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.

Use of the NTSP to define "as-found" OPERABILITY under the expected circumstances described above would result in actions required by both the rule and Technical Specifications that are clearly not warranted. However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This value is specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11, in order to define OPERABILITY of the devices and is designated as the Allowable Value which is the least conservative

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The actual NTSP values and Allowable Values (derived from the Analytical / Design Limits specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1) and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances will be maintained in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11.

The Allowable Valuable is the least conservative value that the setpoint of the channel can have when tested such that a channel is OPERABLE if the setpoint is found conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Note that, although a channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the established "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned in the setpoint calculation. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount equal to or greater than the "as-found" tolerance value. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will ensure that a SL is not exceeded or that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value the device would be considered inoperable from a Technical Specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.

The MSIV Isolation circuitry, as shown in Reference 1, is divided into four redundant divisions of sensor (instrument) channels, four trip logics, and the hard wired MSIV solenoid logic circuitry. The MSIV Isolation circuitry is contained in the Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) circuitry along with the Reactor Protection System (RPS). Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of dependent and independent parameters. The input parameters to the MSIV logic are from instrumentation that monitors (a) reactor vessel water level (Level 1 and Level 2), (b) main steam line pressure, main steam line flow, condenser pressure, main steam tunnel ambient temperature, main steam turbine area ambient temperature. The plant parameters that are required to be monitored for MSIV logic are each measured, independently, by four sensors. Each sensor is assigned to one of the four redundant instrument channels, which are in turn associated with four divisions of logic. For any monitored parameter, the sensor signals of at least two of the four redundant instrument channels must exceed a predetermined setpoint value for trip to occur in a division of logic.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Each MSIV Isolation division has a Remote Multiplexer Unit (RMU) function, a Digital Trip Module (DTM) function, a Trip Logic Unit (TLU) function, and the Output Logic Unit (OLU) function. The RMU receives input from the sensor devices and performs analog-to-digital conversion and signal processing functions. The digitized signal is then sent to the DTM. The DTM generates the trip signal based on setpoint comparison. Each DTM sends a separate trip/no trip output signal to the TLUs in the four divisions of tip logic. Each TLU performs the two-out-of-four logic function to determine the trip status for each of the four divisions.

For maintenance purposes and added reliability, each TLU receives a division of sensors bypass such that all instruments in that division can be bypassed in the trip logic at the TLU. Thus, each TLU will be making its trip decision on a two-out-of-three logic basis for each variable. It is possible for only one division of sensors bypass condition to be in effect at any time.

The two-out-of-four trip logic decision (or two-out-of-three if a division of sensors bypass is in effect) is made by each TLU on a per variable basis such that setpoint exceedence in two instrument divisions for the same variable is required to initiate a trip output at the TLU. Since each TLU sees the outputs from all four DTMs, all four divisions of logic should sense and initiate a required trip simultaneously. A two-out-of-four trip in a TLU causes a trip in its corresponding OLU. It is this trip that then initiates an isolation by tripping load drivers in the power circuits that energize the MSIV solenoids. Each OLU sends output signals to a total of 16 load drivers, one for each MSIV solenoid (each MSIV has two solenoids). The total set of 64 load drivers are grouped in a series-parallel arrangement such that each load driver group energizes either the ‘Solenoid 1’ or the ‘Solenoid 2’ scram pilot valve solenoids for the eight MSIVs. The overall arrangement of OLU outputs and load driver groupings is such that a trip of any two of four TLUs (and associated OLUs) will cause the de-energization of both ‘Solenoid 1’ and ‘Solenoid 2’ for all eight MSIVs, affecting a full MSIV isolation. Each of the four TLUs has a division of logic bypass switch so that they can be bypassed, only one at any one time, such that the MSIV output logic reverts to two-out-of-three, i.e., the tripping of any two of the three remaining TLUs will still result in a full MSIV isolation. However, with this bypass in effect, the OLU for the division can be manually actuated at the OLU. Each OLU has test and trip switches such that the load drivers can be tested both with and without causing a full isolation condition (i.e., tripping of either the ‘Solenoid 1’ or ‘Solenoid 2’ of the MSIVs).

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Each MSIV valve operator has two solenoids. The valve pilot system and accumulator are connected so that when one or both pilots are energized, the accumulator pressurizes the valve operator to open the MSIV. When both pilots are de-energized, the accumulator pressure is switched to pressurize the opposite side of the valve operator and helps the spring close the valve. If one pilot de-energizes (e.g., solenoid failure), the MSIV does not close, and plant operation is not interrupted. A separate solenoid-operated pilot valve with an independent switch is provided for remote-manual testing of the valve.

Equipment within a single division is powered from the safety-related power source of the same division.

This Specification covers provides the OPERABILITY requirements for the MSIV isolation instrumentation from the input variable sensors through the DTM digital trip function. Operability requirements for the MSIV isolation actuation circuitry consisting of the TLU two-out-of-four function, timers, OLUs, and load drivers are provided by LCO 3.3.6.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Actuation." Operability requirements for actuated components (i.e., MSIV solenoid valves) are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs)."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

The isolation signals generated by the MSIV instrumentation are assumed in the safety analyses of References 2 and 3 to initiate closure of the MSIVs to limit offsite doses. Refer to LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs)," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases, for more detail on MSIV isolation

MSIV isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). However, certain monitored instrumentation parameters are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual process parameter discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the MSIV isolation instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1. Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints in accordance with the SCP, where appropriate. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time, where appropriate.

The Setting Basis, from which the NTSPs and Allowable Values are derived is specified for each MSIV isolation Function, where appropriate,

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

in Table 3.3.6.1-1. NTSPs and Allowable Values are specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11. The NTSPs are selected to ensure the setpoints are conservative with respect to the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the NTSP, but conservative with respect to its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is non-conservative with respect to its required Allowable Value.

NTSPs are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g.,DTM) changes state. For those LSSS related to variables protecting SLs the Analytical Limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. For those LSSS related to variables having significant safety functions but which do not protect the SLs, the Design Limits are those settings that must initiate automatic protective actions consistent with the design basis. The Allowable Values are derived from the Analytical / Design Limits, corrected for calibration, process and some of the instrument errors. The NTSPs are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

In general, the individual monitored process parameters are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 consistent with the Applicability of LCO 3.6.1.3. Functions that have different Applicabilities are discussed below in the individual Functions discussion.

Although there are four channels of MSIV instrumentation for each function, only three channels of MSIV instrumentation for each function are required to be OPERABLE. The three required channels are those channels associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems - Operating." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is met with three OPERABLE MSIV instrumentation channels, and because each MSIV instrumentation division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO and specific Applicability discussions are provided below on a Function basis.

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The isolations of the MSIVs limit the release of fission products to help ensure that offsite does limits are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 is explicitly credited in the LOCA inside containment radiological analysis (Ref. 4)

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column (reference leg) of water and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Three channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 Analytical / Design Limit was chosen to be the same as the Isolation Condenser Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 Analytical / Design Limit.

2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1

Low RPV water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The isolations of the MSIVs limit the release of fission products to help ensure that offsite does limits are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 channels are provided as a backup to the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 channels and is not credited in the safety analysis. These channels are hardwired into the logic.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column (reference leg) of water and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Three channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 Analytical / Design Limit was chosen to be the same as the Automatic Depressurization Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 Analytical / Design Limit .

3. Main Steam Line Pressure - Low

Low main steam line pressure indicates that there may be a problem with the turbine pressure regulation that could result in a condition that the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) is cooling down more than 55°C/hr (100°F/hr) if the pressure loss is allowed to continue. The Main Steam Line Pressure - Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the pressure regulator failure (Ref. 5). For this event the closure of the MSIVs ensures that the RPV temperature change limit 55°C/hr (100°F/hr) is not reached.

The main steam line low-pressure signals are initiated from four transmitters that sense the pressure downstream of the outboard MSIVs. The transmitters are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, each transmitter is able to detect low main steam line pressure. Three channels of Main Steam Line Pressure - Low Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Analytical / Design Limit was selected to be high enough to prevent excessive RPV depressurization.

The Main Steam Line Pressure - Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 since this is when the assumed transient can occur (Ref. 5).

4. Main Steam Line Flow - High

Main Steam Line Flow - High is provided to detect a break of the main steam line (MSL) and to initiate closure of the MSIVs. If the steam was allowed to continue flowing out the break, the reactor would depressurize and the core could uncover. If the RPV water level decreases too far, fuel damage could occur. Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The Main Steam Line Flow - High Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the MSL break (Ref. 6). The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS and the operation of the ECCS and Safety Relief Valves assures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46 and off-site dose limits.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The MSL flow signals are initiated from 16 differential pressure transmitters that are connected to the four MSLs, four per steam line. The differential pressure transmitters are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, all four connected to one MSL would be able to detect the high flow in that steam line. High MSL flow in any steam line will result in isolation of all MSLs. Three channels of Main Steam Line Flow - High Function for each main steam line are are required to be OPERABLE so that no single instrument failure will preclude detecting a break in any individual main steam line.

The Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to ensure that off-site dose limits are not exceeded due to the break.

5. Condenser Pressure - High

The Condenser Pressure - High Function is provided to prevent overpressurization of the main condenser in the event of a loss of main condenser vacuum. Since, the integrity of the condenser is an assumption in off-site dose calculations, the Condenser Pressure - High Function is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs. The closure of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident. The Condenser Pressure - High Function is credited in the transients in References 7 and 8.

Condenser pressure signals are derived from four pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the condenser. Three channels of Condenser Pressure - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to prevent damage to the condenser due to pressurization, thereby ensuring its integrity for off-site dose analysis.

As noted, the Condenser Pressure - Low Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2, 3, and 4 when all turbine stop valves are closed since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Switches are provided to manually bypass the channels when all turbine stop valves are closed.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

6, 7. Main Steam Tunnel and Turbine Area Ambient Temperature - High

Main Steam Tunnel and Turbine Area Ambient Temperature - High Functions are provided to detect a leak in the reactor coolant pressure boundary and provides diversity to the MSL high flow instrumentation. The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, off-site dose limits may be reached. However, credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis because bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as a MSL break.

Ambient temperature signals are initiated from thermocouples located away from the main steam lines so they are only sensitive to ambient air temperature. Three channels of Main Steam Tunnel Temperature - High Function are available and required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. Three channels of Turbine Area Ambient Temperature - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

{The ambient temperature monitoring Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to detect a leak equivalent to 1.577 liters/second (25 gpm).}

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by two NOTES. Note 1 allows penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration flow path can be rapidly isolated when a need for isolation is indicated. Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to Isolation Instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable MSIV Instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable MSIV Instrumentation channel.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1

With one or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, the affected instrument division must be verified to be in trip. Tripping the affected instrumentation division places all instrument Functions in a one-out-of-two configuration.

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the MSIV instrumentation is capable of performing its trip Function in the presence of any single random failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 9.

Alternately, if the instrument division can not be verified to be in trip Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped required channels (i.e., two or more required channels) for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining isolation capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining MSIV isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that the MSIV isolation logic will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal to at least one valve in the associated penetration flow path.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 9.

C.1

This Required Action directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B, and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1

If the required channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status, or verified to be in trip, or if MSIV isolation capability is not restored within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours.

The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 9.

E.1

If the required channel(s) is not restored to OPERABLE status, or verified to be in trip, or if MSIV isolation capability is not restored within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the associated MSIV(s) is declared inoperable. Because this Function is required to ensure that the MSIVs perform their intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated MSIV(s) inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

As noted at the beginning of the Surveillance Requirements, the SRs for each isolation instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1.

SR 3.3.6.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 24 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one required channel to a similar parameter in other required channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or even something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. {Because the SSLC performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a CHANNEL CHECK of all instrument channels, and because the SSLC System performs a

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL CHECK may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 9. Thus, performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that undetected outright channel failure is limited to 24 hours.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.

SR 3.3.6.1.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. {Because the SSLC performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a functional test of all instrument channels, and because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant-specific setpoint methodology as required by the SCP.

The Frequency of 184 days is based on the reliability of the Isolation Instrumentation channels and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 9.

SR 3.3.6.1.3

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the required channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the required channel adjusted to the

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

NTSP within the "leave alone" tolerance to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the SCP.

The Surveillance Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 9.

For selected Functions, the SCP provides additional requirements for the evaluation of the performance of required channels. The selected Functions are those Functions whose instruments are not totally mechanical devices. Mechanical devices (e.g., devices which have an "on" or "off" output or an open/close position such as limit switches, float switches, and proximity detectors) are not calibrated in the traditional sense and do not have as-left or as-found conditions that would indicate drift of the component setpoint. These devices are considered not trendable and the requirements of TS 5.5.11.c.1 and TS 5.5.11.c.2 are not applicable to these mechanical components. Where a non-trendable component provides signal input to other channel components that can be trended, the remaining components must be evaluated in accordance with the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.1 evaluation of channel performance is required for the condition where the "as-found" setting for the channel is outside its "as-found" tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. For digital channel components, the "as-found" tolerance may be identical to the "leave alone" tolerance because drift may not be an expected error. In these cases, a channel "as-found" value outside the "leave alone" tolerance may be cause for component assessment. Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will continue to behave in accordance with design-basis assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for OPERABILITY. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the Allowable Values and the methodology for calculating the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.2, the as-left setting for the instrument is required to be returned to within the "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in plant surveillance procedures, the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Analytical / Design Limit is maintained. If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the "leave alone" tolerance, then

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the NTSP and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP.

SR 3.3.6.1.4

This SR ensures that the individual required channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The instrument response times must be added to the associated closure times to obtain the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME. ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 10. ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.6.2.2 to ensure complete testing of instrumentation channels and actuation circuitry.

However, some sensors are allowed to be excluded from specific ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME measurement if the conditions of Reference 11 are satisfied. If these conditions are satisfied, sensor response time may be allocated based on either assumed design sensor response time or the manufacturer's stated design response time. When the requirements of Reference 11 are not satisfied, sensor response time must be measured. Furthermore, measurement of the instrument loops response time for some Functions is not required if the conditions of Reference 12 are satisfied. For all other Functions, the measurement of instrument loop response times may be excluded if the conditions of Reference 11 are satisfied.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four channels. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that the channels associated with each division are alternately tested. The 24 month test Frequency is consistent with the refueling cycle and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 9.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 7, Figure 7.2-1.

2. Section 6.3.

3. Chapter 15.

BASES

REFERENCES (continued)

4. Subsection 15.4.4.

5. Subsection 15.3.3.

6. Subsection 15.4.5.

7. Subsection 15.2.5.2.

8. Subsection 15.2.2.8.

9. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

10. {Reference for ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria}.

11. {NEDO-32291-A, "System Analyses For the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.

12. NEDO-32291-A, Supplement 1, "System Analyses for The Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1999.}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.6.2 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Actuation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The MSIV actuation logic is designed to isolate the MSIVs when one or more monitored parameters exceed the specified limit. The function of the MSIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during a postulated Design Bases Accidents (DBAs). MSIV isolation within the times specified ensure that the release of radioactive materials to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis of DBAs.

A detailed description of the MSIV instrumentation and MSIV actuation logic is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.3.6.1, "Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Instrumentation."

This Specification provides requirements for the MSIV actuation circuitry consisting of the inputs to the Trip Logic units (TLUs) through the Output Logic Units (OLUs) through the Load Drivers (LDs), and the associated timers. Operability of the MSIV instrumentation channels, up to and including the digital trip function of the Digital Trip module (DTM), is addressed by LCO 3.3.6.1. The OPERABILITY of the MSIVs and their associated solenoids is addressed by LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs)."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The isolation signals generated by the MSIV instrumentation are assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of the MSIVs to limit offsite doses. Refer to LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs)," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases, for more detail on MSIVs.

MSIV Actuation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Although there are four MSIV actuation divisions, only three are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single automatic actuation division failure will preclude an MSIV isolation to occur on a valid signal. The three required divisions are those divisions associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems - Operating." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is still met with three OPERABLE

BASES

LCO (continued)

MSIV actuation divisions, and because each MSIV division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

APPLICABILITY

The MSIV actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 consistent with the Applicability of LCO 3.3.6.1 and LCO 3.6.1.3.

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by two NOTES. Note 1 allows penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration flowpath can be rapidly isolated when a need for isolation is indicated. Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to MSIV actuation divisions. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable MSIV actuation divisions provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable divisions. As such, a Note has been provided which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable MSIV actuation division.

A.1

With one required MSIV actuation division inoperable, the affected actuation division must be verified to be in trip. Tripping the division places all MSIV actuation in a one-out-of-two configuration.

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the MSIV actuation is capable of performing its trip Function in the presence of any single random failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

Alternately, if the affected required actuation division can not be verified to be tripped Condition C would be entered and its Required Action taken when the Completion Time of Required Action A.1 expires.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped required MSIV actuation divisions result in not maintaining MSIV actuation capability. MSIV actuation capability is considered to be maintained when sufficient required actuation divisions will generate an isolation from a given Function on a valid signal so that at least one valve in the associated penetration flow path is isolated.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

C.1

If the required division is not restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed Completion Time, the associated MSIV(s) must be declared inoperable immediately. Because MSIV actuation is required to ensure that the MSIV(s) performs its intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated MSIV(s) inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.6.2.1

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the MSIV actuation divisions, including the two-out-of-four function of the Trip Logic Unit (TLU), Output Logic Unit (OLU), and Load Drivers (LDs) for a specific division. {Because the Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including portions of a LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, portions of the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four divisions. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that the channels associated with each division are alternately tested. The testing in LCO 3.3.6.1 and LCO 3.6.1.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.6.2.2

This SR ensures that the individual required division response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The instrument response times must be added to the associated closure times to obtain the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME. ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 4. ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.6.1.4 to ensure complete testing of instrumentation channels and actuation circuitry.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for each four divisions. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that the channels associated with each division are alternately tested. The 24 month test Frequency is consistent with the refueling cycle and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

REFERENCES

1. Section 6.3.

2. Chapter 15.

3. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

4. {Reference for ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria}.

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.6.3 Isolation Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The isolation instrumentation contained in this specification provides the capability to generate isolation signals to the containment isolation valves, the reactor building boundary isolation dampers{, feedwater isolation valves and feedwater pump breakers}. The function of the isolation valves and dampers, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). {The function of the feedwater isolation valves and feedwater pump breaker trip is to limit the mass addition of water into containment during and following a design basis feedwater line rupture inside containment.} The function of the reactor water cleanup/shutdown cooling (RWCU/SDC) isolation valves in MODES 5 and 6 is to protect the core by isolating the RWCU/SDC system from the reactor pressure vessel and minimizing a potential loss of coolant resulting from a line break in the RWCU/SDC system.

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain limiting safety system settings (LSSS) defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions." Where LSSS is specified for a variable on which a Safety Limit (SL) has been placed, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a SL is exceeded. The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. Where LSSS is specified for a variable having a significant safety function but which does not protect SLs, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. The Design Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that these automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. These limits (i.e., Analytical Limit and Design Limit) constitute the Setting Basis specified in Table 3.3.6.3-1.

The actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical / Design Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur. The methodology for determining the actual settings, and the required tolerances to maintain these settings conservative to the Analytical / Design Limits, including the requirements

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

for determining that the channel is OPERABLE, are defined in the Setpoint Control Program (SCP), in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, Setpoint Control Program (SCP)."

The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical / Design Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded (i.e., for Analytical Limits), or that automatic protective actions occur consistent with the design basis (i.e., for Design Limits). As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors that may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident environments). In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded and that automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. As such, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS.

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." For automatic protective devices, the required safety function is to ensure that a SL is not exceeded and that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. Therefore, the NTSP is the LSSS as defined by 10 CFR 50.36. However, use of the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protective device setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule that are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded or that automatic protective actions would initiate consistent with the design basis with the "as-found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the NTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Use of the NTSP to define "as-found" OPERABILITY under the expected circumstances described above would result in actions required by both the rule and Technical Specifications that are clearly not warranted. However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This value is specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11, in order to define OPERABILITY of the devices and is designated as the Allowable Value which is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The actual NTSP values and Allowable Values (derived from the Analytical / Design Limits specified in Table 3.3.6.3-1) and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances will be maintained in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11.

The Allowable Valuable is the least conservative value that the setpoint of the channel can have when tested such that a channel is OPERABLE if the setpoint is found conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Note that, although a channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the established "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned in the setpoint calculation. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount equal to or greater than the "as-found" tolerance value. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will ensure that a SL is not exceeded or that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value the device would be considered inoperable from a Technical Specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.

The containment isolation function is performed by the Leak Detection and Isolation (LD&IS) portion of the Logic and Control (SSLC) System. Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters. Containment isolation occurs in response to signals from any of the following:

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2,
2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1,
3. Drywell Pressure - High,

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

4. Main Steam Line Pressure - Low,
5. Main Steam Line Flow - High (Per Steam Line),
6. Condenser Pressure - High,
7. Main Steam Tunnel Ambient Temperature - High,
8. Main Steam Turbine Area Ambient Temperature - High,
9. {RWCU/SDC System Differential Flow - High (Per RWCU/SDC subsystem)},
10. Isolation Condenser Steam Line Flow - High (Per Isolation Condenser),
11. Isolation Condenser Condensate Return Line Flow - High (Per Isolation Condenser), and
12. Isolation Condenser Pool Vent Discharge Radiation - High (Per Isolation Condenser).

The RWCU/SDC isolation function in MODES 5 and 6 is performed by the LD&IS portion of the SSLC System. RWCU/SDC isolation in MODES 5 and 6 isolation occurs in response to signals from any of the following:

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 and
2. {RWCU/SDC System Differential Flow - High (Per RWCU/SDC subsystem)},

{The feedwater isolation and feedwater pump breaker trip functions are performed by the LD&IS portion of the SSLC System. Feedwater isolation and feedwater pump breaker trip occur in response to Feedwater Line Differential Pressure - High concurrent with Drywell Pressure - High.}

The Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) System controls the initiation signals and logic for isolation. SSLC is a four division, separated protection logic system designed to provide a very high degree of assurance to both ensure isolation when required and prevent inadvertent initiation. The input and output trip determinations for all isolation functions are based upon a two-out-of-four logic arrangement.

Four separate instrument channels are used to monitor isolation initiation parameters. Signals from sensors are multiplexed at the divisional level and the sensor data is then transmitted to the SSLC/ESF digital trip module (DTM) function for setpoint comparison. The output of each divisional DTM function (a trip/no-trip condition) is routed to all four divisional voter logic unit (VLU) functions such that each divisional VLU function receives input from each of the four divisions of DTMs.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

For maintenance purposes and added reliability, each DTM has a division of sensors bypass such that all instruments in that division will be bypassed in the trip logic at the VLU functions. Thus, each VLU function will be making its trip decision on a two-out-of-three logic basis for each variable. It is possible for only one division of sensors bypass condition to be in effect at any time.

The processed trip signal from its own division and trip signals from the other three divisions are processed in the voter logic unit function (VLU) for 2-out-of-4 voting. The final trip signal is then transmitted to the Remote Multiplexing Unit (RMU) to initiate mechanical actuation devices. There are two independent and redundant VLU functional channels in each division of the SSLC/ESF equipment. The vote logic trip signals from both VLU functional channels are transmitted to the RMUs, where a 2-out-of-2 confirmation is performed to initiate the isolation actuation signals. The redundant channels within a division are necessary to prevent single failures within a division from causing an isolation; as a result both VLU logics are required to operate to get an output.

For the isolation logic in the SSLC, since there is the division of sensor bypass implemented, and there are two channels of 2-out-of-4 VLU logic, no additional division trip logic bypass is implemented in the isolation logic. Each of the two VLU trip outputs is directly applied to one of the two load drivers in series. Both VLU trips are required to prevent inadvertent actuation of isolation. It is undesirable to perform the VLU logic bypass activities with the RMU electrically connected to the valve. The keylock switch that bypasses (disables) the load driver actuation provides effective bypass function required at the actuator level.

The LD&IS logic is designed to seal-in the isolation signal once the trip has been initiated. The isolation signal overrides any control action to cause the closure of isolation valves. Reset of the isolation logic is required before any isolation valve can be manually opened.

Equipment within a single division is powered from the safety-related power source of the same division.

This Specification provides Operability requirements for the isolation instrumentation from the input variable sensors through the DTM function. Operability requirements for the isolation actuation circuitry consisting of timers, VLUs, and load drivers are provided by LCO 3.3.6.4, " Isolation Actuation." Operability requirements for the actuated components are

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

addressed in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs)," and LCO 3.6.3.1, "Reactor Building."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

The containment isolation signals generated by the isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of containment isolation valves and reactor building boundary isolation dampers to limit off-site doses. Refer to LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs), "Applicable Safety Analyses Bases, for more detail on containment isolation valves and LCO 3.6.3.1, “Reactor Building,” Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail on reactor building boundary isolation dampers.

The RWCU/SDC isolation signals generated by the isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the analyses of Reference 3 to initiate closure of the RWCU/SDC isolation valves to protect the core by minimizing a potential loss of reactor pressure vessel coolant inventory in MODES 5 and 6.

{The feedwater isolation and feedwater pump breaker trip signals generated by the isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of feedwater isolation valves and trip of the feedwater pump breakers to limit mass water additions to the containment during and following a design basis feedwater line rupture inside containment.}

Isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). However, certain monitored instrumentation parameters are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual process parameter discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the isolation instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.6.3-1. Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints in accordance with the SCP, where appropriate. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time, where appropriate. The Setting Basis, from which the NTSPs and Allowable Values are derived is specified for each Function, where appropriate, in Table 3.3.6.3-1. NTSPs and Allowable Values are specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11. The NTSPs are selected to ensure the setpoints are conservative with respect to the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the NTSP, but

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

conservative with respect to its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is non-conservative with respect to its required Allowable Value.

NTSPs are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., DTM) changes state. For those LSSS related to variables protecting SLs the Analytical Limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. For those LSSS related to variables having significant safety functions but which do not protect the SLs, the Design Limits are those settings that must initiate automatic protective actions consistent with the design basis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process and some of the instrument errors. The NTSPs are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

In general, the individual monitored process parameters are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 consistent with the Applicability of LCO 3.6.1.3 and LCO 3.6.3.1. Functions that have different Applicabilities are discussed below in the individual Functions discussion.

Although there are four channels of isolation instrumentation for each function, only three channels of isolation instrumentation for each function are required to be OPERABLE. The three required channels are those channels associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems - Operating." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is met with three OPERABLE isolation instrumentation channels, and because each isolation instrumentation division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO and specific Applicability discussions are provided below on a Function basis.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The isolations of valves whose penetration communicate with the containment or the reactor vessel and the isolation of the reactor building boundary isolation dampers limit the release of fission products to help ensure that offsite does limits are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 is credited in the LOCA inside containment radiological analysis (Ref. 4)

In MODES 5 and 6, low RPV water level may indicate a loss of coolant. Should RPV water level decrease too far, the ability to cool the core may be threatened. Closure of the RWCU/SDC isolation valves isolates the system from the RPV, minimizing the potential loss of coolant inventory. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 is implicitly credited in the shutdown probabilistic risk assessment (Ref. 3), and therefore satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column (reference leg) of water and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Three channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 Analytical / Design Limit was chosen to be the same as the IC Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 Analytical / Design Limit.

This Function isolates the main steam drain lines, RWCU/SDC lines, fission product sampling lines, drywell low conductivity waste sump drain line, drywell high conductivity waste sump drain line, containment purge and vent lines, reactor component cooling water lines to the drywell air coolers, fuel and auxiliary pools cooling process lines, and the reactor building boundary isolation dampers.

2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1

Low RPV water level indicates the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The isolations of valves whose penetration communicate with the

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

containment or the reactor vessel and the isolation of the reactor building boundary isolation dampers limit the release of fission products to help ensure that offsite does limits are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 channels are provided as a backup to the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 channels and is not credited in the safety analysis. These channels are hardwired into the logic.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column (reference leg) of water and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Three channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 Analytical / Design Limit was chosen to be the same as the Automatic Depressurization System Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1 Analytical / Design Limit.

This Function isolates the main steam drain lines, RWCU/SDC lines, fission product sampling lines, drywell low conductivity waste sump drain line, drywell high conductivity waste sump drain line, containment purge and vent valves, reactor component cooling water valves to the drywell air coolers, fuel and auxiliary pools cooling process lines, and the reactor building boundary isolation dampers.

3. Drywell Pressure - High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The isolations of valves whose penetration communicate with the containment and the isolation of the reactor building boundary isolation dampers limit the release of fission products to help ensure that offsite does limits are not exceeded. The Drywell Pressure -High channels are not explicitly credited in the safety analyses but retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation instrumentation.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell. Three channels of Drywell Pressure—High are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The Drywell Pressure - High Analytical / Design Limit was chosen to be the same as the Reactor Protection System Drywell Pressure - High Analytical / Design Limit.

This Function isolates the fission product sampling lines, drywell low conductivity waste sump drain line, drywell high conductivity waste sump drain line, containment purge and vent lines, reactor component cooling water system lines to the drywell air coolers, fuel and auxiliary pools cooling system process lines, and the reactor building boundary isolation dampers. {In addition, this Function, in conjunction with Feedwater Line Differential Pressure - High, isolates the feedwater lines and trips the feedwater pump breakers.}

4. Main Steam Line Pressure - Low

Low main steam line pressure indicates that there may be a problem with the turbine pressure regulation that could result in a condition that the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) is cooling down more than 55°C/hr (100°F/hr) if the pressure loss is allowed to continue. The Main Steam Line Pressure - Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the pressure regulator failure (Ref. 5). For this event the closure of the main steam drain lines helps to ensures that the RPV temperature change limit 55°C/hr (100°F/hr) is not reached.

The main steam line low-pressure signals are initiated from four transmitters that sense the pressure downstream of the outboard MSIVs. The transmitters are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, each transmitter is able to detect low main steam line pressure. Three channels of Main Steam Line Pressure - Low Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Analytical / Design Limit was selected to be high enough to prevent excessive RPV depressurization.

The Main Steam Line Pressure - Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 since this is when the assumed transient can occur (Ref. 5).

This Function isolates the main steam drain lines.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

5. Main Steam Line Flow - High

Main Steam Line Flow - High is provided to detect a break of the main steam line (MSL) and to initiate closure of main steam drain valves. If the steam was allowed to continue flowing out the break, the reactor would depressurize and the core could uncover. If the RPV water level decreases too far, fuel damage could occur. Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The Main Steam Line Flow - High Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the MSL break (Ref. 6). The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS and the operation of the ECCS and Safety Relief Valves assures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46 and off-site dose limits.

The MSL flow signals are initiated from 16 differential pressure transmitters that are connected to the four MSLs, four per steam line. The differential pressure transmitters are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, all four connected to one MSL would be able to detect the high flow in that steam line. High MSL flow in any steam line will result in isolation of the drain lines. Three channels of Main Steam Line Flow - High Function for each main steam line are required to be OPERABLE so that no single instrument failure will preclude detecting a break in any individual main steam line.

The Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to ensure that off-site dose limits are not exceeded due to the break.

This Function isolates the main steam drain lines.

6. Condenser Pressure - High

The Condenser Pressure - High Function is provided to prevent overpressurization of the main condenser in the event of a loss of main condenser vacuum. Since, the integrity of the condenser is an assumption in off-site dose calculations, the Condenser Pressure - High Function is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating closure of the main steam drain valves. The closure of the main steam drain valves is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident. The Condenser Pressure - High Function is credited in the transients in References 7 and 8.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Condenser pressure signals are derived from four pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the condenser. Three channels of Condenser Pressure - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to prevent damage to the condenser due to pressurization, thereby ensuring its integrity for off-site dose analysis.

As noted, the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2, 3, and 4 when all turbine stop valves are closed since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Switches are provided to manually bypass the channels when all turbine stop valves are closed.

This Function isolates the main steam drain lines.

7, 8. Main Steam Tunnel and Turbine Area Ambient Temperature - High

Main Steam Tunnel and Turbine Area Ambient Temperature - High Functions are provided to detect a leak in the reactor coolant pressure boundary and provides diversity to the MSL high flow instrumentation. The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, off-site dose limits may be reached. However, credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis because bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as a MSL break.

Temperature signals are initiated from thermocouples located away from the main steam lines so they are only sensitive to ambient air temperature. Three channels of Main Steam Tunnel Temperature - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. Three channels of Turbine Area Ambient Temperature - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

{The ambient temperature monitoring Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to detect a leak equivalent to 1.577 liters/second (25 gpm).}

The Main Steam Tunnel Ambient Temperature - High Function will isolation both main steam drain lines and RWCU/SDC lines while the Main Steam Turbine Area Ambient Temperature - High Function will isolate the main steam drain lines.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

9. {RWCU/SDC System Differential Flow - High (Per RWCU/SDC subsystem)}

The {Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling (RWCU/SDC) System Differential Flow - High} signal is provided to detect a break in the RWCU System outside containment. Should the reactor coolant continue to flow out the break off-site dose limits may be exceeded. Therefore, isolation of the RWCU System is initiated when {RWCU/SDC System Differential Flow - High} is sensed to prevent exceeding off-site doses. This Function is directly assumed in the RWCU/SDC System line failure event outside containment (Ref. 9).

In MODES 5 and 6, high RWCU/SDC differential flow may indicate a loss of coolant. Should RPV water level decrease too far, the ability to cool the core may be threatened. Closure of the RWCU/SDC isolation valves isolates the system from the RPV, minimizing the potential loss of coolant inventory. The {Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling (RWCU/SDC) System Differential Flow - High} is implicitly credited in the shutdown probabilistic risk assessment (Ref. 3), and therefore satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Each RWCU/SDC subsystem includes a suction line near the mid level of the reactor pressure level (RPV) and another suction line at the RPV bottom. Each suction line includes a venturi-type flow element inside containment. Each flow element is instrumented with four flow transmitters. The temperature of each suction line is also monitored by four temperature elements close to the venturi-type flow element. Each RWCU/SDC subsystem also includes a return line to the feedwater lines and another return line to the overboarding lines. These lines are instrumented consistent with the suction lines. Each flow rate signal is converted to a mass flow rate signal using its associated temperature element. A differential flow rate is calculated from the difference between the suction flows and return flows. This differential flow rate is compared to the setpoint {and after a time delay an isolation signal is sent}. Therefore, each differential flow channel consists of all the components to necessary to calculate the differential flow signal and provide a trip signal.

Three channels of the {RWCU/SDC System Differential Flow - High} Function per RWCU/SDC subsystem are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The {RWCU/SDC System Differential Flow - High} Analytical / Design Limit ensures that a leak or a line break of the RWCU/SDC piping is detected.

{The time delay was chosen to be long enough to prevent false isolations due to system starts but not so long as to impact offsite dose calculations.}

This Function isolates the RWCU/SDC lines.

10, 11, and 12. Isolation Condenser Steam and Condensate Return Line Flow -High and Pool Vent Discharge Radiation - High

The Isolation Condenser Steam Line Flow High, Condensate Return Line Flow - High, and Pool Vent Discharge Radiation -High Functions are provided to monitor the pressure boundary status of each individual Isolation Condenser (IC) subsystem. The Isolation Condenser Steam Line Flow High and Condensate Return Line Flow - High Functions will isolate the associated subsystem when a leak or a break has occurred while the Pool Vent Discharge Radiation -High Function will isolate the associated subsystem when leakage is detected outside the drywell. These Functions are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as MSL breaks.

The isolation signals can be initiated from a total of 12 instruments per IC subsystem, with each IC subsystem having four differential pressure transmitters per IC subsystem steam line, four differential pressure transmitters per IC subsystem condensate line, and four radiation detectors located in its associated IC subsystem vent discharge into the pool area. The flow instrumentation is designed to detect leakage both inside and outside of the drywell. The radiation detectors are designed to detect leakage outside of containment. Three channels of each monitored parameter for each IC subsystem are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation functions.

The Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to be low enough to ensure that the isolation occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSL break event as the bounding event.

These Functions isolate the associated IC System lines.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

13. {Feedwater Line Differential Pressure - High

The Feedwater Line Differential Pressure - High signal is provided to detect a break in the feedwater lines inside containment. Should the feedwater continue to flow into containment, containment integrity could be challenged as a result of the mass and energy addition to the containment drywell from the external feedwater system. Therefore, isolation of the feedwater system flow and a trip of the affected feedwater pump breaker(s) is initiated when Feedwater Line Differential Pressure - High is sensed in conjunction with Drywell Pressure - High to protect containment integrity. This Function is directly assumed in the { Ref. X).}

Each feedwater line includes { }

Three channels of the Feedwater Line Differential Pressure - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation finction.

The Feedwater Line Differential Pressure - High Analytical / Design Liimit ensures that a leak or a line break of the feedwater piping is detected.

This Function in conjunction with the Drywell Pressure - High Function isolates the feedwater flow and trips the feedwater pump breaker(s).}

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by two NOTES. Note 1 allows penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration flow path can be rapidly isolated when a need for isolation is indicated. Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to Isolation Instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable Isolation Instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable Isolation Instrumentation channel.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1

With one or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, the affected instrument division must be verified to be in trip. Tripping the affected instrumentation division places all instrument Functions in a one-out-of-two configuration.

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the isolation instrumentation is capable of performing its trip Function in the presence of any single random failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

Alternately, if the required instrument division can not be verified in trip Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped required channels for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining isolation capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that the isolation logic will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal so that at least one valve in the associated penetration flow path.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

C.1

This Required Action directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.3-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B, and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1

If the affected instrumentation channel cannot be verified to be in trip within the specified Completion Time or if isolation capability cannot be restored within the specified Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the associated Containment Isolation Valve(s) (CIVs) is declared inoperable immediately. Because this Function is required to ensure that the CIVs perform their intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated CIV(s) inoperable.

E.1

If the affected penetration flowpath(s) cannot be isolated within the specified Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours.

The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

F.1

If the affected instrumentation channel cannot be verified to be in trip within the specified Completion Time or if isolation capability cannot be restored within the specified Completion Time, plant operations may continue if feedwater flow through the affected feedwater penetration flow path is isolated. With feedwater flow through the penetration isolated, the isolation function has been satisfied.

The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

G.1

If feedwater flow through the affected penetration cannot be isolated within the specified Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 10) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 11 is followed, except that reference to standby gas treatment system OPERABILITY is not applicable.

H.1 and H.2

If the affected instrumentation channel cannot be verified to be in trip within the specified Completion Time or if isolation capability cannot be restored within the specified Completion Time, the associated flow path should be isolated. However, if the RWCU/SDC function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to isolate the RWCU/SDC system (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the flow path can be isolated). ACTIONS must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status or the RWCU/SDC system is isolated.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

As noted at the beginning of the Surveillance Requirements, the SRs for each isolation instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.3-1.

SR 3.3.6.3.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 24 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one required channel to a similar parameter in other required channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or even something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

CHANNEL CALIBRATION. {Because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a CHANNEL CHECK of all instrument channels, and because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL CHECK may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3. Thus, performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that undetected outright channel failure is limited to 24 hours.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.

SR 3.3.6.3.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. {Because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a functional test of all instrument channels, and because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant-specific setpoint methodology as specified in the SCP.

The Frequency of 184 days is based on the reliability of the Isolation Instrumentation channels and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.6.3.3

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the required channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the required channel adjusted to the NTSP within the "leave alone" tolerance to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the SCP.

The Surveillance Frequency is based upon is based on the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

For selected Functions, the SCP provides additional requirements for the evaluation of the performance of required channels. The selected Functions are those Functions whose instruments are not totally mechanical devices. Mechanical devices (e.g., devices which have an "on" or "off" output or an open/close position such as limit switches, float switches, and proximity detectors) are not calibrated in the traditional sense and do not have as-left or as-found conditions that would indicate drift of the component setpoint. These devices are considered not trendable and the requirements of TS 5.5.11.c.1 and TS 5.5.11.c.2 are not applicable to these mechanical components. Where a non-trendable component provides signal input to other channel components that can be trended, the remaining components must be evaluated in accordance with the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.1 evaluation of channel performance is required for the condition where the "as-found" setting for the channel is outside its "as-found" tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. For digital channel components, the "as-found" tolerance may be identical to the "leave alone" tolerance because drift may not be an expected error. In these cases, a channel "as-found" value outside the "leave alone" tolerance may be cause for component assessment. Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will continue to behave in accordance with design-basis assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for OPERABILITY. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the Allowable Values and the methodology for calculating the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.2, the as-left setting for the instrument is required to be returned to within the "leave

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

alone" tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in plant surveillance procedures, the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Analytical / Design Limit is maintained. If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the "leave alone" tolerance, then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the NTSP and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP.

SR 3.3.6.3.4

This SR ensures that the individual required channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The instrument response times must be added to the associated closure times to obtain the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME. ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 12.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.6.4.2 to ensure complete testing of instrumentation channels and actuation circuitry.

A Note to the Surveillance states that the radiation detectors may be excluded from ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficulty of generating an appropriate detector input signal and because the principles of detector operation virtually ensure an instantaneous response time. Response Time for radiation detection channels shall be measured from detector output or the input of the first electronic component in the channel.

However, some sensors are allowed to be excluded from specific ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME measurement if the conditions of Reference 13 are satisfied. If these conditions are satisfied, sensor response time may be allocated based on either assumed design sensor response time or the manufacturer's stated design response time. When the requirements of Reference 13 are not satisfied, sensor response time must be measured. Furthermore, measurement of the instrument loops response time for some Functions is not required if the conditions of Reference 13 are satisfied. For all other Functions, the measurement of

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

instrument loop response times may be excluded if the conditions of Reference 14 are satisfied.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four channels. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that the channels associated with each division are alternately tested. The 24 month test Frequency is consistent with the refueling cycle and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

REFERENCES

1. Section 6.3.
2. Chapter 15.
3. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment }.
4. Subsection 15.4.4.
5. Subsection 15.3.3.
6. Subsection 15.4.5.
7. Subsection 15.2.5.2.
8. Subsection 15.2.2.8.
9 Subsection 15.4.9.
10. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}
11. TSTF-IG-05-02, Implementation Guidance For TSTF-423, Revision {1}, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," {2007}.
12. {Reference for ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria}
13. {NEDO-32291-A, "System Analyses For the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.

BASES

REFERENCES (continued)

14. NEDO-32291-A, Supplement 1, "System Analyses for The Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1999.}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.6.4 Isolation Actuation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The isolation actuation logic is designed to isolate the affect penetration flow paths when one or more monitored parameters exceed the specified limit. The isolation actuation logic actuates the following containment isolation flow paths: (a) main steam line (MSL) drains, (b) Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling (RWCU/SDC) System lines, (c) Isolation Condenser (IC) System lines, (d) fission product sampling lines, (e) drywell low and high conductivity waste sump drain lines, (f) containment purge and vent lines, (g) Reactor Component Cooling Water System (RCCWS) lines to the drywell air coolers, (h) Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System (FAPCS) process lines, (i) Chilled Cooling Water System, (j) High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply System, and (k) Process Radiation Monitoring System. The isolation actuation logic also isolates the reactor building boundary isolation dampers. The function of the containment isolation valves and reactor building boundary isolation dampers, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during a postulated Design Bases Accidents (DBAs). Containment and reactor building isolation within the times specified ensure that the release of radioactive materials to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis of DBAs.

The isolation actuation logic is also designed to isolate the RWCU/SDC System from the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) in MODES 5 and 6, isolate feedwater flow into containment and trip main feedwater pump breakers when one or more monitored parameters exceed the specified limit. {The function of the feedwater isolation valves and feedwater pump breaker trip is to limit the mass addition of water into containment during and following a design basis feedwater line rupture inside containment.} The function of the reactor water cleanup/shutdown cooling (RWCU/SDC) isolation valves in MODES 5 and 6 is to protect the core by isolating the RWCU/SDC system from the reactor pressure vessel and minimizing a potential loss of coolant resulting from a line break in the RWCU/SDC system.

A detailed description of the isolation instrumentation and isolation actuation logic is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.3.6.3, "Isolation Instrumentation."

