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MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
RECORD RETENTION # 005893

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS
MANUAL (SLC)

Page 2 of 2

Date: 07/12/07

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SLC 16.9.7	NA	089 06/15/07																	

REMARKS: PLEASE UPDATE ACCORDINGLY

RECIPIENT # 00422 PREVIOUSLY COMPLETED

G R PETERSON
VICE PRESIDENT
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION

BY:
B C BEAVER MG01RC BCB/CMK

1112
A053

June 18, 2007

MEMORANDUM

To: All McGuire Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual Holders

Subject: McGuire SLC Manual Update

Please revise your copy of the manual as follows:

REMOVE

INSERT

List of Effective Sections (Rev 78)

List of Effective Sections (Rev 79)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 72)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 89)

Revisions may skip numbers due to Regulatory Compliance Filing System.

Please call me if you have questions.

Bonnie Beaver

Bonnie Beaver
Regulatory Compliance

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES

SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION

SECTION	REVISION NUMBER	DATE
16.1	REVISION 32	12/2/02
16.2	REVISION 90	3/13/07
16.3	REVISION 48	7/31/03
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16.13.1	REVISION 51	10/1/03
16.13.2	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
16.13.3	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
16.13.4	REVISION 58	5/11/04
16.14.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99

REMEDIAL ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>B. (continued).</p>	<p>B.2 Verify offsite power and one emergency diesel generator OPERABLE.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.3 Restore the component to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>1 hour</p> <p>7 days</p>
<p>C. Total Unidentified LEAKAGE, Identified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 20 gpm.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 16.3 gpm.</p>	<p>C.1 Declare the Standby Makeup Pump inoperable.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>C.2 Enter Condition A.</p>	<p>Immediately</p>
<p>D. Required Action A.2 and its associated Completion Time not met.</p>	<p>D.1 Prepare and submit a Special Report to the NRC outlining the cause of the inoperability, corrective actions taken, and plans for restoring the SSS to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>30 days</p>
<p>E. Required Action B.3 and its associated Completion Time not met.</p>	<p>E.1 Prepare and submit a Special Report to the NRC outlining the extent of repairs required, schedule for completing repairs, and basis for continued operation.</p>	<p>14 days</p>

TESTING REQUIREMENTS

TEST	FREQUENCY
<p>TR 16.9.7.1 Verify total Identified LEAKAGE, Unidentified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff are ≤ 20 gpm.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Verify total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff ≤ 16.3 gpm.</p>	72 hours
<p>TR 16.9.7.2 Verify the requirements for spent fuel water level in Surveillance Requirement 3.7.13.1 are met and the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool is within the limits specified in the COLR.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Verify the refueling water storage tank is capable of being aligned to the SSS standby makeup pump.</p>	7 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.3 Verify fuel oil level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank is ≥ 4.0 ft.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.4 Verify the SSS diesel generator starts from ambient conditions and operates for ≥ 30 minutes at ≥ 700 kW.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.5 Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator are tested in accordance with, and maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.</p>	In accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program
<p>TR 16.9.7.6 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.7 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.8 Verify the electrolyte level of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is above the plates.</p>	31 days

(continued)

TESTING REQUIREMENTS (continued)

TEST	FREQUENCY
TR 16.9.7.9 Verify the total battery terminal voltage of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is $\geq 258/129$ V on float charge.	31 days
TR 16.9.7.10 Verify the average specific gravity of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is ≥ 1.200 .	92 days
TR 16.9.7.11 Verify the standby makeup pump's developed head and capacity is greater than or equal to that required by the Inservice Testing Supplemental Program.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.12 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V batteries and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.13 Verify SSS diesel generator 24 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, and free of corrosion.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.14 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.15 Perform inspection of SSS diesel generator in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with manufacturer's recommendations for class of service.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.16 Verify the SSS 250/125 V batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.17 Verify the SSS 250/125 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti-corrosion material.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.18 Verify the "C" solenoid to valve SA48ABC can be deenergized to provide steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.	18 months

TABLE 16.9.7-1

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS VERIFICATION⁽¹⁾

INOPERABLE SSS COMPONENT	FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS LOCATION								
	EL 716 EE-KK	EL 733 EE-KK	EL 750 EE-KK	Control Room	Battery Room	Cable Rooms	Turbine Driven AFW Pump	Motor Driven AFW Pump	Containment
SSS Diesel Generator ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
SSS DG Starting 24 V Battery Bank and Charger ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
Standby Makeup Pump and Water Supply	X	X	X						
SSS 250/125V Battery and Charger ⁽³⁾				X	X	X			Note 2
Turbine Driven AFW Pump and Water Supply								X	
Turbine Driven AFW Pump Solenoid "C"								X	
Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump A AND Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump B								X	
INSTRUMENTATION:									
1. RCS Pressure				X	X	X			Note 2
2. Pressurizer Level				X	X	X			Note 2
3. SG Level				X	X	X			Note 2
4. Incore Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2
5. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2

NOTES:

1. If fire detection and/or suppression systems are inoperable, then the ACTION statement(s) of the applicable fire detection and/or suppression SLC shall be complied with.
2. Monitor containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations specified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1 or 3.6.5.2, in lieu of verification of operability of systems inside containment
3. With this component inoperable, then denoted areas of both units are affected.

TABLE 16.9.7-2

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
INSTRUMENTATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	REQUIRED CHANNELS	TESTING REQUIREMENTS	READOUT LOCATION
1. Reactor Coolant Pressure	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
2. Pressurizer Level	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
3. Steam Generator Level (Wide Range)	1 per SG	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
4. Incore Temperature	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
5. Standby Makeup Pump Flow	1	TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
6. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature	1 per 2 Cold Legs	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel

BASES

The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) is designed to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated fire incidents, sabotage, or station blackout events by providing capability to maintain HOT STANDBY conditions and by controlling and monitoring vital systems from locations external to the main control room. The facility is credited with the ability to cope with a station black out (SBO) event of 4 hour duration. This capability is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and 10 CFR 50.63.

By design, the SSS is intended to respond to those low-probability events which render both the control room and automatic safety systems inoperable. Because of the low probability of occurrence of these events, the remedial actions rely on compensatory action, timely repair or return to operability and, if necessary, a justification for continued operation.

Because the SSS performs a redundant fire protection function, compensatory action during periods when the SSS is inoperable relies largely on assurance of the operability of fire detection and suppression systems. Table 16.9.7-1 establishes requirements for operability of fire detection and suppression systems.

Both A&D NC Cold Leg Wide Range Temperatures are required for SSS operability. This conclusion is based on NRC Correspondence during issuance of the original operating license.

The Source Range Wide Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation was installed at the SSS Control Panel as part of NRC review of this system in the early 1980s. The indication is not required for SSS operability, based on the NRC's response to Duke dated July 12, 1983.

Controls and power to the pressurizer heater banks are included for SSF events; however, they are not required for SSS operability. NRC Generic Letter 86-10 provides that conclusion.

The Testing Requirements ensure that the SSS systems and components are capable of performing their intended functions. The testing requirements were based largely on SSS Technical Specifications for the Catawba Nuclear Station, which was approved prior to the issuance of the fuel load license for Unit 1 of that plant. Also considered in the formulation of the testing requirements were existing McGuire Technical Specifications, such as those for the 1E Diesel Generators, Refueling Water Storage Tank, Fire Protection & Detection Systems, and other Tech Specs which are related to the safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant.

The required level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank ensures sufficient fuel for 3 ½ days of uninterrupted operation. Per Appendix R requirements, the unit must be in cold shutdown within 72 hours of going to the SSF. The 3 ½ day supply of fuel oil assures this capability.

Testing has demonstrated the ability of plant operations to start the SSF diesel within 10 minutes of the recognition of an SBO event, thus satisfying the intent of NUMARC 87-00 guidance. The SSF diesel generator has sufficient capacity and capability to operate equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for a 4-hour SBO event.