This Specification provides Operability requirements for the isolation actuation circuitry consisting of timers, VLUs, and load drivers. Operability requirements for the isolation instrumentation from the input

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

variable sensors through the DTM function are provided by LCO 3.3.6.3, "Isolation Instrumentation." Operability requirements for the actuated components are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs)," and LCO 3.6.3.1, "Reactor Building."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

The containment isolation signals generated by the isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of valves and reactor building boundary isolation dampers to limit off site doses. Refer to LCO 3.6.1.3, Applicable Safety Analyses, for more details of containment isolation valves. Refer to LCO 3.6.3.1, Applicable Safety Analyses, for more details of the reactor building isolation dampers.

The RWCU/SDC isolation signals generated by the isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the analyses of Reference 3 to initiate closure of the RWCU/SDC isolation valves to protect the core by minimizing a potential loss of reactor pressure vessel coolant inventory in MODES 5 and 6.

{The feedwater isolation and feedwater pump breaker trip signals generated by the isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of feedwater isolation valves and trip of the feedwater pump breakers to limit mass water additions to the containment during and following a design basis feedwater line rupture inside containment.}

Isolation Actuation satisfies Criteria 3 and 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Although there are four isolation actuation divisions, only three are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single automatic actuation division failure will preclude an isolation to occur on a valid signal. The three required divisions are those divisions associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems - Operating." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is still met with three OPERABLE isolation actuation divisions, and because each isolation division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

The individual containment isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 consistent with the Applicability of LCO 3.6.1.3 and LCO 3.6.3.1. {The feedwater isolation valve and

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

feedwater pump breaker trip actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 consistent with the assumptions of References 1 and 2. The RWCU/SDC isolation actuation division is also required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 consistent with the assumptions of Reference 3.}

1. Main Steam Line Drains

The MSL drain isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2; Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1; Main Steam Line Pressure - Low; Main Steam Line Flow - High (Per Steam Line); Condenser Vacuum - Low; Main Steam Tunnel Ambient Temperature - High; and Main Steam Turbine Area Ambient Temperature - High. Three isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.

2. Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System Lines

The RWCU/SDC System lines isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2; Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1; Main Steam Tunnel Ambient Temperature - High; and {Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System Differential Flow - High (Per RWCU/SDC subsystem)} Functions. In MODES 5 and 6, the RWCU/SDC System lines isolation actuation divisions receive input from the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 and from the {Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System Differential Flow - High (Per RWCU/SDC subsystem)} Functions. Three Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System Lines isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.

3. Isolation Condenser System Lines

The IC System Lines isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: Isolation Condenser Steam Line Flow - High (per IC subsystem); Isolation Condenser Condensate Line Flow - High (per IC subsystem); and Isolation Condenser Pool Vent Discharge Radiation - High (per IC subsystem) Functions. Three Isolation Condenser System Lines isolation actuation divisions per IC subsystem are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

4. Fission Product Sampling Lines

The fission product sampling lines isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2; Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1; and Drywell Pressure - High Functions. Three Fission Product Sampling Lines isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.

5. Drywell High Conductivity Waste Sump Drain Line

The Drywell High Conductivity Waste Sump Drain Line isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2; Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1; and Drywell Pressure High Functions. Three Drywell High Conductivity Waste Sump Drain Line isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.

6. Drywell Low Conductivity Waste Sump Drain Line

The Drywell Low Conductivity Waste Sump Drain Line isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2; Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1; and Drywell Pressure - High Functions. Three Drywell Low Conductivity Waste Sump Drain Line isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.

7. Containment Purge and Vent Lines

The Containment Purge and Vent Lines isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2; Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1; Reactor Building HVAC Exhaust Radiation - High; Refueling Area Exhaust Radiation - High; and Drywell Pressure - High Functions. Three Containment Purge and Vent Lines isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

8. Reactor Component Cooling Water System Lines to the Drywell Air Coolers

The Reactor Component Cooling Water System Lines to the Drywell Air Coolers isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2; Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1; and Drywell Pressure - High Functions. Three Reactor Component Cooling Water System Lines to the Drywell Air Coolers isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.

9. Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System Process Lines

The FAPCS Process Lines isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2; Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1; and Drywell Pressure - High Functions. Three FAPCS Process Lines isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.

10. Reactor Building Boundary Isolation

Reactor Building Boundary Isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2; Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 1; Drywell Pressure - High; Reactor Building HVAC Exhaust Radiation - High; and Refueling Area Exhaust Radiation - High. Three Reactor Building Boundary Isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.

11. Chilled Water Cooling System

The Chilled Water Cooling System isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: {Information to be supplied later}. {Three Chilled Water Cooling System isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.}

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

12. Process Radiation Monitoring System

The Process Radiation Monitoring System isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: {Information to be supplied later}. {Three Process Radiation Monitoring System isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.}

13. High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply

The High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply isolation actuation divisions receive input from the following isolation instrumentation: {Information to be supplied later}. {Three High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply isolation actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the isolation function.}

{14 and 15. Feedwater Isolation Valves and Feedwater Pump Breakers

The Feedwater Isolation Valve and Feedwater Pump Breaker actuation divisions receive input from the Reactor Vessel level - Low, Level 2 and Drywell Pressure - High isolation instrumentation channels. Three Feedwater Isolation Valve actuation divisions and three Feedwater Pump Breaker actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single isolation actuation failure can preclude the function.}

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by two NOTES. Note 1 allows penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration flowpath can be rapidly isolated when a need for isolation is indicated. Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to isolation actuation. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable isolation actuation provides appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable isolation actuation divisions. As such, a Note has been provided which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable isolation actuation division.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1

With one or more Functions with one or more required isolation actuation divisions inoperable, the affected isolation actuation division must be verified to be in trip. Tripping the affected division places all isolation actuation in a one-out-of-two configuration.

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the isolation actuation is capable of performing its trip Function in the presence of any single random failure. The 4 hour Completion Time is consistent with the Completion Times of LCO 3.6.1.3 for penetration flow paths with two CIVs and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3. Alternately, if the actuation division can not be verified to be in trip Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped required divisions of isolation actuation (i.e., one or two divisions associated with each isolation valve or damper in a penetration flow path) result in the isolation actuation capability not maintained. Isolation automatic actuation capability is considered to be maintained when sufficient actuation divisions are OPERABLE or in trip such that the isolation logic will generate a trip signal on a valid signal to close one valve on the associated penetration.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

C.1

This Required Action directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.4-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable division has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B, and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that division and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1

If the affected actuation division cannot be verified to be in trip within the specified Completion Time or if isolation actuation capability cannot be restored within the specified Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the associated Containment Isolation Valve(s) (CIVs) is declared inoperable immediately. Because isolation actuation is required to ensure that the CIVs performs their intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated CIV(s) inoperable.

E.1

If the affected actuation division cannot be verified to be in trip within the specified Completion Time or if isolation actuation capability cannot be restored within the specified Completion Time, plant operations may continue if feedwater flow through the affected feedwater isolation valve(s) is isolated. With feedwater flow through the penetration isolated, the isolation function has been satisfied.

The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

F.1

If the affected actuation division cannot be verified to be in trip within the specified Completion Time or if isolation actuation capability cannot be restored within the specified Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the affected feedwater pump breaker is placed in trip. With the affected feedwater pump breaker in trip, the isolation function has been satisfied.

The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

G.1

If feedwater flow through the affected feedwater isolation valve(s) cannot be isolated within the specified Completion Time or if the affected feedwater pump breaker cannot be placed in trip within the specified Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which overall

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

plant risk is minimized This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 4 is followed, except that reference to standby gas treatment system OPERABILITY is not applicable.

H.1 and H.2

If the affected actuation division cannot be verified to be in trip within the specified Completion Time or if isolation capability cannot be restored within the specified Completion Time, the associated flow path should be isolated. However, if the RWCU/SDC function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the division to OPERABLE status or to isolate the RWCU/SDC system (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the flow path can be isolated). ACTIONS must continue until the division is restored to OPERABLE status or the RWCU/SDC system is isolated.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each isolation actuation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.4-1.

SR 3.3.6.4.1

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the isolation actuation divisions. {Because the Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) System performs a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including portions of a LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and because the SSLC System performs a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, portions of the LOGIC SYSTEM

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four divisions. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that the channels associated with each division are alternately tested. The testing in LCO 3.3.6.3, LCO 3.6.1.3, and LCO 3.6.3.1 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.6.4.2

This SR ensures that the individual required division response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The instrument response times must be added to the associated closure times to obtain the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME. ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 4.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME may be verified by actual response time measurements in any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements. This test overlaps the testing required by SR 3.3.6.3.4 to ensure complete testing of instrumentation channels and actuation divisions.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four divisions. The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that the channels associated with each division are alternately tested. The 24 month test Frequency is consistent with the refueling cycle and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.4.6.4.3

A system functional test is performed to verify that the mechanical portions of the actuation function operate as designed when demanded. This includes verifying that RWCU/SDC isolation valves and feedwater isolation valves automatically close and that feedwater pump breakers automatically trip. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.4.1 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The 24-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

REFERENCES

1. Section 6.3.

2. Chapter 15.

3. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

4. TSTF-IG-05-02, Implementation Guidance For TSTF-423, Revision {1}, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," {2007}.

5. {Reference for ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.7.1 Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the CRHAVS instrumentation is to initiate appropriate actions to ensure the CRHAVS and control room habitability area (CRHA) boundary provide a protected environment from which occupants can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity, hazardous chemicals, or smoke. The equipment involved with CRHAVS is described in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2, "Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS)."

The safety-related function of the CRHAVS used to control radiation exposure consists of two independent and redundant high efficiency air filtration subsystems, or Emergency Filtration Units (EFUs), for treatment of outside supply air and a CRHA boundary that limits the inleakage of unfiltered air. Upon receipt of a high control room air intake radiation initiation signal (indicative of conditions that could result in radiation exposure to CRHA occupants) or an extended loss of AC power, the CRHAVS automatically switches to the isolation mode of operation to minimize infiltration of contaminated air into the CRHA. A system of dampers isolates the CRHA, the nonsafety-related internal floor mounted air handling units (AHUs) continue to operate to maintain the CRHA temperature, and CRHA makeup air flow is processed through either of the two EFU filter subsystems. If all onsite and offsite AC power is lost, one of the nonsafety-related AHUs and a nonsafety-related recirculating chilled water pump operate for a minimum of two hours using the nonsafety-related Uninterruptible AC Power Supply System to dissipate heat from operation of the nonsafety-related main control room Nonsafety-Related Distributed Control and Instrumentation System (N-DCIS) electrical loads. These nonsafety-related electrical loads are automatically de-energized upon receipt of a CRHA high temperature initiation signal (indicating failure of the redundant nonsafety-related AHUs). During operation of the EFU, the standby selected EFU is automatically started upon receipt of a EFU low flow initiation signal (indicating failure of the normal selected EFU filters or fan to operate) or upon receipt of a high radiation downstream of the EFU filters initiation signal (indicating failure of the EFU filtration function). Controls to manually isolate the CRHA and to manually actuate CRHAVS following indication of a radiological event (indicative of conditions that could result in radiation exposure to CRHA occupants) are provided.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

CRHAVS operation in maintaining CRHA habitability is discussed in Section 6.4 and Section 9.4.1 (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively).

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions." Where LSSS is specified for a variable on which a Safety Limit (SL) has been placed, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a SL is exceeded. The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. Where LSSS is specified for a variable having a significant safety function but which does not protect SLs, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. The Design Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that these automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. These limits (i.e., Analytical Limit and Design Limit) constitute the Setting Basis specified in Table 3.3.7.1-1.

The actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical / Design Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur. The methodology for determining the actual settings, and the required tolerances to maintain these settings conservative to the Analytical / Design Limits, including the requirements for determining that the channel is OPERABLE, are defined in the Setpoint Control Program (SCP), in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, "Setpoint Control Program (SCP)."

The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical / Design Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded (i.e., for Analytical Limits), or that automatic protective actions occur consistent with the design basis (i.e., for Design Limits). As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors that may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

environments). In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded and that automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. As such, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS.

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." For automatic protective devices, the required safety function is to ensure that a SL is not exceeded and that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. Therefore, the NTSP is the LSSS as defined by 10 CFR 50.36. However, use of the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protective device setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule that are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded or that automatic protective actions would initiate consistent with the design basis with the "as-found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the NTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.

Use of the NTSP to define "as-found" OPERABILITY under the expected circumstances described above would result in actions required by both the rule and Technical Specifications that are clearly not warranted. However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This value is specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11, in order to define OPERABILITY of the devices and is designated as the Allowable Value, which is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The actual NTSP values and Allowable Values (derived from the Setting Basis, as specified in Table 3.3.7.1-1) and the

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BACKGROUND (continued)

methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances will be maintained in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11.

The Allowable Value is the least conservative value that the setpoint of the channel can have when tested such that a channel is OPERABLE if the setpoint is found conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Note that, although a channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the established "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned in the setpoint calculation. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount equal to or greater than the "as-found" tolerance value. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will ensure that a SL is not exceeded or that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value the device would be considered inoperable from a Technical Specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.

{The Process Radiation Monitoring System (PRMS) and Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) System controls the initiation signals and logic for CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization. Both PRMS and SSLC are designed to provide a very high degree of assurance to both ensure CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization when required, and prevent inadvertent isolation, actuation, and de-energization. The input and output trip determinations for all CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization functions are based upon a two–out–of–four logic arrangement.

Four separate PRMS (control room air intake radiation - high and EFU outlet radiation – high) or SSLC (EFU air flow – low, extended loss of AC power, and CRHA temperature - high) instrument channels are used to monitor CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization parameters. Signals from sensors are multiplexed at the divisional level and the sensor data is then transmitted to the PRMS and SSLC/ESF digital trip module (DTM) function for setpoint comparison.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The output of each divisional DTM (a trip/no-trip condition) is routed to all four divisional voter logic units (VLU) functions such that each divisional VLU function receives input from each of the four divisions of DTMs.

For maintenance purposes and added reliability, each DTM has a division of sensors bypass such that all instruments in that division will be bypassed in the trip logic at the VLU functions. Thus, each VLU function will be making its trip decision on a two-out-of-three logic basis for each variable. It is possible for only one division of sensors bypass condition to be in effect at any time.

The processed trip signal from its own division and trip signals from the other three divisions are processed in the VLU function for 2-out-of-4 voting. The final trip signal is then transmitted to the Remote Multiplexing Unit (RMU) to initiate mechanical actuation devices. There are two independent and redundant VLU functional channels in each division of the PRMS and SSLC/ESF equipment. The vote logic trip signals from both VLU functional channels are transmitted to the RMU, where a 2-out-of-2 confirmation is performed to initiate the CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization signals. The redundant channels within a division are necessary to prevent single failures within a division from causing an inadvertent CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation; or N-DCIS electrical load de-energization as a result both VLU logics are required to operate to get an output.

For the CRHAVS logic in the PRMS and SSLC, since there is the division of sensor bypass implemented, and there are two channels of 2-out-of-4 VLU logic, no additional division trip logic bypass is implemented in the CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization logic. Each of the two VLU trip outputs is directly applied to one of the two load drivers in series. Both VLU trips are required to prevent inadvertent initiation of CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization. It is undesirable to perform the VLU logic bypass activities with the RMU electrically connected to the dampers, fans, and breakers. The keylock switch that bypasses (disables) the load driver actuation provides effective bypass function required at the actuator level.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The load driver arrangement for actuation of the CRHA isolation dampers, CRHAVS fans and dampers, and N-DCIS electrical load breakers are such that an actuation signal from two division of CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization logic are required to actuate each damper, fan, or breaker.}

This Specification provides OPERABILITY requirements for the CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization instrumentation from the input variable sensors through the DTM function. OPERABILITY requirements for the CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization instrumentation circuitry consisting of VLUs and load drivers are provided by LCO 3.3.7.2, "Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS) Actuation." OPERABILITY requirements for the actuated components are addressed in LCO 3.7.2, "Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS)."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO and APPLICABILITY

The ability of the CRHAVS to maintain habitability of the CRHA is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 15, (Refs. 1 and 3, respectively). The isolation mode of the CRHAVS is assumed to operate following a design basis accident (DBA). The radiological dose to control room personnel as a result of various DBAs is summarized in Reference 3. No single active or passive failure will cause the loss of outside air from the CRHA.

CRHAVS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

The OPERABILITY of the CRHAVS instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.7.1-1. Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints in accordance with the SCP, where appropriate.

The Setting Basis, from which the NTSPs and Allowable Values are derived, is specified for each Function, where appropriate, in Table 3.3.7.1-1. NTSPs and Allowable Values are specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11. The NTSPs are conservative with

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

respect to the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the NTSP, but conservative with respect to its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is non-conservative with respect to its required Allowable Value.

NTSPs are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., control room air intake radiation), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., DTM) changes state. For those LSSS related to variables protecting SLs, the Analytical Limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. For those LSSS related to variables having significant safety functions but which do not protect the SLs, the Design Limits are those settings that must initiate automatic protective actions consistent with the design basis. The Allowable Values are derived from the Analytical Limits, corrected for calibration, process and some of the instrument errors. The NTSPs are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES specified in the Table which may require a CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization to mitigate the consequences of a DBA or transient.

Although there are four channels of CRHAVS instrumentation for each function, only three channels of CRHAVS instrumentation for each function are required to be OPERABLE. The three required channels are those channels associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems – Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is met with three OPERABLE CRHAVS instrumentation channels, and because each CRHAVS instrumentation division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function-by-Function basis.

{1. Control Room Air Intake Radiation – High (per train)

The Control Room Air Intake Radiation Monitoring System within the PRMS consists of four channels per CRHAVS train, or eight total channels. Two sets of four Radiation Detection Assemblies are mounted external to the normal outside air intake duct for the CRHAVS. The Radiation Detection Assemblies continuously monitor the gamma radiation levels in the outside air intake, and a Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High signal from either CRHAVS train will cause automatic actuation of the normal selected CRHAVS train to supply filtered makeup air to the CRHA by opening the normal selected EFU outside air inlet damper, stopping both outside air intake fans, closing the normal outside air intake and both outside air intake fan outlet dampers, and automatically starting the normal selected EFU. In addition, there are eight CRHA isolation dampers in total located as close as possible to the CRHA boundary, including two dampers in series in the single outside air intake line to the CRHA, two dampers in series in the single restroom exhaust line from the CRHA, two dampers in series in the single smoke purge supply line to the CRHA, and two dampers in series in the single smoke purge exhaust line from the CRHA. These eight CRHA isolation dampers close on a Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High signal from either CRHAVS train. The Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to ensure sufficient emergency filtration exists to ensure adequate radiological conditions in the CRHA during the emergency filtration mode of operation.

Three channels of Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High Function per CRHAVS train are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude CRHA isolation and actuation of CRHAVS in the emergency filtration mode of operation.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High signal must be OPERABLE to maintain habitability of the control room following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission-product release.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High signal OPERABLE is not required in MODES 5 or 6, except for other

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, i.e., during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

2. Extended Loss of AC Power (per train)

Upon detection of an extended loss of AC power {to either CRHAVS normal outside air supply train using four channels of loss of power relays on the normal AC power supply to each train}, the normal selected CRHAVS train will automatically actuate to supply filtered makeup air to the CRHA by opening the normal selected EFU outside air inlet damper, stopping both outside air intake fans, closing the normal outside air intake and both outside air intake fan outlet dampers, and automatically starting the normal selected EFU. In addition, there are eight CRHA isolation dampers in total located as close as possible to the CRHA boundary, including two dampers in series in the single outside air intake line to the CRHA, two dampers in series in the single restroom exhaust line from the CRHA, two dampers in series in the single smoke purge supply line to the CRHA, and two dampers in series in the single smoke purge exhaust line from the CRHA. These eight CRHA isolation dampers close on an Extended Loss of AC Power signal from either CRHAVS train. The Extended Loss of AC Power Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to ensure sufficient emergency filtration exists to ensure adequate radiological conditions in the CRHA during the emergency filtration mode of operation.

Three channels of Extended Loss of AC Power Function per CRHAVS train are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude CRHA isolation and actuation of CRHAVS in the emergency filtration mode of operation.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the Extended Loss of AC Power signal must be OPERABLE to maintain habitability of the control room following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission-product release.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Extended Loss of AC Power signal OPERABLE is not required in MODES 5 or 6, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, i.e., during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

3. Emergency Filter Unit (EFU) Air Flow - Low (per train)

Upon detection of EFU Air Flow – Low on the operating CRHAVS train, the operating EFU fan is stopped and the associated EFU inlet and outlet dampers are closed, and the standby selected CRHAVS train is automatically actuated by opening the associated EFU inlet and outlet dampers and starting the standby selected EFU fan.

Three channels of EFU Air Flow – Low Function per CRHAVS train are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude actuation of the standby CRHAVS train.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the EFU Air Flow – Low signal must be OPERABLE to maintain habitability of the control room following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission-product release.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the EFU Air Flow – Low signal OPERABLE is not required in MODES 5 or 6, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, i.e., during OPDRVs.

4. Emergency Filter Unit (EFU) Outlet Radiation - High (per train)

Upon detection of EFU Outlet Radiation - High on the operating CRHAVS train, the operating EFU fan is stopped and the associated EFU inlet and outlet dampers are closed, and the standby selected CRHAVS train is automatically actuated by opening the associated EFU inlet and outlet dampers and starting the standby selected EFU fan.

Three channels of EFU Outlet Radiation - High Function per CRHAVS train are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude actuation of the standby CRHAVS train.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the EFU Outlet Radiation - High signal must be OPERABLE to maintain habitability of the control room following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission-product release.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the EFU Outlet Radiation - High signal OPERABLE is not required in MODES 5 or 6, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, i.e., during OPDRVs.

5. Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Temperature - High

Upon detection of CRHA high temperature, the N-DCIS electrical load in the CRHA is de-energized to limit the heatup of the CRHA when operating in the CRHAVS emergency filtration mode of operation.

Three channels of CRHA Temperature - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude N-DCIS electrical load de-energization upon loss of normal CRHA cooling.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CRHA Temperature - High signal must be OPERABLE to maintain habitability of the control room following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission-product release.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the CRHA Temperature - High signal OPERABLE is not required in MODES 5 or 6, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, i.e., during OPDRVs.}

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS have been modified by a Note to permit separate Condition entry for each CRHAVS instrumentation channel. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable CRHAVS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable CRHAVS instrumentation channel.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1

With one or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, the affected instrumentation division must be verified to be in trip. Tripping the affected instrumentation division places all CRHAVS instrumentation Functions in a one-out-of-two configuration.

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the CRHAVS is capable of actuation in the presence of any single random failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped required channels for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining CRHAVS actuation capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining CRHAVS actuation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that the CRHAVS logic will generate an initiation signal from the given Function on a valid signal.

The Completion Time provides sufficient time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

C.1.1, C.1.2, and C.2

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition A or B are not met, the affected train(s) of CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, or N-DCIS electrical load de-energization may be incapable of automatically performing their safety function in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, immediate actions must be taken to ensure that the CRHA boundary is isolated and an OPERABLE CRHAVS train is placed in the isolation mode, or the associated CRHAVS train(s) are immediately declared inoperable.

Required Action C.1.1 and Required Action C.1.2 require manual isolation of the CRHA boundary and placing an OPERABLE CRHAVS train in the isolation mode, respectively, which accomplishes the safety function of

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

the inoperable channel by ensuring radiological protection of the occupants within the CRHA boundary.

Alternatively, Required Action C.2 requires declaring the associated CRHAVS train(s) inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.7.2. Declaring the associated CRHAVS train(s) inoperable is acceptable, since the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.2 provide appropriate actions for the inoperable components.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

The SRs are modified by a Note. The Note directs the reader to Table 3.3.7.1-1 to determine the correct SRs to perform for each CRHAVS Function.

SR 3.3.7.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 24 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one required channel to a similar parameter on other required channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. {Because the PRMS and SSLC perform a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a CHANNEL CHECK of all instrument channels, and because the PRMS and SSLC perform a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL CHECK may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4. The CHANNEL CHECK every 24 hours supplements

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.7.1.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. {Because the PRMS and SSLC perform a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a functional test of all instrument channels, and because the PRMS and SSLC perform a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant-specific setpoint methodology as specified in the SCP.

The Frequency of 184 days is based on the reliability of the CRHAVS instrumentation channels and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

SR 3.3.7.1.3

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the required channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the required channel adjusted to the NTSP within the "leave alone" tolerance to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the SCP.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

For selected Functions, the SCP provides additional requirements for the evaluation of the performance of required channels. The selected Functions are those Functions whose instruments are not totally mechanical devices. Mechanical devices (e.g., devices which have an "on" or "off" output or an open/close position such as limit switches, float switches, and proximity detectors) are not calibrated in the traditional

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

sense and do not have as-left or as-found conditions that would indicate drift of the component setpoint. These devices are considered not trendable and the requirements of TS 5.5.11.c.1 and TS 5.5.11.c.2 are not applicable to these mechanical components. Where a non-trendable component provides signal input to other channel components that can be trended, the remaining components must be evaluated in accordance with the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.1 evaluation of channel performance is required for the condition where the "as-found" setting for the channel is outside its "as-found" tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. For digital channel components, the "as-found" tolerance may be identical to the "leave alone" tolerance because drift may not be an expected error. In these cases, a channel "as-found" value outside the "leave alone" tolerance may be cause for component assessment. Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will continue to behave in accordance with design basis assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for OPERABILITY.
TS 5.5.11.a requires that the Allowable Values and the methodology for calculating the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.2, the as-left setting for the instrument is required to be returned to within the "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in plant surveillance procedures, the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Analytical / Design Limit is maintained. If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the "leave alone" tolerance, then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the NTSP and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP.

REFERENCES

1. Section 6.4.

2. Section 9.4.1.

3. Section 15.4.

BASES

REFERENCES (continued)

4. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.7.1 Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS) Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the CRHAVS instrumentation is to initiate appropriate actions to ensure the CRHAVS and control room habitability area (CRHA) boundary provide a protected environment from which occupants can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity, hazardous chemicals, or smoke. The equipment involved with CRHAVS is described in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2, "Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS)."

The safety-related function of the CRHAVS used to control radiation exposure consists of two independent and redundant high efficiency air filtration subsystems, or Emergency Filtration Units (EFUs), for treatment of outside supply air and a CRHA boundary that limits the inleakage of unfiltered air. Upon receipt of a high control room air intake radiation initiation signal (indicative of conditions that could result in radiation exposure to CRHA occupants) or an extended loss of AC power, the CRHAVS automatically switches to the isolation mode of operation to minimize infiltration of contaminated air into the CRHA. A system of dampers isolates the CRHA, the nonsafety-related internal floor mounted air handling units (AHUs) continue to operate to maintain the CRHA temperature, and CRHA makeup air flow is processed through either of the two EFU filter subsystems. If all onsite and offsite AC power is lost, one of the nonsafety-related AHUs and a nonsafety-related recirculating chilled water pump operate for a minimum of two hours using the nonsafety-related Uninterruptible AC Power Supply System to dissipate heat from operation of the nonsafety-related main control room Nonsafety-Related Distributed Control and Instrumentation System (N-DCIS) electrical loads. These nonsafety-related electrical loads are automatically de-energized upon receipt of a CRHA high temperature initiation signal (indicating failure of the redundant nonsafety-related AHUs). During operation of the EFU, the standby selected EFU is automatically started upon receipt of a EFU low flow initiation signal (indicating failure of the normal selected EFU filters or fan to operate) or upon receipt of a high radiation downstream of the EFU filters initiation signal (indicating failure of the EFU filtration function). Controls to manually isolate the CRHA and to manually actuate CRHAVS following indication of a radiological event (indicative of conditions that could result in radiation exposure to CRHA occupants) are provided.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

CRHAVS operation in maintaining CRHA habitability is discussed in Section 6.4 and Section 9.4.1 (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively).

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to contain Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) defined by the regulation as "...settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions." Where LSSS is specified for a variable on which a Safety Limit (SL) has been placed, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a SL is exceeded. The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated, as established by the safety analysis, to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded. Where LSSS is specified for a variable having a significant safety function but which does not protect SLs, the setting must be chosen such that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. The Design Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that these automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. These limits (i.e., Analytical Limit and Design Limit) constitute the Setting Basis specified in Table 3.3.7.1-1.

The actual settings for automatic protective devices must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical / Design Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur. The methodology for determining the actual settings, and the required tolerances to maintain these settings conservative to the Analytical / Design Limits, including the requirements for determining that the channel is OPERABLE, are defined in the Setpoint Control Program (SCP), in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, "Setpoint Control Program (SCP)."

The Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) is a predetermined setting for a protective device chosen to ensure automatic actuation prior to the process variable reaching the Analytical / Design Limit and thus ensuring that the SL would not be exceeded (i.e., for Analytical Limits), or that automatic protective actions occur consistent with the design basis (i.e., for Design Limits). As such, the NTSP accounts for uncertainties in setting the device (e.g., calibration), uncertainties in how the device might actually perform (e.g., repeatability), changes in the point of action of the device over time (e.g., drift during surveillance intervals), and any other factors that may influence its actual performance (e.g., harsh accident

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BACKGROUND (continued)

environments). In this manner, the NTSP ensures that SLs are not exceeded and that automatic protective devices will perform their specified safety function. As such, the NTSP meets the definition of an LSSS.

Technical Specifications contain values related to the OPERABILITY of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. OPERABLE is defined in Technical Specifications as "...being capable of performing its safety function(s)." For automatic protective devices, the required safety function is to ensure that a SL is not exceeded and that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis. Therefore, the NTSP is the LSSS as defined by 10 CFR 50.36. However, use of the NTSP to define OPERABILITY in Technical Specifications would be an overly restrictive requirement if it were applied as an OPERABILITY limit for the "as-found" value of a protective device setting during a Surveillance. This would result in Technical Specification compliance problems, as well as reports and corrective actions required by the rule that are not necessary to ensure safety. For example, an automatic protective device with a setting that has been found to be different from the NTSP due to some drift of the setting may still be OPERABLE since drift is to be expected. This expected drift would have been specifically accounted for in the setpoint methodology for calculating the NTSP and thus the automatic protective action would still have ensured that the SL would not be exceeded or that automatic protective actions would initiate consistent with the design basis with the "as-found" setting of the protective device. Therefore, the device would still be OPERABLE since it would have performed its safety function and the only corrective action required would be to reset the device to the NTSP to account for further drift during the next surveillance interval.

Use of the NTSP to define "as-found" OPERABILITY under the expected circumstances described above would result in actions required by both the rule and Technical Specifications that are clearly not warranted. However, there is also some point beyond which the device would have not been able to perform its function due, for example, to greater than expected drift. This value is specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11, in order to define OPERABILITY of the devices and is designated as the Allowable Value, which is the least conservative value of the as-found setpoint that a channel can have during CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The actual NTSP values and Allowable Values (derived from the Setting Basis, as specified in Table 3.3.7.1-1) and the

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BACKGROUND (continued)

methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances will be maintained in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11.

The Allowable Value is the least conservative value that the setpoint of the channel can have when tested such that a channel is OPERABLE if the setpoint is found conservative with respect to the Allowable Value during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Note that, although a channel is OPERABLE under these circumstances, the setpoint must be left adjusted to a value within the established "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP and confirmed to be operating within the statistical allowances of the uncertainty terms assigned in the setpoint calculation. As such, the Allowable Value differs from the NTSP by an amount equal to or greater than the "as-found" tolerance value. In this manner, the actual setting of the device will ensure that a SL is not exceeded or that automatic protective actions will initiate consistent with the design basis at any given point of time as long as the device has not drifted beyond that expected during the surveillance interval. If the actual setting of the device is found to be non-conservative with respect to the Allowable Value the device would be considered inoperable from a Technical Specification perspective. This requires corrective action including those actions required by 10 CFR 50.36 when automatic protective devices do not function as required.

{The Process Radiation Monitoring System (PRMS) and Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) System controls the initiation signals and logic for CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization. Both PRMS and SSLC are designed to provide a very high degree of assurance to both ensure CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization when required, and prevent inadvertent isolation, actuation, and de-energization. The input and output trip determinations for all CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization functions are based upon a two–out–of–four logic arrangement.

Four separate PRMS (control room air intake radiation - high and EFU outlet radiation – high) or SSLC (EFU air flow – low, extended loss of AC power, and CRHA temperature - high) instrument channels are used to monitor CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization parameters. Signals from sensors are multiplexed at the divisional level and the sensor data is then transmitted to the PRMS and SSLC/ESF digital trip module (DTM) function for setpoint comparison.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The output of each divisional DTM (a trip/no-trip condition) is routed to all four divisional voter logic units (VLU) functions such that each divisional VLU function receives input from each of the four divisions of DTMs.

For maintenance purposes and added reliability, each DTM has a division of sensors bypass such that all instruments in that division will be bypassed in the trip logic at the VLU functions. Thus, each VLU function will be making its trip decision on a two-out-of-three logic basis for each variable. It is possible for only one division of sensors bypass condition to be in effect at any time.

The processed trip signal from its own division and trip signals from the other three divisions are processed in the VLU function for 2-out-of-4 voting. The final trip signal is then transmitted to the Remote Multiplexing Unit (RMU) to initiate mechanical actuation devices. There are two independent and redundant VLU functional channels in each division of the PRMS and SSLC/ESF equipment. The vote logic trip signals from both VLU functional channels are transmitted to the RMU, where a 2-out-of-2 confirmation is performed to initiate the CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization signals. The redundant channels within a division are necessary to prevent single failures within a division from causing an inadvertent CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation; or N-DCIS electrical load de-energization as a result both VLU logics are required to operate to get an output.

For the CRHAVS logic in the PRMS and SSLC, since there is the division of sensor bypass implemented, and there are two channels of 2-out-of-4 VLU logic, no additional division trip logic bypass is implemented in the CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization logic. Each of the two VLU trip outputs is directly applied to one of the two load drivers in series. Both VLU trips are required to prevent inadvertent initiation of CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization. It is undesirable to perform the VLU logic bypass activities with the RMU electrically connected to the dampers, fans, and breakers. The keylock switch that bypasses (disables) the load driver actuation provides effective bypass function required at the actuator level.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The load driver arrangement for actuation of the CRHA isolation dampers, CRHAVS fans and dampers, and N-DCIS electrical load breakers are such that an actuation signal from two division of CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization logic are required to actuate each damper, fan, or breaker.}

This Specification provides OPERABILITY requirements for the CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization instrumentation from the input variable sensors through the DTM function. OPERABILITY requirements for the CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization instrumentation circuitry consisting of VLUs and load drivers are provided by LCO 3.3.7.2, "Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS) Actuation." OPERABILITY requirements for the actuated components are addressed in LCO 3.7.2, "Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS)."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO and APPLICABILITY

The ability of the CRHAVS to maintain habitability of the CRHA is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 15, (Refs. 1 and 3, respectively). The isolation mode of the CRHAVS is assumed to operate following a design basis accident (DBA). The radiological dose to control room personnel as a result of various DBAs is summarized in Reference 3. No single active or passive failure will cause the loss of outside air from the CRHA.

CRHAVS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

The OPERABILITY of the CRHAVS instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.7.1-1. Each Function must have the required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints in accordance with the SCP, where appropriate.

The Setting Basis, from which the NTSPs and Allowable Values are derived, is specified for each Function, where appropriate, in Table 3.3.7.1-1. NTSPs and Allowable Values are specified in the SCP, as required by Specification 5.5.11. The NTSPs are conservative with

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

respect to the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the NTSP, but conservative with respect to its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is non-conservative with respect to its required Allowable Value.

NTSPs are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., control room air intake radiation), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., DTM) changes state. For those LSSS related to variables protecting SLs, the Analytical Limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. For those LSSS related to variables having significant safety functions but which do not protect the SLs, the Design Limits are those settings that must initiate automatic protective actions consistent with the design basis. The Allowable Values are derived from the Analytical Limits, corrected for calibration, process and some of the instrument errors. The NTSPs are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES specified in the Table which may require a CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, and N-DCIS electrical load de-energization to mitigate the consequences of a DBA or transient.

Although there are four channels of CRHAVS instrumentation for each function, only three channels of CRHAVS instrumentation for each function are required to be OPERABLE. The three required channels are those channels associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems – Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is met with three OPERABLE CRHAVS instrumentation channels, and because each CRHAVS instrumentation division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function-by-Function basis.

{1. Control Room Air Intake Radiation – High (per train)

The Control Room Air Intake Radiation Monitoring System within the PRMS consists of four channels per CRHAVS train, or eight total channels. Two sets of four Radiation Detection Assemblies are mounted external to the normal outside air intake duct for the CRHAVS. The Radiation Detection Assemblies continuously monitor the gamma radiation levels in the outside air intake, and a Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High signal from either CRHAVS train will cause automatic actuation of the normal selected CRHAVS train to supply filtered makeup air to the CRHA by opening the normal selected EFU outside air inlet damper, stopping both outside air intake fans, closing the normal outside air intake and both outside air intake fan outlet dampers, and automatically starting the normal selected EFU. In addition, there are eight CRHA isolation dampers in total located as close as possible to the CRHA boundary, including two dampers in series in the single outside air intake line to the CRHA, two dampers in series in the single restroom exhaust line from the CRHA, two dampers in series in the single smoke purge supply line to the CRHA, and two dampers in series in the single smoke purge exhaust line from the CRHA. These eight CRHA isolation dampers close on a Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High signal from either CRHAVS train. The Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to ensure sufficient emergency filtration exists to ensure adequate radiological conditions in the CRHA during the emergency filtration mode of operation.

Three channels of Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High Function per CRHAVS train are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude CRHA isolation and actuation of CRHAVS in the emergency filtration mode of operation.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High signal must be OPERABLE to maintain habitability of the control room following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission-product release.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Control Room Air Intake Radiation - High signal OPERABLE is not required in MODES 5 or 6, except for other

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, i.e., during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

2. Extended Loss of AC Power (per train)

Upon detection of an extended loss of AC power {to either CRHAVS normal outside air supply train using four channels of loss of power relays on the normal AC power supply to each train}, the normal selected CRHAVS train will automatically actuate to supply filtered makeup air to the CRHA by opening the normal selected EFU outside air inlet damper, stopping both outside air intake fans, closing the normal outside air intake and both outside air intake fan outlet dampers, and automatically starting the normal selected EFU. In addition, there are eight CRHA isolation dampers in total located as close as possible to the CRHA boundary, including two dampers in series in the single outside air intake line to the CRHA, two dampers in series in the single restroom exhaust line from the CRHA, two dampers in series in the single smoke purge supply line to the CRHA, and two dampers in series in the single smoke purge exhaust line from the CRHA. These eight CRHA isolation dampers close on an Extended Loss of AC Power signal from either CRHAVS train. The Extended Loss of AC Power Analytical / Design Limit is chosen to ensure sufficient emergency filtration exists to ensure adequate radiological conditions in the CRHA during the emergency filtration mode of operation.

Three channels of Extended Loss of AC Power Function per CRHAVS train are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude CRHA isolation and actuation of CRHAVS in the emergency filtration mode of operation.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the Extended Loss of AC Power signal must be OPERABLE to maintain habitability of the control room following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission-product release.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Extended Loss of AC Power signal OPERABLE is not required in MODES 5 or 6, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, i.e., during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

3. Emergency Filter Unit (EFU) Air Flow - Low (per train)

Upon detection of EFU Air Flow – Low on the operating CRHAVS train, the operating EFU fan is stopped and the associated EFU inlet and outlet dampers are closed, and the standby selected CRHAVS train is automatically actuated by opening the associated EFU inlet and outlet dampers and starting the standby selected EFU fan.

Three channels of EFU Air Flow – Low Function per CRHAVS train are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude actuation of the standby CRHAVS train.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the EFU Air Flow – Low signal must be OPERABLE to maintain habitability of the control room following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission-product release.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the EFU Air Flow – Low signal OPERABLE is not required in MODES 5 or 6, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, i.e., during OPDRVs.

4. Emergency Filter Unit (EFU) Outlet Radiation - High (per train)

Upon detection of EFU Outlet Radiation - High on the operating CRHAVS train, the operating EFU fan is stopped and the associated EFU inlet and outlet dampers are closed, and the standby selected CRHAVS train is automatically actuated by opening the associated EFU inlet and outlet dampers and starting the standby selected EFU fan.

Three channels of EFU Outlet Radiation - High Function per CRHAVS train are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude actuation of the standby CRHAVS train.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the EFU Outlet Radiation - High signal must be OPERABLE to maintain habitability of the control room following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission-product release.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the EFU Outlet Radiation - High signal OPERABLE is not required in MODES 5 or 6, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, i.e., during OPDRVs.

5. Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Temperature - High

Upon detection of CRHA high temperature, the N-DCIS electrical load in the CRHA is de-energized to limit the heatup of the CRHA when operating in the CRHAVS emergency filtration mode of operation.

Three channels of CRHA Temperature - High Function are required to be OPERABLE to ensure no single instrument failure will preclude N-DCIS electrical load de-energization upon loss of normal CRHA cooling.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CRHA Temperature - High signal must be OPERABLE to maintain habitability of the control room following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission-product release.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the CRHA Temperature - High signal OPERABLE is not required in MODES 5 or 6, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, i.e., during OPDRVs.}

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS have been modified by a Note to permit separate Condition entry for each CRHAVS instrumentation channel. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable CRHAVS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable CRHAVS instrumentation channel.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1

With one or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, the affected instrumentation division must be verified to be in trip. Tripping the affected instrumentation division places all CRHAVS instrumentation Functions in a one-out-of-two configuration.

Operation in the one-out-of-two configuration may continue indefinitely. In this configuration, the CRHAVS is capable of actuation in the presence of any single random failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

B.1

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped required channels for the same Function result in the Function not maintaining CRHAVS actuation capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining CRHAVS actuation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that the CRHAVS logic will generate an initiation signal from the given Function on a valid signal.

The Completion Time provides sufficient time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

C.1.1, C.1.2, and C.2

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition A or B are not met, the affected train(s) of CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, or N-DCIS electrical load de-energization may be incapable of automatically performing their safety function in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, immediate actions must be taken to ensure that the CRHA boundary is isolated and an OPERABLE CRHAVS train is placed in the isolation mode, or the associated CRHAVS train(s) are immediately declared inoperable.

Required Action C.1.1 and Required Action C.1.2 require manual isolation of the CRHA boundary and placing an OPERABLE CRHAVS train in the isolation mode, respectively, which accomplishes the safety function of

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

the inoperable channel by ensuring radiological protection of the occupants within the CRHA boundary.

Alternatively, Required Action C.2 requires declaring the associated CRHAVS train(s) inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.7.2. Declaring the associated CRHAVS train(s) inoperable is acceptable, since the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.2 provide appropriate actions for the inoperable components.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

The SRs are modified by a Note. The Note directs the reader to Table 3.3.7.1-1 to determine the correct SRs to perform for each CRHAVS Function.

SR 3.3.7.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 24 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one required channel to a similar parameter on other required channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. {Because the PRMS and SSLC perform a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a CHANNEL CHECK of all instrument channels, and because the PRMS and SSLC perform a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL CHECK may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4. The CHANNEL CHECK every 24 hours supplements

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.7.1.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. {Because the PRMS and SSLC perform a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis including a functional test of all instrument channels, and because the PRMS and SSLC perform a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant-specific setpoint methodology as specified in the SCP.

The Frequency of 184 days is based on the reliability of the CRHAVS instrumentation channels and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

SR 3.3.7.1.3

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the required channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the required channel adjusted to the NTSP within the "leave alone" tolerance to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the SCP.

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 4.

For selected Functions, the SCP provides additional requirements for the evaluation of the performance of required channels. The selected Functions are those Functions whose instruments are not totally mechanical devices. Mechanical devices (e.g., devices which have an "on" or "off" output or an open/close position such as limit switches, float switches, and proximity detectors) are not calibrated in the traditional

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

sense and do not have as-left or as-found conditions that would indicate drift of the component setpoint. These devices are considered not trendable and the requirements of TS 5.5.11.c.1 and TS 5.5.11.c.2 are not applicable to these mechanical components. Where a non-trendable component provides signal input to other channel components that can be trended, the remaining components must be evaluated in accordance with the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.1 evaluation of channel performance is required for the condition where the "as-found" setting for the channel is outside its "as-found" tolerance but conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. For digital channel components, the "as-found" tolerance may be identical to the "leave alone" tolerance because drift may not be an expected error. In these cases, a channel "as-found" value outside the "leave alone" tolerance may be cause for component assessment. Evaluation of instrument performance will verify that the instrument will continue to behave in accordance with design basis assumptions. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure confidence in the instrument performance prior to returning the instrument to service. These channels will also be identified in the Corrective Action Program. Entry into the Corrective Action Program will ensure required review and documentation of the condition for OPERABILITY.
TS 5.5.11.a requires that the Allowable Values and the methodology for calculating the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP. As indicated in TS 5.5.11.c.2, the as-left setting for the instrument is required to be returned to within the "leave alone" tolerance of the NTSP. Where a setpoint more conservative than the NTSP is used in plant surveillance procedures, the "leave alone" and "as-found" tolerances, as applicable, will be applied to the surveillance procedure setpoint. This will ensure that sufficient margin to the Analytical / Design Limit is maintained. If the as-left instrument setting cannot be returned to a setting within the "leave alone" tolerance, then the instrument channel shall be declared inoperable. TS 5.5.11.a requires that the NTSP and the methodology for calculating the "leave alone" and the "as-found" tolerances be in the SCP.

REFERENCES

1. Section 6.4.

2. Section 9.4.1.

3. Section 15.4.

BASES

REFERENCES (continued)

4. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.7.2 Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS) Actuation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the CRHAVS actuation logic is to initiate appropriate actions to ensure the CRHAVS and control room habitability area (CRHA) boundary provide a protected environment from which occupants can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity, hazardous chemicals, or smoke. The equipment involved with CRHAVS is described in the Bases for LCO 3.7.2, "Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS)."

This specification addresses OPERABILITY of the CRHAVS actuation circuitry from the outputs of the Digital Trip Modules (DTMs) through the load drivers (LDs) that consists of voter logic units (VLUs) and the LDs associated with the CRHAVS. Operability requirements associated with the CRHAVS instrumentation channels are provided in LCO 3.3.7.1, "Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS) Instrumentation." Operability requirements for actuated components (i.e., dampers and valves) are addressed in LCO 3.7.2, "Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS)."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO and APPLICABILITY

The ability of the CRHAVS to maintain habitability of the CRHA is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 15, (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively). The isolation mode of the CRHAVS is assumed to operate following a design basis accident (DBA). The radiological dose to control room occupants as a result of various DBAs is summarized in Reference 2. No single active or passive failure will cause the loss of outside air from the CRHA.

CRHAVS actuation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

CRHAVS actuation supports OPERABILITY of the CRHAVS Instrumentation, LCO 3.3.7.1, "Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS) Instrumentation," and therefore is required to be OPERABLE. This Specification addresses OPERABILITY of the CRHAVS actuation circuitry from the outputs of the DTMs through the LDs, which covers the VLUs

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

and the LDs associated with the CRHA isolation dampers, CRHAVS Emergency Filtration Unit (EFU) fans and isolation dampers, and Nonsafety-Related Distributed Control and Instrumentation System (N-DCIS) electrical load breakers.

Although there are four divisions of CRHAVS actuation, only three CRHAVS actuation divisions are required to be OPERABLE. The three required divisions are those divisions associated with the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems – Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown." This is acceptable because the single-failure criterion is met with three OPERABLE CRHAVS actuation divisions, and because each CRHAVS actuation division is associated with and receives power from only one of the four electrical divisions.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the CRHAVS must be OPERABLE to maintain habitability of the control room following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission-product release.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the CRHAVS OPERABLE is not required in MODE 5 or 6, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, i.e., during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS

A.1

Condition A exists when one required CRHAVS actuation division is inoperable. In this Condition, CRHAVS actuation still maintains actuation trip capability, but cannot accommodate a single failure. The 12 hour Completion Time is sufficient to perform Required Action A.1 and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

Alternately, if it is not desired to restore the required actuation division to OPERABLE status, Condition C would be entered and its Required Action taken when the Completion Time of Required Action A.1 expires.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

Condition B exists when two or more required actuation divisions are inoperable. In this Condition, a loss of CRHAVS actuation capability occurs. CRHAVS automatic actuation capability is considered to be maintained when sufficient actuation divisions are OPERABLE or in trip such that the CRHAVS logic will generate an actuation signal on a valid signal. Required Action B.1 limits the time the loss of CRHAVS actuation capability exists. Therefore, CRHAVS actuation capability must be restored to OPERABLE within 1 hour.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

C.1.1, C.1.2, and C.2

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition A or B are not met, the affected train(s) of CRHA isolation, CRHAVS actuation, or N-DCIS electrical load de-energization may be incapable of automatically performing their safety function in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, immediate actions must be taken to ensure that the CRHA boundary is isolated and an OPERABLE CRHAVS train is placed in the isolation mode, or the associated CRHAVS train(s) are immediately declared inoperable.

Required Action C.1.1 and Required Action C.1.2 require manual isolation of the CRHA boundary and placing an OPERABLE CRHAVS train in the isolation mode, respectively, which accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channel by ensuring radiological protection of the occupants within the CRHA boundary.

Alternatively, Required Action C.2 requires declaring the associated CRHAVS train(s) inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.7.2. Declaring the associated CRHAVS train(s) inoperable is acceptable, since the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.2 provide appropriate actions for the inoperable components.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.7.2.1

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required CRHAVS logic for a specific channel. {Because the Process Radiation Monitoring System (PRMS) and Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) actuation logic systems perform a diagnostic self-test on a continuous basis, including portions of a LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and because the PRMS and SSLC actuation logic systems perform a diagnostic self-check (watchdog system) of the self-test feature to ensure the self-test is functioning properly, portions of the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by review of the system self-test report.}

The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS for four divisions alternates between the combinations for actuation of the load drivers over 4 refueling intervals.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. Section 6.4.

2. Section 15.4.

3. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.1 Safety Relief Valves (SRVs)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Ref. 1) requires the Reactor Pressure Vessel be protected from overpressure during upset conditions by self-actuated safety valves. As part of the nuclear pressure relief system, the size and number of SRVs are selected such that peak pressure in the nuclear system will not exceed the ASME Code limits for the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The ESBWR steam relief capacity is designed to satisfy both ASME Code Level B (upset) overpressure protection, and Level C (emergency) design service limits. This LCO addresses only those requirements for operability of the vessel overpressure protection that satisfy the Level B service limit.

The SRVs are located on the main steam lines between the reactor vessel and the first isolation valve within the drywell. Although all eighteen SRVs are capable of functioning in the system pressurization safety mode, only the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) SRV setpoints meet the acceptance criteria of SR 3.4.1.1. In the safety mode, the direct action of the steam pressure in the main steam lines will act against a spring-loaded disk that will pop open when the valve inlet pressure exceeds the spring force and the frictional forces acting against the inlet steam pressure at the main or pilot disk.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The overpressure protection system must accommodate the most severe pressure transient. Evaluations have determined that the most severe Level B pressure transient is the closure of all main steamline isolation valves (MSIVs) followed by reactor scram on high neutron flux (i.e., failure of the direct scram associated with MSIV position) (Ref. 2). The analysis results demonstrate that the design capacity of one SRV is capable of maintaining reactor pressure below the ASME Code limit of 110% of vessel design pressure, i.e., 110% x 8.62 MPaG (1250 psig) = 9.48 MPaG (1375 psig). This LCO helps to ensure that the acceptance limit of 9.48 MPaG (1375 psig) is met during the design basis event.

The additional events discussed in Reference 3 are not expected to actuate the SRVs. From an overpressure standpoint, these events are bounded by the MSIV closure with flux scram event described above.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Safety/relief valves satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The results of the overpressure analysis provided in Reference 2 demonstrate that one SRV is required to function in the safety mode to meet ASME overpressure protection. Therefore, to satisfy the design basis overpressure event (including provision for single failure), two SRVs are required to be OPERABLE. The requirements of this LCO are applicable only to the capability of the SRVs to mechanically open in the safety mode to relieve excess pressure.

The SRV setpoints are established to ensure the ASME Code limit on peak reactor pressure is satisfied. The ASME Code specifications require the lowest safety valve be set at or below vessel design pressure, i.e., 8.62 MPaG (1250 psig), and the highest safety valve is set so the total accumulated pressure does not exceed 110% of the design pressure for conditions. The transient evaluations in Reference 3 assume that the SRV setpoints are at conservatively high values above the nominal setpoints to account for initial setpoint errors and any setpoint drift that might occur during operation.

Operation with fewer valves OPERABLE than specified, or with setpoints greater than specified, could result in a more severe reactor response to a transient than predicted, possibly resulting in the ASME Code limit on reactor pressure being exceeded.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4, the specified number of SRVs must be OPERABLE because there may be considerable energy in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients are assumed to occur.

In MODE 5, reactor pressure is low enough that the overpressure limit is not likely to be approached by assumed operational transients or accidents. In MODE 6, the reactor vessel head is unbolted or removed and the reactor is at atmospheric pressure. Therefore, the SRV function is not required by LCO 3.4.1 during these conditions.

ACTIONS

A.1

With the safety mode of one required SRV inoperable, the remaining operable SRV is capable of providing the necessary overpressure

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

protection. However, the overall reliability of the pressure relief system is reduced because additional failure of the remaining OPERABLE SRV could result in failure to adequately relieve pressure during an overpressure event. For this reason, continued operation is permitted for a limited time only.

The 14-day Completion Time to restore the inoperable required SRV to OPERABLE status is based on the relief capability of the remaining SRV, the low probability of an event requiring SRV actuation, and a reasonable time to complete the Required Action.

B.1

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 5 is followed.

C.1 and C.2

With less than the minimum number of required SRVs OPERABLE, a transient may result in violation of the ASME Code limit on reactor pressure. In this Condition, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.1.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that the required SRVs will open at the pressures assumed in the safety analysis of Reference 2. Although all eighteen SRVs are capable of functioning in the system pressurization safety mode, only the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) SRV setpoints meet the acceptance criteria of SR 3.4.1.1.

The demonstration of the SRV safety mode lift settings is a bench test and must be performed during shutdown. The SRV setpoint is ± 3% for OPERABILITY and the valves are reset to ± 1% during the Surveillance.

The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

REFERENCES

1. ASME, *Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code*, Section III.

2. Section 5.2.

3. Chapter 15.

4. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

5. TSTF-IG-05-02, "Implementation Guidance for TSTF-423, Revision {1}, 'Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A,'" {2007}.

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.2 RCS Operational LEAKAGE

BASES

BACKGROUND

The RCS includes systems and components that contain or transport the coolant to or from the reactor core. The pressure containing components of the RCS and the portions of connecting systems out to and including the isolation valves define the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The joints of the RCPB components are welded unless applicable codes permit flanged or threaded joints.

During plant life, the joint and valve interfaces can produce varying amounts of reactor coolant LEAKAGE, through either normal operational wear or mechanical deterioration. Limits on RCS operational LEAKAGE are required to ensure appropriate action is taken before the integrity of the RCPB is impaired. This LCO specifies the types and limits of LEAKAGE.

This protects the RCS pressure boundary described in 10 CFR 50.2, 10 CFR 50.55a(c) and GDC 55 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A (Ref. 1, 2, and 3). 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 30 (Ref. 4), requires means for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the source of reactor coolant LEAKAGE. Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Ref. 5) describes acceptable methods for selecting Leakage Detection Systems.

The safety significance of leaks from the RCPB varies widely depending on the source, rate, and duration. Therefore, detection of LEAKAGE in the primary containment is necessary. Methods for quickly separating the identified LEAKAGE from the unidentified LEAKAGE are necessary to provide the operators quantitative information to permit them to take corrective action should a leak occur detrimental to the safety of the facility or the public.

A limited amount of leakage inside primary containment is expected from auxiliary systems that cannot be made 100% leak tight. Leakage from these systems should be detected and isolated from the primary containment atmosphere, if possible, so as not to mask RCS operational LEAKAGE detection.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

This LCO deals with protection of the RCPB from degradation and the core from inadequate cooling, in addition to preventing the accident analyses radiation release assumptions from being exceeded. The consequences of violating this LCO include the possibility of a loss-of-coolant accident.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The allowable RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The normally expected background LEAKAGE due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system LEAKAGE were also considered. The evidence from experiments suggests, for LEAKAGE even greater than the specified unidentified LEAKAGE limits, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such LEAKAGE would grow rapidly.

The unidentified LEAKAGE flow limit allows time for corrective action before the RCPB could be significantly compromised. The 19 L/min (5 gpm) limit is a small fraction of the calculated flow from a critical crack in the primary system piping. Crack behavior from experimental programs (Refs. 6 and 7) shows leak rates of hundreds of Liters per minute (hundreds of gpm) will precede crack instability (Ref. 8).

No applicable safety analysis assumes the total LEAKAGE limit. The total LEAKAGE limit considers RCS inventory makeup capability and drywell floor sump capacity.

RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

a. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE

No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material degradation. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets are not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.

BASES

LCO (continued)

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE

The unidentified LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the drywell air monitoring, drywell sump level monitoring, and drywell air cooler condensate flow rate monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.

c. Total LEAKAGE

The total LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount. The limit also accounts for LEAKAGE from known sources (identified LEAKAGE). Violation of this LCO indicates an unexpected amount of LEAKAGE and, therefore, could indicate new or additional degradation in an RCPB component or system.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the RCS operational LEAKAGE LCO applies because the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the reactor is pressurized.

In MODES 5, and 6, compliance with the RCS operational LEAKAGE limits is not required because the reactor is not pressurized and stresses in the RCPB materials and potential for LEAKAGE are reduced.

ACTIONS

A.1

With RCS LEAKAGE greater than the limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE, actions must be taken to reduce LEAKAGE to within limits. Because the LEAKAGE limits are conservatively below the LEAKAGE that would constitute a critical crack size, 4 hours are allowed to verify the source and reduce the LEAKAGE rates before the reactor must be shut down. A change in unidentified LEAKAGE that has been identified and quantified may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE. However, the total LEAKAGE limit would remain unchanged. The 4-hour Completion Time is needed to properly verify the source and reduce the LEAKAGE before the reactor must be shut down.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours, and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.2.1

The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to provide alarms when LEAKAGE is indicated and to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.3.4.1, “RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation.” Sump level and flow rate are typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates. However, any method may be used to quantify LEAKAGE within the guidelines of Reference 5. In conjunction with alarms and other administrative controls, a 12-hour Frequency for this Surveillance is appropriate for identifying changes in LEAKAGE and for tracking required trends (Ref. 9).

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.2.
2. 10 CFR 50.55a(c).
3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Section V, GDC 55.
4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Section IV, GDC 30.
5. Regulatory Guide 1.45.
6. NEDO-21000, July 1975.

BASES

REFERENCES (continued)

7. NUREG-75/067, October 1975.

8. Section 5.2.5.

9. Generic Letter 88-01, Supplement 1.

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.3 RCS Specific Activity

BASES

BACKGROUND

During circulation, the reactor coolant acquires radioactive materials due to release of fission-products from fuel leaks into the coolant and activation of corrosion products in the reactor coolant. These radioactive materials in the coolant can plate out in the RCS, and, at times, an accumulation will break away to spike the normal level of radioactivity. The release of coolant during an accident could send radioactive materials into the environment.

Limits on the maximum allowable level of radioactivity in the reactor coolant are established to ensure, in the event of a release of any radioactive material to the environment during an accident, radiation doses are maintained within the limits of 10 CFR 50 (Ref. 1).

This LCO contains iodine specific activity limits. The iodine isotopic activities per gram of reactor coolant are expressed in terms of a DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131. The allowable levels are intended to limit the 2-hour radiation dose to an individual at the site boundary to within the 10 CFR 50 limit.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Analytical methods and assumptions involving radioactive material in the primary coolant are presented in Reference 2. The specific activity in the reactor coolant (the source term) is an initial condition for evaluation of the consequences of an accident due to a main steam line break (MSLB) outside containment. No fuel damage is postulated in the MSLB accident, and the release of radioactive material to the environment is assumed to end when the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) close completely.

This MSLB release forms the basis for determining offsite doses (Ref. 2). The limits on the specific activity of the primary coolant ensure that the 2 hour Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) doses at the site boundary, resulting from a MSLB outside containment during steady state operations, will not exceed the dose guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.183 (Ref. 3).

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The limits on specific activity are values from a parametric evaluation of typical site locations. These limits are conservative because the evaluation considered more restrictive parameters than for a specific site, such as the location of the site boundary and the meteorological conditions of the site.

RCS specific activity satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The specific iodine activity is limited to ≤ 7400 Bq/gm (0.2 μCi/gm) DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131. This limit ensures the source term assumed in the safety analysis for the MSLB is not exceeded, so any release of radioactivity to the environment during an MSLB is less than the Regulatory Guide 1.183 limits.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 1, and MODES 2, 3, and 4 with any main steam line not isolated, limits on the primary coolant radioactivity are applicable because there is an escape path for release of radioactive material from the primary coolant to the environment in the event of an MSLB outside of primary containment.

In MODES 2, 3, and 4, with the MSIVs closed, such limits do not apply because an escape path does not exist. In MODES 5 and 6, no limits are required because the reactor is not pressurized and the potential for leakage is reduced.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

When the reactor coolant specific activity exceeds the LCO DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 limit, but is ≤ 148,000 Bq/gm (4.0 μCi/gm), samples must be analyzed for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 at least once every 4 hours. In addition, the specific activity must be restored to the LCO limit within 48 hours. The Completion Time of once every 4 hours is the time needed to take and analyze a sample. The 48-hour Completion Time to restore the activity level provides a reasonable time for temporary coolant activity increases (iodine spikes or crud bursts) to be cleaned up with the normal processing systems.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

If the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 cannot be restored to ≤ 7400 Bq/gm (0.2 μCi/gm) within 48 hours, or if at any time it is > 148,000 Bq/gm (4.0 μCi/gm), it must be determined at least every 4 hours and all the main steam lines must be isolated within 12 hours. Isolating the main steam lines precludes the possibility of releasing radioactive material to the environment in an amount that is more than the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.183 during a postulated MSLB accident.

The Completion Time of once every 4 hours is the time needed to take and analyze a sample. The 12-hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to isolate the main steam lines in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.3.1

This Surveillance is performed to ensure iodine remains within limit during normal operation. The 7 day Frequency is adequate to trend changes in the iodine activity level.

This SR is modified by a Note that requires this Surveillance to be performed only in MODE 1 because the level of fission products generated in other MODES is much less.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.34.

2. Section 15.4.5.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.183, “Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants,” July 2000.

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.4 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits

BASES

BACKGROUND

All components of the RCS are designed to withstand effects of cyclic loads due to system pressure and temperature changes. These loads are introduced by startup (heatup) and shutdown (cooldown) operations, power transients, and reactor trips. This LCO limits the pressure and temperature changes during RCS heatup and cooldown, within the design assumptions and the stress limits for cyclic operation.

The PTLR contains P/T limit curves for heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and data for the maximum rate of change of reactor coolant temperature. The heatup curve provides limits for both heatup and criticality.

Each P/T limit curve defines an acceptable region for normal operation. The usual use of the curves is operational guidance during heatup or cooldown maneuvering, when pressure and temperature indications are monitored and compared to the applicable curve to determine that operation is within the allowable region.

The LCO establishes operating limits that provide a margin to brittle failure of the reactor vessel and piping of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The vessel is the component of most concern in regard to brittle failure. Therefore, the LCO limits apply mainly to the vessel.

10 CFR50, Appendix G (Ref. 1), requires the establishment of P/T limits for material fracture toughness requirements of the RCPB materials. Reference 1 requires an adequate margin to brittle failure during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and system hydrostatic tests. It mandates the use of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, Section III, Appendix G (Ref. 2).

The actual shift in the Reference Temperature, Nil-Ductility Transition (RTNDT) of the vessel material will be established periodically by removing and evaluating the irradiated reactor vessel material specimens, in accordance with ASTM E 185 (Ref. 3) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix H (Ref. 4). The operating P/T limit curves will be adjusted as necessary, based on the evaluation findings and the recommendations of Reference 5.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The P/T limit curves are composite curves established by superimposing limits derived from stress analyses of those portions of the reactor vessel and head that are the most restrictive. At any specific pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change, one location within the reactor vessel will dictate the most restrictive limit. Across the span of the P/T limit curves, different locations are more restrictive, and, thus, the curves are composites of the most restrictive regions.

The criticality limits include the Reference 1 requirement that they be at least 22°C (40°F) above the heatup curve or the cooldown curve and not lower than the minimum permissible temperature for the inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.

The consequence of violating the LCO limits is that the RCS has been operated under conditions that can result in brittle failure of the RCPB, possibly leading to a non-isolable leak or loss-of-coolant accident. In the event these limits are exceeded, an evaluation must be performed to determine the effect on the structural integrity of the RCPB components. {The ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6), provides a recommended methodology for evaluating an operating event that causes an excursion outside the limits.}

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The P/T limits are not derived from Design Basis Accident (DBA) analyses. They are prescribed during normal operation to avoid encountering pressure, temperature, and temperature rate-of-change conditions that might cause undetected flaws to propagate and cause non-ductile failure of the RCPB, a condition that is unanalyzed. Reference 7 establishes the methodology for determining the P/T limits. Because the P/T limits are not derived from any DBA, there are no acceptance limits related to the P/T limits. Rather, the P/T limits are acceptance limits themselves because they preclude operation in an unanalyzed condition.

RCS P/T limits satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO

The elements of this LCO are:

a. RCS pressure, temperature, and heatup or cooldown rate are within the limits specified in the PTLR;

b. RCS pressure and temperature are within the criticality limits specified in the PTLR, prior to achieving criticality; and

c. Reactor vessel flange and the head flange temperatures are within the limits of the PTLR when tensioning reactor vessel head bolting studs.

These limits define allowable operating regions and permit a large number of operating cycles while also providing a wide margin to non-ductile failure.

The temperature rate-of-change limits control the thermal gradient through the vessel wall and are used as inputs for calculating the heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing P/T limit curves. Thus, the LCO for the rate-of-change of temperature restricts stresses caused by thermal gradients and also ensures the validity of the P/T limit curves.

Violation of the limits places the reactor vessel outside of the bounds of the stress analyses and can increase stresses in other RCS components. The consequences depend on several factors, as follow:

a. The severity of the departure from the allowable operating pressure temperature regime or the severity of the rate-of-change of temperature;

b. The length of time the limits were violated (longer violations allow the temperature gradient in the thick vessel walls to become more pronounced); and

c. The existence, size, and orientation of flaws in the vessel material.

BASES

APPLICABILITY

The potential for violating a P/T limit exists at all times. For example, P/T limit violations could result from ambient temperature conditions that result in the reactor vessel metal temperature being less than the minimum allowed temperature for boltup. Therefore, this LCO is applicable even when fuel is not loaded in the core.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

Operation outside the P/T limits while in MODES 1, 2, 3,or 4 must be corrected so that the RCPB is returned to a condition that has been verified by stress analyses.

The 30-minute Completion Time reflects the urgency of restoring the parameters to within the analyzed range. Most violations will not be severe, and the activity can be accomplished in this time in a controlled manner.

Besides restoring operation within limits, an evaluation is required to determine if RCS operation can continue. The evaluation must verify the RCPB integrity remains acceptable and must be completed if continued operation is desired. Several methods may be used, including comparison with pre-analyzed transients in the stress analyses, new analyses, or inspection of the components.

{ASME Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6), may be used to support the evaluation. However, its use is restricted to evaluation of the vessel beltline.}

The 72-hour Completion Time is reasonable to accomplish the evaluation. The evaluation for a mild violation is possible within this time, but more severe violations may require special, event-specific stress analyses or inspections. A favorable evaluation must be completed if continued operation beyond the 72 hours is desired.

Condition A is modified by a Note requiring Required Action A.2 be completed whenever the Condition is entered. The Note emphasizes the need to perform the evaluation of the effects of the excursion outside the allowable limits. Restoration alone per Required Action A.1 is insufficient because higher than analyzed stresses may have occurred and may have affected the RCPB integrity.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

If a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, the plant must be brought to a lower MODE because either the RCS remained in an unacceptable P/T region for an extended period of increased stress, or a sufficiently severe event caused entry into an unacceptable region. Either possibility indicates a need for more careful examination of the event, best accomplished with the RCS at reduced pressure and temperature. With the reduced pressure and temperature conditions, the possibility of propagation of undetected flaws is decreased.

Pressure and temperature are reduced by bringing the plant to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1 and C.2

Operation outside the P/T limits in other than MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 (including defueled conditions) must be corrected so that the RCPB is returned to a condition that has been verified by stress analyses. The Required Action must be initiated without delay and continued until the limits are restored.

Besides restoring the P/T limit parameters to within limits, an evaluation is required to determine if RCS operation is allowed. This evaluation must verify that the RCPB integrity is acceptable and must be completed before approaching criticality or heating up to > 93.3°C (200°F). Several methods may be used, including comparison with pre-analyzed transients, new analyses, or inspection of the components. {ASME Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6), may be used to support the evaluation; however, its use is restricted to evaluation of the beltline.}

Condition C is modified by a Note requiring Required Action C.2 be completed whenever the Condition is entered. The Note emphasizes the need to perform the evaluation of the effects of the excursion outside the allowable limits. Restoration alone per Required Action C.1 is insufficient because higher than analyzed stresses may have occurred and may have affected the RCPB integrity.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.4.1

Verification that operation is within PTLR limits is required every 30 minutes when RCS pressure and temperature conditions are undergoing planned changes. This Frequency is considered reasonable in view of the control room indication available to monitor RCS status. Also, since temperature rate-of-change limits are specified in hourly increments, 30 minutes permits assessment and correction of minor deviations.

Surveillance for heatup, cooldown, or inservice leak and hydrostatic testing may be discontinued when the definition given in the relevant plant procedure for ending the activity is satisfied.

This SR has been modified by a Note that requires this Surveillance to be performed only during system heatup, and cooldown operations and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.

SR 3.4.4.2

A separate limit is used when the reactor is approaching criticality. Consequently, the RCS pressure and temperature must be verified within the appropriate limits before withdrawing control rods that will make the reactor critical.

Performing the Surveillance within 15 minutes before control rod withdrawal for the purpose of achieving criticality provides adequate assurance that the limits will not be exceeded between the time of the Surveillance and the time of the control rod withdrawal.

SR 3.4.4.3, SR 3.4.4.4, and SR 3.4.4.5

Limits on the reactor vessel flange and head flange temperatures are generally bounded by the other P/T limits during system heatup and cooldown. However, operations approaching MODE 5 and MODE 6 and in MODE 5 with RCS temperature less than or equal to certain specified values require assurance that these temperatures meet the LCO limits.

The flange temperatures must be verified to be above the limits 30 minutes before and while tensioning the vessel head bolting studs to ensure that once the head is tensioned the limits are satisfied. When in MODE 5 with RCS temperature ≤ {26.7°C (80°F)}, 30-minute checks of the flange temperatures are required because of the reduced margin to the limits. When in MODE 5 with RCS temperature ≤ {37.8°C (100°F)},

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

monitoring of the flange temperature is required every 12 hours to ensure the temperatures are within the limits specified in the PTLR.

The 30-minute Frequency reflects the urgency of maintaining the temperatures within limits, and also limits the time that the temperature limits could be exceeded. The 12-hour Frequency is reasonable based on the rate of temperature change possible at these temperatures.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.

2. ASME, *Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code*, Section III, Appendix G.

3. {ASTM E 185-XX]}
4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix H.

5. Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 1988.

{6. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Appendix E.}

{7. P/T Limits Methodology Topical.}

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.5 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure

BASES

BACKGROUND	The reactor steam dome pressure is an assumed initial condition of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) and is also an assumed value in the determination of compliance with reactor pressure vessel overpressure protection criteria.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The reactor steam dome pressure of ≤ 7.07 MPaG (1025 psig) is an initial condition of the vessel overpressure protection analysis of Reference 1. This analysis assumes an initial maximum reactor steam dome pressure and evaluates the response of the pressure relief system, primarily the safety/relief valves, during the limiting pressurization transient. The determination of compliance with the overpressure criteria is dependent on the initial reactor steam dome pressure; therefore, the limit on this pressure ensures that the assumptions of the overpressure protection analysis are conserved. Reference 2 also assumes an initial reactor steam dome pressure for the analysis of DBAs and transients used to determine the limits for fuel cladding integrity MCPR (see Bases for LCO 3.2.2, “MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)”). Reactor steam dome pressure satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO	The specified reactor steam dome pressure limit of ≤ 7.07 MPaG (1025 psig) ensures the plant is operated within the assumptions of the transient analyses. Operation above the limit may result in a transient response more severe than analyzed.
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1 and 2, the reactor steam dome pressure is required to be less than or equal to the limit. In these MODES the reactor may be generating significant steam and the DBAs and transients are bounding. In MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, the limit is not applicable because the reactor is shutdown. In these MODES, the reactor pressure is well below the required limit, and no anticipated events will challenge the overpressure limits.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1

With the reactor steam dome pressure greater than the limit, prompt action should be taken to reduce pressure to below the limit and return the reactor to operation within the bounds of the analyses. The 15-minute Completion Time is reasonable considering the importance of maintaining the pressure within limits. This Completion Time also ensures that the probability of an accident while pressure is greater than the limit is minimal. If the operator is unable to restore the reactor steam dome pressure to below the limit, then the reactor should be brought to MODE 3 to be within the assumptions of the transient analyses.

B.1

If the reactor steam dome pressure cannot be restored to within the limit within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.5.1

Verification that reactor steam dome pressure is ≤ 7.07 MPaG (1025 psig) ensures that the initial conditions of the DBAs and transients are met. Operating experience has shown the 12-hour Frequency to be sufficient for identifying trends and verifying operation within safety analyses assumptions.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 5.2.

2. Chapter 15.

B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS)

B 3.5.1 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The ECCS function is provided by the combination of the Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS), the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System, and the Isolation Condenser System (ICS). The ECCS is designed to flood the core during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) to provide required core cooling. By providing core cooling following a LOCA, the ECCS, in conjunction with the containment, limits the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a LOCA.

The ADS (Ref.1) is an integral part of the ECCS because GDCS flow to the RPV requires the RPV to be close to containment pressure. Therefore, the ADS is designed to depressurize the RPV following indication of a LOCA. The ADS consists of eight squib-actuated depressurization valves (DPVs) and ten of the eighteen Safety Relief valves (SRVs) that have been configured to function as ADS valves. The ten dual function SRVs are pneumatically actuated when functioning as ADS valves using energy stored in nitrogen accumulators.

Each of the eight DPVs is equipped with four squib initiators. A signal to any of the four squib initiators will actuate the DPV. Each of the ten ADS SRVs is equipped with four actuation solenoids. A signal to any of the four solenoids will actuate the ADS SRV. Three of the four squib initiators or solenoids on each valve are actuated by the Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) described in the Bases for LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.3.5.2, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Actuation." The fourth squib initiator or solenoid is actuated by the Diverse Protection System (DPS), which uses diverse hardware/software and separate reactor level sensors from those used by the primary ECCS functions. Actuation power to each of the three squib initiators or solenoids on each ECCS valve is supplied from a different division of the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution. This arrangement ensures that all of the ECCS valves are capable of actuating when there is power to any two of the four divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution.

Actuation signals and logic for ADS initiation are described the Bases of LCO 3.3.5.1. ADS initiation is sequenced beginning with the opening of five ADS SRVs that reduce reactor pressure. The remaining five ADS SRVs open after a short time delay. After another short time delay,

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

the DPVs are staggered opened beginning with a group of three DPVs, followed by consecutive groups of two, two and one DPV with a short time delay between each group. This sequential operation facilitates rapid depressurization while minimizing the amount of water lost because of level swell in the reactor that occurs when pressure is rapidly reduced.

The ADS is designed to ensure that no single active component failure will cause inadvertent initiation of ADS or prevent automatic initiation and successful operation of the minimum required ECCS subsystems when any three of the four divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution and the associated instrumentation divisions are OPERABLE.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

ADS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for postulated LOCAs. The accidents for which ADS operation is required are presented in Reference 2. The required ECCS analyses and assumptions and the results of these analyses are described in References 1, 2, and 4. This LCO ensures that the following acceptance criteria for the ECCS, established by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 3), will be met following a LOCA assuming the worst-case single active component failure in the ECCS:

a. Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is ≤ 1204°C (2200°F).

b. Maximum cladding oxidation is ≤ 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation.

c. Maximum hydrogen generation from zirconium-water reaction is ≤ 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react.

d. The core is maintained in a coolable geometry.

e. Adequate long-term cooling capability is maintained.

Each break location is analyzed assuming each potential failure to determine the most limiting single failure for the LOCA event to ensure that the remaining OPERABLE ECCS subsystems provide the capability

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

to adequately cool the core and prevent excessive fuel damage. The limiting failures are discussed in Reference 4.

For ADS to support GDCS injection following a small break LOCA, the analysis in Reference 4 determined that RPV depressurization requires a minimum of 5 of the 8 DPVs even if only 7 of the 10 ADS SRVs function as required. At least three Isolation Condenser loops, two SLC trains, and the minimum required complement of GDCS injection and equalizing lines are assumed to be available during the LOCA.

The ADS satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

This LCO for ADS requires the OPERABILITY of the following:

a. The ADS function of ten SRVs; and

b. Eight DPVs.

OPERABILITY of the squib-actuated DPV valves requires electrical continuity of at least two squib firing circuits in each valve that are actuated by the SSLC and associated with OPERABLE divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution. However, one required squib firing circuit may be bypassed intermittently under administrative controls for required testing or maintenance as specified in SR 3.5.1.3.

OPERABILITY of the ADS function of the SRVs requires that ADS SRV nitrogen accumulator pressure be within the limit specified by SR 3.5.1.1. Additionally, at least two solenoid-operated pilot valves on each SRV that are actuated by the SSLC and associated with OPERABLE divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution must be OPERABLE. However, one required solenoid may be bypassed for performance of required testing or maintenance.

The Diverse Protection System is not required to satisfy the assumptions in any accident analysis. Therefore, the solenoid-operated pilot valve on each SRV actuated by the DPS logic is not required for ADS OPERABILITY.

BASES

APPLICABILITY

ADS is required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling may be required to prevent fuel damage following a LOCA. ADS requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are determined by the requirements of the GDCS system, which is being supported.

ACTIONS

A.1

If one ADS SRV is inoperable, at least 8 ADS SRVs and 5 DPVs will be available to depressurize the RPV during a small break LOCA even if 2 DPVs are already inoperable and there is an additional failure of either an ADS SRV or DPV. In this Condition, the inoperable ADS SRV must be restored to OPERABLE the next time the plant is placed in MODE 5 (i.e., prior to entering MODE 2 or MODE 4 from Mode 5). This Completion Time is acceptable because the analysis described in Reference 4 determined that a minimum combination of 6 ADS SRVs and 4 DPVs is sufficient to depressurize the RPV within the time assumed in the ECCS analysis for a small break LOCA.

B.1

If one DPV is inoperable, at least 7 ADS SRVs and 6 DPVs will be available to depressurize the RPV during a small break LOCA even if 2 ADS SRVs are already inoperable and there is an additional failure of either an ADS SRV or DPV. In this Condition, the inoperable DPV must be restored to OPERABLE the next time the plant is placed in MODE 5 (i.e., prior to entering MODE 2 or MODE 4 from Mode 5). This Completion Time is acceptable because the analysis described in Reference 4 determined that a minimum combination of 6 ADS SRVs and 4 DPVs is sufficient to depressurize the RPV within the time assumed in the ECCS analysis for a small break LOCA.

C.1

If two ADS SRVs are inoperable, at least 7 ADS SRVs and 5 DPVs will be available to depressurize the RPV during a small break LOCA even if 2 DPVs are already inoperable and there is an additional failure of either an ADS SRV or DPV. In this Condition, at least one of the inoperable ADS SRVs must be restored to OPERABLE within 14 days because two inoperable ADS SRVs indicate a degraded ADS SRV capability. This Completion Time is acceptable because the analysis described in Reference 4 determined that a minimum combination of 6 ADS SRVs and 4 DPVs is sufficient to depressurize the RPV within the time assumed in the ECCS analysis for a small break LOCA.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1

If two DPVs are inoperable, at least 7 ADS SRVs and 5 DPVs will be available to depressurize the RPV during a small break LOCA even if 2 ADS SRVs are also inoperable and there is an additional failure of either an ADS SRV or DPV. In this Condition, at least one of the inoperable DPVs must be restored to OPERABLE within 14 days because two inoperable DPVs indicate a degraded DPV capability. This Completion Time is acceptable because the analysis described in Reference 4 determined that a minimum combination of 6 ADS SRVs and 4 DPVs is sufficient to depressurize the RPV within the time assumed in the ECCS analysis for a small break LOCA.

E.1

If three or more ADS SRVs are inoperable or if three or more DPVs are inoperable, there is a significant degradation of ADS capability and the plant may not have sufficient capacity to depressurize the RPV within the time assumed in the analysis for a small break LOCA (Ref. 4).

Alternately, if the Required Actions and Completion Times of Conditions A, B, C or D are not met, the plant has exceeded the time limit determined to be acceptable for operation with degraded ADS capability. In either case, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.1

This SR requires periodic verification that the supply pressure to ADS SRV accumulators (i.e., High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System (HPNSS)) is greater than or equal to the specified limit. An accumulator on each ADS SRV provides pneumatic pressure for ADS valve actuation. The SRV accumulator capacity is sufficient for one actuation at drywell design pressure following a failure of the gas supply to the accumulator.

The 31 day Frequency is acceptable because HPNSS low pressure alarms provide prompt notification of an abnormal pressure in the HPNSS.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.5.1.2

This SR requires a periodic verification of the continuity of each of the required circuits that initiate the explosive charge for squib-actuated valves in the ADS. The 31 day Frequency is acceptable because an alarm will provide prompt notification of loss of circuit continuity.

This SR is modified by a Note that continuity is not required to be met for one required squib firing circuit intermittently bypassed under administrative controls. This is acceptable because the keylock switch that disables the firing circuit allows the continuity monitor to be tested and allows surveillance and maintenance with the assurance that the valve will not be opened inadvertently. The operation of the keylock switch in either division does not disable the DPV because the valve will still be opened by the squib initiator in the other division and a single failure will not cause inadvertent actuation.

SR 3.5.1.3

This SR requires periodic verification that the ADS function of each SRV actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The ADS function of each SRV is required to actuate automatically to perform its design function. This test overlaps Surveillance Testing required in the instrumentation section of the Technical Specifications and is intended to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes ADS SRV valve actuation as a requirement for this SR to be met. This is acceptable because the valve actuation is verified by SR 3.5.1.5.

The 24 month Frequency for performing this SR is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the SR were performed with the reactor at power. From past operating experience, it is believed that these components will pass the SR when performed once per the 24 month refueling interval.

SR 3.5.1.4

This SR requires periodic verification that that the ADS function of each DPV actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The ADS function of each DPV is required to actuate automatically to perform their design functions. This test overlaps Surveillance Testing required

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

in the instrumentation section of the Technical Specifications and is intended to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes squib valve actuation as a requirement for this SR to be met. This is acceptable because the design of the squib-actuated valve was selected for this application because of its very high reliability. The OPERABILITY of squib-actuated valves is verified by continuity tests in SR 3.5.1.2 and the Inservice Test Program for squib-actuated valves.

The 24 month Frequency for performing this SR is based on the need to perform this SR under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the SR were performed with the reactor at power. From past operating experience, it is believed that these components will pass the SR when performed once per the 24 month refueling interval.

SR 3.5.1.5

This SR requires periodic verification that each ADS SRV opens when actuated using a manually initiated signal. The ADS SRV actuation is performed to verify that the valve and solenoids are functioning properly and that no blockage exists in the SRV discharge lines. SRV actuation is demonstrated by the response of the turbine control or bypass valves, by a change in the measured steam flow, or by any other method suitable to verify steam flow.

The SRV manufacturer recommends that SRVs not be actuated unless steam pressure is ≥ {6.2} MPaG ({900} psig). Also, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine control or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the ADS valves divert steam flow upon opening. Meeting these recommendations requires that the reactor be placed in a MODE where the SR is applicable before the conditions for performing the SR are established. Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note stating that the SR is required to be performed within 12 hours after reactor dome pressure is ≥ {6.2} MPaG ({900} psig) and steam flow is adequate to perform the test. This Note allows entry into MODES where the SR is applicable without the SR being completed; however, the SR must be completed for each SRV within 12 hours after minimum conditions for performing the SR are achieved. Operation in the applicable MODES for a short period of time without this SR completed is acceptable because of the following: there is a low likelihood of a LOCA requiring ADS actuation during this period; the ADS SRVs are highly

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

reliable and typically pass the SR when it is performed; the redundancy and diversity provided by 10 ADS SRVs and 8 DPVs minimizes the consequences of an individual ADS SRV failure; and, the decay heat load is significantly reduced following shutdown where ADS SRV testing is required. Additionally, SRV OPERABILITY and the setpoints for overpressure protection are verified prior to valve installation.

The 24 month Frequency for performing this SR is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the SR were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

This SR verifies SRV actuation. Actuation can be initiated by any of four solenoid-operated pilot valves. Three of the solenoids are actuated by the SSLC logic and the fourth is actuated by the DPS. This SR Frequency requires that the SR be performed 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS for each valve solenoid logic so that each of the four solenoids is used to initiate valve actuation every fourth cycle.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 6.

2. Chapters 15.

3. 10 CFR 50.46.

4. {ECCS Topical Report – TBD}

B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS)

B 3.5.2 Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS) - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The ECCS function is provided by the combination of the Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS), the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System, and the Isolation Condenser System (ICS). The ECCS is designed to flood the core during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) to provide required core cooling. By providing core cooling following a LOCA, the ECCS, in conjunction with the containment, limits the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a LOCA.

The GDCS (Ref.1) is divided into three subsystems: the GDCS short-term cooling (injection subsystem); the GDCS long-term cooling (equalizing subsystem); and, the GDCS deluge subsystem. Three GDCS pools, located above the wetwell, at an elevation above the reactor core, contain the water that supports all four GDCS trains for the injection and deluge subsystems.

The GDCS injection subsystem is capable of refilling the RPV following a LOCA after the RPV is depressurized by the ADS. Each of the four injection trains connects to the associated GDCS pool through a single pipe that includes a block valve at the pool. Each of the four injection trains then divides into two branch lines after entering the drywell. The resulting eight injection branch lines each include a check valve, squib-actuated injection valve, and a block valve near the RPV. Each injection branch line provides coolant to the annulus region of the reactor through an RPV nozzle located above the top of active fuel (TAF).

The GDCS equalizing subsystem provides long term post-LOCA water makeup by connecting the annulus region of the reactor to the suppression pool. Each of the four equalizing trains includes a block valve at the suppression pool, a check valve, a squib-actuated equalizing valve, and a block valve at the RPV. The suppression pool is located in the containment with a normal level above the top of the core.

The GDCS deluge subsystem is used to dump water from the GDCS pools to the lower drywell in the event of a severe accident. Each of the four deluge trains connects to the GDCS pools just downstream of the injection line block valves. Each of the four GDCS deluge trains branches into three branch lines. Each deluge branch line is equipped with a

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

squib-actuated valve and a deluge line tailpipe located in the upper drywell. The deluge subsystem is designed to respond to a severe accident and is not required in any accident analysis in Reference 1. Therefore, OPERABILITY of the GDCS deluge subsystems is not required by Technical Specifications and is addressed in licensee controlled documents.