BASES (continued)

Fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator is tested and maintained in accordance with the same Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program used for the 4kV emergency diesel generators (see Technical Specification 5.5.13, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.3.2 and associated Bases).

Although the Standby Makeup Pump is not nuclear safety-related and was not designed according to ASME code requirements, it is tested quarterly to ensure its OPERABILITY. The Standby Makeup Pump (SMP) functions as part of the SSF to provide makeup capacity to the reactor coolant system and cooling flow to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals. The RCP seal leak-off flow is temperature dependent (i.e., the higher the temperature the higher the leak-off flow). During normal operation the RCP seals are supplied from the Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) drawing from the Volume Control Tank (VCT). During the SSF event, the SMP draws from the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). During the SSF event there is no SFP cooling, so water injected into the RCP seals will have a higher temperature than during normal operation. The SMP is capable of providing a makeup capacity of 26 gpm. The revised SLC limit of 20 gpm total accumulative leakage is based on a calculation that was performed by Westinghouse, indicating increased RCP seal leak-off at higher seal water temperatures, to relate the SSF event leakage of 26 gpm at elevated RCP seal temperatures. This more conservative limit will ensure that the SMP will be capable of providing makeup and seal cooling flow equal to or greater than total leakage during the SSF event, increased RCP seal leak-off flow due to heat-up of the SFP, and still provide a margin of safety. As a conservative measure, during normal power operation the total accumulative system leakage (unidentified + identified + RCP seal leak-off flows) shall be limited to 20 gpm. The Testing Requirement concerning the SMP water supply ensures that an adequate water volume is available to supply the pump continuously for 72 hours.

The additional requirement that total RCP seal leak-off flow be ≤ 16.3 gpm resulted from a historical review of NRC correspondence that specified the SMP also provide for reactor coolant system makeup and boration in addition to RCP seal leakage requirements (Ref. 17). Calculations show that this upper limit for RCP seal leak-off provides sufficient margin to maintain the required unit conditions for a bounding SSS event.

The Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, in the A (Unit 1) and B (Unit 2) sumps, can be controlled and powered from the SSF. These Sump Pumps remove accumulation of groundwater, Turbine driven AFW Pump drains, and other miscellaneous sources. For the SSS to be OPERABLE, a minimum of one of these pumps must be OPERABLE. Credit is taken for the groundwater underdrain system to transport water from one sump to the other.

The turbine driven AFW pump can be controlled from the SSF and is utilized during an SSS event to maintain adequate secondary side heat removal. For the SSS to be OPERABLE, the turbine driven AFW pump must be OPERABLE. The SSF has the ability to align the Condenser Circulating Water (RC) System to maintain hot standby conditions for approximately 72 hours. This makeup water source is isolated from the Auxiliary Feedwater pump suction by two dc power-operated valves (CA161C and CA162C). The procedure, that transfers control to the SSS, directs the operators to open these valves and disable the power supply to prevent spurious closure during the fire event. In addition, these valves also have a pressure switch to open automatically on low pump suction pressure.

The SSF is provided with its own 250/125 VDC power system which is independent from the normal 125 VDC and 120 VAC vital I&C power systems. The SSF batteries are charged by

the SSF diesel generator and are available to power the SSF instruments and controls necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions from the SSF control room following a station black out (SBO) event.

While the SSS 24 VDC battery charger is isolated for battery surveillance testing, the SSS Diesel Generator remains operable as long as the battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.

The SSS 125V batteries and battery chargers consist of three pairs SDSP1, SDSP2 and SDSS. Each pair consists of a battery and associated battery charger. Pair SDSS can be used to substitute for either pair SDSP1 or SDSP2. Only two of these pairs are required operable since pair SDSS is spare.

This selected licensee commitment is part of the McGuire Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C.4 (Unit 1) and C.7 (Unit 2).

REFERENCES

1. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Chapter 9.5.1
2. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 2, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix D
3. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 5, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix B
4. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 6, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix C
5. McGuire Fire Protection Review, as revised
6. McGuire Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Review
7. IEEE 308-1974, Class 1E Power Systems
8. IEEE 450-1975, Maintenance Testing & Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries
9. OP/O/B/6350/04, Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Operation
10. McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses, Unit 1 License Condition C.(4) and Unit 2 License Condition C.(7)
11. PIP 0-M-99-03926
12. PIP-M-01-3466
13. 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current
14. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 4, 1990, Requirements for Station Blackout.
15. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 17, 1989, Requirements for Station Blackout.

16. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Safety Evaluation for Station Blackout (10CFR50.63), Dated February 19, 1992.
17. SAIC-91/1265, "Technical Evaluation Report, McGuire Nuclear Station, Station Blackout Evaluation," Dated December 10, 1991.
18. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Section 18.2.4, Chemistry Control Program.
19. MCS-1465.00-00-0019, "Plant Design Basis Specification For Station Blackout Rule," Rev. 3.
20. McGuire License Renewal Commitments MCS-1274.00-00-0016, Section 4.6, Chemistry Control Program.
21. PIP M-04-3317.

June 18, 2007

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Subject: McGuire SLC Manual Update

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16.11.15	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.16	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.17	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.19	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.20	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.13.1	REVISION 51	10/1/03
16.13.2	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
16.13.3	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
16.13.4	REVISION 58	5/11/04
16.14.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99

TESTING REQUIREMENTS

TEST	FREQUENCY
<p>TR 16.9.7.1 Verify total Identified LEAKAGE, Unidentified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff are ≤ 20 gpm.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Verify total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff ≤ 16.3 gpm.</p>	72 hours
<p>TR 16.9.7.2 Verify the requirements for spent fuel water level in Surveillance Requirement 3.7.13.1 are met and the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool is within the limits specified in the COLR.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Verify the refueling water storage tank is capable of being aligned to the SSS standby makeup pump.</p>	7 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.3 Verify fuel oil level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank is ≥ 4.0 ft.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.4 Verify the SSS diesel generator starts from ambient conditions and operates for ≥ 30 minutes at ≥ 700 kW.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.5 Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator are tested in accordance with, and maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.</p>	In accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program
<p>TR 16.9.7.6 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.7 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.8 Verify the electrolyte level of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is above the plates.</p>	31 days

(continued)

TESTING REQUIREMENTS (continued)

TEST	FREQUENCY
TR 16.9.7.9 Verify the total battery terminal voltage of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is \geq 258/129 V on float charge.	31 days
TR 16.9.7.10 Verify the average specific gravity of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is \geq 1.200.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.11 Verify the standby makeup pump's developed head and capacity is greater than or equal to that required by the Inservice Testing Supplemental Program.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.12 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V batteries and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.13 Verify SSS diesel generator 24 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, and free of corrosion.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.14 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.15 Perform inspection of SSS diesel generator in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with manufacturer's recommendations for class of service.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.16 Verify the SSS 250/125 V batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.17 Verify the SSS 250/125 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti-corrosion material.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.18 Verify the "C" solenoid to valve SA48ABC can be deenergized to provide steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.	18 months

TABLE 16.9.7-1

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS VERIFICATION⁽¹⁾

INOPERABLE SSS COMPONENT	FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS LOCATION								
	EL 716 EE-KK	EL 733 EE-KK	EL 750 EE-KK	Control Room	Battery Room	Cable Rooms	Turbine Driven AFW Pump	Motor Driven AFW Pump	Containment
SSS-Diesel Generator ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
SSS DG Starting 24 V Battery Bank and Charger ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
Standby Makeup Pump and Water Supply	X	X	X						
SSS 250/125V Battery and Charger ⁽³⁾				X	X	X			Note 2
Turbine Driven AFW Pump and Water Supply								X	
Turbine Driven AFW Pump Solenoid "C"								X	
Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump A AND Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump B								X	
INSTRUMENTATION:									
1. RCS Pressure				X	X	X			Note 2
2. Pressurizer Level				X	X	X			Note 2
3. SG Level				X	X	X			Note 2
4. Incore Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2
5. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2

NOTES:

1. If fire detection and/or suppression systems are inoperable, then the ACTION statement(s) of the applicable fire detection and/or suppression SLC shall be complied with.
2. Monitor containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations specified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1 or 3.6.5.2, in lieu of verification of operability of systems inside containment
3. With this component inoperable, then denoted areas of both units are affected.