Each of the eight GDCS injection subsystem squib valves and each of the four equalizing subsystem squib valves are equipped with four squib initiators. A signal to any of the four squib initiators will actuate the valve. Three of the four squib initiators on each valve are actuated by the Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) described in the Bases for LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.3.5.2, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Actuation." The fourth squib initiator is actuated by the Diverse Protection System (DPS), which uses diverse hardware/software equipment and separate reactor level sensors from those used in the primary ECCS functions. Actuation power to each of the three squib initiators in each ECCS valve is supplied from a different division of the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution. This arrangement ensures that all of the ECCS valves are capable of actuating when there is power to any two of the four divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution.

Actuation signals and logic for the GDCS injection subsystem and equalizing subsystem are described in Bases of LCO 3.3.5.1. The initiation signal for the GDCS deluge subsystem is high temperature in the lower drywell floor area, which will actuate the squib valves in the GDCS deluge branch lines.

The GDCS is designed to ensure that no single active component failure will cause inadvertent initiation of GDCS or prevent automatic initiation and successful operation of the minimum required ECCS subsystems when any three of the four divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution and the associated instrumentation divisions are OPERABLE.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

GDCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for postulated LOCAs. The accidents for which GDCS operation is required are presented in Reference 1. The required ECCS analyses and assumptions and the results of these analyses are described in References 1, 2, and 4.

This LCO ensures that the following acceptance criteria for the ECCS, established by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 3), will be met following a LOCA assuming the worst-case single active component failure in the ECCS:

a. Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is ≤ 1204°C (2200°F).

b. Maximum cladding oxidation is ≤ 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation.

c. Maximum hydrogen generation from zirconium-water reaction is ≤ 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react.

d. The core is maintained in a coolable geometry.

e. Adequate long-term cooling capability is maintained.

Each break location is analyzed assuming each potential failure to determine the most limiting single failure for the LOCA event to ensure that the remaining OPERABLE ECCS subsystems provide the capability to adequately cool the core and prevent excessive fuel damage.

Both the injection and equalizing subsystems are designed to ensure that adequate reactor vessel inventory is provided assuming the initiating event is a LOCA in one train and there is a failure of one squib valve to actuate in a second train.

The analysis described in Reference 4 indicates that only 2 of the 8 injection branch lines (i.e., 1 GDCS injection train) and only 1 of the 4 GDCS equalizing trains are capable providing the minimum required short-term and long-term core cooling following a LOCA. A LOCA initiated by a break in one of the 8 injection branch lines is assumed to disable the injection capability of both injection branch lines in that injection train.

The GDCS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO

This LCO requires the OPERABILITY of the following:

a. Eight branch lines of the injection subsystem (i.e., all four injection trains); and

b. Four trains of the equalizing subsystem.

OPERABILITY of the squib-actuated GDCS valves requires electrical continuity of {both} redundant explosive charge firing circuits to each valve. However, one squib charge firing circuit may be bypassed intermittently for required testing or maintenance as specified in SR 3.5.2.3.

OPERABILITY of each GDCS branch line requires that water level in the associated GDCS pool be within the limit specified by SR 3.5.2.1. Additionally, all GDCS RPV block valves, GDCS pool block valves, and suppression pool block valves must be locked open.

APPLICABILITY

GDCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling may be required to prevent fuel damage following a LOCA. GDCS requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are specified in LCO 3.5.3, “Gravity Driven Cooling System (GDCS) - Shutdown.”

ACTIONS

A.1

If one GDCS injection branch line is inoperable, at least 4 GDCS injection branch lines will be available to respond to the design basis LOCA. This assumes that the break disables the injection capability of the two branch lines and a concurrent random failure of another injection branch line. In this Condition, the inoperable injection branch line must be restored to OPERABLE the next time the plant is placed in MODE 5 (i.e., prior to entering MODE 2 or MODE 4 from Mode 5). This Completion Time is acceptable because the analysis described in Reference 4 determined that 3 injection branch lines are sufficient to respond to the design basis LOCA.

B.1

If one GDCS equalizing line is inoperable, at least 1 GDCS equalizing line will be available to respond to the design basis LOCA. This assumes that the break disables one of the equalizing lines and a concurrent random

ACTIONS (continued)

failure of another equalizing line. In this Condition, the inoperable equalizing line must be restored to OPERABLE the next time the plant is placed in MODE 5 (i.e., prior to entering MODE 2 or MODE 4 from Mode 5). This Completion Time is acceptable because the analysis described in Reference 4 determined that 1 equalizing line is sufficient to respond to the design basis LOCA.

C.1

If two GDCS injection branch lines are inoperable, at least 3 GDCS injection branch lines will be available to respond to the design basis LOCA. This assumes that the break disables the injection capability of the two branch lines and a concurrent random failure of another injection branch line. In this Condition, at least one of the inoperable injection branch lines must be restored to OPERABLE within 14 days because two inoperable indicate a degraded GDCS capability. This Completion Time is acceptable because the analysis described in Reference 4 determined that 3 injection branch lines are sufficient to respond to the design basis LOCA.

D.1

If two GDCS equalizing lines are inoperable, at least 1 GDCS equalizing line will be available to respond to the design basis LOCA. This assumes that the break or a concurrent random failure disables another equalizing line. In this Condition, at least one of the inoperable equalizing lines must be restored to OPERABLE within 14 days because two inoperable equalizing lines indicate a degraded GDCS capability. This Completion Time is acceptable because the analysis described in Reference 4 determined that 1 equalizing line is sufficient to respond to the design basis LOCA.

E.1

If three or more injection branch lines are inoperable or if three or more equalizing lines are inoperable, the plant may not have sufficient GDCS capability to respond to a design basis LOCA. Alternately, if the Required Actions and Completion Time of Conditions A, B, C or D are not met, the plant has exceeded the time limit determined to be acceptable for operation with degraded GDCS capability. In either case, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.2.1

This SR requires verification every 12 hours that the water level in each of the GDCS pools is within the specified limit. The minimum specified level ensures there is a sufficient volume of water in the drywell to ensure the core remains covered following a severe LOCA and support decay heat removal without operator intervention for a minimum of 72 hours.

The 12 hour Frequency is acceptable because GDCS pool low level alarms will provide prompt notification of an abnormal level in any of the GDCS pools.

SR 3.5.2.2

This SR requires verification every 31 days of the continuity of each of the required circuits that initiate the explosive charges for squib-actuated valves in the GDCS. The 31 day Frequency is acceptable because an alarm will provide prompt notification of loss of circuit continuity.

This SR is modified by a Note that continuity is not required to be met for one required squib firing circuit intermittently bypassed under administrative controls. This is acceptable because the keylock switch that disables the firing circuit allows the continuity monitor to be tested and allows surveillance and maintenance with the assurance that the valve will not be opened inadvertently. The operation of the keylock switch in either division does not disable the GDCS because the valve will still be opened by the squib initiator in the other division and a single failure will not cause inadvertent actuation.

SR 3.5.2.3

This SR requires verification every 24 months that that each required GDCS valve actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The GDCS is required to actuate automatically to perform its design function. This test overlaps Surveillance Testing required in the instrumentation section of the Technical Specifications and is intended to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes squib valve actuation as a requirement for this SR to be met. This is acceptable because the design of the squib-actuated valve was selected for this application because of its very high reliability. The OPERABILITY of squib-actuated valves is verified by continuity tests in SR 3.5.2.3 and the Inservice Test Program for squib-actuated valves.

The 24 month Frequency for performing this SR is based on the need to perform this SR under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the SR were performed with the reactor at power. From past operating experience, it is believed that these components will pass the SR when performed once per the 24 month refueling interval.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 6.
2. Chapters 15.
3. 10 CFR 50.46.
4. {ECCS Topical Report – TBD}

B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.3 GDCS - Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of the GDCS is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.2, "Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS) - Operating." In MODES 5 and 6, GDCS is used to provide additional water inventory inside the containment to respond to a loss of decay heat removal capability or a loss of reactor coolant inventory. Loss of decay heat removal capability could result from the unavailability of both Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling loops, loss of reactor component cooling water or plant service water systems, or loss of preferred power. Loss of reactor coolant inventory could result from pipe breaks in the RCS associated with maintenance or refueling, misalignment of systems connected to the RCS, or leakage during replacement of control rod drive assemblies. GDCS pools with a minimum combined volume of within the limit specified in this LCO provide additional water inventory to support decay heat removal for an extended period and makeup to respond to a loss of reactor coolant inventory.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	Two GDCS trains are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 to provide additional water inventory inside the containment to respond to a loss of non-safety-related decay heat removal capability or a loss of reactor coolant inventory (Ref. 1). The GDCS satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO	This LCO requires that {four} branch lines of the GDCS injection subsystem are OPERABLE and capable of injecting the specified combined volume from the associated GDCS pools. The RPV must have or have the ability to establish sufficient RPV venting capacity to maintain the RPV depressurized following loss of decay heat removal capability for a GDCS injection branch line to be capable of injecting into the RPV.

BASES

APPLICABILITY

Two GDCS divisions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 to assure adequate coolant inventory and sufficient heat removal capability for the irradiated fuel in the core in response to a loss of decay heat removal capability, a LOCA, or an inadvertent draindown of the RPV. These requirements are not applicable when the new fuel pool gate is removed and water level is above the specified level over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange because of the additional inventory available when in this configuration.

ACTIONS

A.1

{If one GDCS injection branch line is inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE branch lines provide sufficient RPV flooding capability to recover from a loss of decay heat removal capability, LOCA, or inadvertent vessel draindown.} However, overall reliability is reduced. Therefore, the inoperable branch line must be restored to OPERABLE within 14 days. The 14 day Completion Time for restoring the required secondary line to OPERABLE status has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

B.1 and B.2

If the LCO is not met for reasons other than Condition A, action must be initiated to provide at least two methods of injecting the minimum specified volume of water into the RPV. In addition, LCO requirements must be met within 72 hours. The Completion Times have been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

Alternate sources and methods for water injection are identified in the plant's Abnormal and Emergency Operating Procedures. The method used to provide water for core flooding should be the most prudent and the safest choice, based upon plant conditions.

C.1 and C.2

If Required Actions and associated Completion Times for Conditions A or B are not met, the water inventory available for injection may not be sufficient for a LOCA. Therefore, actions must to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) must be initiated immediately to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. In addition, action must be initiated immediately to restore Reactor Building to OPERABLE status as described in the Bases for LCO 3.6.3.1, "Reactor Building." This action is

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

needed to establish appropriate compensatory measures for a potential loss of decay heat removal as a result of an inadvertent draindown event. The Completion Times have been shown to be acceptable by Reference 2.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.3.1

This SR requires verification every 24 hours that the combined water volume associated with Operable GDCS injection branch lines is greater than or equal to the specified limit. This SR ensures adequate inventory is maintained in the containment to respond to a loss of decay heat removal capability or a loss of reactor coolant due to a LOCA or inadvertent draining of the RPV.

The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because highly reliable GDCS pool low level alarms will provide prompt notification of an abnormal level in any of the GDCS pools.

SR 3.5.3.2

This SR requires verification every 31 days of the continuity of each of the required circuits that initiate the explosive charge for squib-actuated valves in the GDCS. The 31 day Frequency is acceptable because an alarm will provide prompt notification of loss of circuit continuity.

This SR is modified by a Note that continuity is not required to be met for one required squib firing circuit intermittently bypassed under administrative controls. This is acceptable because the keylock switch that disables the firing circuit allows the continuity monitor to be tested and allows surveillance and maintenance with the assurance that the valve will not be opened inadvertently. The operation of the keylock switch in either division does not disable the GDCS because the valve will still be opened by the squib initiator in the other division and a single failure will not cause inadvertent actuation.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 6.

2. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

B 3.5 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)

B 3.5.4 Isolation Condenser System (ICS) - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Isolation Condenser System (ICS) actuates automatically following a reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation and transfers sufficient heat from the RPV to the IC/PCC pool to prevent safety relief valve (SRV) actuation (Ref. 1). LCO 3.7.1, "Isolation Condenser (IC)/Passive Containment Cooling (PCC) Pools," supports the ICS in removing sufficient decay heat following an RPV isolation to cool the reactor to safe shutdown conditions (MODE 4) within 36 hours and maintain the reactor in a safe condition for an additional 36 hours with minimal loss of RCS inventory (Ref. 1). The ICS also provides water inventory to the RPV at the start of a LOCA and provides the initial RPV depressurization following a loss of feedwater allowing ADS initiation to be delayed. The ICS is also assumed available to respond to a Station Blackout and an Anticipated Transient without Scram (Ref. 1).

The ICS consists of four independent trains. Each ICS train includes a heat exchanger (isolation condenser), a steam supply line that connects the top of the isolation condenser to the RPV, a condensate return line that connects the bottom of the isolation condenser to the RPV, a high point purge line, and vent lines from both the upper and lower headers of the isolation condenser. The isolation condensers are located above the containment and are submerged in a large pool of water (IC/PCC pool) that is at atmospheric pressure. Steam produced in IC/PCC pools by boiling around the isolation condenser is vented to the atmosphere (Ref. 1).

Each of the four isolation condensers consists of two identical modules. Each module includes an upper and lower header connected by a bank of vertical tubes. A single vertical steam supply line directs steam from the RPV to the horizontal upper header in each module through four branch lines. The branch lines include flow restrictors that limit the consequences of a line break. Steam is condensed inside banks of vertical tubes that connect the upper and lower headers in each module and the condensate collects in the lower header.

Operation of each ICS train is controlled by the motor operated condensate return isolation valve or the nitrogen piston operated condensate return bypass valve. These valves are in parallel and are both normally closed. With both condensate return valves closed and the steam supply line to reactor open, the isolation condenser and the

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

condensate return line fill with condensate to a level above the upper headers. The steam supply line, which is insulated to prevent the accumulation of condensate, remains filled with steam. A purge line with an orifice connects the top of the isolation condenser to a main steam line. Flow through the purge line when the ICS is in standby prevents the accumulation of non-condensable gases in the top of the isolation condenser.

Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the valves in the condensate return line open, the condensate in the isolation condenser and condensate return line return to the RPV. Steam from the RPV continues to condense in the isolation condenser and drains back to the RPV. Radiolytically generated non-condensable gases are periodically vented to the suppression pool through vent lines connected to both the upper and lower headers of isolation condenser. The lower vent line opens automatically on high reactor pressure that could be indicative of a loss of flow through the ICS.

Each ICS condenser is located in a sub-compartment of the IC/PCC pool. Following RPV isolation, pool water temperature could rise to about 101°C (214°F). The steam formed will be non-radioactive and have a slight positive pressure relative to station ambient. The steam generated in the IC/PCC pool is released to the atmosphere through large-diameter discharge vents. Each ICS train is designed to remove 33.75 MWt of decay heat when the reactor is above normal operating pressure so that any three of the four ICS trains have sufficient capacity to perform the ICS design function (Ref. 1).

Signals that initiate the ICS are described in LCO 3.3.5.3, "Isolation Condenser System (ICS) Instrumentation." The ICS can also be manually initiated. The operator is able to stop any individual IC train whenever the RPV pressure is below a reset value, overriding IC automatic actuation signals.

Each ICS condenser forms a closed safety-related loop outside the containment that acts as a "passive" substitute for an open "active" valve outside the containment. In addition, the ICS steam supply line and condensate return line each include two, normally open containment isolation valves in series. One isolation valve in each line is motor operated and a pneumatic motor operates the other valve with an accumulator. These valves close automatically to isolate the RPV on indication of a leak or break in the ICS that could bypass the

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

containment. Specifically, high flow indicated on two of the four differential pressure transmitters on each steam supply line or high flow indicated on two of the four differential pressure transmitters on each condensate return line will close all four isolation valves on the associated ICS train. Additionally, elevated radiation levels on two of the four radiation monitors associated with the steam space above each ICS pool subcompartment cause an alarm on radiation levels indicative of a minor leak and will isolate the steam supply and condensate return line of the associated ICS train on radiation levels indicative of a significant leak. Similarly, each IC purge line also penetrates the containment to the closed system and is equipped with an excess flow check valve and a normally open shutoff valve. Each IC venting line also penetrates the containment to the closed system and is equipped with two normally closed control valves in series.

Each of the four IC trains receives power from three of the four divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution. If the three safety-related power supplies used to start an individual IC Train fail, then the IC would automatically start because of the “fail open” actuation of the condensate return bypass valves on loss of electrical power to the solenoids which control its nitrogen-actuated valves. The power supplies are configured so that loss of any two of the four divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution will not result in the failure of any IC train. The second and third source of power is provided to operate the ICS automatic venting system during long-term IC operation; otherwise, the manually controlled backup venting system, which uses one of the divisional power sources that starts the ICS, can be used for long-term operation.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The ICS is assumed to function following an RPV isolation or low water level (Level 2) event (Ref. 1). Operation of three of the four ICS trains after RPV isolation will limit RCS pressure enough to prevent safety relief valve (SRV) actuation. By conserving reactor water inventory following the RPV isolation, ICS minimizes the need for automatic reactor depressurization that would be required to add additional water inventory from low pressure sources.

The ICS also has an ECCS function to provide liquid inventory to the RPV during the initial stages of a LOCA. The ICS also provides the initial depressurization of the reactor during a loss of feed water so that ADS initiation can be delayed.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

ICS - Operating satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

This LCO requires four ICS trains to be OPERABLE. OPERABILITY of an ICS train requires that all the performance and physical arrangement SRs be met. Additionally, the isolation valve for the ICS condenser subcompartment pool must be locked open. This ensures that the full capacity of the IC/PCC pools is available to provide required cooling water to the ICS train for at least 72 hours after an RPV isolation or LOCA without the need for operator action. With the ICS subcompartment isolation valve locked open, subcompartment level is maintained in accordance with the requirements in LCO 3.7.1, "Isolation Condenser (IC)/Passive Containment Cooling (PCC) Pools."

{There are no requirements for maximum or minimum temperature in individual ICS condenser subcompartments. However, the analyses for LOCA and RPV isolation assume that the isolation condenser and condensate return line are filled with sub-cooled condensate when ICS is initiated.}

APPLICABILITY

Four ICS trains are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2 and in MODES 3 and 4 when < 2 hours since reactor was critical, to remove reactor decay heat, or provide additional RCS inventory following a LOCA, a loss of feedwater, or a reactor shutdown with isolation. In addition, in MODES 1 and 2, the ICS is required to be OPERABLE to prevent unnecessary automatic reactor depressurization or SRV actuation following RPV isolation or low water level events.

ACTIONS

A.1

If one of the four ICS trains is inoperable, the remaining three trains have adequate capacity to meet the assumptions of the design basis transient analysis events (Ref. 1). However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in one of the OPERABLE trains could result in SRV actuation and the need to add additional water inventory to the RPV following RPV isolation. Therefore, the inoperable ICS train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

The Completion Time of 14 days is acceptable because in this condition the remaining three ICS trains are sufficient to meet the assumptions described in Reference 2.

{B.1

If two of the four ICS trains are inoperable, one IC train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this condition, the ICS may not have sufficient capacity to prevent SRV actuation and the need to add additional water inventory to the RPV following RPV isolation. {Additionally, the reduced quantity of ICS condensate available at the start of a LOCA reduces margins assumed in the ECCS analyses.}

The Completion Time of 72 hours is reasonable based on the availability of alternate pressure and temperature control functions and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the ICS.}

C.1

If three of the four ICS trains are inoperable, one IC train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. In this condition the ICS does not have sufficient capacity to attenuate RPV pressure to acceptable ranges or to provide adequate core cooling that would preclude the use of automatic depressurization.

The Completion Time of 1 hour is reasonable based on the availability of alternate pressure and temperature control functions and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the ICS during this period.

D.1

If an inoperable ICS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Times of Conditions A, B, or C, or four ICS trains are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowable Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.4.1

This SR requires periodic verification that each ICS manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position. This SR is intended to ensure proper valve alignment in any flow path required for proper operation of the ICS. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency for performing this SR is acceptable based on engineering judgment and was chosen to provide added assurance that ICS valves are correctly positioned.

SR 3.5.4.2

This SR requires verification every 31 days that the High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System (HPNSS) pressure to each nitrogen operated ICS steam supply and condensate return valve is within the specified limit. The 31 day Frequency is acceptable because HPNSS low pressure alarms will provide prompt notification of an abnormal pressure in the HPNSS.

SR 3.5.4.3

This SR requires periodic verification that each ICS subcompartment manual isolation valve is locked open. This SR ensures that the level in the subcompartment is the same as the level in the associated expansion pool and that the full volume of water in the IC/PCC pools is available to each condenser. If this SR is not met, the associated ICS train may not be capable of performing its design functions. The 24 month Frequency for this SR is based on engineering judgment and is acceptable because the manual isolation valves between the IC/PCC pool and the ICS subcompartments are locked open and maintained in their correct position under administrative controls.

SR 3.5.4.4

This SR requires periodic verification that the ICS actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The ICS is required to actuate automatically to perform its design function. This Surveillance test

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

verifies that the automatic initiation logic will cause the ICS to operate as designed when a system initiation signal (actual or simulated) is received. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.4 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed ICS function.

The 24 month Frequency for performing this SR is acceptable based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the SR were performed with the reactor at power.

SR 3.5.4.5

This SR requires periodic verification that the heat removal capability of each IC train satisfies design requirements specified in Reference 1. Test data is derived from the temperature sensor located downstream of the condensate return isolation valve and the differential pressure transmitter on the condensate return line. The Frequency of {24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS} is based on engineering judgment.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 5.
2. Chapter 6.
3. Chapter 7.

B 3.4 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)

B 3.5.5 Isolation Condenser System (ICS) - Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND

The ICS is designed to operate either automatically or manually following reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation to provide adequate RPV pressure reduction to preclude safety/relief valve operation and provide core cooling while conserving reactor water inventory (Ref. 1). A description of the ICS is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.4, "Isolation Condenser System (ICS) - Operating." When the reactor is shutdown, a reduced ICS capability is maintained to provide cooldown capability and to ensure a highly reliable and passive alternative to the Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System (RWCU/SDC) system for decay heat removal.

RWCU/SDC consists to two independent and redundant trains powered from separate electrical divisions that can be powered from either offsite power or either of the station diesel generators. However, RWCU/SDC is a nonsafety-related system that cannot be assumed to remain available following an equipment failure or a loss of offsite power. Depending on plant and equipment status, various alternatives to the RWCU/SDC for decay heat removal can be configured in MODES 3, 4 and 5. When the IC/PCC pool and the individual ICS pool subcompartments are flooded, use of one or more ICS loops is the preferred backup method for decay heat removal in MODES 3 and 4.

Although not effective for decay heat removal in MODE 5, the ICS does provide a highly reliable and passive backup to the RWCU/SDC for decay heat removal in this MODE. If normal decay heat removal capability is lost, the reactor coolant temperature will increase until the ICS provides the required decay heat removal capacity.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

A highly reliable, safety-related, and passive alternative to RWCU/SDC for decay heat removal when shutdown is not required for mitigation of any event or accident evaluated in the safety analyses. However, decay heat removal must be accomplished to prevent core damage could.

ICS - Shutdown satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO

This LCO requires that two trains of ICS be OPERABLE when shutdown to provide a backup method for decay heat removal.

Although various methods of active decay heat removal using feed and bleed may be available, this LCO is intended to ensure that at least one highly reliable and passive alternative to RWCU/SDC for decay heat removal is available when in MODES 3, 4, and 5. When in MODE 5, required IC loops will require functionality of associated IC/PCC expansion pools as heat sink for the ICS condensers.

APPLICABILITY

This LCO requires that two trains of ICS be OPERABLE in MODES 3 and 4 when ≥ 2 hours since reactor was critical, and in MODE 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

If one or more of the required ICS trains are not available, the plant may not have a reliable and passive alternative to RWCU/SDC for decay heat removal. Therefore, action must be taken to ensure that a minimum of two methods capable of decay heat removal is available. The Completion Time of 4 hours recognizes the need to maintain redundant decay heat removal capability.

B.1

If redundant decay heat removal capability is not available, action must be initiated immediately to restore Reactor Building to OPERABLE status as described in the Bases for LCO 3.6.3.1, “Reactor Building.” This action is needed to establish appropriate compensatory measures for a loss of decay heat removal.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.5.1

This SR requires verification every 31 days that each ICS manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position. This SR is intended to ensure proper valve alignment in any flow path required for proper operation of the ICS. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in correct, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The 31 day Frequency for performing this SR is acceptable based on engineering judgment and was chosen to provide added assurance that ICS valves are correctly positioned.

SR 3.5.5.2

This SR requires verification every 31 days that the High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System (HPNSS) pressure to each nitrogen operated ICS valve is within the specified limit. The 31 day Frequency is acceptable because highly reliable HPNSS low pressure alarms will provide prompt notification of an abnormal pressure in the HPNSS.

SR 3.5.5.3

This SR requires verification every 24 months that each ICS subcompartment manual isolation valve is locked open. This SR is necessary to ensure that the full volume of water in the IC/PCC pools is available to each condenser. If this SR is not met, the associated ICS loop may not be capable of performing its design functions. The 24 month Frequency for this SR is based on engineering judgment and is acceptable because the manual isolation valves between the IC/PCC pool and the ICS subcompartments are locked open and maintained in their correct position under administrative controls.

SR 3.5.5.4

This SR requires verification every 24 months that the ICS actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The ICS is required to actuate automatically to perform its design function. This Surveillance test verifies that the automatic initiation logic will cause the ICS to operate as designed when a system initiation signal (actual or simulated) is received. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.4 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed ICS function.

The 24 month Frequency for performing this SR is acceptable based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the SR were performed with the reactor at power.

REFERENCES 1. Chapter 5.

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.1 Containment

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the containment is to isolate and contain fission products released from the reactor coolant system following a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material to within limits. The containment structure, is a reinforced concrete cylindrical structure, which encloses the reactor pressure vessel and its related systems and components. The containment structure has an internal steel liner, which provides an essentially leak-tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

   1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system or

   2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs),"

b. Containment air locks are OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, "Containment Air Lock,"

c. All equipment hatches are closed, and

d. The sealing mechanism (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) associated with a penetration is OPERABLE.

This Specification ensures that the performance of the containment, in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 4 and 5. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The safety design basis for the containment is that it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate such that the postulated release of fission-product radioactivity subsequent to a DBA will not result in doses in excess of the values given in the licensing basis.

The DBA that results in a release of radioactive material within containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE at event initiation such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage.

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the containment are presented in References 4 and 5. The safety analyses assume a non-mechanistic fission-product release following a DBA that forms the basis for determination of off-site doses. The fission-product release is in turn based on an assumed leakage rate from the containment. OPERABILITY of the containment ensures that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded, and that the site boundary radiation dose will not exceed the limits of 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) and Regulatory Guide 1.183 (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively) even if the non-mechanistic release were to occur.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the containment (L_a) is 0.5% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the maximum calculated containment pressure (Ref. 4), excluding MSIV leakage. The bulk of the containment leakage (0.98 L_a) is released into the Reactor building. The remaining portion of primary leakage (0.02 L_a) is assumed to leak through the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) into the airspace directly above the PCCS and Isolation Condenser pools and is quickly vented directly to the atmosphere.

Containment satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to ≤ 1.0 L_a, except prior to the first startup after performing a required Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test. At this time the applicable leakage limits must be met.

Compliance with this LCO will ensure a containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis. Individual

BASES

LCO (continued)

leakage rates specified for the containment air locks are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2.

APPLICABILITY

The containment is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 because a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment.

ACTIONS

A.1

If the containment is inoperable, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. Therefore, the containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1

If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status in the required Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 6) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 7 is followed, except that reference to standby gas treatment system OPERABILITY is not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.1.1

Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.2.1) or main steam isolation valve leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.8) does not necessarily result in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test is required to be < 0.6 L_a for combined Type B and C leakage, and ≤ 0.75 L_a for Option B for overall Type A leakage. At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage limit of ≤ 1.0 L_a. At ≤ 1.0 L_a the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. The Frequency is required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.1.2

{This SR measures inleakage past the feedwater flow isolation valves into the containment to ensure that leakage past the feedwater isolation valves is within allowable limits.

Limiting the leakage from the feedwater system outside containment into the containment is necessary to limit mass water additions to the containment during and following a design basis feedwater line rupture inside containment.}

The 24-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.6.1.1.3

This SR measures leakage past the wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breakers to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.

Limiting the leakage from the drywell to the wetwell is necessary for the functioning of the pressure suppression function of the containment. This ensures that the steam produced by an event that pressurized the drywell will be directed through the pressure suppression vent system into the suppression pool.

The 24-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1).
2. Regulatory Guide 1.183, July 2000.
3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, “Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water Cooled Power Reactors.”
4. Section 6.2.
5. Section 15.4.
6. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}
7. TSTF-IG-05-02, Implementation Guidance For TSTF-423, Revision {1}, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," {2007}.

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.2 Containment Air Lock

BASES

BACKGROUND

Two double-door containment air locks, one in the upper drywell region and one in the lower drywell region, are built into the containment to provide personnel access to the drywell while maintaining containment isolation during the process of personnel entering and exiting the drywell. The air lock is designed to withstand the same loads, temperatures, and peak design internal and external pressures as the containment (Ref. 1). As part of the containment, the air locks limit the release of radioactive material to the environment during normal plant operation and through a range of incidents up to and including postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).

Each air lock door has been designed and tested to verify its ability to withstand pressures in excess of the maximum expected pressure following a DBA in containment. As such, closure of a single door supports containment OPERABILITY. Each of the doors contains double seals and local leakage rate testing capability to ensure pressure integrity. To obtain a leak tight seal, the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an increase in containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door).

Each air lock is nominally a right circular cylinder with doors at each end that are interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening. The air lock is provided with limit switches on both doors that provide control room indication of door position. During periods when containment is not required to be OPERABLE, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. Under some conditions as allowed by this LCO, the containment may be accessed through the air lock when the interlock mechanism has failed by manually performing the interlock function.

The containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure boundary. As such, air lock integrity and air tightness are essential to limit off-site doses from a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or air tightness may result in off-site doses in excess of those described in the plant safety analyses. All leakage rate surveillance requirements conform

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 2), as modified by approved exemptions described in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment is designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.5% by weight of the containment per 24 hours at the calculated maximum containment pressure (Ref. 3), excluding MSIV leakage. This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.

The containment air lock satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

As part of the containment pressure boundary, the air lock's safety function is related to control of containment leakage rates following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

Two containment air locks are required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, both air lock doors must be OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, and the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage testing requirements as described in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The closure of either the inner or outer door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. However, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into or exit from containment.

The air lock interlock mechanism allows only one air lock door to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when the containment is required to be OPERABLE.

BASES

APPLICABILITY

The containment air locks are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when a DBA could cause a significant increase in containment pressure and the release of radioactive material to containment.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced because RPV pressure and temperature are lower. Therefore, maintaining OPERABILITY of the containment air locks is not required.

ACTIONS

Three Notes modify ACTIONS. Note 1 specifies that entry into and exit from the containment is permissible to perform repairs on the affected air lock. If the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed to repair. If the inner door is the one that is inoperable, however, then a short time exists when the containment boundary is not intact (during access through the outer door). The ability to open the OPERABLE door, even if it means the containment boundary is temporarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. The OPERABLE door must be immediately closed after each entry and exit.

Note 2 clarifies that, for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock. This is acceptable because the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable air lock. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for operation to continue. This note clarifies that a subsequent inoperable air lock is governed by same Condition and associated Required Actions used for the other air lock.

Note 3 provides the clarification that Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, “Containment,” are applicable when air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

A.1, A.2, and A.3

If one air lock door is inoperable, Required Action A.1 specifies that the OPERABLE door must be verified closed and remain closed. This action must be completed within 1 hour. Maintaining the OPERABLE door closed assures that a leak tight containment barrier is maintained by an OPERABLE air lock door. The 1-hour Completion Time is consistent with the Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, “Containment,” which requires that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Required Action A.2 specifies the air lock must be isolated by locking closed the OPERABLE air lock door within the 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time is considered reasonable for locking the OPERABLE air lock door because the OPERABLE door is being maintained closed.

Required Action A.3 requires periodic verification that the air lock with an inoperable door has been isolated by the use of a locked closed OPERABLE air lock door. This ensures that an acceptable containment leakage boundary is maintained. The verification interval of 31 days is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the administrative controls that make a mispositioned locked door unlikely.

Required Action A.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas and allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, because access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

Two Notes modify the Required Actions for Condition A. Note 1 ensures that Condition C is entered if both doors in the air lock are inoperable. With both doors in an air lock inoperable, the Action to lock an OPERABLE door closed is not applicable. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the appropriate remedial actions.

Note 2 provides an allowance that entry and exit using an inoperable air lock is permissible under the control of a dedicated individual stationed at the air lock to ensure that only one door is opened at a time and that the door does not remain open longer than is required.

B.1, B.2, and B.3

If an air lock door interlock mechanism is inoperable, the Required Actions and associated Completion Times for one inoperable air lock door described for Condition A are applicable.

Two Notes modify the Required Actions. Note 1 ensures that Condition C is entered if both doors in the air lock are inoperable. With both doors in an air lock inoperable, the Action to lock an OPERABLE door closed is not applicable. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the appropriate remedial actions.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Note 2 provides an allowance that entry and exit using an inoperable air lock is permissible under the control of a dedicated individual stationed at the air lock to ensure that only one door is opened at a time and that the door does not remain open longer than is required.

Required Action B.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas and allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, because access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

C.1, C.2, and C.3

If the air lock is inoperable for reasons other than those described in Condition A or B, Required Action C.1 specifies that action must be initiated to evaluate containment overall leakage rate using current air lock test results to verify that the requirements of LCO 3.6.1.1 are being met.

Required Action C.2 specifies that the OPERABLE door be verified closed and remain closed. This action must be completed within 1 hour. This specified time period is consistent with the Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, “Containment,” which requires that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

Required Action C.3 specifies that the air lock must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. The 24-hour Completion Time is reasonable for restoring an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status, considering that at least one door in the air lock is maintained closed.

D.1

If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the containment air lock to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 5 is followed, except that reference to standby gas treatment system OPERABILITY is not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.2.1

Maintaining containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment leakage rate. The Frequency is specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Two Notes modify SR 3.6.1.2.1. Note 1 clarifies that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of an overall air lock leakage test. This is acceptable because either air lock door is capable of providing a fission-product barrier in the event of a DBA.

Note 2 specifies that the results of containment air lock leakage rate testing be evaluated as part of the acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1.

SR 3.6.1.2.2

This SR requires periodic verification that the air lock door interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not occur inadvertently.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is acceptable because the interlock mechanism is typically not challenged when containment is entered. Additionally, indications of air lock door status would alert operators promptly of a failure of an interlock.

REFERENCES

1. Section 3.8.

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors."

3. Section 6.2.

4. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

5. TSTF-IG-05-02, Implementation Guidance For TSTF-423, Revision {1}, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," {2007}.

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.3 Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of CIVs is to limit fission-product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) to values less than 10 CFR 50.34 (Ref. 1) off-site dose limits and GDC 19 control room dose limits (Ref. 2). The OPERABILITY requirements for CIVs help ensure that adequate containment leaktightness is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential leakage paths to the environment. Containment isolation, within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically, ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the DBA analyses. Therefore, the OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that containment leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses will not be exceeded.

Containment isolation devices are either passive or active (automatic). Passive devices include manual valves, deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), blind flanges, and closed systems. Active devices include check valves and automatic valves designed to close following an accident without operator's action.

Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration so that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation (and possibly loss of containment integrity) or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. One of these barriers may be a closed system.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

This LCO was derived from the requirements related to the control of off-site radiation doses resulting from major accidents. As delineated in 10 CFR 50.34 (Ref. 1), a proposed site must consider a fission-product release from the core, with off-site release based on the expected demonstrable leakage rate from the containment. As part of the containment boundary, CIV function is essential to containment integrity. Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of containment is applicable to this LCO.

The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within containment are a LOCA such as a main feedwater line break (MFLB), or a main steam line break (MSLB). In the analysis for each of these

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

accidents, it is assumed that CIVs are either closed or close within the required isolation times following event initiation. This ensures that potential leakage paths to the environment through CIVs are minimized. Of the events analyzed in Reference 3,the MSLB is the most limiting event] based on the radiological consequences. The closure time of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) is a significant variable from a radiological standpoint in the MSLB event. The MSIVs are required to close in > 3 but < 5 seconds; therefore, the 5-second closure time is assumed in the analysis. {The off-site dose calculations assume that the purge valves were closed at event initiation.} Likewise, it is assumed that the containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage.

{The DBA analysis assumes that within {30} seconds of the accident, isolation of the containment is complete and leakage is terminated, except for the maximum allowable leakage, (L_a).} {The containment isolation total response time of {30} seconds includes signal delay and CIV stroke times.} The single-failure criterion required to be imposed in the conduct of plant safety analyses was considered in the design of the containment isolation valves.

The CIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

This LCO requires that each CIV is OPERABLE because CIVs form a part of the containment boundary. The CIV safety function is minimizing off-site radiation exposures resulting from a DBA. This LCO provides assurance that the CIVs will perform their designed safety functions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in off-site exposure.

The automatic power-operated isolation valves are OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits, the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal, and excess flow check valves (EFCVs) actuate within the required differential pressure range. The valves covered by this LCO are listed with their associated stroke times in Reference 5.

The normally closed isolation valves are OPERABLE when manual valves are closed, automatic valves are deactivated and secured in their closed position, and blind flanges and closed systems are in place. The

BASES

LCO (continued)

normally open manual isolation valves are OPERABLE when they are capable of closing. {The passive isolation valves/devices are those listed in Reference 5.}

APPLICABILITY

CIVs must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to protect against a DBA release of radioactive material to containment.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced because RPV pressure and temperature are lower. Therefore, OPERABILITY of CIVs is not required to ensure containment integrity when in MODE 5 or 6.

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by four Notes. Note 1 allows CIVs to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the valve to isolate the valve when a valid containment isolation signal is indicated.

Note 2 provides clarification that separate condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable CIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable CIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

Note 3 requires that the OPERABILITY of the affected systems be evaluated when a CIV is inoperable. This ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable CIV. Note 4 specifies that the Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Containment," are applicable when CIV leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria when in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these ACTIONS are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions are taken.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Periodic verification of isolation devices located in high radiation areas may be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is acceptable because access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the potential for misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

Periodic verification of isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position may be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the potential for misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

A.1 and A.2

Condition A is applicable only to those penetration flow paths with two CIVs. For penetration flow paths with one CIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

If one of the CIVs in one or more penetration flow paths is inoperable for reasons other than Condition D, the penetration still has isolation capability but the ability to tolerate a single failure is lost. Therefore, Required Action A.1 requires that the affected penetrations must be isolated within 4 hours for penetrations other than the main steam line and within 8 hours for main steam lines.

For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the valve or device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest to the containment that is available. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and deactivated automatic CIV, a closed manual valve, a check valve with flow through the valve secured, or a blind flange.

The Completion Time of 4 hours to isolate penetrations (other than a main steam line) provides sufficient time to complete the action and is acceptable because the penetration still has isolation capability although the ability to tolerate a single failure is lost.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

The Completion Time of 8 hours to isolate a main steam line provides additional time to attempt restoration before initiating the transient associated with main steam line isolation. This is acceptable because the penetration still has isolation capability although the ability to tolerate a single failure is lost.

Required Action A.2 requires periodic verification that isolated penetrations remain isolated. This is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and which are no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is acceptable because the valves are operated under administrative control and the probability of their misalignment is low.

The Completion Time for verification of isolation valves inside containment is that verification must be completed prior to entering MODE 2 or 4 from MODE 5 if containment was de-inerted while in MODE 5 unless the verification was performed within the previous 92 days. This Completion Time is based on engineering judgment and is acceptable because of the inaccessibility of the valves and other administrative controls that ensure that valve misalignment is unlikely.

B.1

Condition B is applicable only to those penetration flow paths with two CIVs. For penetration flow paths with one CIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

If two CIVs are inoperable in one or more penetration flow paths for reasons other than Condition D, isolation capability for the penetration may be lost. Therefore, at least one of the CIVs in each flow path must be restored to OPERABLE within one hour or Required Action B.1 requires that the penetration be isolated within one hour.

For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action B.1, the valve or device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest to the containment available. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and deactivated automatic CIV, a closed manual valve, a check valve with flow through the valve secured, or a blind flange.

The Completion Time of one hour is acceptable because it is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, “Containment,” and is reasonable considering the importance of maintaining containment integrity during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

C.1 and C.2

Condition C is applicable only to those penetration flow paths with one CIV. For penetration flow paths with two CIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions.

If the CIV is inoperable in one or more penetration flow paths (for reasons other than Condition D), isolation capability is degraded. Therefore, Required Action C.1 specifies that the affected penetrations must be isolated within 4 hours except for penetrations with EFCVs or penetrations for closed systems. Penetrations with EFCVs and penetrations for closed systems must be isolated within 72 hours.

For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the valve or device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest to the containment available. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and deactivated automatic CIV, a closed manual valve, or a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration, because GDC 57 (Ref. 2) does not consider the check valve an acceptable automatic isolation valve.

The Completion Time of 72 hours to isolate penetrations with closed systems is acceptable because of the relative reliability of the closed system as a penetration isolation boundary. The Completion Time of 72 hours to isolate penetrations with EFCVs is needed because closure of these valves may result in an unplanned transient

Required Action C.2 requires periodic verification that isolated penetrations remain isolated. This is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and which are no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is acceptable because the valves are operated under administrative control and the probability of their misalignment is low.

D.1

If CIV leakage is not within required limits, the assumptions of the safety analysis for the radiological consequences of an event are not met. Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within the required limit.

Restoration of the leakage rate can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolation penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices.

{The Completion Time for restoration of hydrostatically tested lines {not on a closed system} is 4 hours.} The Completion Time for restoration of reactor building bypass leakage is 4 hours. The Completion Time for restoration of Main Steam Isolation Valve leakage is 8 hours. {The Completion Time for restoration of hydrostatically tested lines on a closed system is 72 hours.} Each of these completion times is consistent with the Completion Time for isolation of an inoperable valve of the same type.

E.1

If a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, or D is not met, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 6) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 7 is followed, except that reference to standby gas treatment system OPERABILITY is not applicable.

F.1 and F.2

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B is not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner, without challenging plant systems, and have been shown to be acceptable by Reference 6.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.3.1

This SR requires periodic verification that each 500 mm (20 in) containment purge valve is closed. This SR ensures that the primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a purge valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is inoperable.

This SR is modified by a Note that permits the 500 mm (20 in) containment purge valves to be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. The 31 day Frequency is acceptable because containment purge valve status is available to operations personnel.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.6.1.3.2

This SR requires periodic verification that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. This SR is not required on valves or blind flanges that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured. The SR helps to ensure that post-accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the containment boundary is within design limits.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves or blind flanges located outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. A sealed valve utilizes a device that provides evidence of unauthorized manipulation (e.g., cable secured by means of a lead seal).

The 31 day Frequency is relatively easy and was chosen to provide added assurance that the valves are in the correct positions. The 31 day Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. A Note has been added to this SR to clarify that valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the valves are open.

SR 3.6.1.3.3

This SR requires periodic verification that each containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located inside containment and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post-accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the containment boundary is within design limits.

For valves inside containment, the Frequency defined as “prior to entering MODE 2 or 4 from MODE 5 if containment was de-inerted while in MODE 5 and if not performed within the previous 92 days” is appropriate because these valves and flanges are operated under administrative control and the probability of their misalignment is low. A Note has been added to this SR to clarify that valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the valves are open.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.6.1.3.4

This SR requires periodic verification that the isolation time of each power-operated and automatic CIV is within required limits. The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. MSIVs are excluded from this SR because MSIV full-closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.5.

The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.3.5

This SR requires periodic verification that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the required limits. The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA analyses.

The 24 month Frequency was developed to be consistent with the normal refueling interval and is acceptable based on engineering judgment.