TABLE 16.9.7-2

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
INSTRUMENTATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	REQUIRED CHANNELS	TESTING REQUIREMENTS	READOUT LOCATION
1. Reactor Coolant Pressure	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
2. Pressurizer Level	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
3. Steam Generator Level (Wide Range)	1 per SG	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
4. Incore Temperature	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
5. Standby Makeup Pump Flow	1	TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
6. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature	1 per 2 Cold Legs	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel

BASES

The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) is designed to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated fire incidents, sabotage, or station blackout events by providing capability to maintain HOT STANDBY conditions and by controlling and monitoring vital systems from locations external to the main control room. The facility is credited with the ability to cope with a station black out (SBO) event of 4 hour duration. This capability is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and 10 CFR 50.63.

By design, the SSS is intended to respond to those low-probability events which render both the control room and automatic safety systems inoperable. Because of the low probability of occurrence of these events, the remedial actions rely on compensatory action, timely repair or return to operability and, if necessary, a justification for continued operation.

Because the SSS performs a redundant fire protection function, compensatory action during periods when the SSS is inoperable relies largely on assurance of the operability of fire detection and suppression systems. Table 16.9.7-1 establishes requirements for operability of fire detection and suppression systems.

Both A&D NC Cold Leg Wide Range Temperatures are required for SSS operability. This conclusion is based on NRC Correspondence during issuance of the original operating license.

The Source Range Wide Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation was installed at the SSS Control Panel as part of NRC review of this system in the early 1980s. The indication is not required for SSS operability, based on the NRC's response to Duke dated July 12, 1983.

Controls and power to the pressurizer heater banks are included for SSF events; however, they are not required for SSS operability. NRC Generic Letter 86-10 provides that conclusion.

The Testing Requirements ensure that the SSS systems and components are capable of performing their intended functions. The testing requirements were based largely on SSS Technical Specifications for the Catawba Nuclear Station, which was approved prior to the issuance of the fuel load license for Unit 1 of that plant. Also considered in the formulation of the testing requirements were existing McGuire Technical Specifications, such as those for the 1E Diesel Generators, Refueling Water Storage Tank, Fire Protection & Detection Systems, and other Tech Specs which are related to the safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant.

The required level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank ensures sufficient fuel for 3 ½ days of uninterrupted operation. Per Appendix R requirements, the unit must be in cold shutdown within 72 hours of going to the SSF. The 3 ½ day supply of fuel oil assures this capability.

Testing has demonstrated the ability of plant operations to start the SSF diesel within 10 minutes of the recognition of an SBO event, thus satisfying the intent of NUMARC 87-00 guidance. The SSF diesel generator has sufficient capacity and capability to operate equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for a 4-hour SBO event.

BASES (continued)

Fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator is tested and maintained in accordance with the same Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program used for the 4kV emergency diesel generators (see Technical Specification 5.5.13, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.3.2 and associated Bases).

Although the Standby Makeup Pump is not nuclear safety-related and was not designed according to ASME code requirements, it is tested quarterly to ensure its OPERABILITY. The Standby Makeup Pump (SMP) functions as part of the SSF to provide makeup capacity to the reactor coolant system and cooling flow to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals. The RCP seal leak-off flow is temperature dependent (i.e., the higher the temperature the higher the leak-off flow). During normal operation the RCP seals are supplied from the Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) drawing from the Volume Control Tank (VCT). During the SSF event, the SMP draws from the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). During the SSF event there is no SFP cooling, so water injected into the RCP seals will have a higher temperature than during normal operation. The SMP is capable of providing a makeup capacity of 26 gpm. The revised SLC limit of 20 gpm total accumulative leakage is based on a calculation that was performed by Westinghouse, indicating increased RCP seal leak-off at higher seal water temperatures, to relate the SSF event leakage of 26 gpm at elevated RCP seal temperatures. This more conservative limit will ensure that the SMP will be capable of providing makeup and seal cooling flow equal to or greater than total leakage during the SSF event, increased RCP seal leak-off flow due to heat-up of the SFP, and still provide a margin of safety. As a conservative measure, during normal power operation the total accumulative system leakage (unidentified + identified + RCP seal leak-off flows) shall be limited to 20 gpm. The Testing Requirement concerning the SMP water supply ensures that an adequate water volume is available to supply the pump continuously for 72 hours.

The additional requirement that total RCP seal leak-off flow be ≤ 16.3 gpm resulted from a historical review of NRC correspondence that specified the SMP also provide for reactor coolant system makeup and boration in addition to RCP seal leakage requirements (Ref. 17). Calculations show that this upper limit for RCP seal leak-off provides sufficient margin to maintain the required unit conditions for a bounding SSS event.

The Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, in the A (Unit 1) and B (Unit 2) sumps, can be controlled and powered from the SSF. These Sump Pumps remove accumulation of groundwater, Turbine driven AFW Pump drains, and other miscellaneous sources. For the SSS to be OPERABLE, a minimum of one of these pumps must be OPERABLE. Credit is taken for the groundwater underdrain system to transport water from one sump to the other.

The turbine driven AFW pump can be controlled from the SSF and is utilized during an SSS event to maintain adequate secondary side heat removal. For the SSS to be OPERABLE, the turbine driven AFW pump must be OPERABLE. The SSF has the ability to align the Condenser Circulating Water (RC) System to maintain hot standby conditions for approximately 72 hours. This makeup water source is isolated from the Auxiliary Feedwater pump suction by two dc power-operated valves (CA161C and CA162C). The procedure, that transfers control to the SSS, directs the operators to open these valves and disable the power supply to prevent spurious closure during the fire event. In addition, these valves also have a pressure switch to open automatically on low pump suction pressure.

The SSF is provided with its own 250/125 VDC power system which is independent from the normal 125 VDC and 120 VAC vital I&C power systems. The SSF batteries are charged by

the SSF diesel generator and are available to power the SSF instruments and controls necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions from the SSF control room following a station black out (SBO) event.

While the SSS 24 VDC battery charger is isolated for battery surveillance testing, the SSS Diesel Generator remains operable as long as the battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.

The SSS 125V batteries and battery chargers consist of three pairs SDSP1, SDSP2 and SDSS. Each pair consists of a battery and associated battery charger. Pair SDSS can be used to substitute for either pair SDSP1 or SDSP2. Only two of these pairs are required operable since pair SDSS is spare.

This selected licensee commitment is part of the McGuire Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C.4 (Unit 1) and C.7 (Unit 2).

REFERENCES

1. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Chapter 9.5.1
2. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 2, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix D
3. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 5, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix B
4. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 6, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix C
5. McGuire Fire Protection Review, as revised
6. McGuire Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Review
7. IEEE 308-1974, Class 1E Power Systems
8. IEEE 450-1975, Maintenance Testing & Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries
9. OP/O/B/6350/04, Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Operation
10. McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses, Unit 1 License Condition C.(4) and Unit 2 License Condition C.(7)
11. PIP 0-M-99-03926
12. PIP-M-01-3466
13. 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current
14. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 4, 1990, Requirements for Station Blackout.
15. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 17, 1989, Requirements for Station Blackout.

16. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Safety Evaluation for Station Blackout (10CFR50.63), Dated February 19, 1992.
17. SAIC-91/1265, "Technical Evaluation Report, McGuire Nuclear Station, Station Blackout Evaluation," Dated December 10, 1991.
18. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Section 18.2.4, Chemistry Control Program.
19. MCS-1465.00-00-0019, "Plant Design Basis Specification For Station Blackout Rule," Rev. 3.
20. McGuire License Renewal Commitments MCS-1274.00-00-0016, Section 4.6, Chemistry Control Program.
21. PIP M-04-3317.