SR 3.6.1.3.6

This SR requires periodic verification that each automatic CIV will actuate to its isolation position on a containment isolation signal. Containment isolation is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA.

This 24 month Frequency was developed to be consistent with the normal refueling interval. This Frequency will allow the SR to be performed during a plant outage because isolation of penetrations could disrupt cooling water flow and the normal operation of critical components.

SR 3.6.1.3.7

This SR requires periodic verification that a representative sample of reactor instrumentation line EFCVs each reduce flow to ≤ {3.79 liters/hour (1 gph)} on a simulated line break. This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform so that predicted radiological consequences will not be exceeded during the postulated instrumentation line break event evaluated in Reference 3.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This 24 month Frequency was developed to be consistent with the normal refueling interval. This interval will allow the SR to be performed during a plant outage because of the potential for an unplanned plant transient if the SR is performed with the reactor at power.

SR 3.6.1.3.8

This SR requires periodic verification that the leakage rate through each MSIV is within the specified limit. The analyses in Reference 3 are based on leakage that is less than the specified limit.

The MSIV leakage rate must be verified in accordance with Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses in Reference 3. Maintaining the MSIVs OPERABLE requires compliance with requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 8), as modified by approved exemptions, which are identified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

{SR 3.6.1.3.9

This SR requires periodic verification that the leakage through each hydrostatically tested line that penetrates the containment does not exceed {0.227 m^3/hour (1 gpm)} when tested at 1.1 times peak calculated containment pressure. Note that dual function valves must pass all applicable SRs.

The leakage rate must be verified in accordance with Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses in References 3 and 4. Maintaining the hydrostatically tested lines OPERABLE requires compliance with requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 8), as modified by approved exemptions, which are identified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.}

{SR 3.6.1.3.10

This SR requires periodic verification that the leakage rate for all Reactor Building bypass leakage paths, except MSIVs, is within limits.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The leakage rate must be verified in accordance with Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses in References 3 and 4. Maintaining the Reactor Building bypass leakage paths OPERABLE requires compliance with requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 8), as modified by approved exemptions, which are identified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.}

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.34.

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," GDC 19 and GDC 57.

3. Section 15.4.

4. Section 6.2.

5. Section 6.2, Tables 6.2-15 through 6.2-45.

6. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

7. TSTF-IG-05-02, Implementation Guidance For TSTF-423, Revision {1}, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," {2007}.

8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors."

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.4 Drywell Pressure

BASES

BACKGROUND	The upper limit for containment drywell pressure is an input to the analyses for containment performance during postulated loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs). The limit was selected based on plant operating experience as a reasonable upper bound during normal operation. This limitation on drywell pressure provides added assurance that the peak containment pressure does not exceed the design value of 310 kPaG (45 psig).
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	Containment performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for postulated LOCAs. The upper limit for containment drywell pressure is an initial condition in the analyses (Ref. 1) that ensures that the peak drywell internal pressure will be maintained below the drywell design pressure in the event of a LOCA. The calculated peak drywell pressure for the limiting event is provided in Reference 1. Drywell pressure satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO	This LCO requires that containment drywell pressure be maintained {less than or equal to 8.96 kPaG (1.3 psig)} during normal operation. Maintaining containment drywell pressure within the specified limit ensures that an initial condition assumed in the safety analysis remains valid. This ensures that the peak LOCA drywell internal pressure will be maintained below the drywell design pressure in the event of a LOCA.
APPLICABILITY	Containment drywell pressure must be maintained within the specified limit in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when a LOCA could cause a significant increase in containment pressure and the release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of LOCA are reduced because RPV pressure and temperature are lower. Therefore, maintaining drywell pressure within limits is not required when in MODE 5 or 6.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1

If drywell pressure is not within the limits of the LCO, drywell pressure must be restored within 1 hour. The Required Action is necessary to return operation to within the bounds of the containment analysis. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Containment," which requires that Containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

B.1

If drywell pressure cannot be restored to within limits in the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to restore drywell pressure to within the specified limit will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 3 is followed, except that reference to standby gas treatment system OPERABILITY is not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.4.1

This SR requires periodic verification that drywell pressure is within the specified limit. This ensures that facility operation remains within the limits assumed in the containment analysis.

The 12-hour Frequency for this SR was developed based on operating experience related to trending of drywell pressure variations and pressure instrument drift during the applicable MODES. The 12-hour Frequency is acceptable because of other indications available in the control room, including drywell pressure alarms, will provide prompt notification of abnormal drywell pressure.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. Section 6.2.

2. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

3. TSTF-IG-05-02, Implementation Guidance For TSTF-423, Revision {1}, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," {2007}.

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature

BASES

BACKGROUND	During normal operation, the reactor vessel and piping add heat to the drywell airspace. Drywell coolers remove this energy and maintain appropriate drywell average air temperature. The average airspace temperature affects the calculated response to postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). The limit on drywell average air temperature was developed as a reasonable upper bound based on the plant design and operating plant experience. This limit on drywell temperature was then used in the safety analyses (Ref. 1).
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	Containment performance is evaluated for the spectrum of break sizes for postulated loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) (Ref. 1). Among the inputs to the design basis analysis is the initial drywell average air temperature (Ref. 1). Analyses assume an initial average drywell air temperature of {46.1°C (115°F)}. This limitation ensures that the safety analysis remains valid by maintaining the expected initial conditions and ensures that the peak LOCA drywell temperature does not exceed the maximum allowable of 171°C (340°F) (Ref. 2). The most severe drywell temperature condition occurs as a result of a feedwater line rupture. The maximum calculated drywell average temperature for the worst case break area is provided in Reference 1. Equipment inside containment required to mitigate the effects of a DBA is designed to operate and capable of operating under environmental conditions expected for the accident. Exceeding drywell average air temperature may result in the degradation of the equipment and containment structure under accident loads. Drywell air temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO

This LCO requires that drywell average air temperature be ≤ {46.1°C (115°F)}.

In the event of a DBA, with an initial drywell average temperature less than or equal to the LCO temperature limit, the resultant peak accident temperature is maintained below the containment design temperature. As a result, the ability of containment to perform its design function is ensured.

APPLICABILITY

Drywell average air temperature is required to be within specified limits in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. A DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment and cause a heatup and pressurization of containment.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced because RPV pressure and temperature are lower. Therefore, drywell average temperature within limits is not required in MODE 5 or 6.

ACTIONS

A.1

If drywell average air temperature is not within the limit of the LCO, operation may not be within the assumptions of the containment analysis. Therefore, drywell average air temperature must be restored within the specified limit within eight hours.

The 8 hour Completion Time provides sufficient time to correct minor problems or to prepare the plant for an orderly shutdown and is acceptable because of the low sensitivity of the analysis to variations in this parameter.

B.1

If the drywell average air temperature cannot be restored within limits in the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to restore drywell average air temperature to within the specified limit will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 4 is followed, except that reference to standby gas treatment system OPERABILITY is not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.5.1

This SR requires verification that drywell average air temperature in within specified limits every 24 hours. Permanently installed temperature sensors are provided in various locations and elevations inside containment. These sensors are fed to the plant computer for averaging and continuous monitoring of the containment.

The 24 hour Frequency of the SR is acceptable based on (1) operating experience related to drywell average air temperature variations and temperature instrument drift during the applicable MODES and (2) the low probability of a DBA occurring between surveillances. Furthermore, the 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because highly reliable drywell average air temperature alarms will provide prompt notification of abnormal average air temperature.

REFERENCES

1. Section 6.2.

2. Section 15.4.2.

3. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

4. TSTF-IG-05-02, Implementation Guidance For TSTF-423, Revision {1}, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," {2007}.

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.6 Wetwell-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breakers is to relieve vacuum in the drywell. There are 3 vacuum breaker flow paths between the drywell and the wetwell, which allow air and steam flow from the wetwell to the drywell when the drywell is at a negative pressure with respect to the wetwell. Therefore, wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breaker flow paths prevent an excessive negative differential pressure across the wetwell-drywell boundary. Each vacuum breaker is a self-actuating valve, similar to a check valve.

A negative differential pressure across the drywell wall is caused by rapid depressurization of the drywell. Events that cause this rapid depressurization are cooling cycles, inadvertent drywell spray actuation, and steam condensation from sprays or subcooled water reflood of a break in the event of a primary system rupture. Cooling cycles result in minor pressure transients in the drywell that occur slowly and are normally controlled by heating and ventilation equipment. Spray actuation or spill of subcooled water out of a break result in more significant pressure transients and become important in sizing the vacuum breakers.

In the event of a primary system rupture, steam condensation within the drywell results in the most severe pressure transient. Following a primary system rupture, air in the drywell is purged into the wetwell free airspace, leaving the drywell full of steam. Condensation of the steam caused by ECCS causes depressurization of the drywell.

On the upstream side of the vacuum breaker, a DC solenoid operated valve designed to fail-close is provided. During a LOCA, when the vacuum breaker opens to equalize the wetwell-to-drywell pressure and subsequently does not completely close as detected by the proximity sensors, a control signal will close the upstream valve to prevent extra bypass leakage due to the opening created by the vacuum breaker.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breaker flow paths are presented in Reference 1 as part of the accident response of the containment systems. The vacuum breaker flow paths are provided as part of the containment to limit the negative pressure differential across the drywell and wetwell walls that form part of the containment boundary.

A DBA could result in excessive negative differential pressure across the wetwell-to-drywell wall, caused by the rapid depressurization of the drywell. The event that results in the limiting rapid depressurization of the drywell is the primary system rupture that purges the drywell of nitrogen gas and fills the drywell free airspace with steam. Subsequent condensation of the steam would result in depressurization of the drywell.

The Reference 1 safety analyses assume that the vacuum breakers are closed initially and are fully open at a differential pressure of {3.07 kPa (0.445 psi)}. The analyses also assume that a single failure causes one of the 3 vacuum breakers to fail to open. The Reference 1 safety analyses also assume that all three vacuum breaker flow paths are isolated when the wetwell and drywell differential pressure is equalized, following the initial opening of the vacuum breakers. Because failure of a vacuum breaker flow path to isolate could result in excessive bypass leakage that would degrade the pressure suppression capability of the containment, each vacuum breaker flow path is equipped with an isolation valve that will close on a control signal if the associated vacuum breaker does not completely close, as detected by proximity sensors. The analyses show that the drywell-to-wetwell design pressure is not exceeded even under the worst-case accident scenario.

The wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breakers satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

This LCO requires that all 3 vacuum breaker flow paths are OPERABLE. Vacuum breaker flow path OPERABILITY provides assurance that the drywell-to-wetwell negative pressure differential remains below the design value. Vacuum breaker flow path OPERABILITY also ensures that there is no excessive bypass leakage should a LOCA occur.

BASES

APPLICABILITY

Vacuum breaker flow path OPERABILITY must be maintained in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when a DBA could cause significant heatup of the suppression pool.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced because RPV pressure and temperature are lower. Therefore, maintaining wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breaker flow paths OPERABLE is not required in MODE 5 or 6 to ensure containment integrity.

ACTIONS

A.1

If one wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breaker flow path is inoperable because its vacuum breaker will not open or the associated isolation valve is not open, the remaining 2 OPERABLE vacuum breaker flow paths are capable of providing the vacuum relief function. However, overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in one of the remaining vacuum breaker flow paths could result in an excessive wetwell-to-drywell differential pressure during a DBA. Therefore, 7 days is allowed to restore the inoperable vacuum breaker flow path to OPERABLE status so that plant conditions are consistent with those assumed for the design basis analysis.

The Completion Time of 7 days is acceptable because the remaining 2 OPERABLE vacuum breaker flow paths are capable of providing the vacuum relief function and the low likelihood of a LOCA with a single failure of a vacuum breaker during this period.

B.1

If one wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breaker flow path is inoperable because the vacuum breaker will not close or the associated flow path isolation function is inoperable, there is the potential for containment overpressurization due to this bypass leakage if a LOCA were to occur. An open vacuum breaker flow path allows communication between the drywell and wetwell airspace, degrading the pressure suppression capabilities of the containment. Therefore, the vacuum breaker flow path must be isolated within 8 hours.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 3 is followed.

D.1

If one wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breaker flow path is inoperable because the vacuum breaker will not close and the associated flow path isolation function is inoperable, there is a high potential for wetwell overpressurization due to bypass leakage if a LOCA were to occur. An open vacuum breaker flow path allows communication between the drywell and wetwell airspace, degrading the pressure suppression capabilities of the containment. Therefore, the vacuum breaker flow path must be isolated within 1 hour.

E.1

If two wetwell-to-drywell vacuum breaker flow paths are inoperable, there is a high potential that an excessive wetwell-to-drywell differential pressure could exist during a DBA, or for degradation of the pressure suppression capabilities of the containment. Therefore, one vacuum breaker flow path must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

F.1 and F.2

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D or E cannot be met the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on plant design, to

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.6.1

This SR requires periodic verification that each vacuum breaker is closed to ensure that this potential large bypass leakage path is not present. This SR is performed by observing the vacuum breaker position indication.

The 14 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. The 14 day Frequency is acceptable because vacuum breaker status is available to operations personnel and a highly reliable alarm will alert operations personnel of abnormal vacuum breaker position or valve alignment.

SR 3.6.1.6.2

This SR requires periodic verification that the isolation valve associated with each vacuum breaker flow path is open.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. The 31 day Frequency is acceptable because {isolation valve status is available to operations personnel and a highly reliable alarm will alert operations personnel of abnormal isolation valve position or valve alignment}.

SR 3.6.1.6.3

This SR requires periodic verification of the free movement of each vacuum breaker by verifying that the force required to fully open each vacuum breaker is within limits to ensure they are capable of performing their intended function.

The 24 month Frequency was developed to coincide with the 24 month refueling interval because access to the vacuum breakers is required to perform the SR. The 24 month Frequency is acceptable based on the simplicity and reliability of the valve design. Specifically, the design of the ESBWR vacuum breakers has been enhanced by eliminating the actuator and the associated failure mode, improving the valve hinge design, and selecting materials which are resistant to wear and galling.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.6.1.6.4

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The 24 month Frequency was developed to coincide with the 24 month refueling interval because access to the vacuum breakers is required to perform the SR.

SR 3.6.1.6.5

A system functional test is performed to ensure that each vacuum breaker flow path isolation function operates as required. This includes verifying that the isolation valve automatically closes when the associated vacuum breaker does not completely close, as detected by proximity switches. The 24 month Frequency was developed to coincide with the 24 month refueling interval based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage.

REFERENCES

1. Section 6.2.

2. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

3. TSTF-IG-05-02, "Implementation Guidance for TSTF-423, Revision {1}, 'Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A,'" {2007}.

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.7 Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) is designed to transfer heat from the containment drywell to the IC/PCC pools following a LOCA. The PCCS consists of six independent loops. Each loop is a heat exchanger (condenser) that is a closed-loop extension of the containment pressure boundary. The condensers are located above the containment and are submerged in a large pool of water (IC/PCC pool) that is at atmospheric pressure. Steam produced in IC/PCC pools by boiling around the PCCS condensers is vented to the atmosphere. LCO 3.7.1, "Isolation Condenser (IC)/Passive Containment Cooling (PCC) Pools," supports the PCCS in removing sufficient post-LOCA decay heat from the containment to maintain containment pressure and temperature within design limits for a minimum of 72 hours, without operator action (Ref. 1).

Each of the six PCCS condensers consists of two identical modules. A single central steam supply pipe, open to the containment drywell at its lower end, directs steam from the drywell to the horizontal upper header in each module. Steam is condensed inside banks of vertical tubes that connect the upper and lower header in each module. The condensate collects in each module's lower header and drain volume and then returns by gravity flow to the GDCS pools. By returning the condensate to the GDCS pools, it is available to return to the RPV via the GDCS injection lines. Noncondensable gases that collect in the condensers during operation are purged to the suppression pool via vent lines. Back-flow from the GDCS pool to the suppression pool is prevented by a loop seal in the GDCS drain line.

The RPV is contained within the drywell so that drywell pressure rises above the pressure in the wetwell (suppression pool) during a LOCA. This differential pressure initially directs the high energy blowdown fluids from the RPV break in the drywell through both the pressure suppression pool and through the PCCS heat exchanger loops. As the flow passes through the PCCS heat exchangers, heat is rejected to the IC/PCC pool, thus cooling the containment.

There are no isolation valves on the PCCS inlets from the drywell, or the drain lines to the GDCS pools, or the vent lines to the suppression pool. The PCCS does not have instrumentation, control logic, or power-actuated valves, and does not need or use electrical power for its

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

operation. This configuration makes the PCCS fully passive because no active components are required for the system to perform its design function (Ref. 2).

Spectacle flanges in the suppression pool vent line and the GDCS drain line are used to isolate the condensers to allow post maintenance leakage tests separately from Type A containment leakage tests.

Each PCCS condenser is located in a sub-compartment of the IC/PCC pool. During a LOCA, pool water temperature could rise to about 101°C (214°F) (Ref. 1). The steam formed will be non-radioactive and have a slight positive pressure relative to station ambient. The steam generated in the IC/PCC pool is released to the atmosphere through large-diameter discharge vents. A moisture separator is installed at the entrance to the discharge vent lines to preclude excessive moisture carryover and loss of IC/PCC pool water.

Each PCCS loop is designed to remove a nominal 11 MWt of decay heat assuming the containment side of the condenser contains pure, saturated steam at 308 kPa absolute (45 psia) and 134°C; and, the IC/PCC pool is at atmospheric pressure with a water temperature of 102°C.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Reference 1 contains the results of analyses used to predict containment pressure and temperature following large and small break LOCAs. The intent of the analyses is to demonstrate that the heat-removal capacity of the Passive Containment Cooling System is adequate to maintain the containment conditions within design limits. The time history for containment pressure and temperature are calculated to demonstrate that the maximum values remains below the design limit.

PCCS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

This LCO requires six PCCS loops to be OPERABLE. OPERABILITY of a PCCS loop requires that all the performance and physical arrangement SRs for the PCCS loops be met. Additionally, the isolation valve for the PCCS condenser subcompartment pool must be locked open. This ensures that the full capacity of the IC/PCC pools is available to provide required cooling water to the PCCS loop for at least 72 hours after a LOCA without the need for operator action. With the PCCS

BASES

LCO (continued)

subcompartment isolation valve locked open, subcompartment level is maintained in accordance with the requirements in LCO 3.7.1, "Isolation Condenser System (ICS)/Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) Pools." {There are no requirements for temperature in individual PCCS condenser subcompartments.}

APPLICABILITY

The PCCS loops are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 because a LOCA could cause a pressurization and heat up of containment.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, passive containment cooling is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS

A.1

If one or more PCCS loops are inoperable, the functional capability of the passive containment cooling is degraded. All six PCCS loops must be made OPERABLE within 8 hours to ensure that containment cooling capacity is maintained. The Completion Time of 8 hours has been shown to be acceptable by Reference 3.

B.1 and B.2

If the Required Action and Completion Time of Condition A are not met, functional capability of the passive containment cooling is assumed lost. Therefore, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.7.1

This SR requires periodic verification that the spectacle flanges for the vent, and drain line for each PCCS loop are in the free flow position. This SR is required to ensure that each PCCS condenser is aligned to function properly when required.

Performance of the SR requires entry into containment. Therefore, this SR is performed prior to entering MODE 2 or 4 from MODE 5 if containment was de-inerted while in MODE 5 unless the SR was performed in the previous 92 days. This Frequency is acceptable because changing the status of the PCCS spectacle flanges requires entry into containment, is performed under administrative controls during planned maintenance activities, and is unlikely to occur inadvertently.

SR 3.6.1.7.2

This SR requires verification every 24 months that each PCCS subcompartment manual isolation valve is locked open. This SR ensures that the level in the subcompartment is the same as the level in the associated expansion pool and that the full volume of water in the IC/PCC pools is available to each condenser. If this SR is not met, the associated PCCS loop may not be capable of performing its design function. The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is acceptable because the manual isolation valves between the IC/PCC pool and the PCCS subcompartments are locked open and maintained in their correct position under administrative controls.

SR 3.6.1.7.3

This SR requires periodic verification that both modules in the condenser in each PCCS loop have an unobstructed path from the drywell inlet through the condenser tubes to both the GDCS pool through the drain line and to the suppression pool through the vent line.

The Frequency for this SR is 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS for each PCCS loop. This Frequency requires testing one of the six PCCS loops every 24 months, which is consistent with the normal refueling interval. The Frequency is based on engineering judgment, the simplicity of the design, and the requirement for containment access to perform the SR.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 6.

2. Chapter 19.

3. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature

BASES

BACKGROUND

The wetwell is a reinforced concrete vessel containing a volume of water called the suppression pool. The suppression pool is designed to absorb the energy associated with decay heat and sensible energy released during a reactor blowdown from Safety Relief Valve (SRV) discharges or from Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). The suppression pool must quench all the steam released through the vent lines during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). This is the essential mitigative feature of a pressure suppression containment that ensures that the peak containment pressure is maintained below the design pressure for DBAs of 310 kPaG (45 psig). Suppression pool average temperature (along with LCO 3.6.2.2, “Suppression Pool Water Level”) is a key indication of the capacity of the suppression pool to fulfill these requirements.

The technical concerns that lead to the development of suppression pool average temperature limits are as follows:

a. Assure steam condensation of the blowdown.

b. Assure containment peak pressure and temperature are below design values.

c. Assure steam condensation loads are acceptable.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The postulated DBA against which containment performance is evaluated is the entire spectrum of postulated pipe breaks within the containment. Inputs to the safety analyses include initial suppression pool water volume and suppression pool temperature (Ref. 1 for LOCAs, and Reference 2 for stuck open relief valve).

An initial pool temperature of 43.3°C (110°F) is assumed for the Reference 1 and Reference 2 analyses. Reactor shutdown at a pool temperature of 48.9°C (120°F) and vessel depressurization at a pool temperature of 54.4°C (130°F) are also assumed.

Suppression pool average temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO

This LCO establishes the following limits for suppression pool average temperature:

a. When THERMAL POWER is > 1% RTP and testing which adds heat to the suppression pool is not being performed, average temperature must be ≤ 43.3°C (110°F). This requirement ensures that licensing bases initial conditions are met.

b. When THERMAL POWER is > 1% RTP and testing which adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed, average temperature must be ≤ 46.1°C (115°F). This requirement ensures that the plant has testing flexibility and was selected to provide margin below the 48.9°C (120°F) limit at which reactor shutdown is required. When testing ends, temperature must be restored to ≤ 43.3°C (110°F) within 24 hours per Required Action A.2.

c. When THERMAL POWER is ≤ 1% RTP, average temperature must be ≤ 48.9°C (120°F). This requirement ensures that licensing bases initial conditions are met.

A limitation on the suppression pool average temperature is required to ensure that the containment conditions assumed for the safety analyses are met. This limitation is necessary so that peak containment pressures and temperatures predicted by the safety analyses do not exceed maximum allowable values during a postulated DBA or any transient that results in heatup of the suppression pool.

APPLICABILITY

Suppression pool average temperature must be maintained within specified limits in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when a DBA could cause significant heatup of the suppression pool.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced because RPV pressure and temperature are lower. Therefore, maintaining suppression pool average temperature within limits is not required in MODES 5 or 6 to ensure containment integrity.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

If suppression pool average temperature is > 43.3°C (110°F) but ≤ 48.9°C (120°F), and THERMAL POWER is > 1% RTP, and testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is not being performed, then the requirements of LCO 3.6.2.1.a are not being met. Therefore, Required Action A.2 requires that suppression pool average temperature be restored to within required limits within 24 hours. Additionally, Required Action A.1 requires verification every hour that suppression pool average temperature has not exceeded limits specified in LCO 3.6.2.1.c because this temperature would require immediate entry into condition D.

The Completion Time of 24 hours to restore the temperature to within the limits of LCO 3.6.2.1.a is acceptable because significant containment cooling capability still exists and the containment pressure suppression function will occur at temperatures well above those assumed for safety analyses. Therefore, continued operation is allowed for a limited time. Additionally, the 24-hour Completion Time is adequate to allow the suppression pool temperature to be restored below the limit.

The Completion Time of once per hour for verification that the limits specified in LCO 3.6.2.1.c have not been exceeded is acceptable because experience has shown that pool temperature increases relatively slowly when not performing testing that adds heat to the pool. Furthermore, other indications in the control room will alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool temperature trends and alarms will alert operators is specified limits are exceeded.

B.1

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition A not met, suppression pool average temperature has not been restored to within limits in the required Completion Time. Therefore, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO 3.6.2.1.a does not apply. This is accomplished by reducing power to < 1% RTP within 12 hours. The 12 hour Completion Time for reducing reactor is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce reactor power from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1

If suppression pool average temperature is > 46.1°C (115°F), THERMAL POWER is > 1% RTP and testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed, the temporary allowance provided for suppression

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

pool heating for testing has been exceeded. Therefore, all testing must be immediately suspended to preserve the heat absorption capability of the pool. When the testing suspended, Condition A is entered and the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are applicable.

D.1 and D.2

If suppression pool average temperature is ≥ 48.9°C (120°F), an automatic reactor shutdown is initiated because suppression pool temperature exceeds safety analyses assumptions. Therefore, Required Action D.1 specifies placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position as a manual backup to the automatic function.

If the reactor is shutdown and suppression pool average temperature ≥ 48.9°C (120°F), the requirements of LCO 3.6.2.1.c are still not met. Therefore, Required Action D.2 requires verification every 30 minutes that suppression pool average temperature has not exceeded 54.4°C (130°F) because this temperature would require immediate entry into Condition E.

The Completion Time of once per 30 minutes for verification that the limits for entry into Condition E have not been exceeded is required because of the degraded capacity of the suppression pool. This completion time is acceptable because other indications in the control room will alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool temperature trends and alarms will alert operators is specified limits are exceeded.

E.1 and E.2

If suppression pool average temperature is > 54.4°C (130°F), the capacity of the suppression pool is significantly degraded. Therefore, the plant must be placed in a condition in which overall plant risk is reduced. This is accomplished by reducing reactor pressure to {< 1.38 MPaG (200 psig)} within 12 hours. Additionally, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from the reactor shutdown condition in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.1.1

This SR requires verification that suppression pool average temperature in within specified limits every 24 hours. The average temperature is determined automatically by instrumentation that takes an average of OPERABLE suppression pool water temperature channels.

The 24 hour Frequency for this SR is based on operating experience related to trending suppression pool average temperature changes and instrument drift during the applicable MODES and the need for assessing the proximity to the specified limits. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because highly reliable suppression pool temperature alarms will provide prompt notification of abnormal suppression pool average temperature.

REFERENCES

1. Section 6.2.
2. Chapter 15.

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND

The wetwell is a reinforced concrete vessel containing a volume of water called the suppression pool. The suppression pool is designed to absorb the energy associated with decay heat and sensible heat released during a reactor blowdown from Safety Relief Valve (SRV) discharges or from a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The suppression pool must quench all the steam released through the vent lines during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). This is the essential mitigative feature of a pressure suppression containment, which ensures that the peak containment pressure during a DBA is maintained below the design pressure of 310 kPaG (45 psig).

The suppression pool water volume is approximately 4424 m^3 (156,200 ft^3) at the normal water level of 5.45 m (215 inches) above pool floor.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The upper and lower limits for suppression pool water level are inputs to the analyses for containment performance during postulated accidents and transients. Suppression pool level affects suppression pool temperature response calculations, calculated drywell pressure during vent clearing for a DBA, calculated loads due to a DBA LOCA, and calculated loads due to SRV discharges. Suppression pool water level must be maintained within the limits specified so that the safety analysis of Reference 1 remains valid.

If suppression pool water level is too low, insufficient water is available to adequately condense the steam from the SRV quenchers and the main vents. The lower volume would absorb less steam energy before heating up excessively. The Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) vent return lines must also be submerged. Therefore, a minimum pool water level is specified.

If suppression pool water level is too high, it could result in excessive clearing loads from SRV discharges and excessive hydrodynamic loads due to a DBA LOCA. Therefore, a maximum pool water level is specified. This LCO specifies an acceptable range to prevent the suppression pool water level from being either too high or too low.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Suppression pool water level satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

This LCO requires that suppression pool water level be maintained ≥ 5.4 meters (213 inches) and ≤ 5.5 meters (216 inches) above the pool floor. These limits ensure that the initial conditions assumed for the safety analyses for containment are met.

APPLICABILITY

Suppression pool water level must be maintained within specified limits in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when a DBA could cause significant loads on the containment. The suppression pool water level upper limit is not applicable in MODE 4 because {the RPV temperature and pressure in MODE 4 are sufficiently reduced to prevent excessive hydrodynamic loads during a DBA LOCA. Additionally, a small increase in SRV clearing loads due to high suppression pool level when in MODE 4 will not result in exceeding analysis assumptions.}

In MODES 5 and 6, the potential for SRV actuation is eliminated and the probability and consequences of LOCA are reduced because RPV pressure and temperature are lower. Therefore, maintaining suppression pool level within limits is not required to ensure containment integrity when in MODE 5 or 6.

ACTIONS

A.1

If suppression pool water level is not within specified limits, the initial conditions assumed for the safety analyses are not met. Therefore, suppression pool water level must be restored to within specified limits within 2 hours. This Completion Time is expected to be sufficient to restore suppression pool water level.

The 2 hour Completion Time is acceptable because the pressure suppression function still exists as long as the main vents, SRV quenchers, and PCCS vent return lines are covered even if water level is below the minimum level. Additionally, protection against overpressurization may still exist due to the margin in the peak containment pressure analysis even if water level is above the maximum level. This Completion Time also takes into account the low probability of an event during this.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

If the Required Action and Completion Time of Condition A are not met, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.2.1

This SR requires verification that suppression pool water level in within specified limits every 24 hours. The 24 hour Frequency for this SR is based on operating experience related to trending suppression pool water level variations and water level instrument drift during the applicable MODES and the need for assessing the proximity to the specified limits. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because suppression pool level alarms will provide prompt notification of abnormal suppression pool.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 6.

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.3.1 Reactor Building

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Reactor Building (RB) is a reinforced concrete structure that completely surrounds the containment (except the basemat). The RB provides an added barrier to fission product release from the containment during an accident; contains, dilutes, and holds up any leakage from the containment; and, houses safety-related systems.

The ESBWR design does not include a secondary containment and minimal credit is taken for the existence of the RB surrounding the primary containment vessel in any radiological analyses. Some credit is taken for hold up and plate out in the Reactor Building because the building is sealed during isolation and, if AC power is available, internal recirculation is active. However, the radiological dose consequences for LOCAs are based on an assumed containment leak rate of 0.5% per day. {The bulk of the containment leakage (0.98 L_a) is released into the RB. The RB leaks to the environment at 50% by weight of RB air per 24 hours. The remaining portion of primary leakage (0.02 L_a) is assumed to leak through the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) into the airspace directly above the PCCS and Isolation Condenser pools and is quickly vented directly to the atmosphere.}

The RB structure encloses all penetrations through the containment (except for the main steam tunnel, i.e., main steam and feedwater lines, IC/PCC pools, and miscellaneous other penetrations such as RWCU/SDC, FAPCS, RCCWS, etc.). Under accident conditions, the RB is isolated or passively sealed (e.g., water loop seals) to provide a hold up and plate out barrier. Therefore, containment isolation valve leakage as well as penetration leakage collects in the RB. With low leakage and stagnant conditions, the RB provides a significant volume for hold up and plate out mechanisms to enhance the basic mitigating functions provided by containment.

Leakage through the MSIVs is routed through the main steamline drain lines where large volumes and surface provide effective mechanisms to hold up and plate out the relatively low leakage flow. The feedwater lines are flooded with water that acts to seal or scrub any leakage. Leakage through the drywell head and from the PCCS and ICS condensers is scrubbed by the reactor well water and large ICS/PCCS pool of water, respectively, prior to release to the environment.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The RB HVAC system does not perform an ESF/safety-related function. However, the RB HVAC system automatically isolates upon detection of high radiation levels in the ventilation exhaust system. The RB is divided into clean and contaminated radiological zones. Under normal conditions, airflow is maintained from clean to contaminated areas and then routed via the Reactor Building HVAC system to the plant stack. Under high radiation conditions, the air flow is rerouted to the HEPA filter train or shut down to provide a hold up and plate out volume. Stack radiation monitors monitor RB effluents for radioactivity. If the radioactivity level rises above set levels, the discharge can be routed for treatment before further release.

The compartments within the RB are designed to withstand the maximum pressure due to a high-energy line break (HELB). Each line break analyzed is a double-ended break. In this analysis, the rupture producing the greatest blowdown of mass and enthalpy in conjunction with worst-case single active component failure is considered. Blowout panels between compartments provide flow paths to relieve pressure.

Personnel and equipment entrances to the RB consist of vestibules with interlocked doors and hatches. Large equipment access is by means of a dedicated, external access tower that provides the necessary interlocks. All openings through the RB boundary, such as personnel and equipment doors, are closed during normal operation and after a DBA by interlocks or administrative control. The doors are provided with position indicators and alarms, which are monitored in the control room.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The radiological dose consequences for LOCAs are based on an assumed containment leak rate of 0.5% per day and RB bypass leakage is assumed to be equal to 100% of the containment leak rate. However, the RB HVAC system automatically isolates upon detection of high radiation levels in the ventilation exhaust system. Therefore, some credit may be taken for hold up and plate out in the Reactor Building because the building is sealed during isolation and, if AC power is available, internal recirculation is active.

Reactor Building satisfies Criteria 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO

This LCO requires that Reactor Building OPERABILITY is maintained by keeping all RB equipment hatches closed, keeping RB access doors closed, except for entry and exit, and ensuring RB ventilation dampers actuate when required. RB OPERABILITY also requires RB leakage to be within limits.

APPLICABILITY

The RB is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 because a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment and the RB provides an added barrier to fission product release from the containment during an accident.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the RB is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when the need for RB isolation is indicated.

The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable RB boundary isolation damper. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable RB boundary isolation dampers are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1 and A.2

In the event that there are one or more penetration flow paths with one RB boundary isolation damper inoperable, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criteria are a closed and de-activated automatic damper, a closed manual damper, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1,

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to the RB. This Required Action must be completed within the 7 day Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and because minimal credit is taken for the existence of the RB surrounding the primary containment vessel in any radiological analyses.

For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that RB penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, but no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that the affected penetration remains isolated.

B.1

With two RB boundary isolation dampers in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 48 hours. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic damper, a closed manual damper, and a blind flange. The 48 hour Completion Time is reasonable because minimal credit is taken for the existence of the RB surrounding the primary containment vessel in any radiological analyses.

C.1

If the RB is inoperable, the RB must be restored to OPERABLE within 24 hours. This Completion Time is acceptable because minimal credit is taken for the existence of the RB surrounding the primary containment vessel in any radiological analyses.

D.1

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C are not met, Required Action D.1 requires that the plant be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 3 is followed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.3.1.1

This SR requires periodic verification that all RB equipment hatches are closed. The 31 day Frequency is acceptable because RB equipment hatches are maintained in position under administrative controls that make a mis-positioned hatch unlikely.

SR 3.6.3.1.2

This SR requires periodic verification that one RB access door in each access opening is closed, except when open for entry and exit. The 31 day Frequency is acceptable because RB access doors are monitored and alarmed to prevent mis-positioning.

SR 3.6.3.1.3

This SR requires periodic verification that RB ventilation dampers actuate on an actual or simulated isolation signal. The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is acceptable based on the reliability of this type of component.

SR 3.6.3.1.4

This SR requires periodic verification that the Reactor Building exfiltration (leakage) rate is less than the limit which is based on the assumptions in the radiological evaluations. The 60 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 6.

2. {NEDO-33201, “ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment.”}

3. TSTF-IG-05-02, Implementation Guidance For TSTF-423, Revision {1}, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," {2007}.

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.1 Isolation Condenser (IC)/Passive Containment Cooling (PCC) Pools

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) is the Isolation Condenser (IC)/Passive Containment Cooling (PCC) Pools that transfer heat from the Isolation Condenser System (ICS) and the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) to the atmosphere (Ref. 1). The ICS removes heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) following RCS isolation, a loss of feedwater or a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The PCCS removes heat from the containment following a LOCA or any transient that releases heat to the containment.

The IC/PCC pools are located above and outside the containment boundary, directly above the drywell top slab. The condenser module associated with each ICS train and PCCS loop is submerged in a separate subcompartment of the IC/PCC pools. Subcompartments (i.e., pools) P3A, P3B, P3C, and P3D contain the condenser modules for the ICS trains. Subcompartments P4A, P4B, P4C, P3D, P4E, and P4F contain the condenser modules for the PCCS loops.

Heat from the ICS and PCCS condensers is transferred to water in the associated subcompartment causing the water in the subcompartment to boil. Following reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation or a LOCA, subcompartment water temperature could rise to about 101°C (214°F). The steam formed will be non-radioactive and have a slight positive pressure. The steam from each subcompartment collects in the common air/steam space above the subcompartments and IC/PCC pools. The steam is then released to the atmosphere through two large-diameter discharge vents located on opposite sides of the expansion pools. A moisture separator is installed at the entrance to the discharge vent lines to preclude excessive moisture carryover and loss of IC/PCC pool water. No forced circulation equipment is required for operation (Refs. 2 and 3).

To support decay heat removal for 72 hours without operator action, water must be supplied to the IC and PCC subcompartments to replace the water lost by boiling. This water is supplied from the two IC/PCC expansion pools, the dryer/separator pool, and the reactor well pool.

Each IC and PCC subcompartment is connected to its associated expansion pool by a manually operated valve located below the water level, which allows makeup water from the expansion pool to flow into the

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

bottom of the subcompartment. The subcompartment isolation valves are normally locked open so that the full inventory of the associated expansion pool is available to any subcompartment. The subcompartment isolation valves can be closed to isolate a subcompartment allowing it to be emptied for maintenance of the condenser.

In addition to the IC and PCC subcompartments, each expansion pool is partitioned into three parts. Manually operated valves, which are normally locked open, separate each partition.

The dryer/separator pool and reactor well pool are normally isolated from the expansion pools because the dryer/separator pool and reactor well are maintained at a higher water level than the expansion pools. The dryer/separator pool is connected to each expansion pool by redundant {squib} valves that open automatically when there is a low level in the expansion pools. The dryer/separator pool is connected to the reactor well pool through the reactor well gate, which is not installed during normal plant operation. By connecting the dryer/separator pool and reactor well pool to the expansion pools, the volume of water available to the ICS and PCCS subcompartments is sufficient to support decay heat removal for 72 hours without operator action or the need to replenish the water in the expansion pools.

Cooling and clean up of IC/PCC pool water is performed by Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System (FAPCS). The FAPCS includes a separate subsystem with its own pump, heat exchanger, and water treatment unit that is dedicated for cooling and cleaning of the IC/PCC pools to prevent radioactive contamination of the IC/PCC pools. The FAPCS includes flow paths for post-accident make-up water transfer, from the fire protection system and off-site water supply sources to the IC/PCCS pools (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

In the event of a LOCA, the passive PCCS is required to maintain the containment peak pressure and temperature below design limits for at least 72 hours after the LOCA without operator action (Ref. 3).

In the event of reactor isolation or a station blackout, the ICS must maintain the reactor coolant system pressure and temperature below design limits and remove core decay heat for at least 72 hours after reactor isolation without operator action (Ref. 2).

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The IC/PCC pools are also needed as a heat sink for the ICS condensers when ICS is used as a backup to the Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System (RWCU/SDC) system for decay heat removal when shutdown.

The IC/PCC pools satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

This LCO requires that the IC/PCC pools are OPERABLE. Operability requires the IC/PCC pools be maintained within specified limits for minimum level and maximum average temperature.

To ensure that the total volume of water in the IC/PCC pools is available to the IC and PCC condensers, isolation valves between the partitions within each expansion pool must be locked open and the isolation valves between the dryer/separator pool and the expansion pools must open automatically on a low water level signal from the expansion pools. Additionally, the reactor well gate, which connects the reactor well to the dryer/separator pool, must be removed.

APPLICABILITY

The IC/PCC pools are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 because the PCCS and ICS could be required to respond to an event that caused pressurization and heat up of containment or the ICS could be required to respond to an RPV isolation.

Requirements for the IC/PCC expansion pools in MODE 5 are determined by the requirements of LCO 3.5.5, Isolation Condenser System (ICS) - Shutdown.

ACTIONS

A.1

If the IC/PCC pool is not OPERABLE, the ICS and PCCS may not be capable of performing their required safety function for 72 hours and the initial conditions used in the analyses in References 2 and 3 may not be met. Required Action A.1 requires that the IC/PCC pools be restored within 8 hours. The Completion Time of 8 hours is acceptable because the IC/PCC pools still provide substantial heat sink capacity and there are alternate methods for providing makeup to the IC/PCC pools.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, Required Action B.1 requires that the plant be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.1.1 and SR 3.7.1.2

This SR requires verification every 24 hours that the water levels in each expansion pool and the water level in the dryer/separator pool or reactor well are within specified limits. These levels are necessary to ensure that the volume of water in the IC/PCC pools is sufficient to support decay heat removal via the ICS and/or the PCCS for 72 hours without the need to replenish the water in the expansion pools. The 24 hour frequency is acceptable because abnormal water levels are identified by alarms and indication in the control room.

SR 3.7.1.2 is modified by a Note that specifies that this SR is not required to be met in MODES 3 and 4. Considering the reduced decay heat loads following events initiated after the reactor is shutdown, isolation of these pools from the IC/PCC expansion pools when in Modes 3 and 4 will not result in a significant reduction in the 72 hours assumed available to provide makeup to the IC/PCC pools.

SR 3.7.1.3

This SR requires verification every 24 hours that the bulk average temperature of the IC/PCC pools is ≤ 43.3°C (110°F). The bulk average temperature is calculated based on the volume and temperature of the water in the expansion pools, the IC and PCC subcompartments, the dryer/separator pool, and the reactor well. This value for the average temperature of the IC/PCC pools is an assumption in the analyses described in References 2 and 3 that determined that the heat sink capacity of the IC/PCC pools is sufficient to support decay heat removal for 72 hours without the need to replenish the water in the expansion pools. The 24 hour frequency is acceptable because operators will be promptly alerted to abnormal water temperatures by alarms and indication in the control room.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.7.1.4

This SR requires verification every 24 months that each manual isolation valve between the IC/PCC expansion pool partitions is locked open. This SR is needed to ensure that the full volume of water in each expansion pool is available to the IC and PCC subcompartments. If this SR is not met, the ICS and PCCS may not be capable of performing their design functions. The 24 month Frequency for this SR is based on engineering judgment and is acceptable because the manual isolation valves between the IC/PCC pool partitions are locked open and maintained in their correct position under administrative controls.

SR 3.7.1.5

This SR requires verification every 24 months that the reactor well-to-dryer/separator pool gate is not installed. This SR is necessary to ensure that the volume of water in the reactor well is available to the ICS and/or the PCCS condensers. The volume of water in the reactor well is needed to support decay heat removal for 72 hours without the need to replenish the water in the expansion pools. The 24 month frequency is acceptable because installation of the reactor well-to-dryer/separator pool gate is a significant change in plant status that would not occur without the cognizance of the operators.

This SR is modified by a Note that specifies that this SR not required to be met in MODES 3 and 4. Considering the reduced decay heat loads following events initiated after the reactor is shutdown, isolation of this pool from the IC/PCC expansion pools when in Modes 3 and 4 will not result in a significant reduction in the 72 hours assumed available to provide makeup to the IC/PCC pools.

SR 3.7.1.6

This SR requires verification every 24 months that each isolation valve between the IC/PCC expansion pools and the dryer/separator actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. At least one of the two valves that isolate each expansion pool from the dryer/separator pool must be open to ensure that the volume of water in the dryer/separator pool and the reactor well is available to the ICS and/or the PCCS heat exchangers. The volume of water in the reactor well and the dryer/separator pool is needed to support decay heat removal for 72 hours without the need to replenish the water in the expansion pools.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This 24 month Frequency is consistent with the normal refueling interval. This interval will allow the SR to be performed during a plant outage. This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation as a requirement for this SR to be met. This is acceptable because the design of the {squib-actuated} valve was selected for this application because of its very high reliability.

This SR is modified by a Note that specifies that this SR not required to be met in MODES 3 and 4. Considering the reduced decay heat loads following events initiated after the reactor is shutdown, isolation of this pool from the IC/PCC expansion pools when in Modes 3 and 4 will not result in a significant reduction in the 72 hours assumed available to provide makeup to the IC/PCC pools.

SR 3.7.1.7

This SR requires verification every 10 years that each ICS and PCCS pool subcompartment has an unobstructed path for steam release through moisture separator to the atmosphere. This SR is needed to ensure that steam formed in the ICS and PCCS subcompartments will be properly vented to the atmosphere. The Frequency is based on engineering judgment and the simplicity of the design. This Frequency is acceptable because the flow path from the ICS subcompartments to the expansions pool area and through the moisture separators will be verified whenever the ICS is used.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 9.

2. Chapter 5.

3. Chapter 6.

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.2 Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Subsystem (CRHAVS)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The CRHAVS and control room habitability area (CRHA) boundary provide a protected environment from which occupants can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity, hazardous chemicals, or smoke.

The safety-related function of the CRHAVS used to control radiation exposure consists of two independent and redundant high efficiency air filtration subsystems, or Emergency Filtration Units (EFUs), for treatment of outside supply air and a CRHA boundary that limits the inleakage of unfiltered air. Each CRHAVS consists of an EFU fan; an EFU including a medium efficiency filter, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section, and a post-filter; and the associated ductwork, valves or dampers, doors, barriers, and instrumentation. Each EFU fan, and EFU associated instrumentation, can be powered from {any one of the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems – Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown."} Prefilters and HEPA filters remove particulate matter, which may be radioactive. The charcoal adsorbers provide a holdup period for gaseous iodine, allowing time for decay.

The CRHA is the area within the confines of the CRHA boundary that contains the spaces that control room occupants inhabit to control the unit during normal and accident conditions. This area encompasses the control room, and may encompass other non-critical areas to which frequent personnel access or continuous occupancy is not necessary in the event of an accident. The CRHA is protected for normal operation, natural events, and accident conditions. The CRHA boundary is the combination of walls, floor, roof, ducting, doors, penetrations and equipment that physically form the CRHA. The OPERABILITY of the CRHA boundary must be maintained to ensure that the inleakage of unfiltered air into the CRHA will not exceed the inleakage assumed in the licensing basis analysis of design basis accident (DBA) consequences to CRHA occupants. The CRHA and its boundary are defined in the Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Boundary Program.

In addition to the safety-related standby emergency filtration function, parts of the CRHAVS are operated to maintain the CRHA environment during normal operation, including two redundant nonsafety-related fresh

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

air supply fans and two redundant nonsafety-related internal floor mounted air handling units (AHUs). Upon receipt of the initiation signal(s) (indicative of conditions that could result in radiation exposure to CRHA occupants or an extended loss of normal air supply to the CRHA), the CRHAVS automatically switches to the isolation mode of operation to minimize infiltration of contaminated air into the CRHA. A system of dampers isolates the CRHA, the AHUs continue to operate to maintain the CRHA temperature, and CRHA makeup air flow is processed through either of the two EFU filter subsystems. If all onsite and offsite AC power is lost, one of the nonsafety-related AHUs and a nonsafety-related recirculating chilled water pump operate for a minimum of two hours using the nonsafety-related Uninterruptible AC Power Supply System to dissipate heat from operation of the nonsafety-related main control room Nonsafety-Related Distributed Control and Instrumentation System (N-DCIS) electrical loads. These nonsafety-related main control room N-DCIS electrical loads are automatically de-energized when the CRHA temperature rises above the normal maximum temperature, indicating that the redundant nonsafety-related AHUs are not in operation. The safety-related CRHA heat loads are passively dissipated by the walls, floor, ceiling, and interior walls for 72 hours concurrent with a loss of all onsite and offsite AC power and, upon recovery of onsite or offsite AC power, for an additional 27 days continuous occupancy, without exceeding the initial main control room temperature by more than 8.3 C (15 F) for any loss of cooling event.

The CRHAVS is designed to maintain a habitable environment in the CRHA for 72 hours continuous occupancy after a design basis accident (DBA) concurrent with a loss of all onsite and offsite AC power and, upon recovery of onsite or offsite AC power, for an additional 27 days continuous occupancy, without exceeding 0.05 Sv (5 rem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE). Controls to manually isolate the CRHA and to manually actuate CRHAVS following indication of a radiological event (indicative of conditions that could result in radiation exposure to CRHA occupants) are provided. CRHAVS operation in maintaining CRHA habitability is discussed in Section 6.4 and Section 9.4.1 (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The ability of the CRHAVS to maintain the habitability of the CRHA is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 15, (Refs. 1 and 3, respectively). The isolation mode of the CRHAVS is assumed to operate following a DBA. The radiological dose to CRHA occupants as a result of various DBAs is

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

summarized in Reference 3. No single active or passive failure will cause the loss of outside air from the CRHA. The CRHAVS provides protection from smoke and hazardous chemicals to the CRHA occupants. The analysis of hazardous chemical releases demonstrates that the toxicity limits are not exceeded in the CRHA following a hazardous chemical release (Ref. 2). The evaluation of a smoke challenge demonstrates that it will not result in the inability of the CRHA occupants to control the reactor either from the main control room or from the remote shutdown panels (Ref. 2).

The CRHAVS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Two redundant one hundred percent capacity trains of the CRHAVS, each associated with {a different single division} of the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems – Operating," and LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown," are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables one train. Total system failure could result in control room personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem) TEDE in the event of a DBA. The CRHAVS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to limit CRHA occupant exposure are OPERABLE in each train. A train is considered OPERABLE when:

a. The EFU fan is OPERABLE; and

b. The EFU HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions.

In order for the CRHAVS to be considered OPERABLE, the CRHA ductwork and CRHA ventilation dampers for isolation of the CRHA boundary must be OPERABLE, and the CRHA boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors, such that the CRHA occupant dose from a large radioactive release does not exceed the calculated dose in the licensing basis consequence analyses for DBAs, and that CRHA occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. In addition, the trip breakers for de-energization of the N-DCIS electrical loads inside the CRHA must be OPERABLE.

BASES

LCO (continued)

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the CRHA boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. This Note only applies to openings in the CRHA boundary that can be rapidly restored to the design condition, such as doors, hatches, floor plugs, and access panels. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the operators in the CRHA. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening and to restore the CRHA boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need for CRHA isolation is indicated.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CRHAVS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the CRHA will remain habitable during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the CRHAVS OPERABLE is not required in MODES 5 or 6, except during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), which is a situation under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated.

ACTIONS

A.1

When the average CRHA air temperature is outside the acceptable range during normal operation of the nonsafety-related AHUs, action is required to restore it to an acceptable range. A Completion Time of 72 hours is permitted based upon the availability of temperature indication in the main control room. It is judged to be a sufficient amount of time allotted to correct the deficiency in the nonsafety-related ventilation system before shutting down.

B.1, B.2, and B.3

If the unfiltered inleakage of potentially contaminated air past the CRHA boundary can result in CRHA occupant radiological dose greater than the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences (allowed to be up to 5 rem TEDE), or inadequate protection of CRHA occupants from hazardous chemicals or smoke, the CRHA boundary is

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

inoperable. Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE CRHA boundary within 90 days.

During the period that the CRHA boundary is considered inoperable, action must be initiated to implement mitigating actions to lessen the effect on CRHA occupants from the potential hazards of a radiological or chemical event or a challenge from smoke. Actions must be taken within 24 hours to verify that in the event of a DBA, the mitigating actions will ensure that CRHA occupant radiological exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRHA occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. These mitigating actions (i.e., actions that are taken to offset the consequences of the inoperable CRHA boundary) should be preplanned for implementation upon entry into the condition, regardless of whether entry is intentional or unintentional. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the use of mitigating actions. The 90 day Completion Time is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will ensure protection of CRHA occupants within analyzed limits while limiting the probability that CRHA occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA. In addition, the 90 day Completion Time is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the CRHA boundary.

C.1

With one CRHAVS train inoperable for reasons other than the average CRHA air temperature outside the acceptable range or an inoperable CRHA boundary (i.e., Condition A or B), the inoperable CRHAVS train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CRHAVS train is adequate to perform the CRHA occupant protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE train could result in loss of CRHAVS function. The 7-day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining train can provide the required capabilities.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1

In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the average CRHA air temperature cannot be restored to the acceptable range, the inoperable CRHAVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or the CRHA boundary cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours (operation in MODE 4 also satisfies this requirement). The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 and MODE 4 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 5 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 or MODE 4 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 5 may be made, as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. When remaining in MODE 3 or MODE 4, the implementation guidance of Reference 5 is followed.

E.1 and E.2

During OPDRVs, if the inoperable CRHAVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CRHAVS train may be placed in the isolation mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action E.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRHA. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

Applicable actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

F.1

If two CRHAVS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than the average CRHA air temperature outside the acceptable range or an inoperable CRHA boundary (i.e., Condition A or B), the unit must be placed in a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. This is accomplished by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The Completion Time is reasonable, based on plant design, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

G.1

During OPDRVs, with two CRHAVS trains inoperable or with one or more CRHAVS trains inoperable due to an inoperable CRHA boundary, action must be taken to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRHA. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

Applicable actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.2.1

The average CRHA air temperature is checked at a frequency of 24 hours to verify that the nonsafety-related AHUs are performing as required to maintain the initial condition temperature assumed in the safety analysis, and to ensure that the CRHA temperature will not exceed the required conditions after loss of CRHAVS cooling. The surveillance limit of 25.6°C (78.0°F) is the initial heat sink temperature assumed in the CRHA thermal analysis. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable based on the availability of temperature indication in the main control room.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.7.2.2

This SR verifies that a CRHAVS train in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing each train once every month provides an adequate check on this system. Systems without heaters need only be operated for ≥ 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system. Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy available.

SR 3.7.2.3

This SR verifies that the required CRHAVS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.2.4

This SR verifies that each CRHA isolation damper closes and each CRHAVS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.7.2.1 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the normal refueling frequency, and is consistent with the Frequency of the surveillances performed for the actuation instrumentation.

SR 3.7.2.5

This SR verifies that the main control room N-DCIS electrical loads automatically de-energize on an actual or simulated initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.7.2.1 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the normal refueling frequency, and is consistent with the Frequency of the surveillances performed for the actuation instrumentation.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.7.2.6

This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the CRHA boundary by testing for unfiltered air inleakage past the CRHA boundary and into the CRHA. The details of the testing are specified in the Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) Boundary Program. The CRHA is considered habitable when the radiological dose to CRHA occupants calculated in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences is no more than 5 rem TEDE and the CRHA occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. This SR verifies that the unfiltered air inleakage into the CRHA is no greater than the flow rate assumed in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences. When unfiltered air inleakage is greater than the assumed flow rate, Condition B must be entered. Required Action B.3 allows time to restore the CRHA boundary to OPERABLE status provided mitigating actions can ensure that the CRHA remains within the licensing basis habitability limits for the occupants following an accident. Compensatory measures are discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.196, Section C.2.7.3, (Ref. 6) which endorses, with exceptions, NEI 99-03, Section 8.4 and Appendix F (Ref. 7). These compensatory measures may also be used as mitigating actions as required by Required Action B.2. Temporary analytical methods may also be used as compensatory measures to restore OPERABILITY (Ref. 8). Options for restoring the CRHA boundary to OPERABLE status include changing the licensing basis DBA consequence analysis, repairing the CRHA boundary, or a combination of these actions. Depending upon the nature of the problem and the corrective action, a full scope inleakage test may not be necessary to establish that the CRHA boundary has been restored to OPERABLE status.

REFERENCES

1. Section 6.4.

2. Section 9.4.1.

3. Section 15.4.

4. {NEDO-33201, "ESBWR Design Certification Probabilistic Risk Assessment."}

5. TSTF-IG-05-02, Implementation Guidance For TSTF-423, {Revision 1}, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," {2007}.

BASES

REFERENCES (continued)

6. Regulatory Guide 1.196.

7. NEI 99-03, "Control Room Habitability Assessment," June 2001.

8. Letter from Eric J. Leeds (NRC) to James W. Davis (NEI) dated January 30, 2004, "NEI Draft White Paper, Use of Generic Letter 91-18 Process and Alternative Source Terms in the Context of Control Room Habitability." (ADAMS Accession No. ML040300694).

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.3 Main Condenser Offgas

BASES

BACKGROUND	During unit operation, steam from the low-pressure turbine is exhausted directly into the condenser. Air and noncondensible gases are collected in the condenser, and then exhausted through the steam jet air ejectors (SJAEs) to the Main Condenser Offgas System. The offgas from the main condenser normally includes radioactive gases. The Main Condenser Offgas System has been incorporated into the unit design to reduce the gaseous radwaste emission. This system uses a catalytic recombiner to recombine radiolytically dissociated hydrogen and oxygen. The gaseous mixture is cooled by the offgas condenser, and the water and condensibles are stripped out by the offgas condenser and moisture separator. The radioactivity of the remaining gaseous mixture (i.e., the offgas recombiner effluent) is monitored downstream of the moisture separator prior to entering the holdup line.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The main condenser offgas gross gamma activity rate is an initial condition of the Waste Gas System leak or failure event as discussed in Sections 11.3.7 and 15.0.3.4.7 (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively). The analysis assumes an operator error in conjunction with the bypass of the delay charcoal banks leading to a direct release of radioactive noble gases from the Main Condenser Offgas System. The gross gamma activity rate is controlled to ensure that during the event, the calculated offsite doses using the annual average atmospheric dispersion factor will be well within the acceptance criterion is 1 mSv (0.1 rem) TEDE, based on 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(1) (Ref. 3). The main condenser offgas limits satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
LCO	To ensure compliance with the assumptions of the Waste Gas System leak or failure event (Refs. 1 and 2), the fission product release rate should be consistent with a noble gas release to the reactor coolant of 100 µCi/second/Mwt after decay of 30 minutes. The LCO is established consistent with this requirement (4500 Mwt x 100 µCi/second/Mwt = 450 mCi/second).

BASES

APPLICABILITY

The LCO is applicable when steam is being exhausted to the main condenser and the resulting noncondensibles are being processed via the Main Condenser Offgas System. This occurs during MODE 1, and during MODES 2, 3, and 4 with any main steam line not isolated and the SJAE in operation. In MODES 5 and 6, steam is not being exhausted to the main condenser and the requirements are not applicable.

ACTIONS

A.1

If the offgas radioactivity rate limit is exceeded, 72 hours is allowed to restore the gross gamma activity rate to within the limit. The 72-hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment considering the time required to complete the Required Action, the large margins associated with permissible dose and exposure limits, and the low probability of a Waste Gas System leak or failure event occurring.

B.1 and B.2

If the gross gamma activity rate is not restored to within the limits within the associated Completion Time, all main steam lines or the SJAE must be isolated. This isolates the Main Condenser Offgas System from the source of the radioactive steam. The main steam lines are considered isolated if at least one main steam isolation valve in each main steam line is closed, and at least one main steam line drain valve in each drain line is closed. The 12-hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the actions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.3.1

This SR, on a 31-day Frequency, requires an isotopic analysis of an offgas sample to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The noble gases to be sampled are Xe-133, Xe-135, Xe-138, Kr-85, Kr-87, and Kr-88. If the measured rate of radioactivity increases significantly (by ≥ 50% after correcting for expected increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER), an isotopic analysis is also performed within 4 hours after the increase is noted, to ensure that the increase is not indicative of a sustained increase in the radioactivity rate. The 31-day Frequency is adequate in view of other instrumentation that continuously monitors the offgas, and is acceptable based on operating experience.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR is not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line is not isolated and the SJAE is in operation. Only in this condition can radioactive fission gases be in the Main Condenser Offgas System at significant rates.

REFERENCES

1. Section 11.3.7.

2. Section 15.0.3.4.7.

3. 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(1).

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.4 Main Turbine Bypass System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Main Turbine Bypass System is designed to control steam pressure when reactor steam generation exceeds turbine requirements during unit startup, sudden load reduction, and cooldown. It allows excess steam flow from the reactor to the condenser without going through the turbine. The bypass capacity of the system is 110% of the Nuclear Steam Supply System rated steam flow. Sudden load reductions within the capacity of the steam bypass can be accommodated without reactor scram.

The Main Turbine Bypass System consists of four three-valve chests connected to the main steam lines between the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) and the turbine stop valves. The turbine hydraulic fluid power unit supplies high-pressure fluid to sequentially open the twelve turbine bypass valves (TBVs), and can be isolated from supplying high-pressure fluid to the turbine valves while supplying hydraulic fluid to the TBVs. The TBVs are controlled by the pressure regulation function of the Steam Bypass and Pressure Control (SB&PC) System, as discussed in Section 7.7.5 (Ref. 1). The TBVs are normally closed, and the pressure regulator controls the turbine control valves (TCVs), directing all steam flow to the turbine. The TBVs are opened by redundant signals from the SB&PC System, which uses a triplicated digital control system, whenever the actual steam pressure exceeds the preset steam pressure by a small margin. This bypass demand opens the TBVs in sequence as necessary to control pressure. Additionally, the TBVs are equipped with fast acting servo valves to allow rapid opening of the valves for the generator load rejection with turbine bypass, generator load rejection with a single failure in the turbine bypass system, turbine trip with turbine bypass, and turbine trip with a single failure in the turbine bypass system events (Ref. 1). No credible single failure in the control system results in a minimum demand to all TCVs and TBVs. When the TBVs open, the steam flows from the bypass chest, through connecting piping, to the pressure breakdown assemblies where a series of orifices are used to further reduce the steam pressure before the steam enters the condenser.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The Main Turbine Bypass System is assumed to function during transient events that could result in increase in reactor pressure (i.e., closure of one TCV, generator load rejection with turbine bypass, generator load rejection with a single failure in the turbine bypass system, turbine trip with turbine bypass, turbine trip with a single failure in the turbine bypass system, closure of one MSIV, and feedwater controller failure – maximum demand). Opening of the bypass valves during the pressurization event mitigates the increase in reactor vessel pressure, which affects the MCPR during the event. [An inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System may result in an MCPR penalty.

---------- **REVIEWER'S NOTE** ----------
An MCPR penalty is optional based upon completion of the required analyses to demonstrate that, given the specific inoperabilities that can be postulated and the number of turbine bypass valves (TBVs) affected for each inoperability, sufficient margin exists to operate the unit with an MCPR penalty without exceeding the Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit (FCISL) and the cladding 1% plastic strain limit during the licensing basis events requiring an acceptable operating MCPR limit as an initial condition.
----------]

The Main Turbine Bypass System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to be OPERABLE to limit peak pressure in the main steam lines and maintain reactor pressure within acceptable limits during events that cause rapid pressurization, such that the Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit (FCISL) is not exceeded. [With the Main Turbine Bypass System inoperable, modifications to the MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") may be applied to allow continued operation. The MCPR limit for the inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System is specified in the COLR.]

An OPERABLE Main Turbine Bypass System requires the TBVs to open in response to increasing main steam line pressure or in the fast opening mode, as applicable. This response is within the assumptions of the applicable analyses (Ref. 2).

BASES

APPLICABILITY

The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to be OPERABLE at ≥ 25% RTP to ensure that the FCISL and the cladding 1% plastic strain limit are not violated during transient events such as the generator load rejection with turbine bypass event. As discussed in the Bases for LCO 3.2.2, sufficient margin to these limits exists below 25% RTP. Therefore, these requirements are only necessary when operating at or above this power level.

ACTIONS

A.1

If the Main Turbine Bypass System is inoperable (one or more TBVs inoperable)[, or the MCPR limits for an inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System, as specified in the COLR, are not applied], the assumptions of the design basis transient analysis may not be met. Under such circumstances, prompt action should be taken to restore the Main Turbine Bypass System to OPERABLE status or adjust the MCPR limits accordingly. The 2-hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on the time to complete the Required Action, and the low probability of an event occurring during this period requiring the Main Turbine Bypass System.

B.1

If Required Action A.1 and associated Completion Time cannot be met, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 25% RTP. As discussed in the Applicability section, operation at < 25% RTP results in sufficient margin to the required limits, and the Main Turbine Bypass System is not required to protect fuel integrity during transient events such as the generator load rejection with turbine bypass event. The 4-hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

[---------- **REVIEWER'S NOTE** ----------
For SR 3.7.4.1, a Frequency of 31 days shall be specified unless an evaluation is performed and approved by the NRC using sufficient industry, site-specific, or manufacturer's operating experience or reliability studies that justifies extension to a longer Frequency (e.g., 92 days), a Reference to the evaluation and NRC approval is added to these Bases, and a commitment is made to establish appropriate procedural controls governing valve operation that support the extended Frequency.
----------]

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.7.4.1

Cycling each TBV through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will function when required. The [31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation,] and ensures correct valve positions. Therefore, the Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.7.4.2

The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to actuate automatically to perform its designed function. This SR demonstrates that with the required system initiation signals, the TBVs will actuate to their required position. The 24-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown the 24-month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle, is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.7.4.3

This SR ensures that the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is in compliance with the assumptions of the appropriate safety analysis. The 24-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown the 24-month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle, is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. Section 7.7.5.

2. Section 15.2.2.

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.5 Fuel Pool Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND	The minimum water level in the deep pit area of the reactor building buffer pool and in the fuel building spent fuel storage pool meets the assumptions of iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident. A general description of the reactor building buffer pool and fuel building spent fuel storage pool design is found in Section 9.1.2 (Ref. 1). The assumptions of the fuel handling accident are found in Section 15.4.1 (Ref. 2).
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The water level above the irradiated fuel assemblies is an explicit assumption of the fuel handling accident. A fuel handling accident is evaluated to ensure the radiological consequences (whole-body dose or its equivalent to any part of the body calculated at the exclusion area and low population zone boundaries) are < 0.063 Sv (6.3 rem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) and < 0.05 Sv (5 rem) TEDE in the control room as required by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) (Ref. 3) and Regulatory Guide 1.183 (Ref. 4) acceptance criteria. A fuel handling accident is assumed to damage all of the fuel rods in four (4) fuel assemblies as discussed in References 2 and 4. The fuel handling accident is evaluated for the dropping of an irradiated fuel assembly onto the reactor core which bounds the consequences of dropping an irradiated fuel assembly onto stored fuel bundles. The justification for the bounding analysis used, initial assumptions of the analysis, and consequences of a fuel handling accident inside the reactor building or fuel building are documented in Reference 2. The water level above the irradiated fuel assemblies provides for absorption of water-soluble fission-product gases and transport delays of soluble and insoluble gases that must pass through the water before being released to the reactor building or fuel building atmosphere. This absorption and transport delay reduces the potential radioactivity of the release during a fuel handling accident. The fuel pool water level satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

BASES

LCO	The specified water level preserves the assumption of the fuel handling accident analysis (Ref. 2). As such, it is the minimum required for fuel movement within the spent fuel storage pool.
APPLICABILITY	This LCO applies whenever movement of irradiated fuel assemblies occurs in the associated fuel storage racks since the potential for a release of fission-products exists.
ACTIONS	A.1 When the initial conditions for an accident cannot be met, steps should be taken to preclude the accident from occurring. With either fuel pool level less than required, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the associated storage pool is immediately suspended. Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completion of movement of an irradiated fuel assembly to a safe position. This effectively precludes a spent fuel handling accident from occurring. Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	SR 3.7.5.1 This SR verifies sufficient water is available to mitigate the consequences of a fuel handling accident in the spent fuel storage pool. The water level in the spent fuel storage pool must be checked periodically. The 7-day Frequency is acceptable, based on operating experience, considering that the water volume in the pool is normally stable and water level changes are controlled by unit procedures. During refueling operations, the level above the top of the RPV flange is verified every 24 hours in accordance with SR 3.9.6.1.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. Section 9.1.2.
2. Section 15.4.1.
3. 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1).
4. Regulatory Guide 1.183, July 2000.

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.6 Selected Control Rod Run-In (SCRRI) and Selected Rod Insertion (SRI) Functions

BASES

BACKGROUND

Selected Control Rod Run-In (SCRRI) function logic in the Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS) performs 2/3 voting on loss of feedwater heating signal from Feedwater Control System (FWCS) to produce the automatic SCRRI command signal within the RC&IS. Similarly, 2/3 voting is performed on the turbine trip and load reject signals from the turbine control system to produce an automatic SCRRI command signal to the RC&IS. RC&IS provides for electrical insertion of selected control rods: 1) for mitigation of a loss of feedwater heating event; or 2) for providing needed power reduction after occurrence of a load rejection event or a turbine trip event (that does not result in scram).

RC&IS utilizes a dual-redundant architecture of two independent channels for normal monitoring of control rod positions and executing normal control rod movement commands. Under normal conditions, each channel receives separate input signals and both channels perform the same functions. The outputs of the two channels are continuously compared. For normal functions of enforcing and monitoring control rod positions and emergency rod insertion, the outputs of the two channels must be in agreement. Any sustained disagreement between the two channels would result in a rod block. However, when the conditions for generating a rod block signal in a single channel are satisfied, that channel alone (and independent of the other) can issue a rod block signal. For the fine motion control rod drive (FMCRD) emergency insertion functions (Scram-Follow, Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI), and SCRRI), 3-out-of-3 logic is used in the induction motor controller logic with the additional input signal coming from the associated emergency rod insertion panels. An automatic single channel bypass feature (only activated when an emergency insertion function is activated) is also provided to assure high availability for the emergency insertion functions when a single channel failure condition exists.

Failure or malfunction of RC&IS has no impact on the hydraulic scram function of the FMCRDs. The circuitry for normal insertion and withdrawal of control rods in RC&IS is completely independent of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) circuitry controlling the scram valves. This separation of the RPS scram and RC&IS normal rod control functions prevents failure in the RC&IS circuitry from affecting the scram circuitry.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

{Selected Rod Insertion (SRI) function logic in the Diverse Protection System (DPS) performs 2/3 voting on the SCRRI initiation signal from RC&IS to produce the automatic SRI command signal to the scram timing test panel. Similarly, 2/3 voting is performed by the DPS on the hard-wired turbine trip and load reject signals from the turbine control system to produce an automatic SRI command signal to the scram timing test panel. The scram timing test panel performs a final 2/3 voting to provide for hydraulic scram insertion of selected control rods: 1) for mitigation of a loss of feedwater heating event; or 2) for providing needed power reduction after occurrence of a load rejection event or a turbine trip event (that does not result in scram).

DPS utilizes a triplicate redundant system to produce the SRI signal to the scram timing test panel, which on a valid SRI initiation signal causes all the hydraulic control unit (HCU) solenoid return line switches for the control rods selected for SRI to open, resulting in a hydraulic scram of those control rods. The scram timing test panel allows specific HCUs associated with the predetermined SRI control rods to be selected on the scram timing test panel video display unit interface.

Failure or malfunction of DPS or the scram timing test panel has no impact on the hydraulic scram function of the FMCRDs. The circuitry for emergency electrical insertion and SRI hydraulic insertion of control rods in DPS and the scram timing test panel is completely independent of the RPS circuitry controlling the scram valves. This separation of the RPS scram and the DPS and scram timing test panel control rod functions prevents failure in the DPS and scram timing test panel circuitry from affecting the scram circuitry.}

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The SCRRI and SRI Functions are assumed to function during transient events that could result in a decrease in core coolant temperature (i.e., loss of feedwater heating, generator load rejection with turbine bypass, and turbine trip with turbine bypass). Power reduction from the electrical run-in and hydraulic insertion of selected control rods during these events mitigates the decrease in the MCPR during the event. [An inoperable SCRRI or SRI Function may result in an MCPR penalty.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

---------- **REVIEWER'S NOTE** ----------
An MCPR penalty is optional based upon completion of the required analyses to demonstrate that, given the specific inoperabilities that can be postulated and the number of selected control rods affected for each inoperability, sufficient margin exists to operate the unit with an MCPR penalty without exceeding the Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit (FCISL) and the cladding 1% plastic strain limit during the licensing basis events requiring an acceptable operating MCPR limit as an initial condition.
----------]

The SCRRI and SRI Functions satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The SCRRI and SRI Functions, as specified in the COLR, are required to be OPERABLE to limit decrease in MCPR within acceptable limits during events that cause rapid increase in core reactivity, such that the Fuel Cladding Integrity Safety Limit (FCISL) is not exceeded. [With the SCRRI or SRI Functions inoperable, modifications to the MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") may be applied to allow continued operation. The MCPR limit for the inoperable SCRRI Function and/or SRI Function is specified in the COLR.]

OPERABLE SCRRI and SRI Functions require the SCRRI and SRI Functions to actuate in response to a loss of feedwater heating, or a turbine trip or load reject, as applicable. This response is within the assumptions of the applicable analyses (Ref. 2).

APPLICABILITY

The SCRRI and SRI Functions are required to be OPERABLE at ≥ 25% RTP to ensure that the FCISL and the cladding 1% plastic strain limit are not violated during transient events such as the loss of feedwater heating event. As discussed in the Bases for LCO 3.2.2, sufficient margin to these limits exists below 25% RTP. Therefore, these requirements are only necessary when operating at or above this power level.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1

If the SCRRI or SRI Function is inoperable (including one or more selected control rods inoperable)[, or the MCPR limits for an inoperable SCRRI and/or SRI Function, as specified in the COLR, are not applied], the assumptions of the design basis transient analysis may not be met. Under such circumstances, prompt action should be taken to restore the SCRRI and SRI Functions to OPERABLE status [or adjust the MCPR limits accordingly]. The 2-hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on the time to complete the Required Action, and the low probability of an event occurring during this period requiring the SCRRI and SRI Functions.

B.1

If Required Action A.1 and associated Completion Time cannot be met, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 25% RTP. As discussed in the Applicability section, operation at < 25% RTP results in sufficient margin to the required limits, and the SCRRI and SRI Functions are not required to protect fuel integrity during transient events such as the loss of feedwater heating event. The 4-hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.6.1

Fine motion control rod drive (FMCRD) electrical insertion capability for the SCRRI Function is verified by ensuring that power is available to the selected FMCRDs. The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because the FMCRD electrical power availability status is displayed in the control room.

SR 3.7.6.2

The SCRRI Function is required to automatically electrically insert selected control rods to perform its designed function. This SR demonstrates that with the required system initiation signals, the SCRRI Function will electrically insert the selected control rods to their required position. The 24-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

outage and because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown the 24-month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle, is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.7.6.3

The SRI Function is required to automatically hydraulically insert selected control rods to perform its designed function. This SR demonstrates that with the required system initiation signals, the SRI Function will hydraulically insert the selected control rods to their required position. The 24-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown the 24-month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle, is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.7.6.4

This SR ensures that the SCRRI electrical insertion rate for each required FMCRD over the required insertion range is in compliance with the assumptions of the appropriate safety analysis. The 24-month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown the 24-month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle, is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. Section 7.7.2.

2. Section 15.2.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.1 DC Sources - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The DC Sources supply the emergency 250 VDC power to the DC to AC inverters, which are used to provide Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power during all modes of operation. Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power supplies all safety-related loads, including the Safety-Related Distributed Control and Information System (Q-DCIS) and the control power for safety-related systems. The DC sources are designed to have sufficient capacity, independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions when any three of the four divisions are available, assuming a single failure of one of the three required divisions. The DC electrical power system conforms to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.6 (Ref. 1) and IEEE-308 (Ref. 2).

There are two DC Sources for each of the four divisions of the DC Electrical Power Distribution system. Each of the two DC Sources in each division includes a 250 V battery, an associated battery charger (the normal charger), and all the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling. The battery and battery charger for each DC source are connected to an associated 250 VDC bus. Each division also includes a third battery charger (the standby charger). The standby battery charger may be connected to either of the DC Sources in that division to replace the normal battery charger. The standby battery charger can also be used to charge the battery in either DC source, even if the battery is disconnected from its associated 250 VDC bus.

Each division has two 120 VAC Uninterruptible AC Power inverters, which receive power from an associated rectifier or battery and battery charger. Each rectifier receives 480 VAC normal power from the isolation power center of that division and converts it to 250 VDC. The 480 VAC/250 VDC rectifier and a safety-related Class 1E 72-hour battery and battery charger of that division supply 250 VDC emergency power through diodes to a common inverter. All safety-related Class 1E loads are isolated from the 480 VAC Isolation Power Centers by diodes on output of both the rectifiers and the 250 VDC bus associated with the DC source prevent degraded voltage from either source affecting the performance of the other source.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The plant design and circuit layout of the DC systems provide physical separation of the equipment, cabling, and instrumentation essential to plant safety to ensure that a single failure in one division does not cause a failure in a redundant division. There is no sharing between redundant divisions such as batteries, battery chargers, or distribution panels. The 250 V batteries for each division are separately housed in a ventilated room apart from their chargers, distribution buses, and ground detection panels. Equipment for each Division of DC distribution is located in an area separated physically from the other divisions. All the components of 250 VDC sources are housed in Seismic Category I structures.

The batteries are sized so that the batteries in any two of the four divisions have sufficient stored capacity, without recharging, to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for 72 hours following any design basis event. The minimum battery terminal voltage at the end of the discharge period is 210 volts (1.75 vpc). {The batteries are sized so that the sum of the required loads does not exceed 80% of the battery ampere-hour rating, or warranted capacity at end-of-installed-life with 100% design demand.} Batteries are sized for the DC load in accordance with IEEE Standard 485 (Ref. 3). The battery banks are designed to permit the replacement of individual cells.

Either the normal or the standby battery charger associated with each battery is capable of recharging its battery from the design minimum charge to fully charged condition within 24 hours while supplying the full load of the associated DC source (Ref. 4).

The battery charger is normally in the float-charge mode supplying the connected loads (when those loads are not being supplied via the 480 VAC rectifier) and the battery cells are receiving adequate current to optimally charge the battery. This assures the internal losses of a battery are overcome and the battery is maintained in a fully charged state.

The charger can be placed at a higher voltage than the float mode for battery equalize and following a battery discharge for more rapid recharge. The battery recharge characteristic accepts current at the current limit of the battery charger (if the discharge was significant, e.g., following a battery service test) until the battery terminal voltage approaches the charger voltage setpoint. Charging current then reduces exponentially during the remainder of the recharge cycle. The 72-hour batteries have recharge efficiencies such that once approximately 105%

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

to 110% of the ampere-hours discharged have been returned, the battery capacity would be restored to the same condition as it was prior to the discharge. This can be monitored by direct observation of the exponentially decaying charging current. When either three consecutive hourly current readings change by < {0.5} amps or the float current is < {2} amps the battery is considered to be in fully charged condition.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in Chapter 6 (Ref. 5) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 6) assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DC Sources provide emergency 250 VDC power to the DC Electrical Power Distribution System, which supplies power through the inverters to the Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power buses. Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power supports Q-DCIS and the control power for safety-related systems.

The OPERABILITY of the DC sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining OPERABILITY of the DC Sources needed to support the three divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems – Operating," so that at least two divisions remain OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite and onsite AC power sources; and

b. A worst-case single failure.

The DC Sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

DC Sources are required to be OPERABLE to support the three Divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems – Operating." Each required division is required to have two DC Sources, with each DC source consisting of the 250 V battery, the associated battery charger (either the normal or the standby charger), and all the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling.

BASES

LCO (continued)

Three of the four Divisions of DC Sources are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA). Loss of one of the required Divisions of DC Sources does not prevent the minimum safety function from being performed (Ref. 4).

APPLICABILITY

The DC Sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure safe unit operation and to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs; and

b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.2, "DC Sources - Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3

Condition A represents one required division with one or both required battery chargers inoperable (e.g., the voltage limit of SR 3.8.1.1 is not maintained) on one required division. The ACTIONS provide a tiered response that focuses on returning the battery to the fully charged state and restoring a fully qualified charger to OPERABLE status in a reasonable time period. Required Action A.1 requires that the battery terminal voltage be restored to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage within 2 hours. This time provides for returning the inoperable charger to OPERABLE status or providing an alternate means of restoring battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage. Restoring the battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage provides good assurance that, within 12 hours, the battery will be restored to its fully charged condition (Required Action A.2) from any discharge that might have occurred due to the charger inoperability.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A discharged battery having terminal voltage of at least the minimum established float voltage indicates that the battery is on the exponential charging current portion (the second part) of its recharge cycle. The time to return a battery to its fully charged state under this condition is simply a function of the amount of the previous discharge and the recharge characteristic of the battery. Thus, there is good assurance of fully recharging the battery within 12 hours, avoiding a premature shutdown with its own attendant risk.

If established battery terminal float voltage cannot be restored to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage within 2 hours, and the charger is not operating in the current-limiting mode, a faulty charger is indicated. A faulty charger that is incapable of maintaining established battery terminal float voltage does not provide assurance that it can revert to and operate properly in the current limit mode that is necessary during the recovery period following a battery discharge event that the DC system is designed to withstand.

If the charger is operating in the current limit mode after 2 hours that is an indication that the battery is partially discharged and its capacity margins will be reduced. The time to return the battery to its fully charged condition in this case is a function of the battery charger capacity, the amount of loads on the associated DC system, the amount of the previous discharge, and the recharge characteristic of the battery. The charge time can be extensive, and there is not adequate assurance that it can be recharged within 12 hours (Required Action A.2).

Required Action A.2 requires that the battery float current be verified as indicating the battery is returned to the fully charged condition (i.e., {either three consecutive hourly current readings change by < {0.5} amps or the float current is < {2} amps}). This indicates that, if the battery had been discharged as the result of the inoperable battery charger, it has now been fully recharged. If at the expiration of the initial 24 hour period the battery float current is returned to the fully charged condition this indicates there may be additional battery problems and the battery must be declared inoperable.

Required Action A.3 limits the restoration time for an inoperable battery charger to 72 hours. This action is applicable if an alternate means of restoring battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage has been used. The 72 hour Completion Time provides a reasonable time to effect restoration of a qualified battery charger to OPERABLE status.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

Condition B represents one or both DC Sources inoperable on one required division for reasons other than Condition A (i.e., one or both batteries inoperable, or the required charger and associated battery inoperable). Condition B also represents the inability to complete Required Action A.1 for restoration of a battery that is degraded as a result of an inoperable battery charger. In this Condition, the affected division of the DC Sources may not have adequate capacity to support the associated division of the DC Electrical Power Distribution system for the required duration of 72 hours following a transient event or DBA concurrent with a loss of offsite and onsite AC power.

With one or both DC Sources inoperable on one required division, the two remaining required divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition even if power is lost to the supporting IPC buses. However, a single failure could result in the loss of minimum necessary 250 VDC subsystems. Therefore, continued power operation should not exceed 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time for the restoration of an inoperable DC source is consistent with the time allowed for an inoperable division of DC Electrical Power Distribution.

C.1 and C.2

When one or more DC Sources on two or more required divisions are inoperable, the remaining DC Sources may not have the capacity to supply power to the divisions of the DC Electrical Power Distribution system for the required duration of 72 hours following a transient event or DBA, concurrent with a loss of offsite and onsite AC power. If the Required Actions for restoration of a required battery charger (i.e., Required Actions A.2 or A.3) or battery (i.e., Condition B) cannot be met within the specified Completion Times, the plant remains vulnerable to a single failure that could impair the capability to reach safe shutdown or to mitigate an accident condition. Therefore, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.1

Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge helps to ensure the effectiveness of the battery chargers, which support the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery and maintain the battery in a fully charged state while supplying the continuous steady state loads of the associated DC subsystem. On float charge, battery cells will receive adequate current to optimally charge the battery. The voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the minimum float voltage established by the battery manufacturer ({2.23} Vpc or {267.6} V at 25°C (77°F) at the battery terminals). Minimum established float voltages as a function of battery {room} temperatures is provided in the manufacturer operating manual. This voltage maintains the battery {plates} in a condition that supports maintaining the {grid} life {(expected to be approximately 20 years)}. The {31 day Frequency is consistent with manufacturer recommendations and IEEE-1188} (Ref. 7).

SR 3.8.1.2

This SR verifies the design capacity of the battery chargers. According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 8), the battery charger supply is recommended to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensures that these requirements can be satisfied.

This SR provides two options. One option requires that each battery charger be capable of supplying {300 or 350} amps at the minimum established float voltage for {4} hours. The ampere requirements are based on the output rating of the chargers. The voltage requirements are based on the charger voltage level after a response to a loss of AC power. The time period is sufficient for the charger temperature to have stabilized and to have been maintained for at least {2} hours.

The other option requires that each battery charger be capable of recharging the battery after a service test coincident with supplying the largest combined demands of the various continuous steady state loads (irrespective of the status of the plant during which these demands occur). This level of loading may not normally be available following the battery service test and will need to be supplemented with additional

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

loads. The duration for this test may be longer than the charger sizing criteria since the battery recharge is affected by float voltage, temperature, and the exponential decay in charging current. The battery is recharged when {either three consecutive hourly current readings change by < {0.5} amps or the float current is < {2} amps}.

The Surveillance Frequency is acceptable, given the unit conditions required to perform the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 24-month intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 3.8.1.3

A battery-service test is a special test of the battery's capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the 250 VDC power system. The discharge rate and test length corresponds to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.

Regulatory Guide 1.129 (Ref. 9) states that the battery-service test should be performed during an outage. The Surveillance Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 8).

{A Note to SR 3.8.1.3 allows the once-per-60-months performance of SR 3.8.3.6 in lieu of SR 3.8.1.3. This substitution is acceptable because SR 3.8.3.6 represents a more severe test of battery capacity than SR 3.8.1.3.}

BASES

REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.6, March 10, 1971.
2. IEEE Standard 308, 1978.
3. IEEE Standard 485.
4. Chapter 8.
5. Chapter 6.
6. Chapter 15.
7. IEEE Standard {1188, 2005}.
8. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.
9. Regulatory Guide 1.129, February 1978.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.2 DC Sources - Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of the DC Sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "DC Sources - Operating."
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2) assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DC Sources provide emergency 250 VDC power to the DC Electrical Power Distribution System, which supplies power through the inverters to the Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power buses. Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power supports Q-DCIS and the control power for safety-related systems. The OPERABILITY of the DC sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY. The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC sources during MODES 5 and 6 ensures that: a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods, b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status, and c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel.. In general, when the unit is shutdown, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 have no specific analyses in MODES 5 and 6. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 5 and 6 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

The shutdown Technical Specification requirements are designed to ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated accidents. Worst case DBAs that are analyzed for operating MODES are generally viewed not to be a significant concern during shutdown MODES due to the lower energies involved. The Technical Specifications therefore require a lesser complement of electrical equipment to be available during shutdown than is required during operating MODES. More recent work completed on the potential risks associated with shutdown, however, has found significant risk associated with certain shutdown evolutions. As a result, in addition to the requirements established in the Technical Specifications, the industry has adopted NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management," as an industry initiative to manage shutdown tasks and associated electrical support to maintain risk at an acceptable low level. This may require the availability of additional equipment beyond that required by the shutdown Technical Specifications.

The DC Sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

DC Sources are required to be OPERABLE to support the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." Each required DC source consists of the battery, the associated battery charger (either the normal or the standby charger), and all the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling.

This LCO ensures the availability of sufficient 250 VDC power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

BASES

APPLICABILITY

The DC Sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 provide assurance that:

a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel,

b. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available, and

c. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC source requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "DC Sources- Operating."