June 18, 2007

MEMORANDUM

To: All McGuire Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual Holders

Subject: McGuire SLC Manual Update

Please revise your copy of the manual as follows:

REMOVE

INSERT

List of Effective Sections (Rev 78)

List of Effective Sections (Rev 79)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 72)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 89)

Revisions may skip numbers due to Regulatory Compliance Filing System.

Please call me if you have questions.

Bonnie Beaver

Bonnie Beaver
Regulatory Compliance

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES

SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION

SECTION	REVISION NUMBER	DATE
16.1	REVISION 32	12/2/02
16.2	REVISION 90	3/13/07
16.3	REVISION 48	7/31/03
16.4	Not Issued	
16.5.1	REVISION 82	6/12/06
16.5.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.4	REVISION 55	3/23/04
16.5.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.6	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.7	REVISION 53	1/13/04
16.5.8	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.10	REVISION 38	4/9/03
16.6.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.6.2	DELETED	6/11/03
16.6.3	REVISION 61	04/07/05
16.6.4	REVISION 27	06/12/02
16.7.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.2	REVISION 80	10/1/05
16.7.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.4	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.7.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.6	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.7	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.8	REVISION 77	10/12/05
16.7.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.10	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.11	REVISION 71	05/25/05
16.8.1	REVISION 93	4/30/07
16.8.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.8.3	REVISION 65	12/21/04
16.9.1	REVISION 53	1/13/04
16.9.2	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.3	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.4	REVISION 83	7/12/06
16.9.5	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.6	REVISION 92	4/4/07
16.9.7	REVISION 89	6/15/07
16.9.8	REVISION 76	7/25/05
16.9.9	REVISION 34	2/26/03
16.9.10	REVISION 13	2/26/01
16.9.11	REVISION 22	2/25/02
16.9.12	REVISION 34	2/26/03

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES

SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION

SECTION	REVISION NUMBER	DATE
16.9.13	Not Used - Rev 13	2/26/01
16.9.14	REVISION 22	2/25/02
16.9.15	REVISION 68	2/28/05
16.9.16	REVISION 65	12/21/04
16.9.17	REVISION 86	1/17/07
16.9.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.9.19	REVISION 48	7/31/03
16.9.20	REVISION 8	11/30/00
16.9.21	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.9.22	REVISION 29	7/10/02
16.9.23	REVISION 88	1/17/07
16.9.24	Not Used - Rev 74	6/20/05
16.9.25	REVISION 87	1/17/07
16.10.1	REVISION 56	4/6/04
16.11.1	REVISION 9	2/1/01
16.11.2	REVISION 84	7/19/06
16.11.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.4	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.6	REVISION 59	6/1/04
16.11.7	REVISION 84	7/19/06
16.11.8	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.10	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.11	REVISION 41	8/21/03
16.11.12	REVISION 67	2/28/05
16.11.13	REVISION 91	3/22/07
16.11.14	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.15	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.16	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.17	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.19	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.20	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.13.1	REVISION 51	10/1/03
16.13.2	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
16.13.3	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
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16.14.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99

TESTING REQUIREMENTS

TEST	FREQUENCY
<p>TR 16.9.7.1 Verify total Identified LEAKAGE, Unidentified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff are ≤ 20 gpm.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Verify total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff ≤ 16.3 gpm.</p>	72 hours
<p>TR 16.9.7.2 Verify the requirements for spent fuel water level in Surveillance Requirement 3.7.13.1 are met and the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool is within the limits specified in the COLR.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Verify the refueling water storage tank is capable of being aligned to the SSS standby makeup pump.</p>	7 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.3 Verify fuel oil level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank is ≥ 4.0 ft.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.4 Verify the SSS diesel generator starts from ambient conditions and operates for ≥ 30 minutes at ≥ 700 kW.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.5 Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator are tested in accordance with, and maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.</p>	In accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program
<p>TR 16.9.7.6 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.7 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.8 Verify the electrolyte level of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is above the plates.</p>	31 days

(continued)

TESTING REQUIREMENTS (continued)

TEST	FREQUENCY
TR 16.9.7.9 Verify the total battery terminal voltage of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is $\geq 258/129$ V on float charge.	31 days
TR 16.9.7.10 Verify the average specific gravity of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is ≥ 1.200 .	92 days
TR 16.9.7.11 Verify the standby makeup pump's developed head and capacity is greater than or equal to that required by the Inservice Testing Supplemental Program.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.12 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V batteries and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.13 Verify SSS diesel generator 24 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, and free of corrosion.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.14 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.15 Perform inspection of SSS diesel generator in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with manufacturer's recommendations for class of service.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.16 Verify the SSS 250/125 V batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.17 Verify the SSS 250/125 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti-corrosion material.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.18 Verify the "C" solenoid to valve SA48ABC can be deenergized to provide steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.	18 months

TABLE 16.9.7-1

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS VERIFICATION⁽¹⁾

INOPERABLE SSS COMPONENT	FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS LOCATION								
	EL 716 EE-KK	EL 733 EE-KK	EL 750 EE-KK	Control Room	Battery Room	Cable Rooms	Turbine Driven AFW Pump	Motor Driven AFW Pump	Containment
SSS Diesel Generator ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
SSS DG Starting 24 V Battery Bank and Charger ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
Standby Makeup Pump and Water Supply	X	X	X						
SSS 250/125V Battery and Charger ⁽³⁾				X	X	X			Note 2
Turbine Driven AFW Pump and Water Supply								X	
Turbine Driven AFW Pump Solenoid "C"								X	
Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump A AND Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump B								X	
INSTRUMENTATION:									
1. RCS Pressure				X	X	X			Note 2
2. Pressurizer Level				X	X	X			Note 2
3. SG Level				X	X	X			Note 2
4. Incore Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2
5. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2

- NOTES:**
1. If fire detection and/or suppression systems are inoperable, then the ACTION statement(s) of the applicable fire detection and/or suppression SLC shall be complied with.
 2. Monitor containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations specified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1 or 3.6.5.2, in lieu of verification of operability of systems inside containment
 3. With this component inoperable, then denoted areas of both units are affected.

TABLE 16.9.7-2

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
INSTRUMENTATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	REQUIRED CHANNELS	TESTING REQUIREMENTS	READOUT LOCATION
1. Reactor Coolant Pressure	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
2. Pressurizer Level	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
3. Steam Generator Level (Wide Range)	1 per SG	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
4. Incore Temperature	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
5. Standby Makeup Pump Flow	1	TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
6. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature	1 per 2 Cold Legs	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel

BASES

The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) is designed to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated fire incidents, sabotage, or station blackout events by providing capability to maintain HOT STANDBY conditions and by controlling and monitoring vital systems from locations external to the main control room. The facility is credited with the ability to cope with a station black out (SBO) event of 4 hour duration. This capability is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and 10 CFR 50.63.

By design, the SSS is intended to respond to those low-probability events which render both the control room and automatic safety systems inoperable. Because of the low probability of occurrence of these events, the remedial actions rely on compensatory action, timely repair or return to operability and, if necessary, a justification for continued operation.

Because the SSS performs a redundant fire protection function, compensatory action during periods when the SSS is inoperable relies largely on assurance of the operability of fire detection and suppression systems. Table 16.9.7-1 establishes requirements for operability of fire detection and suppression systems.

Both A&D NC Cold Leg Wide Range Temperatures are required for SSS operability. This conclusion is based on NRC Correspondence during issuance of the original operating license.

The Source Range Wide Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation was installed at the SSS Control Panel as part of NRC review of this system in the early 1980s. The indication is not required for SSS operability, based on the NRCs response to Duke dated July 12, 1983.

Controls and power to the pressurizer heater banks are included for SSF events; however, they are not required for SSS operability. NRC Generic Letter 86-10 provides that conclusion.

The Testing Requirements ensure that the SSS systems and components are capable of performing their intended functions. The testing requirements were based largely on SSS Technical Specifications for the Catawba Nuclear Station, which was approved prior to the issuance of the fuel load license for Unit 1 of that plant. Also considered in the formulation of the testing requirements were existing McGuire Technical Specifications, such as those for the 1E Diesel Generators, Refueling Water Storage Tank, Fire Protection & Detection Systems, and other Tech Specs which are related to the safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant.

The required level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank ensures sufficient fuel for 3 ½ days of uninterrupted operation. Per Appendix R requirements, the unit must be in cold shutdown within 72 hours of going to the SSF. The 3 ½ day supply of fuel oil assures this capability.

Testing has demonstrated the ability of plant operations to start the SSF diesel within 10 minutes of the recognition of an SBO event, thus satisfying the intent of NUMARC 87-00 guidance. The SSF diesel generator has sufficient capacity and capability to operate equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for a 4-hour SBO event.

BASES (continued)

Fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator is tested and maintained in accordance with the same Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program used for the 4kV emergency diesel generators (see Technical Specification 5.5.13, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.3.2 and associated Bases).

Although the Standby Makeup Pump is not nuclear safety-related and was not designed according to ASME code requirements, it is tested quarterly to ensure its OPERABILITY. The Standby Makeup Pump (SMP) functions as part of the SSF to provide makeup capacity to the reactor coolant system and cooling flow to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals. The RCP seal leak-off flow is temperature dependent (i.e., the higher the temperature the higher the leak-off flow). During normal operation the RCP seals are supplied from the Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) drawing from the Volume Control Tank (VCT). During the SSF event, the SMP draws from the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). During the SSF event there is no SFP cooling, so water injected into the RCP seals will have a higher temperature than during normal operation. The SMP is capable of providing a makeup capacity of 26 gpm. The revised SLC limit of 20 gpm total accumulative leakage is based on a calculation that was performed by Westinghouse, indicating increased RCP seal leak-off at higher seal water temperatures, to relate the SSF event leakage of 26 gpm at elevated RCP seal temperatures. This more conservative limit will ensure that the SMP will be capable of providing makeup and seal cooling flow equal to or greater than total leakage during the SSF event, increased RCP seal leak-off flow due to heat-up of the SFP, and still provide a margin of safety. As a conservative measure, during normal power operation the total accumulative system leakage (unidentified + identified + RCP seal leak-off flows) shall be limited to 20 gpm. The Testing Requirement concerning the SMP water supply ensures that an adequate water volume is available to supply the pump continuously for 72 hours.

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While the SSS 24 VDC battery charger is isolated for battery surveillance testing, the SSS Diesel Generator remains operable as long as the battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.

The SSS 125V batteries and battery chargers consist of three pairs SDSP1, SDSP2 and SDSS. Each pair consists of a battery and associated battery charger. Pair SDSS can be used to substitute for either pair SDSP1 or SDSP2. Only two of these pairs are required operable since pair SDSS is spare.

This selected licensee commitment is part of the McGuire Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C.4 (Unit 1) and C.7 (Unit 2).

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10. McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses, Unit 1 License Condition C.(4) and Unit 2 License Condition C.(7)
11. PIP 0-M-99-03926
12. PIP-M-01-3466
13. 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current
14. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 4, 1990, Requirements for Station Blackout.
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15. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 17, 1989, Requirements for Station Blackout.

16. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Safety Evaluation for Station Blackout (10CFR50.63), Dated February 19, 1992.
17. SAIC-91/1265, "Technical Evaluation Report, McGuire Nuclear Station, Station Blackout Evaluation," Dated December 10, 1991.
18. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Section 18.2.4, Chemistry Control Program.
19. MCS-1465.00-00-0019, "Plant Design Basis Specification For Station Blackout Rule," Rev. 3.
20. McGuire License Renewal Commitments MCS-1274.00-00-0016, Section 4.6, Chemistry Control Program.
21. PIP M-04-3317.

June 18, 2007

MEMORANDUM

To: All McGuire Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual Holders

Subject: McGuire SLC Manual Update

Please revise your copy of the manual as follows:

REMOVE

INSERT

List of Effective Sections (Rev 78)

List of Effective Sections (Rev 79)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 72)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 89)

Revisions may skip numbers due to Regulatory Compliance Filing System.

Please call me if you have questions.

Bonnie Beaver

Bonnie Beaver
Regulatory Compliance

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES

SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION

SECTION	REVISION NUMBER	DATE
16.1	REVISION 32	12/2/02
16.2	REVISION 90	3/13/07
16.3	REVISION 48	7/31/03
16.4	Not Issued	
16.5.1	REVISION 82	6/12/06
16.5.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.4	REVISION 55	3/23/04
16.5.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.6	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.7	REVISION 53	1/13/04
16.5.8	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.10	REVISION 38	4/9/03
16.6.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.6.2	DELETED	6/11/03
16.6.3	REVISION 61	04/07/05
16.6.4	REVISION 27	06/12/02
16.7.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.2	REVISION 80	10/1/05
16.7.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.4	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.7.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.6	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.7	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.8	REVISION 77	10/12/05
16.7.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.10	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.11	REVISION 71	05/25/05
16.8.1	REVISION 93	4/30/07
16.8.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.8.3	REVISION 65	12/21/04
16.9.1	REVISION 53	1/13/04
16.9.2	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.3	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.4	REVISION 83	7/12/06
16.9.5	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.6	REVISION 92	4/4/07
16.9.7	REVISION 89	6/15/07
16.9.8	REVISION 76	7/25/05
16.9.9	REVISION 34	2/26/03
16.9.10	REVISION 13	2/26/01
16.9.11	REVISION 22	2/25/02
16.9.12	REVISION 34	2/26/03

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

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SECTION	REVISION NUMBER	DATE
16.9.13	Not Used - Rev 13	2/26/01
16.9.14	REVISION 22	2/25/02
16.9.15	REVISION 68	2/28/05
16.9.16	REVISION 65	12/21/04
16.9.17	REVISION 86	1/17/07
16.9.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.9.19	REVISION 48	7/31/03
16.9.20	REVISION 8	11/30/00
16.9.21	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.9.22	REVISION 29	7/10/02
16.9.23	REVISION 88	1/17/07
16.9.24	Not Used - Rev 74	6/20/05
16.9.25	REVISION 87	1/17/07
16.10.1	REVISION 56	4/6/04
16.11.1	REVISION 9	2/1/01
16.11.2	REVISION 84	7/19/06
16.11.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.4	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.6	REVISION 59	6/1/04
16.11.7	REVISION 84	7/19/06
16.11.8	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.10	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.11	REVISION 41	8/21/03
16.11.12	REVISION 67	2/28/05
16.11.13	REVISION 91	3/22/07
16.11.14	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.15	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.16	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.17	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.19	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.20	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.13.1	REVISION 51	10/1/03
16.13.2	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
16.13.3	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
16.13.4	REVISION 58	5/11/04
16.14.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99

REMEDIAL ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>B. (continued).</p>	<p>B.2 Verify offsite power and one emergency diesel generator OPERABLE.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.3 Restore the component to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>1 hour</p> <p>7 days</p>
<p>C. Total Unidentified LEAKAGE, Identified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 20 gpm.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 16.3 gpm.</p>	<p>C.1 Declare the Standby Makeup Pump inoperable.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>C.2 Enter Condition A.</p>	<p>Immediately</p>
<p>D. Required Action A.2 and its associated Completion Time not met.</p>	<p>D.1 Prepare and submit a Special Report to the NRC outlining the cause of the inoperability, corrective actions taken, and plans for restoring the SSS to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>30 days</p>
<p>E. Required Action B.3 and its associated Completion Time not met.</p>	<p>E.1 Prepare and submit a Special Report to the NRC outlining the extent of repairs required, schedule for completing repairs, and basis for continued operation.</p>	<p>14 days</p>