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4

When one or more DC Sources being used to support the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.7 are inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE DC Sources may be capable of supporting sufficient systems to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS and/or operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare systems inoperable when the associated DC sources are inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the ACTIONS of the affected system(s) LCO. In many instances, this would likely involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and any activities that could potentially result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC source(s) and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary 250 VDC power to the plant safety systems.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC source(s) should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.2.1

SR 3.8.2.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.3. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for Specification 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 6.
2. Chapter 15.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.3 Battery Parameters

BASES

BACKGROUND

This LCO delineates the limits on battery float current as well as electrolyte temperature, level, and float voltage for the DC source batteries. A discussion of these batteries and their OPERABILITY requirements is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "DC Sources - Operating" and LCO 3.8.2, "DC Sources - Shutdown." In addition to the limitations of this Specification, the Battery Monitoring and Maintenance Program also implements a program specified in Specification 5.5.10 for monitoring various battery parameters that is based on the recommendations of IEEE Standard 1188, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) Batteries for Stationary Applications" (Ref. 1).

The battery cells are constructed with a nominal specific gravity of {1.295}. This specific gravity corresponds to an open circuit battery voltage of approximately {256.8} V for {120} cell battery (i.e., cell voltage of {2.139} volts per cell (Vpc)). The open circuit voltage is the voltage maintained when there is no charging or discharging. Once fully charged with its open circuit voltage ≥ {2.139} Vpc, the battery cell will maintain its capacity for {30} days without further charging per manufacturer's instructions. However, optimal long-term performance is obtained by maintaining a float voltage {2.23 to 2.25} Vpc at 25°C (77°F). This provides adequate over-potential, which {limits the formation of lead sulfate and self-discharge}. The nominal float voltage of {2.24} Vpc at 25°C (77°F) corresponds to a total float voltage output of {268.8} V for a {120} cell battery as discussed in Chapter 8 (Ref. 2).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in Chapter 6 (Ref. 3) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 4) assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DC Sources provide the emergency 250 VDC power to the DC Electrical Power Distribution System, which supplies power through the inverters to the Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power buses. Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power supports Q-DCIS and the control power for safety-related systems.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The OPERABILITY of the DC sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit as described in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "DC Sources - Operating" and LCO 3.8.2, "DC Sources - Shutdown."

Since battery parameters support the operation of the DC sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Battery parameters must remain within acceptable limits to ensure availability of the required DC sources to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. Battery parameter limits are conservatively established, allowing continued DC source function even with limits not met. Additional preventative maintenance, testing, and monitoring are performed in accordance with Specification 5.5.10, Battery Monitoring and Maintenance Program.

APPLICABILITY

The battery parameters are required solely for the support of the associated DC sources. Therefore, battery parameter limits are only required when the DC sources are required to be OPERABLE. Refer to Applicability discussion in Bases for LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2.

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3

With one or more cells in one or more batteries in one required division < {2.14} V, the battery cell is degraded. Within 2 hours, verification of the required battery charger OPERABILITY is made by monitoring the battery terminal voltage (SR 3.8.1.1) and of the overall battery state of charge by monitoring the battery float charge current (SR 3.8.3.1). This assures that there is still sufficient battery capacity to perform the intended function. Therefore, the affected battery is not required to be considered inoperable solely as a result of one or more cells in one or more batteries < {2.14} V, and continued operation is permitted for a limited period up to 24 hours.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Since the Required Actions only specify "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.3.1 acceptance criteria does not result in this Required Action not met. However, if one of the SRs is failed, the appropriate Condition(s), depending on the cause of the failures, is entered. If SR 3.8.3.1 is failed, then there is not assurance that there is still sufficient battery capacity to perform the intended function and the battery must be declared inoperable immediately.

B.1 and B.2

A battery with float > {2} amps indicates that a partial discharge of the battery has occurred. This may be due to a temporary loss of a battery charger or possibly due to one or more battery cells in a low voltage condition reflecting some loss of capacity. Within 2 hours, verification of the required battery charger OPERABILITY is made by monitoring the battery terminal voltage. If the terminal voltage is found to be less than the minimum established float voltage there are two possibilities, the battery charger is inoperable or is operating in the current limit mode. LCO 3.8.1, Condition A, addresses charger inoperability. If the charger is operating in the current limit mode after 2 hours that is an indication that the battery has been substantially discharged and likely cannot perform its required design functions. The time to return the battery to its fully charged condition in this case is a function of the battery charger capacity, the amount of loads on the associated DC system, the amount of the previous discharge, and the recharge characteristic of the battery. The charge time can be extensive, and there is not adequate assurance that it can be recharged within 24 hours (Required Action B.2). The battery must therefore be declared inoperable.

If the float voltage is found not to be satisfactory and there are one or more battery cells with float voltage less than {2.14} V, the associated "OR" statement in Condition F is applicable and the battery must be declared inoperable immediately. If float voltage is satisfactory and there are no cells less than {2.14} V, there is good assurance that, within 24 hours, the battery will be restored to its fully charged condition (Required Action B.2) from any discharge that might have occurred due to a temporary loss of the battery charger.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A discharged battery with float voltage (the charger setpoint) across its terminals indicates that the battery is on the exponential charging current portion (the second part) of its recharge cycle. The time to return a battery to its fully charged state under this condition is simply a function of the amount of the previous discharge and the recharge characteristic of the battery. Thus, there is good assurance of fully recharging the battery within 24 hours, avoiding a premature shutdown with its own attendant risk.

If the condition is due to one or more cells in a low voltage condition but still greater than {2.14} V and float voltage is found to be satisfactory, this is not indication of a substantially discharged battery and 24 hours is a reasonable time prior to declaring the battery inoperable.

Since Required Action B.1 only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in the Required Action not met. However, if SR 3.8.1.1 is failed, the appropriate Condition(s), depending on the cause of the failure, is entered.

C.1, C.2, and C.3

With one or two batteries on one required division with charger voltage greater than maximum established temperature-compensated design limit, the batteries still retain sufficient capacity to perform the intended function. Therefore, the affected batteries are not required to be considered inoperable solely as a result of exceeding the temperature-compensated design limit. Within 7 days, the maximum established temperature-compensated design limit must be re-established.

At a constant battery voltage the charging current will increase as the temperature of the electrolyte increases. Therefore, cells in a battery at a higher temperature than others indicate a lower cell voltage. Continuous prolonged use at elevated temperatures will reduce the battery life. Based on tracking periods of excessive temperature-compensated terminal voltage, the impact on expected battery life can be monitored.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1

With one or two batteries on one required division with battery room temperature greater than the maximum established design limits, 12 hours is allowed to restore the temperature to within limits. A high temperature results in reduced battery life. Since the battery is sized with margin, sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and the temporary degradation in battery life does not require the battery to be considered inoperable solely as a result of the room temperature not met.

E.1

With one or more required batteries in redundant required divisions with battery parameters not within limits, there is not sufficient assurance that battery capacity has not been affected to the degree that the batteries can still perform their required function, given that redundant divisions are involved. With redundant divisions involved, this potential could result in a total loss of function on multiple systems that rely upon the batteries. The longer Completion Times specified for battery parameters on one required division not within limits are therefore not appropriate, and the parameters must be restored to within limits on all but one required division within 2 hours.

F.1

When any battery parameter is outside the allowances of the Required Actions for Condition A, B, C, D, or E, sufficient capacity to supply the maximum expected load requirement is not assured and the corresponding battery must be declared inoperable. Additionally, discovering one battery with one or more battery cells float voltage less than {2.14} V and float current greater than {2} amps indicates that the battery capacity may not be sufficient to perform the intended functions. The battery must therefore be declared inoperable immediately.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.1

Verifying battery float current while on float charge is used to determine the state of charge of the battery. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery and maintain the battery in a charged state. The float current requirements are based on the float current indicative of a charged battery. Use of float current to determine the state of charge of the battery is consistent with IEEE-1188 (Ref. 1) and manufacturer recommendations. The 31-day Frequency is consistent with IEEE-1188 (Ref. 1).

This SR is modified by a Note that states the float current requirement is not required to be met when battery terminal voltage is less than the minimum established float voltage of SR 3.8.1.1. When this float voltage is not maintained, the Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, ACTION A, are being taken, which provide the necessary and appropriate verifications of the battery condition. Furthermore, the float current limit of {2} amps is established based on the nominal float voltage value and is not directly applicable when this voltage is not maintained.

SR 3.8.3.2 and SR 3.8.3.5

Optimal long-term battery performance is obtained by maintaining a float voltage within established design limits provided by the battery manufacturer, which corresponds to nominally {266.8} V at the battery terminals, or {2.24} Vpc at 25°C (77°F). This provides adequate over-potential, which {limits the formation of lead sulfate and self-discharge, which could eventually render the battery inoperable}. Float voltages below 2.18 vpc at 25°C (77°F) but greater than {2.14} Vpc, are addressed in Specification 5.5.10. SR 3.8.3.2 and SR 3.8.3.5 require verification that the cell float voltages are equal to or greater than the short-term absolute minimum voltage of {2.14} Vpc. The Frequency for cell voltage verification every 31 days for pilot cell and 92 days for each connected cell is consistent with manufacturer recommendations. A pilot cell is selected in the series string to reflect the general condition of cells in the battery. The cell selected is the lowest cell voltage in the series string following {each quarterly surveillance}.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.3.3

This Surveillance verifies that the temperature-compensated cell terminal voltage is less than or equal to maximum established temperature compensated design limit. Continuous prolonged use at elevated temperatures will reduce the battery life. Based on tracking periods of excessive temperature-compensated terminal voltage, the impact on expected battery life can be monitored. The Frequency is consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

SR 3.8.3.4

The limit specified for {room} temperature ensures that monitoring and tracking battery service life impacts. The Frequency is consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

SR 3.8.3.6

A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the as found condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.

Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.3.6{; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy the battery service test requirements of SR 3.8.1.3}.

{A modified discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service test.

It may consist of just two rates; for instance, the one minute rate for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by a one minute discharge represents a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

compromising the results of the performance discharge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test must remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.}

{The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance are consistent with IEEE-1188 (Ref. 1){ and IEEE-485 (Ref. 5)}. Acceptance criteria involve demonstrating the capacity of each cell exceeds 90%, and the capacity of all cells are within 10% of the average cell performance.

The Surveillance Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. If the battery shows degradation, or if the battery has reached 85% of its expected life Surveillance Frequency is reduced to 12 months. Degradation is indicated, according to IEEE-1188 (Ref. 1), when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% relative to its capacity on the previous performance test or when it is 90% of the manufacturer's rating. All these Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-1188 (Ref. 1).

REFERENCES

1. IEEE Standard 1188, 2005.
2. Chapter 8.
3. Chapter 6.
4. Chapter 15.
5. IEEE Standard 485.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.4 Inverters - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The DC to AC inverters are the preferred source of power for the Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power during all modes of operation because of the stability and reliability they achieve in being powered from the associated safety-related DC sources. Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power supplies all safety-related loads, including the Safety-Related Distributed Control and Information System (Q-DCIS) and the control power for safety-related systems.

Each of the four divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power includes two separate DC to AC inverters, one associated with each of the DC Sources. Each inverter receives DC power from either the associated nonsafety-related rectifier or the associated 250 VDC bus that is supported by the battery and charger. Diodes on output of both the nonsafety-related rectifiers and the 250 VDC bus associated with the DC source prevent degraded voltage from either source affecting the performance of the other source.

Power to the Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power buses can also be supplied directly from the associated Isolation Power Center (IPC) bus using the nonsafety-related regulating transformer. The regulating transformer bypasses the inverter and both the DC source and the rectifier that support the inverter. A static bypass switch on the output of each inverter will automatically energize the Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power bus from the regulating transformer should an inverter failure occur; however this feature is not a credited safety function that is required for OPERABILITY of either the inverter or distribution system. A manual bypass switch on the output of the inverter is provided for transferring the source of power for the Uninterruptible 120 VAC buses from the inverter to the regulating transformer for maintenance without removing UPS AC loads from service.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of design basis transient and accident analyses in Chapter 6, "Engineered Safety Features," (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15, "Accident Analyses," (Ref. 2) assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The 250 VDC power system provides normal and emergency 250 VDC power to DC to AC inverters, which are used to provide Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power during all modes of operation.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power supports Q-DCIS and the control power for safety-related systems.

The OPERABILITY of the 250 VDC power is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining OPERABILITY of the DC to AC inverters needed to support the three divisions of Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems – Operating," so that at least two divisions remain OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC electrical power and all onsite AC electrical power; and

b. A worst-case single failure.

Inverters are a part of the distribution system and, as such, satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Inverters are required to be OPERABLE to support the three Divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution required by LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems – Operating." Each required division is required to have two inverters, one associated with each DC source. An OPERABLE inverter must be connected to the associated Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power bus and maintaining output voltage and frequency within design tolerances.

APPLICABILITY

The inverters are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

Inverter requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.6, "Inverters – Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A.1

With one or both inverters inoperable on one required division, the associated Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution bus may be powered from the regulating transformers but the overall reliability of the associated Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution bus is reduced. With inverters in one required division inoperable, the Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses in the two remaining required divisions are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.

Required Action A.1 allows 24 hours to fix the inoperable inverter and return it to service. The 24 hour limit is based upon engineering judgment, taking into consideration the time required to repair an inverter and the additional risk to which the plant is exposed because of the inverter inoperability. This risk has to be balanced against the risk of an immediate shutdown, along with the potential challenges to safety systems that such a shutdown might entail. When the AC Vital Bus is powered from the regulating transformer, it is relying upon interruptible AC electrical power sources (offsite and onsite). The uninterruptible inverter source to the Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses is the preferred source for powering safety-related devices.

Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note stating that applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.6 must be entered with any Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution bus de-energized. This Note is necessary to ensure that the ACTIONS for an inoperable Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution bus are taken if that bus cannot be energized from either the inverter or the nonsafety-related regulating transformer. Otherwise, pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions would not be entered even if the AC Vital Bus were de-energized. Therefore, the ACTIONS are modified by a Note stating that ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.6 must be entered immediately. This ensures the Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution bus is re-energized within 8 hours.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

When one or both inverters on two or more required divisions are inoperable, the remaining inverters may not have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition, especially if power is lost to the supporting IPC buses. If the Required Actions for restoration of a required inverter cannot be met within the specified Completion Time, the plant remains vulnerable to a single failure that could impair the capability to reach safe shutdown or to mitigate an accident condition. Therefore, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.1

This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for Q-DCIS and the control power for safety-related systems connected to the AC Vital Buses. The 7-day Frequency takes into account the availability of redundant inverters and other indications available in the control room that will alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 6.
2. Chapter 15.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.5 Inverters - Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of the inverters is provided in the Bases for Specification 3.8.4, "Inverters - Operating."
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The initial conditions of design basis transient and accident analyses in Chapter 6, "Engineered Safety Features," (Ref.1) and Chapter 15, "Accident Analyses," (Ref. 2) assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The 250 VDC power system provides normal and emergency 250 VDC power to DC to AC inverters, which are used to provide Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power during all modes of operation. Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power supports Safety-Related Distributed Control and Information System (Q-DCIS) and the control power for safety-related systems. The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY. The OPERABILITY of the inverters during MODES 5 and 6 ensures that: a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods; b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability are available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and c. Adequate power is available to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

In general, when the unit is shut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 have no specific analyses in MODES 5 and 6. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 5 and 6 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

The shutdown Technical Specification requirements are designed to ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated accidents. Worst case DBAs, which are analyzed for operating MODES, are generally viewed not to be a significant concern during shutdown MODES due to the lower energies involved. The Technical Specifications therefore require a lesser complement of electrical equipment to be available during shutdown than is required during operating MODES. More recent work completed on the potential risks associated with shutdown, however, has found significant risk associated with certain shutdown evolutions. As a result, in addition to the requirements established in the Technical Specifications, the industry has adopted NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management," as an Industry initiative to manage shutdown tasks and associated electrical support to maintain risk at an acceptable low level. This may require the availability of additional equipment beyond that required by the shutdown Technical Specifications.

The inverters are considered part of the Distribution System, and as such, satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Inverters are required to be OPERABLE to support the Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution Divisions required by LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown." This LCO ensures the availability of sufficient inverters to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

BASES

LCO (continued)

An OPERABLE inverter must be connected to the associated Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power bus and maintaining output voltage and frequency within design tolerances.

APPLICABILITY

The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 provide assurance that:

a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel,

b. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available, and

c. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.4, "Inverters - Operating."

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3 and A.2.4

If one or more required inverters are inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient required feature(s) to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS and/or operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required feature(s) associated with an inoperable inverter inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected required feature(s) of the LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and any activities that could potentially result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the plant safety-related systems.
The Completion Time of Immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit's safety-related systems may be without power or powered from a constant voltage source transformer.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.5.1

This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the Q-DCIS and the control power for safety-related systems connected to the Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses. The 7-day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that will alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 6.

2. Chapter 15.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.6 Distribution Systems - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The DC Electrical Power Distribution system provides the normal and emergency power to the DC to AC inverters, which are used to provide Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power during all modes of operation. Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power supplies all safety-related loads, including the Safety-Related Distributed Control and Information System (Q-DCIS) and the control power for safety-related systems. The DC and Uninterruptible 120 VAC Electrical Power Distribution system is designed to have sufficient capacity, independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure, when any three of the four divisions are available.

Each of the four divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power distribution includes two 250 VDC Electrical Power Distribution buses and two Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power buses.

Each of the two 250 VDC Electrical Power Distribution buses in each division is powered from an associated DC source consisting of a battery and a battery charger that is powered from an Isolation Power Center (IPC) bus. The output of each 250 VDC Electrical Power Distribution bus is the safety-related and uninterruptible source of power to an associated DC to AC inverter. A nonsafety-related rectifier powered from the IPC bus provides the normal source of power to the inverter. If there is loss of power to the IPC bus or the nonsafety-related rectifier fails, the 250 VDC Electrical Power Distribution bus will transparently continue to supply power to the Inverter. The Bases for Specification 3.8.1, "DC Sources - Operating," provides a more detailed description of the DC Sources and the 250 VDC Electrical Power Distribution buses.

Each of the two Uninterruptible 120 VAC Electrical Power buses in each division is powered from an associated inverter. The inverter, which receives its power from a 250 VDC Electrical Power Distribution bus as described above, is the safety-related, uninterruptible source of power to an associated Uninterruptible 120 VAC Electrical Power bus. A nonsafety-related regulating transformer, powered from the IPC bus, provides an alternate source of power to each Uninterruptible 120 VAC Electrical Power bus. A static bypass switch on the output of each inverter will automatically energize the Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power bus from the regulating transformer should an inverter failure occur; however this feature is not a credited safety function that is required for

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

OPERABILITY of either the inverter or distribution system. A manual bypass switch on the output of the inverter is provided for transferring the source of power for the Uninterruptible 120 VAC buses from the inverter to the regulating transformer for maintenance without removing UPS AC loads from service. The Bases for Specification 3.8.4, "Inverters - Operating," provides a more detailed description of the inverters and the Uninterruptible 120 VAC Electrical Power buses.

The DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses are listed in Table B 3.8.6-1.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of design basis transient and accident analyses in Chapter 6, "Engineering Safety Features," (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15, "Accident Analyses," (Ref. 2) assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The DC Electrical Power Distribution system provides the normal and emergency power to the DC to AC inverters, which are used to provide Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power during all modes of operation. Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power supplies all safety-related loads, including the Q-DCIS and the control power for safety-related systems.

The OPERABILITY of the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining OPERABILITY of three divisions of Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power so that at least two divisions remain OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC electrical power and all onsite AC electrical power; and

b. A worst-case single failure.

The DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution system satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Three of the four divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses listed in Table B 3.8.6-1 are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA).

BASES

LCO (continued)

Maintaining any three of the four divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Any two of the four divisions of the distribution system are capable of providing the necessary electrical power to the associated ESF components. Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution does not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

OPERABLE 250 VDC Electrical Power Distribution buses must be energized to their proper voltage from either the associated battery or charger. OPERABLE Uninterruptible 120 VAC Electrical Power buses must be energized to their proper voltage and frequency.

APPLICABILITY

The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A.1

Condition A represents one or both 250 VDC Electrical Power Distribution buses in one required division inoperable. In this Condition, power to the associated DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses cannot be assured during an event that includes loss of power to the associated IPC bus, which supplies power to the battery chargers and the nonsafety-related rectifiers and regulating transformers that are also capable of powering the required loads.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

With one or both 250 VDC Electrical Power Distribution buses inoperable on one required division, the two remaining required divisions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition even if power is lost to the supporting IPC bus. Since a subsequent worst-case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems, continued power operation should not exceed 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time for restoration is based upon engineering judgment.

B.1

Condition B represents one or both Uninterruptible 120 VAC Electrical Power buses inoperable in one required division. In this condition, the voltage and frequency of the power being supplied to the safety-related loads for that division, including the Q-DCIS and the control power for safety-related systems, cannot be maintained within required limits even when the associated IPC bus remains energized. The two remaining divisions with OPERABLE 120 VAC Electrical Power buses still have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition even if power is lost to the supporting IPC buses. Since a subsequent single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary Uninterruptible 120 VAC Electrical Power buses, continued power operation should not exceed 8 hours. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on engineering judgment.

C.1

Condition C represents two or more required divisions with one or both DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses inoperable, or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or Condition B is not met. When one or more DC or Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses (i.e., any combination) on two or more required divisions are inoperable, the remaining DC Sources may not have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition, especially if power is lost to the supporting IPC buses. If the Required Actions for restoration of a required DC or Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution bus cannot be met within the specified Completion Time, the plant remains vulnerable to a single failure that could impair the capability to reach safe

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

shutdown or to mitigate an accident condition. Therefore, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.6.1

This Surveillance verifies that the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment and that the buses energized from normal power. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required power is readily available for all safety-related loads, including the Q-DCIS and the control power for safety-related systems. The 7-day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses, and other indications available in the control room that will alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 6.

2. Chapter 15.

BASES

Table B 3.8.6-1 (page 1 of 1)
DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution

TYPE	VOLTAGE	DIVISION 1	DIVISION 2	DIVISION 3	DIVISION 4
Electrical Power Distribution buses	250 VDC	Bus 11 Bus 12	Bus 21 Bus 22	Bus 31 Bus 32	Bus 41 Bus 42
Uninterruptible Electrical Power buses	120 VAC	Bus 11 Bus 12	Bus 21 Bus 22	Bus 31 Bus 32	Bus 41 Bus 42

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution System - Operating."
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The initial conditions of design basis transient and accident analyses in Chapter 6, "Engineering Safety features," (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15, "Accident Analyses," (Ref. 2) assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power to DC to AC inverters, which are used to provide Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power during all modes of operation. Uninterruptible 120 VAC Power supports Safety-Related Distributed Control and Information System (Q-DCIS) and the control power for safety-related systems. The OPERABILITY of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY. The OPERABILITY of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution during MODES 5 and 6 ensures that: a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods, b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status, and c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

In general, when the unit is shut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 have no specific analyses in MODES 5 and 6. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 5 and 6 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

The shutdown Technical Specification requirements are designed to ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated accidents. Worst case DBAs, which are analyzed for operating MODES, are generally viewed not to be a significant concern during shutdown MODES due to the lower energies involved. The Technical Specifications therefore require a lesser complement of electrical equipment to be available during shutdown than is required during operating MODES. More recent work completed on the potential risks associated with shutdown, however, has found significant risk associated with certain shutdown evolutions. As a result, in addition to the requirements established in the Technical Specifications, the industry has adopted NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management," as an Industry initiative to manage shutdown tasks and associated electrical support to maintain risk at an acceptable low level. This may require the availability of additional equipment beyond that required by the shutdown Technical Specifications.

DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution buses are required to be OPERABLE to support equipment required to respond to any anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or DBA. Various LCOs establish requirements for a minimum number of divisions, subsystems, or trains of equipment needed to respond to an AOO or DBA depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This

BASES

LCO (continued)

LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications' required divisions, subsystems, or trains - both specifically addressed by their own LCOs and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY.

Maintaining these portions of DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY

The DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 provide assurance that:

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;

b. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available, and

c. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

DC and AC Vital Bus electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.6, "Distribution Systems - Operating."

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3 and A.2.4

Although redundant required features may require redundant divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE electrical power distribution Division may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made; (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and any activities that could potentially result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions will minimize probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the unit's safety-related systems.

The Completion Time of Immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit's safety-related systems may be without power.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1

This Surveillance verifies that the DC and Uninterruptible AC Electrical Power Distribution systems are functioning properly, with the required buses energized. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required power is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7-day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the electrical power distribution subsystems, as well as other indications available in the control room that will alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. Chapter 6.

2. Chapter 15.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks

BASES

BACKGROUND

Refueling equipment interlocks restrict the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods to reinforce plant procedures in preventing the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling. The refueling interlock circuitry senses the conditions of the refueling equipment and the control rods. Depending on the sensed conditions, interlocks are actuated to prevent the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods.

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods, when fully inserted, serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions during all fuel movement activities and accidents.

{Two channels of instrumentation are provided to sense the full insertion of control rods, the position of the refueling machine, and the loading of the refueling machine main hoist. With the reactor mode switch in the refueling position, the indicated conditions are combined in logic circuits to determine if all restrictions on refueling equipment operations and control rod insertion are satisfied.

A control rod not at its full-in position interrupts power to the refueling equipment and prevents operating the equipment over the reactor core when loaded with a fuel assembly. Conversely, the refueling equipment located over the core and loaded with fuel generates a control rod withdrawal block signal in the Rod Control & Information System to prevent withdrawing a control rod.

The refueling machine has two mechanical switches that open before the machine and the fuel grapple are physically located over the reactor vessel. The main hoist has two switches that open when the hoist is loaded with fuel. The refueling interlocks use these indications to prevent operation of the refueling equipment with fuel loaded over the core whenever any control rod is withdrawn, or to prevent control rod withdrawal whenever fuel-loaded refueling equipment is over the core (Ref. 2). The main hoist switches open at a load lighter than the weight of a single fuel assembly in water.}

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The refueling interlocks are explicitly assumed in the safety analysis of the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 3). This analysis evaluates the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

Criticality and, therefore, subsequent prompt reactivity excursions are prevented during the insertion of fuel, provided all control rods are fully inserted during the fuel insertion. The refueling interlocks accomplish this by preventing loading fuel into the core with any control rod withdrawn, or by preventing withdrawal of a rod from the core during fuel loading.

{The refueling machine position switches activate at a point outside of the reactor core, such that, considering switch hysteresis and maximum platform momentum toward the core at the time of power loss with a fuel assembly loaded and a control rod withdrawn, the fuel is not over the core.}

Refueling Equipment Interlocks satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

To prevent criticality during refueling, the refueling interlocks ensure that fuel assemblies are not loaded with any control rod withdrawn.

To prevent these conditions from developing, the all-rods-in, the refueling machine position, and the refueling machine main hoist fuel-loaded inputs, are required to be OPERABLE. These inputs are combined in logic circuits that provide refueling equipment or control rod blocks to prevent operations that could result in criticality during refueling operations.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 6, a prompt reactivity excursion could cause fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. The refueling equipment interlocks protect against prompt reactivity excursions during MODE 6. The interlocks are only required to be OPERABLE during in-vessel fuel movement with refueling equipment associated with the interlocks.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head is on and no fuel loading activities are possible. Therefore, the refueling interlocks are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

With one or more of the required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. Therefore, Required Action A.1 requires that in-vessel fuel movement with the affected refueling equipment to be immediately suspended. This action ensures that operations are not performed with equipment that would potentially not be blocked from unacceptable operations (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with a control rod withdrawn). Suspension of in-vessel fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Alternatively, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 require a control rod withdrawal block to be inserted, and all control rods to be subsequently verified to be fully inserted. Required Action A.2.1 ensures no control rods can be withdrawn, because a block to control rod withdrawal is in place. The withdrawal block utilized must ensure that if rod withdrawal is requested, the rod will not respond (i.e., it will remain inserted). Required Action A.2.2 is performed after placing the rod withdrawal block in effect, and provides a verification that all control rods are fully inserted. This verification that all control rods are fully inserted is in addition to the periodic verifications required by SR 3.9.3.1.

Like Required Action A.1, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 ensure unacceptable operations are blocked (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with the control rod withdrawn).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.1.1

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates each required refueling equipment interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps such that the entire channel is tested.

The 7 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of refueling interlocks and their associated input status that are available to plant operations personnel.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
2. Section 7.7.2.
3. Section 15.3.7.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock

BASES

BACKGROUND

The refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock restricts the movement of control rods to reinforce plant procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod or control rod pair with the same hydraulic control unit (HCU) is permitted to be withdrawn. To enable the one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock, the Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS) GANG/SINGLE selection switch may be in "SINGLE" or "GANG" mode. Otherwise, it is not possible to withdraw the one or two rods associated with the same HCU, respectively, while in the refueling mode.

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

The refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock prevents the selection of a second control rod for movement when any other control rod or control rod pair is not fully inserted (Ref. 2). It is a logic circuit, which has redundant channels. It uses the all-rods-in signal (from the control rod full-in position indicators discussed in LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication") and a rod selection signal (from the RC&IS).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock is explicitly assumed in the safety analysis of the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 3). This analysis evaluates the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

The refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock and adequate SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN") prevent criticality by preventing withdrawal of more than one control rod or control rod pair. With one control rod or control rod pair withdrawn, the core will remain subcritical, thereby preventing any prompt critical excursion.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

To prevent criticality during MODE 6, the refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock ensures no more than one control rod or one control rod pair with the same HCU may be withdrawn. {Both} channels of the refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock are required to be OPERABLE and the reactor mode switch must be locked in the refuel position to support the OPERABILITY of these channels.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 6, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the OPERABLE refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock provides protection against prompt reactivity excursions.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, the refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock is not required to be OPERABLE and is bypassed. In MODES 1 and 2, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.1.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation," and LCO 3.3.1.3, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Manual Actuation") and the control rods (LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY") provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions. In MODES 3, 4 and 5, with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation") ensures all control rods are inserted, thereby preventing criticality during shutdown conditions.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

With the refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock inoperable, the refueling interlocks may not be capable of preventing more than one control rod or control rod pair from being withdrawn. This condition may lead to criticality.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Control rod withdrawal must be immediately suspended, and action must be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Action must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, do not have to be inserted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.2.1

Proper functioning of the refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock requires the reactor mode switch to be in refuel. During control rod withdrawal in MODE 6, improper positioning of the reactor mode switch could, in some instances, allow improper bypassing of required interlocks. Therefore, this Surveillance imposes an additional level of assurance that the refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock will be OPERABLE when required. By "locking" the reactor mode switch in the proper position (i.e., removing the reactor mode switch key from the console while the reactor mode switch is positioned in refuel), an additional administrative control is in place to preclude operator errors from resulting in unanalyzed operation.

The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other administrative controls utilized during refueling operations to ensure safe operation.

SR 3.9.2.2

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each channel demonstrates the associated refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps such that the entire channel is tested. The 7 day Frequency is considered adequate because of demonstrated circuit reliability, procedural controls on control rod withdrawals, and visual and audible indications available in the control room to alert the operator of control rods not fully inserted. To perform the required testing, the applicable condition must be entered (i.e., a control rod must be withdrawn from its full-in position). Therefore, SR 3.9.2.1 has been modified by a Note that states the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is only required to be performed within 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
2. Section 7.7.2.
3. Section 15.3.7.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.3 Control Rod Position

BASES

BACKGROUND

Control rods provide the capability to maintain the reactor subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System. During refueling, movement of control rods is limited by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks" and LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock") or the control rod block with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

When the Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS) GANG/SINGLE selection status is in the SINGLE mode, the refueling interlocks allow a single control rod to be withdrawn at any time unless fuel is being loaded into the core. However, when the RC&IS GANG/SINGLE selection status is in the GANG mode with the individual hydraulic control unit (HCU) scram test mode active, the refueling interlocks allow the one or two control rods that are associated with the same HCU to be withdrawn at any time unless fuel is being loaded into the core. To preclude loading fuel assemblies into the core with a control rod or control rod pair withdrawn, all control rods must be fully inserted. This prevents the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling operations.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN"), the startup range neutron monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation" and LCO 3.3.1.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation"), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1).

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The safety analysis of the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 2) assumes the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM. Additionally, prior to fuel reload, all control rods must be fully inserted to minimize the probability of an inadvertent criticality.

Control Rod Position satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

All control rods must be fully inserted during applicable refueling conditions to prevent an inadvertent criticality during refueling.

APPLICABILITY

During MODE 6, loading fuel into a core cell with the control rod withdrawn may result in inadvertent criticality. Therefore, the control rod must be inserted before loading fuel into a core cell. All control rods must be inserted before loading fuel to ensure that a fuel loading error does not result in loading fuel into a core cell with the control rod withdrawn.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head is on and no fuel loading activities are possible. Therefore, this specification is not applicable in these MODES.

ACTIONS

A.1

With all control rods not fully inserted during the applicable conditions, an inadvertent criticality could occur that is not analyzed. All fuel loading operations must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude the completion of movement of a component to a safe condition.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.3.1

During refueling, to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical, all control rods must be fully inserted prior to and during fuel loading. Periodic checks of the control rod position ensure this condition is maintained.

The 12 hour Frequency considers the procedural controls on control rod movement during refueling as well as the redundant functions of the refueling interlocks.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
2. Section 15.3.7.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication

BASES

BACKGROUND

{The full-in position indication channel for each control rod provides information necessary to the refueling interlocks to prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling operations. Control rod position is derived from position synchronizing signal generators, which have an analog output. The Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS) translates the 100% insertion signal into a discrete full-in position signal to be used as a permissive in the refueling interlocks.} During refueling, the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks" and LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock") use the full-in position indication channels to limit the operation of the refueling equipment and the movement of the control rods. {The absence of the full-in position indication channel signal for any control rod removes the all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks and prevents fuel loading.} Also, this condition causes the refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock to not allow the withdrawal of any other control rod.

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SHUTDOWN MARGIN (LCO 3.1.1), the startup range neutron monitor (SRNM) neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation" and LCO 3.3.1.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation"), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").

The safety analysis for the control rod withdrawal during refueling (Ref. 2) assumes the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM. The full-in position indication channel is required to be OPERABLE so that the refueling interlocks can ensure that fuel cannot be loaded with any control rod or control rod pair withdrawn, and that no more than one control rod or control rod pair can be withdrawn at a time.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Control Rod Position Indication satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

{One of the two} control rod full-in position indication channels must be OPERABLE to provide the required inputs to the refueling interlocks. A channel is OPERABLE if it provides correct position indication to the refueling equipment interlock all-rods-in logic (LCO 3.9.1), and correct position indication to at least {one} channel of the refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock logic (LCO 3.9.2).

APPLICABILITY

During MODE 6, the control rods must have OPERABLE full-in position indication {channels} to ensure the applicable refueling interlocks will be OPERABLE.

In MODES 1 and 2, requirements for control rod position are specified in LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY." In MODES 3, 4, and 5, with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1), ensures all control rods are inserted, thereby preventing criticality during shutdown conditions.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to control rod position indication channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for control rods with inoperable position indication channels provide appropriate compensatory measures. As such, a Note has been provided which allows separate Condition entry for each control rod with inoperable position indication channels.

A.1.1, A.1.2, A.1.3, A.2.1, and A.2.2

With one or more required full-in position indication channels inoperable, compensating actions must be taken to protect against potential reactivity excursions from fuel assembly insertions or control rod withdrawals. This may be accomplished by immediately suspending in-vessel fuel

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

movement and control rod withdrawal, and immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Actions must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted. Suspension of in-vessel fuel movements and control rod withdrawal shall not preclude completion of the movement of a component to a safe condition.

Alternatively, actions may be immediately initiated to fully insert the control rod(s) associated with the inoperable full-in position indicator(s) and disarm the drive(s) to ensure that the control rod is not withdrawn. Actions must continue until all associated control rods are fully inserted and drives are disarmed. Under these conditions (control rod full inserted and disarmed), an inoperable full-in channel may be bypassed to allow refueling operations to proceed. An alternate method must be used to ensure the control rod is fully inserted (e.g., use the latched full-in and full-in position reed switches). Another option is to bypass Resolver A (which is the current position probe) and use Resolver B instead. {If the readings of the two resolvers do not agree, the condition will be alarmed to the operator to initiate bypass of Resolver A and use Resolver B.}

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.4.1

The full-in position indication channels provide input to the one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock and other refueling interlocks which require an all-rods-in permissive. The interlocks are activated when the full-in position indication for any control rod is not present since this indicates that all rods are not fully inserted. Therefore, testing of the full-in position indication channels is performed to ensure that when a control rod is withdrawn, the full-in position indication is not present. Note that failure to indicate full-in when the control rod is not withdrawn results in conservative actuation of the one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock, and therefore, is not explicitly required to be verified by this SR. The full-in position indication channel is considered inoperable even with the control rod fully inserted, if it would continue to indicate full-in with the control rod withdrawn. Performing the SR each time a control rod is withdrawn is considered adequate because of the procedural controls on control rod withdrawals and the visual and audible indications available in the control room to alert the operator of control rods not fully inserted.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.

2. Section 15.3.7.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND

Control rods are components of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System, the primary reactivity control system for the reactor. In conjunction with the Reactor Protection System (RPS), the CRD System provides the means for the reliable control of reactivity changes during refueling operation. In addition, the control rods provide the capability to maintain the reactor subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the CRD System.

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The CRD System is the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

The CRD System also includes the fine motion control rod drives (FMCRDs) and the CRD System instrumentation with which the Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS) directly interfaces. The FMCRDs can be inserted either hydraulically or electrically. In response to a scram signal, the FMCRD is inserted hydraulically via the stored energy in the scram accumulators. A redundant signal is also given to insert the FMCRD electrically via its motor drive. This diversity provides a high degree of assurance of rod insertion on demand.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided by refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks" and LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock"), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"), the startup range neutron monitor (SRNM) neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation" and LCO 3.3.1.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation"), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").

The safety analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 2) evaluates the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. Control rod scram provides backup protection should a prompt reactivity excursion occur.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Each withdrawn control rod must be OPERABLE. The withdrawn control rod is considered OPERABLE if the scram accumulator pressure is ≥ {12.76 MPaG (1850 psig)} and the control rod is capable of being automatically inserted upon receipt of a scram signal. Inserted control rods have already completed their reactivity control function.

APPLICABILITY

During MODE 6, withdrawn control rods must be OPERABLE to ensure that in a scram the control rods will insert and provide the required negative reactivity to maintain the reactor subcritical.

For MODES 1 and 2, control rod requirements are found in LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times," and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators." During MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod OPERABILITY during these conditions.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one or more withdrawn control rods inoperable, action must be immediately initiated to fully insert the inoperable control rods. Inserting the control rod ensures that the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. Actions must continue until the inoperable control rod is fully inserted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.5.1 and SR 3.9.5.2

During MODE 6, the OPERABILITY of control rods is primarily required to ensure that a withdrawn control rod will automatically insert if a signal requiring a reactor shutdown occurs. Because no explicit safety analysis exists for automatic shutdown during refueling, the shutdown function is satisfied if the withdrawn control rod is capable of automatic insertion and the associated CRD scram accumulator pressure is ≥ {12.76 MpaG (1850 psig)}.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The 7 day Frequency considers equipment reliability, procedural controls over the scram accumulators, and control room alarms and indicating lights, which indicate low accumulator charge pressures.

SR 3.9.5.1 is modified by a Note that allows 7 days after withdrawal of the control rod to perform the Surveillance. This acknowledges that the control rod must first be withdrawn before performance of the Surveillance, and therefore avoids potential conflicts with SR 3.0.1.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.

2. Section 15.3.7.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND

The movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV requires a minimum water level of 7.01 m (23.0 ft) above the top of the RPV flange. During refueling, this maintains a sufficient water level above the RPV to retain iodine fission product activity in the water in the event of a fuel handling accident (Ref. 1). Sufficient iodine activity would be retained to limit offsite doses from the accident to < 0.063 Sv (6.3 rem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) at the exclusion area boundary and < 0.05 Sv (5 rem) TEDE in the control room as required by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) (Ref. 2) and Regulatory Guide 1.183 (Ref. 3) acceptance criteria.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies the water level in the RPV is an initial condition design parameter in the analysis of a fuel handling accident (Ref. 1). A minimum water level of 7.01 m (23.0 ft) allows a decontamination factor of 200 (Ref. 3) to be used in the accident analysis for iodine. This relates to the assumption that 99.5% of the total iodine released from the pellet to cladding gap of all the dropped fuel assembly rods is retained by the refueling cavity water. The fuel pellet to cladding gap is assumed to contain 8% of the total fuel rod iodine inventory (Refs. 1 and 2). A fuel handling accident is assumed to damage all of the fuel rods in four (4) fuel assemblies as discussed in Reference 1.

Analysis of the fuel handling accident inside the reactor building is described in Reference 1. With a minimum water level of 7.01 m (23.0 ft) and a minimum decay time of 24 hours prior to fuel handling, the analysis demonstrates that the iodine release due to a postulated fuel handling accident is adequately captured by the water, and that offsite doses are maintained within < 0.063 Sv (6.3 rem) TEDE and < 0.05 Sv (5 rem) TEDE in the control room as required by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) (Ref. 2) and Regulatory Guide 1.183 (Ref. 3) acceptance criteria.

While the worst case assumptions include the dropping of the irradiated fuel assembly being handled onto the reactor core, the possibility exists of the dropped assembly striking the RPV flange and releasing fission products. Therefore, the minimum depth for water coverage to ensure acceptable radiological consequences is specified from the RPV flange. Since the worst case event results in failed fuel assemblies seated in the core, as well as the dropped assembly, dropping an assembly on the RPV flange will result in reduced releases of fission gases.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

RPV Water Level satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

A minimum water level of 7.01 m (23.0 ft) above the top of the RPV flange is required to ensure that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are within acceptable limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 4.

APPLICABILITY

LCO 3.9.6 is applicable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV. The LCO minimizes the possibility of a fuel handling accident in the reactor building that is beyond the assumptions of the safety analysis. Requirements for fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel storage pool are covered by LCO 3.7.5, "Fuel Pool Water Level."

ACTIONS

A.1

When the initial conditions for an accident cannot be met, steps should be taken to preclude the accident from occurring. If the water level is < 7.01 m (23.0 ft) above the top of the RPV flange, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the RPV is immediately suspended. Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completion of movement of an irradiated fuel assembly to a safe position. This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from occurring.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.6.1

Verification of a minimum water level of 7.01 m (23.0 ft) above the top of the RPV flange ensures that the design basis for the postulated fuel handling accident analysis during refueling operations is met. Water at the required level limits the consequences of damaged fuel rods, which are postulated to result from a fuel handling accident in the reactor building (Ref. 1).

The Frequency of 24 hours is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the large volume of water and the normal procedural controls on valve positions, which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely.

BASES

REFERENCES

1. Section 15.4.1.
2. 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1).
3. Regulatory Guide 1.183, July 2000.
4. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.7 Decay Time

BASES

BACKGROUND

The movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) requires a minimum decay time of 24 hours to ensure that the initial fission product inventory in the damaged fuel assemblies is less than or equal to the assumptions used in the analysis of a fuel handling accident (Ref. 1). The fission product inventory in the damaged fuel rods in the analysis of a fuel handling accident is based on the days of continuous operation at full power. Due to plant cool down and disassembly operations, there is a time delay following initiation of reactor shutdown before fuel movement operations can be initiated. However, since it may be possible to be ready to move irradiated fuel assemblies in less than 24 hours after subcriticality, requiring a minimum decay time or 24 hours ensures that this assumption is met.

Assuming at least 24 hours of decay time, in conjunction with the minimum water level above the top of the RPV flange as required by LCO 3.9.6, "RPV Water Level," and minimum water level above the irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pools as required by LCO 3.7.5, "Fuel Pool Water Level," is sufficient to limit offsite doses from the accident to < 0.063 Sv (6.3 rem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) at the exclusion area boundary and < 0.05 Sv (5 rem) (TEDE) in the control room as required by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) (Ref. 2) and Regulatory Guide 1.183 (Ref. 3) acceptance criteria.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies the fission product inventory in the fuel assemblies is an initial condition design parameter in the analysis of a fuel handling accident (Ref. 1). A decay time of 24 hours ensures the fission product inventory in the fuel rods is less than or equal to the value (Ref. 3) used in the fuel handling accident analysis. The fuel pellet to cladding gap is assumed to contain 8% of the total fuel rod iodine inventory, 10% of the total fuel rod krypton inventory, and 5% of the total fuel rod noble gases and halogens inventory (Refs. 1 and 2). A fuel handling accident is assumed to damage all of the fuel rods in four (4) fuel assemblies as discussed in Reference 1.