TESTING REQUIREMENTS

TEST	FREQUENCY
<p>TR 16.9.7.1 Verify total Identified LEAKAGE, Unidentified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff are ≤ 20 gpm.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Verify total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff ≤ 16.3 gpm.</p>	72 hours
<p>TR 16.9.7.2 Verify the requirements for spent fuel water level in Surveillance Requirement 3.7.13.1 are met and the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool is within the limits specified in the COLR.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Verify the refueling water storage tank is capable of being aligned to the SSS standby makeup pump.</p>	7 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.3 Verify fuel oil level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank is ≥ 4.0 ft.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.4 Verify the SSS diesel generator starts from ambient conditions and operates for ≥ 30 minutes at ≥ 700 kW.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.5 Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator are tested in accordance with, and maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.</p>	In accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program
<p>TR 16.9.7.6 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.7 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.8 Verify the electrolyte level of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is above the plates.</p>	31 days

(continued)

TESTING REQUIREMENTS (continued)

TEST	FREQUENCY
TR 16.9.7.9 Verify the total battery terminal voltage of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is $\geq 258/129$ V on float charge.	31 days
TR 16.9.7.10 Verify the average specific gravity of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is ≥ 1.200 .	92 days
TR 16.9.7.11 Verify the standby makeup pump's developed head and capacity is greater than or equal to that required by the Inservice Testing Supplemental Program.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.12 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V batteries and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.13 Verify SSS diesel generator 24 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, and free of corrosion.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.14 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.15 Perform inspection of SSS diesel generator in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with manufacturer's recommendations for class of service.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.16 Verify the SSS 250/125 V batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.17 Verify the SSS 250/125 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti-corrosion material.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.18 Verify the "C" solenoid to valve SA48ABC can be deenergized to provide steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.	18 months

TABLE 16.9.7-1

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS VERIFICATION⁽¹⁾

INOPERABLE SSS COMPONENT	FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS LOCATION								
	EL 716 EE-KK	EL 733 EE-KK	EL 750 EE-KK	Control Room	Battery Room	Cable Rooms	Turbine Driven AFW Pump	Motor Driven AFW Pump	Containment
SSS Diesel Generator ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
SSS DG Starting 24 V Battery Bank and Charger ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
Standby Makeup Pump and Water Supply	X	X	X						
SSS 250/125V Battery and Charger ⁽³⁾				X	X	X			Note 2
Turbine Driven AFW Pump and Water Supply								X	
Turbine Driven AFW Pump Solenoid "C"								X	
Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump A AND Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump B								X	
INSTRUMENTATION:									
1. RCS Pressure				X	X	X			Note 2
2. Pressurizer Level				X	X	X			Note 2
3. SG Level				X	X	X			Note 2
4. Incore Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2
5. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2

- NOTES:**
1. If fire detection and/or suppression systems are inoperable, then the ACTION statement(s) of the applicable fire detection and/or suppression SLC shall be complied with.
 2. Monitor containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations specified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1 or 3.6.5.2, in lieu of verification of operability of systems inside containment
 3. With this component inoperable, then denoted areas of both units are affected.

TABLE 16.9.7-2

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
INSTRUMENTATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	REQUIRED CHANNELS	TESTING REQUIREMENTS	READOUT LOCATION
1. Reactor Coolant Pressure	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
2. Pressurizer Level	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
3. Steam Generator Level (Wide Range)	1 per SG	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
4. Incore Temperature	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
5. Standby Makeup Pump Flow	1	TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
6. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature	1 per 2 Cold Legs	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel

BASES

The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) is designed to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated fire incidents, sabotage, or station blackout events by providing capability to maintain HOT STANDBY conditions and by controlling and monitoring vital systems from locations external to the main control room. The facility is credited with the ability to cope with a station black out (SBO) event of 4 hour duration. This capability is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and 10 CFR 50.63.

By design, the SSS is intended to respond to those low-probability events which render both the control room and automatic safety systems inoperable. Because of the low probability of occurrence of these events, the remedial actions rely on compensatory action, timely repair or return to operability and, if necessary, a justification for continued operation.

Because the SSS performs a redundant fire protection function, compensatory action during periods when the SSS is inoperable relies largely on assurance of the operability of fire detection and suppression systems. Table 16.9.7-1 establishes requirements for operability of fire detection and suppression systems.

Both A&D NC Cold Leg Wide Range Temperatures are required for SSS operability. This conclusion is based on NRC Correspondence during issuance of the original operating license.

The Source Range Wide Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation was installed at the SSS Control Panel as part of NRC review of this system in the early 1980s. The indication is not required for SSS operability, based on the NRCs response to Duke dated July 12, 1983.

Controls and power to the pressurizer heater banks are included for SSF events; however, they are not required for SSS operability. NRC Generic Letter 86-10 provides that conclusion.

The Testing Requirements ensure that the SSS systems and components are capable of performing their intended functions. The testing requirements were based largely on SSS Technical Specifications for the Catawba Nuclear Station, which was approved prior to the issuance of the fuel load license for Unit 1 of that plant. Also considered in the formulation of the testing requirements were existing McGuire Technical Specifications, such as those for the 1E Diesel Generators, Refueling Water Storage Tank, Fire Protection & Detection Systems, and other Tech Specs which are related to the safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant.

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While the SSS 24 VDC battery charger is isolated for battery surveillance testing, the SSS Diesel Generator remains operable as long as the battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.

The SSS 125V batteries and battery chargers consist of three pairs SDSP1, SDSP2 and SDSS. Each pair consists of a battery and associated battery charger. Pair SDSS can be used to substitute for either pair SDSP1 or SDSP2. Only two of these pairs are required operable since pair SDSS is spare.

This selected licensee commitment is part of the McGuire Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C.4 (Unit 1) and C.7 (Unit 2).

REFERENCES

1. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Chapter 9.5.1
2. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 2, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix D
3. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 5, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix B
4. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 6, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix C
5. McGuire Fire Protection Review, as revised
6. McGuire Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Review
7. IEEE 308-1974, Class 1E Power Systems
8. IEEE 450-1975, Maintenance Testing & Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries
9. OP/O/B/6350/04, Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Operation
10. McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses, Unit 1 License Condition C.(4) and Unit 2 License Condition C.(7)
11. PIP 0-M-99-03926
12. PIP-M-01-3466
13. 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current
14. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 4, 1990, Requirements for Station Blackout.
15. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 17, 1989, Requirements for Station Blackout.

16. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Safety Evaluation for Station Blackout (10CFR50.63), Dated February 19, 1992.
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20. McGuire License Renewal Commitments MCS-1274.00-00-0016, Section 4.6, Chemistry Control Program.
21. PIP M-04-3317.

June 18, 2007

MEMORANDUM

To: All McGuire Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual Holders

Subject: McGuire SLC Manual Update

Please revise your copy of the manual as follows:

REMOVE

INSERT

List of Effective Sections (Rev 78)

List of Effective Sections (Rev 79)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 72)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 89)

Revisions may skip numbers due to Regulatory Compliance Filing System.

Please call me if you have questions.

Bonnie Beaver

Bonnie Beaver
Regulatory Compliance

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES

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16.1	REVISION 32	12/2/02
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16.9.17	REVISION 86	1/17/07
16.9.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.9.19	REVISION 48	7/31/03
16.9.20	REVISION 8	11/30/00
16.9.21	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.9.22	REVISION 29	7/10/02
16.9.23	REVISION 88	1/17/07
16.9.24	Not Used – Rev 74	6/20/05
16.9.25	REVISION 87	1/17/07
16.10.1	REVISION 56	4/6/04
16.11.1	REVISION 9	2/1/01
16.11.2	REVISION 84	7/19/06
16.11.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.4	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.6	REVISION 59	6/1/04
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16.11.10	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.11	REVISION 41	8/21/03
16.11.12	REVISION 67	2/28/05
16.11.13	REVISION 91	3/22/07
16.11.14	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.15	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.16	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.17	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.19	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.20	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.13.1	REVISION 51	10/1/03
16.13.2	Not Used – Rev 75	8/05
16.13.3	Not Used – Rev 75	8/05
16.13.4	REVISION 58	5/11/04
16.14.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99

16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS - FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

16.9.7 Standby Shutdown System

COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be operable.

APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, and 3.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----

1. The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of the discovery.
2. If inoperable SSS component is located inside containment, repairs shall be made at the first outage which permits containment access.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>-----NOTE----- Not applicable to the SSS Diesel Generator or 24 V Battery Bank and Charger. -----</p>	<p>A.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in Table16.9.7-1.</p>	<p>1 hour</p>
<p>A. One or more required SSS components identified in Table 16.9.7-1 inoperable.</p>	<p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2 Restore the component to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>7 days</p>
<p>B. SSS Diesel Generator or 24 V Battery Bank and Charger inoperable.</p>	<p>B.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in Table16.9.7-1.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p>	<p>1 hour</p> <p>(continued)</p>

REMEDIAL ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>B. (continued).</p>	<p>B.2 Verify offsite power and one emergency diesel generator OPERABLE.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.3 Restore the component to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>1 hour</p> <p>7 days</p>
<p>C. Total Unidentified LEAKAGE, Identified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 20 gpm.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 16.3 gpm.</p>	<p>C.1 Declare the Standby Makeup Pump inoperable.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>C.2 Enter Condition A.</p>	<p>Immediately</p>
<p>D. Required Action A.2 and its associated Completion Time not met.</p>	<p>D.1 Prepare and submit a Special Report to the NRC outlining the cause of the inoperability, corrective actions taken, and plans for restoring the SSS to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>30 days</p>
<p>E. Required Action B.3 and its associated Completion Time not met.</p>	<p>E.1 Prepare and submit a Special Report to the NRC outlining the extent of repairs required, schedule for completing repairs, and basis for continued operation.</p>	<p>14 days</p>

TESTING REQUIREMENTS

TEST	FREQUENCY
<p>TR 16.9.7.1 Verify total Identified LEAKAGE, Unidentified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff are ≤ 20 gpm.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Verify total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff ≤ 16.3 gpm.</p>	72 hours
<p>TR 16.9.7.2 Verify the requirements for spent fuel water level in Surveillance Requirement 3.7.13.1 are met and the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool is within the limits specified in the COLR.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Verify the refueling water storage tank is capable of being aligned to the SSS standby makeup pump.</p>	7 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.3 Verify fuel oil level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank is ≥ 4.0 ft.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.4 Verify the SSS diesel generator starts from ambient conditions and operates for ≥ 30 minutes at ≥ 700 kW.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.5 Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator are tested in accordance with, and maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.</p>	In accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program
<p>TR 16.9.7.6 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.7 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.8 Verify the electrolyte level of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is above the plates.</p>	31 days

(continued)

TESTING REQUIREMENTS (continued)

TEST	FREQUENCY
TR 16.9.7.9 Verify the total battery terminal voltage of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is \geq 258/129 V on float charge.	31 days
TR 16.9.7.10 Verify the average specific gravity of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is \geq 1.200.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.11 Verify the standby makeup pump's developed head and capacity is greater than or equal to that required by the Inservice Testing Supplemental Program.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.12 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V batteries and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.13 Verify SSS diesel generator 24 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, and free of corrosion.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.14 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.15 Perform inspection of SSS diesel generator in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with manufacturer's recommendations for class of service.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.16 Verify the SSS 250/125 V batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.17 Verify the SSS 250/125 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti-corrosion material.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.18 Verify the "C" solenoid to valve SA48ABC can be deenergized to provide steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.	18 months

TABLE 16.9.7-1

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS VERIFICATION⁽¹⁾

INOPERABLE SSS COMPONENT	FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS LOCATION								
	EL 716 EE-KK	EL 733 EE-KK	EL 750 EE-KK	Control Room	Battery Room	Cable Rooms	Turbine Driven AFW Pump	Motor Driven AFW Pump	Containment
SSS Diesel Generator ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
SSS DG Starting 24 V Battery Bank and Charger ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
Standby Makeup Pump and Water Supply	X	X	X						
SSS 250/125V Battery and Charger ⁽³⁾				X	X	X			Note 2
Turbine Driven AFW Pump and Water Supply								X	
Turbine Driven AFW Pump Solenoid "C"								X	
Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump A AND Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump B								X	
INSTRUMENTATION:									
1. RCS Pressure				X	X	X			Note 2
2. Pressurizer Level				X	X	X			Note 2
3. SG Level				X	X	X			Note 2
4. Incore Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2
5. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2

NOTES:

1. If fire detection and/or suppression systems are inoperable, then the ACTION statement(s) of the applicable fire detection and/or suppression SLC shall be complied with.
2. Monitor containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations specified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1 or 3.6.5.2, in lieu of verification of operability of systems inside containment
3. With this component inoperable, then denoted areas of both units are affected.

TABLE 16.9.7-2

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
INSTRUMENTATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	REQUIRED CHANNELS	TESTING REQUIREMENTS	READOUT LOCATION
1. Reactor Coolant Pressure	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
2. Pressurizer Level	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
3. Steam Generator Level (Wide Range)	1 per SG	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
4. Incore Temperature	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
5. Standby Makeup Pump Flow	1	TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
6. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature	1 per 2 Cold Legs	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel

BASES

The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) is designed to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated fire incidents, sabotage, or station blackout events by providing capability to maintain HOT STANDBY conditions and by controlling and monitoring vital systems from locations external to the main control room. The facility is credited with the ability to cope with a station black out (SBO) event of 4 hour duration. This capability is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and 10 CFR 50.63.

By design, the SSS is intended to respond to those low-probability events which render both the control room and automatic safety systems inoperable. Because of the low probability of occurrence of these events, the remedial actions rely on compensatory action, timely repair or return to operability and, if necessary, a justification for continued operation.

Because the SSS performs a redundant fire protection function, compensatory action during periods when the SSS is inoperable relies largely on assurance of the operability of fire detection and suppression systems. Table 16.9.7-1 establishes requirements for operability of fire detection and suppression systems.

Both A&D NC Cold Leg Wide Range Temperatures are required for SSS operability. This conclusion is based on NRC Correspondence during issuance of the original operating license.

The Source Range Wide Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation was installed at the SSS Control Panel as part of NRC review of this system in the early 1980s. The indication is not required for SSS operability, based on the NRC's response to Duke dated July 12, 1983.

Controls and power to the pressurizer heater banks are included for SSF events; however, they are not required for SSS operability. NRC Generic Letter 86-10 provides that conclusion.

The Testing Requirements ensure that the SSS systems and components are capable of performing their intended functions. The testing requirements were based largely on SSS Technical Specifications for the Catawba Nuclear Station, which was approved prior to the issuance of the fuel load license for Unit 1 of that plant. Also considered in the formulation of the testing requirements were existing McGuire Technical Specifications, such as those for the 1E Diesel Generators, Refueling Water Storage Tank, Fire Protection & Detection Systems, and other Tech Specs which are related to the safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant.

The required level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank ensures sufficient fuel for 3 ½ days of uninterrupted operation. Per Appendix R requirements, the unit must be in cold shutdown within 72 hours of going to the SSF. The 3 ½ day supply of fuel oil assures this capability.

Testing has demonstrated the ability of plant operations to start the SSF diesel within 10 minutes of the recognition of an SBO event, thus satisfying the intent of NUMARC 87-00 guidance. The SSF diesel generator has sufficient capacity and capability to operate equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for a 4-hour SBO event.

BASES (continued)

Fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator is tested and maintained in accordance with the same Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program used for the 4kV emergency diesel generators (see Technical Specification 5.5.13, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.3.2 and associated Bases).