Analysis of the fuel handling accident inside the reactor building or fuel building is described in Reference 1. With a minimum water level of 7.01 m (23.0 ft) above the RPV flange and above any irradiated fuel in the spent fuel storage racks, and a minimum decay time of 24 hours prior to fuel handling, the analysis demonstrates that the iodine release due to a

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

postulated fuel handling accident is adequately captured by the water, and that offsite doses are maintained within < 0.063 Sv (6.3 rem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) and < 0.05 Sv (5 rem) in the control room as required by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) (Ref. 2) and Regulatory Guide 1.183 (Ref. 3) acceptance criteria.

Decay Time satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

A minimum decay time of 24 hours is required to ensure that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are within acceptable limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 4.

APPLICABILITY

LCO 3.9.7 is applicable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV. The LCO ensures that the assumptions of the safety analysis of a fuel handling accident in the reactor building or fuel building are met, ensuring that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are within acceptable limits.

ACTIONS

A.1

When the initial conditions for an accident cannot be met, steps should be taken to preclude the accident from occurring. If the reactor has not been subcritical for at least 24 hours, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the RPV is immediately suspended. Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completion of movement of an irradiated fuel assembly to a safe position. This effectively precludes a fuel handling accident from occurring.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.7.1

Verification that the reactor has been subcritical for at least 24 hours prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the RPV ensures that the design basis for the postulated fuel handling accident analysis during refueling operations is met. Adequate decay time, and water at the required level, limits the consequences of damaged fuel rods, which are postulated to result from a fuel handling accident in the reactor building or fuel building (Ref. 1).

BASES

REFERENCES

1. Section 15.4.1.
2. 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1).
3. Regulatory Guide 1.183, July 2000.
4. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to allow certain reactor coolant pressure tests to be performed in MODE 5 when the metallurgical characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) require the pressure testing at temperatures > 93.3°C (200°F) (normally corresponding to MODE 3 or 4) or to allow completing these reactor coolant pressure tests when the initial conditions do not require temperatures > 93.3°C (200°F). Furthermore, the purpose is to allow continued performance of control rod scram time testing required by SR 3.1.4.1 or SR 3.1.4.4 if reactor coolant temperatures exceed 93.3°C (200°F) when the control rod scram time testing is initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test. These control rod scram time tests would be performed in accordance with LCO 3.10.4, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal – Cold Shutdown," during MODE 5 operation.

In-service hydrostatic testing and system leakage pressure tests required by Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Ref. 1) are performed prior to the reactor going critical after a refueling outage. {Control Rod Drive (CRD) pump or hydrostatic test operation and a water solid RPV (except for an air bubble for pressure control) are used to achieve the necessary temperatures and pressures required for these tests}. {The minimum temperatures (at the required pressures) allowed for these tests are established by the Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System (RWCU/SDC) System} and are determined from the RPV pressure and temperature (P/T) limits required by LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits." These limits are conservatively based on the fracture toughness of the reactor vessel, taking into account anticipated vessel neutron fluence.

With increased reactor vessel fluence over time, the minimum allowable vessel temperature increases at a given pressure. Periodic updates to the RPV P/T limit curves are performed as necessary, based on the results of analyses of irradiated surveillance specimens removed from the vessel. Hydrostatic and leak testing may eventually be required with minimum reactor coolant temperatures > 93.3°C (200°F). However, even with required minimum reactor coolant temperatures < 93.3°C (200°F), maintaining RCS temperatures within a small band during the test can be impractical. Removal of heat addition from reactor core decay heat is coarsely controlled by control rod drive hydraulic system purge flow and reactor water cleanup system non-regenerative heat exchanger

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

operation. Test conditions are focused on maintaining a steady state pressure, and tightly limited temperature control poses an unnecessary burden on the operator and may not be achievable in certain instances.

The hydrostatic and/or RCS system leakage test{s} requires increasing pressure to approximately {7.777 MPaG (1128 psig)}. Scram time testing required by SR 3.1.4.1 and SR 3.1.4.4 requires reactor pressures > 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig).

Other testing may be performed in conjunction with the allowances for inservice leak or hydrostatic tests and control rod scram time tests.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Allowing the reactor to be considered in MODE 5 when the reactor coolant temperature is > 93.3°C (200°F), during, or as a consequence of, hydrostatic or leak testing, or as a consequence of control rod scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, effectively provides an exception to MODE 3 and 4 requirements including OPERABILITY of primary containment and the full complement of redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since the tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near MODE 5 conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be very low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity above the limits of LCO 3.4.3, "RCS Specific Activity," are minimized. In addition, the reactor building will be OPERABLE in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, {and will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak, with the reactor building OPERABLE, will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break (MSLB) outside of containment described in Reference 2. Therefore, requiring the reactor building to be OPERABLE will conservatively ensure that any potential airborne radiation from steam leaks will be held up, thereby limiting radiation releases to the environment.}

In the event of a large primary system leak, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize, allowing the low-pressure core cooling systems to operate. {The capability of the GDCS subsystems, as required in MODE 5 by LCO 3.5.3, "Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS) – Shutdown," would be more than adequate to keep the core flooded under this low decay heat load condition.} Small system leaks would be

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.

{For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally required MODE 5 applicable LCOs, in addition to the reactor building requirements required to be met by this special operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions.}

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional and therefore no specific criterion of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) applies. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

Operation at reactor coolant temperatures > 93.3°C (200°F) can be in accordance with Table 1.1-1 for MODE 3 or 4 operation without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. This option may be required due to P/T limits, however, which require testing at temperatures > 93.3°C (200°F), performance of inservice leak and hydrostatic testing would also necessitate the inoperability of some subsystems normally required to be OPERABLE when > 93.3°C (200°F). Additionally, even with required minimum reactor coolant temperatures < 93.3°C (200°F), RCS temperatures may drift above 93.3°C (200°F) during the performance of inservice leak and hydrostatic testing or during subsequent control rod scram time testing, which is typically performed in conjunction with inservice leak and hydrostatic testing. While this Special Operations LCO is provided for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and for scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, parallel performance of others tests and inspections is not precluded.

If it is desired to perform these tests while complying with this Special Operations LCO, then the MODE 5 applicable LCOs and specified MODE 3 and 4 LCOs must be met. This Special Operations LCO allows changing Table 1.1-1 temperature limits for MODE 5 to "N/A." {The additional requirements for reactor building LCOs to be met will provide sufficient protection for operations at reactor coolant temperatures > 93.3°C (200°F) for the purposes of performing an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, and for control rod scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test.}

BASES

LCO (continued)

This LCO allows primary containment to be open for frequent, unobstructed access to perform inspections, and for outage activities on various systems to continue consistent with the MODE 5 applicable requirements that are in effect immediately prior to, and immediately after, this operation.

APPLICABILITY

The MODE 5 requirements may only be modified for the performance of, or as a consequence of, the inservice leak or hydrostatic test, or as a consequence of control rod scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, so that these operations can be considered as in MODE 5 even though the reactor coolant temperature is > 93.3°C (200°F). {The additional requirement for reactor building OPERABILITY per the imposed MODE 3 requirements provides conservatism in the response of the facility to any event that may occur}. Operations in all other MODES are unaffected by this LCO.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operation. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

A.1 and A.2

Required Actions A.1 and A.2 restore compliance with the normal MODE 5 requirements and thereby exit this special operations LCO's Applicability. Activities that could further increase reactor coolant temperature or pressure are suspended immediately in accordance with Required Action A.1 and the reactor coolant temperature is reduced to establish normal MODE 5 requirements. The allowed Completion Time of 24 hours for Required Action A.2 is based on engineering judgment and provides sufficient time to reduce the average reactor coolant

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

temperature from the highest expected value to ≤ 93.3°C (200°F) with normal cooldown procedures.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.1.1

The LCOs made applicable are required to have their Surveillances met to establish that this LCO is being met.

REFERENCES

1. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, "Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components."
2. Subsection 15.4.5.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit operation of the reactor mode switch from one position to another to confirm certain aspects of associated interlocks during periodic tests and calibrations in MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6.

The reactor mode switch is a conveniently located, multi-function, multi-bank, control switch provided to select the necessary scram functions for various plant conditions (Ref. 1). The Reactor Protection System (RPS) selects and bypasses the appropriate trip functions based on the position of the reactor mode switch. For the average power range monitor (APRM), oscillation power range monitor (OPRM), and startup range neutron monitor (SRNM) trip functions the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) selects and bypasses the functions, not the RPS. The mode switch positions and related scram interlock functions are summarized as follows:

a. SHUTDOWN - Initiates a reactor scram; selects NMS APRM neutron flux setdown, NMS SRNM neutron flux high, and NMS SRNM neutron flux short period scram functions, bypasses main steam line isolation, and loss of power generation bus scram functions;

b. REFUEL - Selects NMS APRM neutron flux setdown and SRNM neutron flux high scram functions; bypasses NMS SRNM neutron flux short period, main steam line isolation, and loss of power generation bus scram functions;

c. STARTUP - Selects NMS APRM neutron flux setdown, SRNM neutron flux high, and NMS SRNM neutron flux short period scram functions; bypasses main steam line isolation, and loss of power generation bus scram functions; and

d. RUN - Selects main steam line isolation, and loss of power generation bus scram functions; bypasses NMS APRM neutron flux setdown and all NMS SRNM scram functions.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The reactor mode switch also provides interlocks for such functions as control rod blocks, low CRD charging water header pressure trip bypass, refueling interlocks, and main steam isolation valve isolations.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The acceptance criterion for reactor mode switch interlock testing is to preclude fuel failure by precluding reactivity excursions or core criticality.

The interlock functions of the shutdown and refuel positions of the reactor mode switch in MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6 are provided to preclude reactivity excursions which could potentially result in fuel failure. Interlock testing which requires moving the reactor mode switch to other positions (run, or startup) while in MODES 3, 4, 5, or 6, requires administratively maintaining all control rods inserted in core cells containing 1 or more fuel assemblies and no CORE ALTERATIONS in progress. There are no credible mechanisms for unacceptable reactivity excursions during the planned interlock testing.

For postulated accidents such as control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 2) or loading of fuel with a control rod withdrawn, the accident analysis demonstrates that fuel failure will not occur. The withdrawal of a single control rod will not result in criticality when adequate SDM is maintained. Also, loading fuel assemblies into the core with a single control rod withdrawn will not result in criticality thereby preventing fuel failure.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional and therefore no specific criterion of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) applies. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. MODE 3, 4, 5, and 6 operations not specified in Table 1.1-1 can be performed in accordance with other Special Operations LCOs (i.e., LCO 3.10.1, "Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation," LCO 3.10.3, "Control Rod Withdrawal - Shutdown," LCO 3.10.4, "Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown," and LCO 3.10.8, "Shutdown Margin (SDM) Test-Refueling") without meeting this LCO or its ACTIONS. If any testing is performed which involves the reactor mode switch interlocks

BASES

LCO (continued)

and requires its repositioning beyond that specified in Table 1.1-1 for the current MODE of operation, it can be performed provided all interlock functions potentially defeated are administratively controlled. In MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor mode switch in shutdown per Table 1.1-1, all control rods are fully inserted and a control rod block is initiated. Therefore, all control rods in core cells that contain one or more fuel assemblies must be verified fully inserted while in MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor mode switch in other than the shutdown position.

The additional LCO requirement to preclude CORE ALTERATIONS is appropriate for MODE 6 operations, as discussed below, and is inherently met in MODES 3, 4, and 5 by the definition of CORE ALTERATIONS which cannot be performed with the vessel head in place.

In MODE 6, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, only one control rod or control rod pair can be withdrawn under the refuel position one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock"). The refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks") appropriately control other CORE ALTERATIONS. Due to the increased potential for error in controlling these multiple interlocks and the limited duration of tests involving the reactor mode switch position, conservative controls are required consistent with MODES 3, 4, and 5 operations. The additional controls of administratively not permitting other CORE ALTERATIONS will adequately ensure that the reactor does not become critical during these tests.

APPLICABILITY

Any required periodic interlock testing involving the reactor mode switch while in MODES 1 and 2 can be performed without the need for Special Operations exceptions. Mode switch manipulations in these MODES would likely result in plant trips. In MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, this Special Operations LCO is only permitted to be used to allow reactor mode switch interlock testing that cannot conveniently be performed while in other modes. Such interlock testing may consist of required surveillances or calibrations, or may be the result of maintenance, repair, or troubleshooting activities. In MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, the interlock functions provided by the reactor mode switch in shutdown (i.e., all control rods inserted and incapable of withdrawal) and refueling (i.e., refueling interlocks to prevent inadvertent criticality during CORE

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

ALTERATIONS) positions can be administratively controlled adequately during the performance of certain tests.

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2

These Required Actions are provided to restore compliance with the Technical Specifications overridden by this Special Operations LCO. Compliance will also result in exiting the Applicability of this Special Operations LCO.

All CORE ALTERATIONS, if in progress, are immediately suspended in accordance with Required Action A.1 and all insertable control rods in core cells that contain one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted. This will preclude potential mechanisms that could lead to criticality. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude the completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Placing the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position will ensure that all inserted control rods remain inserted and result in operation in accordance with Table 1.1-1. Alternatively, if in MODE 6, the reactor mode switch must be placed in the refuel position, which will also result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1. A Note is added to Required Action A.3.2 to indicate that this Action is not applicable in MODES 3, 4, and 5 since only the shutdown position is allowed in these MODES. The allowed Completion Time of one hour for Required Actions A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2 provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods and place the reactor mode switch in the required position based on operating experience and is acceptable given that all operations which could increase core reactivity have been suspended.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.2.1 and SR 3.10.2.2

Meeting the requirements of this Special Operations LCO maintains operation consistent with or conservative to operating with the reactor mode switch in shutdown (or refuel for MODE 6). The functions of the reactor mode switch interlocks, which are not in effect due to the testing in progress, are adequately compensated for by the Special Operations LCO requirements. The administrative controls to ensure that the operational requirements continue to be met are to be periodically verified. The Surveillances performed at the 12-hour and 24-hour

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Frequency are intended to provide appropriate assurance that each operating shift is aware of and verify compliance with these Special Operations LCO requirements.

REFERENCES

1. Subsection 7.2.1.5.
2. Subsection 15.3.7.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.3 Control Rod Withdrawal - Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODES 3 and 4 Special Operations LCO is to permit the withdrawal of a single control rod or control rod pair for testing while in shutdown by imposing certain restrictions. In MODES 3 and 4, the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, and all control rods are inserted and blocked from withdrawal. Many systems and functions are not required in these conditions due to other installed interlocks that are actuated when the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position. However, circumstances will arise while in MODES 3 and 4 which present the need to withdraw a single control rod or control rod pair for various tests (e.g., friction tests, scram timing, and coupling integrity checks). These single control rod or dual control rod withdrawals are normally accomplished by selecting the refuel position for the reactor mode switch. A control rod pair (those associated by a shared CRD hydraulic control unit) may be withdrawn by utilizing the {Rod Test Switch}, which "gangs" the two rods together for rod position and control purposes. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional controls to allow a single control rod, or control rod pair, withdrawal in MODES 3 and 4.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod withdrawal during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied in MODES 3 and 4, these analyses will bound the consequences of an accident. The safety analyses (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod (or control rod pair). Under these conditions, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod pair withdrawn if adequate SDM exists.

Control rod pairs have been established for each control rod drive hydraulic control unit ({except for the center rod which has its own accumulator}). These pairs are selected and analyzed so that adequate shutdown margin is maintained with any control rod pair fully withdrawn.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

When the rod test switch is used, the selected rod pair is substituted for a single rod within the appropriate logic in order to satisfy the refuel mode one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock. The rod pair may then be withdrawn simultaneously.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling.

Alternate backup protection can be obtained by assuring that a {five-by-five} array of control rods, centered on each withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional and therefore no specific criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) applies. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 3 and 4 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position can be performed in accordance with other Special Operations LCOs (i.e., 3.10.2, "Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing") without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. However, if a single control rod or control rod pair withdrawal is desired in MODE 3 or 4, controls consistent with those required during refueling must be implemented and this Special Operations LCO applied. The refueling interlocks of LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock," required by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure that only one control rod or control rod pair can be withdrawn.

To back up the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.2), the ability to scram the withdrawn control rod(s) in the event of an inadvertent criticality is provided by this Special Operations LCO's requirements in Item d.1. Alternately, provided a sufficient number of control rods in the vicinity of the withdrawn control rod(s) are known to be inserted and incapable of withdrawal (Item d.2), the possibility of criticality on withdrawal of these control rods is sufficiently precluded so as not to require the scram capability of the withdrawn control rod(s). Also, once this alternate

BASES

LCO (continued)

(Item d.2) is completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod and the highest worth control rod may be changed to allow the withdrawn-untrippable control rod to be the single highest worth control rod.

APPLICABILITY

Control rod withdrawals are adequately controlled in MODES 1, 2, and 6 by existing LCOs. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with this Special Operations LCO or Special Operations LCO 3.10.4, "Control Rod Withdrawal – Cold Shutdown," and if limited to one control rod or control rod pair. This allowance is only provided with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position. For these conditions, the one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2), control rod position indication (LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication"), full insertion requirements for all other control rods and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1 "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.1.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation," LCO 3.3.1.3, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Manual Actuation," LCO 3.3.1.4, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.1.5, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Automatic Actuation") and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY – Refueling," or the added administrative control in Item d.2 of this Special Operations LCO minimizes potential reactivity excursions.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to a single control rod or control rod pair withdrawal while in MODES 3 and 4. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, trains, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1

If one or more of the requirements specified in this Special Operations LCO are not met, the ACTIONS applicable to the stated requirements of the affected LCOs are immediately entered as directed by Required Action A.1. This Required Action has been modified by a Note that clarifies the intent of any other LCO's Required Actions, in accordance with the other applicable LCOs, to insert all control rods and to also require exiting this Special Operations Applicability LCO by returning the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position. A second Note has been added which clarifies that this action is only applicable if the requirements not met are for an affected LCO.

A.2.1 and A.2.2

Required Action A.2.1 and Required Action A.2.2 are alternative ACTIONS that can be taken instead of Required Action A.1 and are provided to restore compliance with the normal MODE 3 or 4 requirements, thereby exiting this Special Operations LCO's Applicability. Actions must be initiated immediately to insert all insertable control rods. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position will ensure that all inserted rods remain inserted and restore operation in accordance with Table 1.1-1. The allowed Completion Time of one hour to place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.3.1, SR 3.10.3.2, and SR 3.10.3.3

The other LCOs made applicable in this Special Operations LCO are required to have their Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod(s) is not available, periodic verification in accordance with SR 3.10.3.2 is required to preclude the possibility of criticality. SR 3.10.3.2 has been modified by a Note that clarifies that this SR is not required to be met if SR 3.10.3.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.3.d.1 requirements, since SR 3.10.3.2 demonstrates that the alternative LCO 3.10.3.d.2 requirements are satisfied. Also, SR 3.10.3.3 verifies that all control rods other than the

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

control rod(s) being withdrawn are fully inserted. The 24-hour Frequency is acceptable because of the administrative controls on control rod withdrawals and the protection afforded by the LCOs involved, and hardware interlocks that preclude additional control rod withdrawals.

REFERENCES 1. Subsection 15.3.7.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.4 Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit the withdrawal of a single control rod or control rod pair for testing or maintenance, while in cold shutdown, by imposing certain restrictions. In MODE 5, the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, and all control rods are inserted and blocked from withdrawal. Many systems and functions are not required in these conditions due to the installed interlocks associated with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Circumstances will arise while in MODE 5, however, that present the need to withdraw a single control rod or control rod pair for various tests (e.g., friction tests, scram time testing, and coupling integrity checks). Certain situations may also require the removal of the associated control rod drive(s) (CRDs). These single or dual control rod withdrawals and possible subsequent removals are normally accomplished by selecting the refuel position for the reactor mode switch. A control rod pair (those associated by a single CRD hydraulic control unit) may be withdrawn by utilizing the {Rod Test Switch}, which "gangs" the two rods together for rod position and control purposes. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional controls to allow a single or dual control rod withdrawal in MODE 5.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod withdrawal during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied in MODE 5, these analyses will bound the consequences of an accident. The safety analyses (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod or control rod pair. Under these conditions, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod pair withdrawn if adequate SDM exists.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Control rod pairs have been established for each control rod drive hydraulic control unit ({except for the center rod, which has its own accumulator}). These pairs are selected and analyzed so that adequate shutdown margin is maintained with any control rod pair fully withdrawn. When the {rod test switch} is used, the selected rod pair is substituted for a single rod within the appropriate logic in order to satisfy the refuel mode one-rod-out interlock. The rod pair may then be withdrawn simultaneously.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. Alternate backup protection can be obtained by assuring that a {five-by-five} array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod(s), are inserted and incapable of withdrawal. This alternate backup protection is required when removing the CRDs because this removal renders the withdrawn control rod(s) incapable of being scrammed.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional and therefore no specific criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) applies. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. MODE 5 operations with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position can be performed in accordance with other LCOs (i.e., Special Operations LCO 3.10.2, "Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing") without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. If a single control rod or control rod pair withdrawal is desired in MODE 5, controls consistent with those required during refueling must be implemented and this Special Operations LCO applied. "Withdrawal" in this application includes the actual withdrawal of the control rod(s) as well as maintaining the control rod(s) in a position other than the full-in position, and reinserting the control rod(s).

The refueling interlocks of LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock," required by this Special Operations LCO will ensure that only one control rod or control rod pair can be withdrawn. At the time CRD removal begins, the disconnection of the position indication probe(s) will cause LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," and, therefore,

BASES

LCO (continued)

LCO 3.9.2 to fail to be met. Therefore, prior to commencing CRD removal, a control rod withdrawal block is required to be inserted to ensure that no additional control rods can be withdrawn and that compliance with this Special Operations LCO is maintained.
To back up the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.2) or the control rod withdrawal block, the ability to scram the withdrawn control rod(s) in the event of an inadvertent criticality is provided by the Special Operations LCO requirements in Item c.1. Alternatively, when the scram function is not OPERABLE, or the CRD is to be removed, a sufficient number of rods in the vicinity of the withdrawn control rod(s) are required to be inserted and made incapable of withdrawal (Item c.2). This precludes the possibility of criticality upon withdrawal of this control rod(s). Also, once this alternate (Item c.2) is completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod(s) and the highest worth control rod(s) may be changed to allow the withdrawn-untrippable control rod(s) to be the highest worth control rod(s).

APPLICABILITY

Control rod withdrawals are adequately controlled in MODES 1, 2, and 6 by existing LCOs. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with Special Operations LCO 3.10.3, or this Special Operations LCO and if limited to one control rod or control rod pair. This allowance is only provided with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position.

During these conditions, the full insertion requirements for all other control rods, the one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2), control rod position indication (LCO 3.9.4), and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1 "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.1.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation," LCO 3.3.1.3, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Manual Actuation," LCO 3.3.1.4, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.1.5, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Automatic Actuation"), and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY – Refueling"), or the added administrative controls in Item b.2 and Item c.2 of this Special Operations LCO, provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions.

BASES

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to a single control rod or control rod pair withdrawal while in MODE 5. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, trains, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod insertable, these Required Actions restore operation consistent with normal MODE 5 conditions (i.e., all rods inserted) or with the exceptions allowed in this Special Operations LCO. Required Action A.1 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 clarifies the intent of any other LCO's Required Actions, in accordance with the other applicable LCOs, to insert all control rods and to also require exiting this Special Operations Applicability LCO by returning the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position. Note 2 has been added to Required Action A.1 to clarify that this action is only applicable if the requirements not met are for an affected LCO.

Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are specified based on the condition of the control rod(s) being withdrawn. If a control rod is still insertable, actions must be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods and within one hour, place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. The allowed Completion Time of one hour for placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1, B.2.1, and B.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod(s) not insertable, withdrawal of the control rod and removal of the associated control rod drive must immediately be suspended. If the CRD has been removed such that the control rod is not insertable, these ACTIONS require the most expeditious action be taken to either restore the CRD and insert its control rod or restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.4.1, SR 3.10.4.2, SR 3.10.4.3, and SR 3.10.4.4

The other LCOs made applicable by this Special Operations LCO are required to have their associated Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. Also, all the control rods are verified to be inserted as well as the control rod withdrawal block. Verification that all the other control rods are fully inserted is required to meet the SDM requirements. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted provides assurance that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the affected control rod. The 24-hour Frequency is acceptable because of the administrative controls on control rod withdrawals, the protection afforded by the LCOs involved, and hardware interlocks to preclude an additional control rod withdrawal.

SR 3.10.4.2 and SR 3.10.4.4 have been modified by Notes that clarify that these SRs are not required to be met if the alternative requirements demonstrated by SR 3.10.4.1 are satisfied.

REFERENCE

1. Subsection 15.3.7.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.5 Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal - Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 6 Special Operations LCO is to permit the removal of a CRD during refueling operations by imposing certain administrative controls. Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod or control rod pair is permitted to be withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. The refueling interlocks use the "full in" position indicators to determine the position of all control rods. If the "full in" position signal is not present for every control rod, then the all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks is not present and fuel loading is prevented. Also, the refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock will not allow the withdrawal of a second control rod. A control rod drive pair (those associated by a shared CRD hydraulic control unit) may be removed under the control of the one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock by utilizing the {Rod Test Switch}. This switch allows the CRD pair to be treated as one CRD for purposes of the one-rod-out interlock.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures, as do the refueling interlocks described above, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. The requirement for this function to be OPERABLE precludes the possibility of removing the CRD once a control rod is withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. This Special Operations LCO provides controls sufficient to ensure that the possibility of an inadvertent criticality is precluded while allowing a single CRD or control rod drive pair to be removed from core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. The removal of the CRD involves disconnecting the position indication probe, which causes noncompliance with LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," and, therefore, LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks," and LCO 3.9.2, "Refueling Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock." {The CRD removal also requires isolation of the CRD from the CRD Hydraulic system, thereby causing inoperability of the control rod (LCO 3.9.5, Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling).}

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod withdrawal during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied, these analyses will bound the consequences of accidents. The safety analyses (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Control rod pairs have been established for each control rod drive hydraulic control unit ({except for the center rod, which has its own accumulator}). These pairs are selected and analyzed so that adequate shutdown margin is maintained with any control rod pair fully withdrawn. When the {rod test switch} is used, the selected rod pair is substituted for a single rod within the appropriate logic in order to satisfy the refuel mode one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock. The rod pair may then be withdrawn simultaneously.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod or control rod pair. Under these conditions, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod or control rod pair withdrawn if adequate SDM exists. By requiring all other control rods to be inserted and a control rod withdrawal block initiated, the function of the inoperable one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) is adequately maintained. This Special Operations LCO requirement to suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS adequately compensates for the inoperable all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1).

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks that prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. Since the scram function and refueling interlocks may be suspended, alternate backup protection required by this Special Operations LCO is obtained by assuring that a {five-by-five} array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and are incapable of being withdrawn (by insertion of a control rod block).

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional and therefore no specific criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) applies. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

BASES

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 6 with any of the following LCOs – LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.1.2 "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation," LCO 3.3.1.3, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Manual Actuation," LCO 3.3.1.4, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.1.5, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Automatic Actuation," LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, or LCO 3.9.5 - not met can be performed in accordance with the Required Actions of these LCOs without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. However, if a single CRD or CRD drive pair removal from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies is desired in MODE 6, controls consistent with those required by LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.1.2, LCO 3.3.1.3, LCO 3.3.1.4, LCO 3.3.1.5, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 must be implemented and this Special Operations LCO applied.

By requiring all other control rods to be inserted and a control rod withdrawal block initiated, the function of the inoperable one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) is adequately maintained. This Special Operations LCO requirement to suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS adequately compensates for the inoperable all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1). Ensuring that the {five-by-five} array of control rods, centered on each withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal adequately satisfies the backup protection that LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.1.2, LCO 3.3.1.3, LCO 3.3.1.4, LCO 3.3.1.5, and LCO 3.9.2 would have otherwise provided. Also, once these requirements (Items a, b, and c) are completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod(s) and the highest worth control rod(s) may be changed to allow the withdrawn-untrippable control rod(s) to be the highest worth control rod(s).

The exception granted in this Special Operations LCO to assume that the withdrawn control rod or control rod pair be the highest worth control rod(s) to satisfy LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)," and the inability to withdraw another control rod during this operation without additional SDM demonstrations, is conservative (i.e., the withdrawn control rod or control rod pair may not be the highest worth control rod(s)).

BASES

APPLICABILITY

MODE 6 operations are controlled by existing LCOs. The allowance to comply with this Special Operations LCO in lieu of the ACTIONS of LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.1.2, LCO 3.3.1.3, LCO 3.3.1.4, LCO 3.3.1.5, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 is appropriately controlled with the additional administrative controls required by this Special Operations LCO, which reduces the potential for reactivity excursions.

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for failure to meet LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.1.2, LCO 3.3.1.3, LCO 3.3.1.4, LCO 3.3.1.5, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 (i.e., all control rods inserted) or with the allowances of this Special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Required Action A.2.1, and Required Action A.2.2 are intended to require these ACTIONS be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the CRD(s) and insert its control rod(s) or restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO. Actions must continue until either required Action A.2.1 or required Action A.2.2 is satisfied.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.5.1, SR 3.10.5.2, SR 3.10.5.3, SR 3.10.5.4, and SR 3.10.5.5

Verification that all the control rods other than the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD are fully inserted is required to assure the SDM is within limits. Verification that the local {five-by-five} array of control rods other than the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted provides assurance that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the withdrawn control rod. The Surveillance for LCO 3.1.1, which is made applicable by this Special Operations LCO, is required in order to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. Verification that no other CORE ALTERATIONS are being made is required to assure the assumptions of the safety analysis are satisfied.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable given the administrative controls on control rod removal and hardware interlocks to block an additional control rod withdrawal.

REFERENCES 1. Subsection 15.3.7.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.6 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 6 Special Operations LCO is to permit multiple control rod withdrawal during refueling by imposing certain administrative controls.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod or control rod pair is permitted to be withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. When all four fuel assemblies are removed from a cell the control rods may be withdrawn with no restrictions. Any number of control rods may be withdrawn and removed from the reactor vessel if their cells contain no fuel.

The refueling interlocks use the "full in" position indicators to determine the position of all control rods. If the "full in" position signal is not present for every control rod, then the all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks is not present and fuel loading is prevented. Also, the refuel position one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock will not allow the withdrawal of additional control rods.

To allow more than one control rod (pair) to be withdrawn during refueling, these interlocks must be defeated. This Special Operations LCO establishes the necessary administrative controls to allow bypass of the "full in" position indicators.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The safety analyses (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN will prevent unacceptable reactivity excursions during refueling. To allow multiple (e.g., more than one control rod or control rod pair) control rod withdrawals, control rod removals, associated control rod drive (CRD) removal, or any combination of these, the "full in" position indication is allowed to be bypassed for each withdrawn control rod if all fuel has been removed from the cell. With no fuel assemblies in the core cell, the associated control rod has no reactivity control function and is not required to remain inserted. Prior to reloading fuel into the cell, however, the associated control rod must be inserted to ensure that an inadvertent criticality does not occur, as evaluated in the Reference 1 analysis.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional and therefore no specific criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) applies. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 6 with LCO 3.9.3, "Control Rod Position," LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," or LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY – Refueling," not met can be performed in accordance with the Required Actions of these LCOs without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. If multiple control rod withdrawal or removal or CRD removal is desired, all four fuel assemblies are required to be removed from the associated cells. Prior to entering this LCO any fuel remaining in a cell whose control rod was previously removed under the provisions of another LCO must be removed. "Withdrawal" in this application includes the actual withdrawal of the control rod as well as maintaining the control rod in a position other than the full-in position, and reinserting the control rod.

When loading fuel into the core with multiple control rods withdrawn, special spiral reload sequences are used to ensure that reactivity additions are minimized. Spiral reloading encompasses reloading a cell (four fuel locations immediately adjacent to a control rod) on the edge of a continuous fueled region (the cell can be loaded in any sequence). Otherwise, all control rods must be fully inserted before loading fuel.

APPLICABILITY

Operation in MODE 6 is controlled by existing LCOs. The exceptions from other LCO requirements (e.g., the ACTIONS of LCO 3.9.3, LCO 3.9.4 or LCO 3.9.5) allowed by this Special Operations LCO are appropriately controlled by requiring all fuel to be removed from cells whose "full in" indicators are allowed to be bypassed.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for refueling (i.e., all control rods inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies) or with the exceptions granted by this Special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Required Action A.2, Required Action A.3.1, and Required Action A.3.2 are intended to require that these ACTIONS be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the affected CRDs and insert their control rods or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.6.1, SR 3.10.6.2, and SR 3.10.6.3

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24-hour Frequency is acceptable given the administrative controls on fuel assembly and control rod removal, and takes into account other indications of control rod status available in the control room.

REFERENCES

1. Subsection 15.3.7.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.7 Control Rod Testing - Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit control rod testing while in MODES 1 and 2 by imposing certain administrative controls. Control rod patterns during startup conditions are controlled by the operator and the rod worth minimizer (RWM) (LCO 3.3.2.1 "Control Rod Block Instrumentation") such that only the specified control rod sequences and relative positions required by LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control," are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM. The sequences effectively limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase that could occur during a Rod Withdrawal Error (RWE). During these conditions, control rod testing is sometimes required that may result in control rod patterns not in compliance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6. These tests may include SDM demonstrations, control rod scram time testing, control rod friction testing, and testing performed during the Startup Test Program. This Special Operations LCO provides the necessary exceptions to the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 and provides additional administrative controls to allow the deviations in such tests from the prescribed sequences in LCO 3.1.6.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the RWE are summarized in Reference{s 1 and} 2. RWE analyses assume the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. These sequences define the potential initial conditions for the RWE analyses. The RWM provides backup to operator control of the withdrawal sequences to ensure that the initial conditions of the RWE analyses are not violated. For special sequences developed for control rod testing, the initial control rod patterns assumed in the safety analyses of Reference{s 1 and} 2 may not be preserved and, therefore, special RWE analyses are required to demonstrate that these special sequences will not result in unacceptable consequences should a RWE occur during the testing. These analyses are dependent on the specific test being performed.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional and therefore no specific criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Control rod testing may be performed, in compliance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6, and during these tests no exceptions to the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 are necessary. For testing performed with a sequence not in compliance with LCO 3.1.6, the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 may be suspended provided additional administrative controls are placed on the test to ensure that the assumptions of the special safety analysis for the test sequence remain valid. When deviating from the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6, individual control rods must be bypassed in the Rod Control and Instrumentation System (RC&IS). Assurance that the test sequence is followed can be provided by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff verifying conformance to the approved test sequence. These controls are consistent with those normally applied to operation in the startup range as defined in SR 3.3.2.1.7 when it is necessary to deviate from the prescribed sequence (e.g., an inoperable control rod that must be fully inserted).

APPLICABILITY

Control rod testing while in MODES 1 and 2 with THERMAL POWER greater than {10% RTP} of the RWM is adequately controlled by the existing LCOs on power distribution limits and control rod block instrumentation. Control rod movement during these conditions is not restricted to prescribed sequences and can be performed within the constraints of LCO 3.2.1, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)," LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," and LCO 3.3.2.1. With THERMAL POWER less than or equal to {10% RTP} of the RWM, the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are necessary to perform special tests which are not in conformance with the prescribed control rod sequences of LCO 3.1.6. While in MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with Special Operations LCO 3.10.3, "Control Rod Withdrawal - Shutdown" or Special Operations LCO 3.10.4, "Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown," which provide adequate controls to ensure that the assumptions of the safety analyses of Reference 3 is satisfied. During these Special Operations and while in MODE 6, the one-rod/rod-pair-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod/Rod-Pair-Out Interlock") and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

Instrumentation Channels," LCO 3.3.1.2 "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation," LCO 3.3.1.3, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Manual Actuation," LCO 3.3.1.4, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.1.5, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Automatic Actuation," and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY – Refueling"), or the added administrative controls prescribed in the applicable Special Operations LCOs, minimize potential reactivity excursions.

ACTIONS

A.1

With the requirements of this Special Operations LCO not met (e.g., the control rod pattern not in compliance with the special test sequence), the testing is required to be immediately suspended. Upon suspension of the special test, the provisions of LCO 3.1.6 are no longer exempted and appropriate actions are to be taken either to restore the control rod sequence to the prescribed sequence of LCO 3.1.6 or to shut down the reactor if required by LCO 3.1.6.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.7.1

During performance of the special test, a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff is required to verify conformance with the approved sequence for the test. This verification must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. This Surveillance provides adequate assurance that the specified test sequence is being followed and is also supplemented by SR 3.3.2.1.7, which requires verification of the bypassing of control rods in RCIS and subsequent movement of these control rods.

REFERENCES

1. {ESBWR reference for analytical methods and assumptions for RWE event topical report}.

2. Section 15.3.8.

3. Section 15.3.7.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test - Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 6 Special Operations LCO is to permit SDM testing to be performed for those plant configurations in which the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head is either not in place or the head bolts are not fully tensioned.

LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)," requires that adequate SDM be demonstrated following fuel movements or control rod replacement within the RPV. The demonstration must be performed prior to or within 4 hours after criticality is reached. This SDM test may be performed prior to or during the first startup following refueling. Performing the SDM test prior to startup requires the test to be performed while in MODE 6 with the vessel head bolts less than fully tensioned (and possibly with the vessel head removed). While in MODE 6, the reactor mode switch is required to be in the shutdown or refuel position where the applicable control rod blocks ensure that the reactor will not become critical. The SDM test requires the reactor mode switch to be in the startup position since more than one control rod will be withdrawn for the purpose of demonstrating adequate SDM. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional controls to allow withdrawing more than one control rod from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies when the reactor vessel head bolts are less than fully tensioned.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Prevention and mitigation of unacceptable reactivity excursions during control rod withdrawal, with the reactor mode switch in the startup position while in MODE 6, is provided by the Startup Range Neutron Monitor (SRNM) neutron flux scram and control rod block instrumentation. The limiting reactivity excursion during startup conditions while in MODE 6 is the Rod Withdrawal Error (RWE) event.

RWE analyses assume that the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. For SDM tests performed within these defined sequences, the analyses of Reference{s 1 and} 2 are applicable. However, for some sequences developed for the SDM testing, the control rod patterns assumed in the safety analysis may not be met and, therefore, special RWE analyses are required to demonstrate that the SDM test sequence will not result in unacceptable consequences should a RWE occur during the testing. For the purpose of this test, protection provided by the normally required MODE 6 applicable LCOs, in addition

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

to the requirements of this LCO, will maintain normal test operations as well as postulated accidents within the bounds of the appropriate safety analyses (Ref{s. 1 and} 2). In addition to the added requirements for the RWM, APRM, and control rod coupling, the notch movement mode is specified for out-of-sequence withdrawals. Requiring the notch movement mode limits withdrawal steps to a single notch, which limits inserted reactivity and allows adequate monitoring of changes in neutron flux that may occur during the test.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional and therefore no specific criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) applies. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 2 in accordance with Table 1.1-1 without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. For SDM tests performed while in MODE 6, additional requirements must be met to ensure that adequate protection against potential reactivity excursions is available. To provide additional scram protection, beyond the normally required SRNMs, the APRMs are also required to be OPERABLE (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," Function 2, LCO 3.3.1.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Actuation," LCO 3.3.1.4 "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Instrumentation," Functions 2.a and 2.d, and LCO 3.3.1.5, "Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) Automatic Actuation," Function 2) as though the reactor were in MODE 2. Because multiple control rods will be withdrawn and the reactor will potentially become critical, the approved control rod withdrawal sequence must be enforced by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation", Function 1.b, MODE 2), or must be verified by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff. To provide additional protection against an inadvertent criticality, control rod withdrawals that do not conform to the ganged withdrawal sequence restrictions (GWSR) specified in LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control" (i.e., out-of-sequence control rod withdrawals) must be made in the notch movement mode to minimize the potential reactivity insertion associated with each movement. Coupling integrity of withdrawn control rods is required to minimize the probability of a RWE and ensure proper functioning of the withdrawn control rods if required to scram. Because the reactor vessel

BASES

LCO (continued)

head may be removed during these tests, no other CORE ALTERATIONS may be in progress. In addition, the MODE 2 requirements for the reactor building (LCO 3.6.3.1, "Reactor Building"), with the reactor building boundary dampers isolated are required to mitigate the consequences of an inadvertent criticality. This Special Operations LCO then allows changing the Table 1.1-1 reactor mode switch position requirements to include the startup position such that the SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 6.

APPLICABILITY

These SDM test Special Operations requirements are only applicable if the SDM tests are to be performed while in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head removed or the head bolts not fully tensioned. Additional requirements during these tests to enforce control rod withdrawal sequences and restrict other CORE ALTERATIONS provide protection against potential reactivity excursions. Operations in all other MODES are unaffected by this LCO.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

With one or more control rods discovered uncoupled during this Special Operation, a controlled insertion of each uncoupled control rod is required to attempt recoupling. If recoupling is not accomplished, operation may continue, provided the control rods are fully inserted within 3 hours and disarmed within 4 hours. Inserting a control rod ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. The control rod is disarmed to prevent inadvertent withdrawal during subsequent operations. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note that allows control rods to be bypassed in accordance with SR 3.3.2.1.7, if required, to allow insertion of inoperable control rod and continued operation. SR 3.3.2.1.7 provides additional requirements when the control rods are bypassed to ensure compliance with the RWE analysis.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, considering the small number of allowed inoperable control rods, and provide time to insert and disarm the control rods in an orderly manner without challenging plant systems.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Condition A is modified by a Note allowing separate Condition entry for each uncoupled control rod. This is acceptable since the Required Actions for this Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each uncoupled control rod. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation. Subsequent uncoupled control rods are governed by subsequent entry into the Condition and application of the Required Actions.

B.1

With one or more of the requirements of this LCO not met, for reasons other than an uncoupled control rod, the testing should be immediately stopped by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refuel position. This results in a condition that is consistent with the requirements for MODE 6 where the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are no longer required.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.8.1, SR 3.10.8.2, and SR 3.10.8.3

LCO 3.3.1.1 Function 2, LCO 3.3.1.2, LCO 3.3.1.4, Functions 2.a and 2.d, LCO 3.3.1.5, Function 2, and LCO 3.6.3.1 made applicable in this Special Operations LCO, are required to have applicable Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. However, the control rod withdrawal sequences during the SDM tests may be enforced by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 1.b, MODE 2 requirements) or by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff. As noted, either the applicable SRs for the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1) must be satisfied according to the applicable Frequencies (SR 3.10.8.2), or the proper movement of control rods must be verified (SR 3.10.8.3). This latter verification (i.e., SR 3.10.8.3) must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. These surveillances provide adequate assurance that the specified test sequence is being followed.

SR 3.10.8.4

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this LCO will ensure that the reactor is operated within the bounds of the safety analysis. The 12 hour Frequency is intended to provide appropriate assurance that each operating shift is aware of and verifies compliance with these Special Operations LCO requirements.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.10.8.5

Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the control rod drive mechanism and will perform its intended function when necessary. The verification is required to be performed prior to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling. This Frequency is acceptable considering the low probability that a control rod will become uncoupled when it is not being moved and operating experience related to uncoupling events.

REFERENCES

1. {ESBWR reference for analytical methods and assumptions for RWE event topical report}.

2. Subsection 15.3.8.