Although the Standby Makeup Pump is not nuclear safety-related and was not designed according to ASME code requirements, it is tested quarterly to ensure its OPERABILITY. The Standby Makeup Pump (SMP) functions as part of the SSF to provide makeup capacity to the reactor coolant system and cooling flow to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals. The RCP seal leak-off flow is temperature dependent (i.e., the higher the temperature the higher the leak-off flow). During normal operation the RCP seals are supplied from the Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) drawing from the Volume Control Tank (VCT). During the SSF event, the SMP draws from the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). During the SSF event there is no SFP cooling, so water injected into the RCP seals will have a higher temperature than during normal operation. The SMP is capable of providing a makeup capacity of 26 gpm. The revised SLC limit of 20 gpm total accumulative leakage is based on a calculation that was performed by Westinghouse, indicating increased RCP seal leak-off at higher seal water temperatures, to relate the SSF event leakage of 26 gpm at elevated RCP seal temperatures. This more conservative limit will ensure that the SMP will be capable of providing makeup and seal cooling flow equal to or greater than total leakage during the SSF event, increased RCP seal leak-off flow due to heat-up of the SFP, and still provide a margin of safety. As a conservative measure, during normal power operation the total accumulative system leakage (unidentified + identified + RCP seal leak-off flows) shall be limited to 20 gpm. The Testing Requirement concerning the SMP water supply ensures that an adequate water volume is available to supply the pump continuously for 72 hours.

The additional requirement that total RCP seal leak-off flow be ≤ 16.3 gpm resulted from a historical review of NRC correspondence that specified the SMP also provide for reactor coolant system makeup and boration in addition to RCP seal leakage requirements (Ref. 17). Calculations show that this upper limit for RCP seal leak-off provides sufficient margin to maintain the required unit conditions for a bounding SSS event.

The Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, in the A (Unit 1) and B (Unit 2) sumps, can be controlled and powered from the SSF. These Sump Pumps remove accumulation of groundwater, Turbine driven AFW Pump drains, and other miscellaneous sources. For the SSS to be OPERABLE, a minimum of one of these pumps must be OPERABLE. Credit is taken for the groundwater underdrain system to transport water from one sump to the other.

The turbine driven AFW pump can be controlled from the SSF and is utilized during an SSS event to maintain adequate secondary side heat removal. For the SSS to be OPERABLE, the turbine driven AFW pump must be OPERABLE. The SSF has the ability to align the Condenser Circulating Water (RC) System to maintain hot standby conditions for approximately 72 hours. This makeup water source is isolated from the Auxiliary Feedwater pump suction by two dc power-operated valves (CA161C and CA162C). The procedure, that transfers control to the SSS, directs the operators to open these valves and disable the power supply to prevent spurious closure during the fire event. In addition, these valves also have a pressure switch to open automatically on low pump suction pressure.

The SSF is provided with its own 250/125 VDC power system which is independent from the normal 125 VDC and 120 VAC vital I&C power systems. The SSF batteries are charged by

the SSF diesel generator and are available to power the SSF instruments and controls necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions from the SSF control room following a station black out (SBO) event.

While the SSS 24 VDC battery charger is isolated for battery surveillance testing, the SSS Diesel Generator remains operable as long as the battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.

The SSS 125V batteries and battery chargers consist of three pairs SDSP1, SDSP2 and SDSS. Each pair consists of a battery and associated battery charger. Pair SDSS can be used to substitute for either pair SDSP1 or SDSP2. Only two of these pairs are required operable since pair SDSS is spare.

This selected licensee commitment is part of the McGuire Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C.4 (Unit 1) and C.7 (Unit 2).

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June 18, 2007

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16.9.16	REVISION 65	12/21/04
16.9.17	REVISION 86	1/17/07
16.9.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.9.19	REVISION 48	7/31/03
16.9.20	REVISION 8	11/30/00
16.9.21	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.9.22	REVISION 29	7/10/02
16.9.23	REVISION 88	1/17/07
16.9.24	Not Used – Rev 74	6/20/05
16.9.25	REVISION 87	1/17/07
16.10.1	REVISION 56	4/6/04
16.11.1	REVISION 9	2/1/01
16.11.2	REVISION 84	7/19/06
16.11.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.4	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.6	REVISION 59	6/1/04
16.11.7	REVISION 84	7/19/06
16.11.8	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.10	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.11	REVISION 41	8/21/03
16.11.12	REVISION 67	2/28/05
16.11.13	REVISION 91	3/22/07
16.11.14	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.15	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.16	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.17	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.19	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.20	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.13.1	REVISION 51	10/1/03
16.13.2	Not Used – Rev 75	8/05
16.13.3	Not Used – Rev 75	8/05
16.13.4	REVISION 58	5/11/04
16.14.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99

TESTING REQUIREMENTS

TEST	FREQUENCY
<p>TR 16.9.7.1 Verify total Identified LEAKAGE, Unidentified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff are ≤ 20 gpm.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Verify total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff ≤ 16.3 gpm.</p>	72 hours
<p>TR 16.9.7.2 Verify the requirements for spent fuel water level in Surveillance Requirement 3.7.13.1 are met and the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool is within the limits specified in the COLR.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Verify the refueling water storage tank is capable of being aligned to the SSS standby makeup pump.</p>	7 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.3 Verify fuel oil level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank is ≥ 4.0 ft.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.4 Verify the SSS diesel generator starts from ambient conditions and operates for ≥ 30 minutes at ≥ 700 kW.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.5 Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator are tested in accordance with, and maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.</p>	In accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program
<p>TR 16.9.7.6 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.7 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.8 Verify the electrolyte level of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is above the plates.</p>	31 days

(continued)

TESTING REQUIREMENTS (continued)

TEST	FREQUENCY
TR 16.9.7.9 Verify the total battery terminal voltage of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is \geq 258/129 V on float charge.	31 days
TR 16.9.7.10 Verify the average specific gravity of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is \geq 1.200.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.11 Verify the standby makeup pump's developed head and capacity is greater than or equal to that required by the Inservice Testing Supplemental Program.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.12 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V batteries and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.13 Verify SSS diesel generator 24 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, and free of corrosion.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.14 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.15 Perform inspection of SSS diesel generator in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with manufacturer's recommendations for class of service.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.16 Verify the SSS 250/125 V batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.17 Verify the SSS 250/125 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti-corrosion material.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.18 Verify the "C" solenoid to valve SA48ABC can be deenergized to provide steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.	18 months

TABLE 16.9.7-1

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS VERIFICATION⁽¹⁾

INOPERABLE SSS COMPONENT	FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS LOCATION								
	EL 716 EE-KK	EL 733 EE-KK	EL 750 EE-KK	Control Room	Battery Room	Cable Rooms	Turbine Driven AFW Pump	Motor Driven AFW Pump	Containment
SSS Diesel Generator ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
SSS DG Starting 24 V Battery Bank and Charger ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
Standby Makeup Pump and Water Supply	X	X	X						
SSS 250/125V Battery and Charger ⁽³⁾				X	X	X			Note 2
Turbine Driven AFW Pump and Water Supply								X	
Turbine Driven AFW Pump Solenoid "C"								X	
Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump A AND Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump B								X	
INSTRUMENTATION:									
1. RCS Pressure				X	X	X			Note 2
2. Pressurizer Level				X	X	X			Note 2
3. SG Level				X	X	X			Note 2
4. Incore Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2
5. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2

NOTES:

1. If fire detection and/or suppression systems are inoperable, then the ACTION statement(s) of the applicable fire detection and/or suppression SLC shall be complied with.
2. Monitor containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations specified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1 or 3.6.5.2, in lieu of verification of operability of systems inside containment.
3. With this component inoperable, then denoted areas of both units are affected.

TABLE 16.9.7-2

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
INSTRUMENTATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	REQUIRED CHANNELS	TESTING REQUIREMENTS	READOUT LOCATION
1. Reactor Coolant Pressure	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
2. Pressurizer Level	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
3. Steam Generator Level (Wide Range)	1 per SG	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
4. Incore Temperature	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
5. Standby Makeup Pump Flow	1	TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
6. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature	1 per 2 Cold Legs	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel

BASES

The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) is designed to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated fire incidents, sabotage, or station blackout events by providing capability to maintain HOT STANDBY conditions and by controlling and monitoring vital systems from locations external to the main control room. The facility is credited with the ability to cope with a station black out (SBO) event of 4 hour duration. This capability is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and 10 CFR 50.63.

By design, the SSS is intended to respond to those low-probability events which render both the control room and automatic safety systems inoperable. Because of the low probability of occurrence of these events, the remedial actions rely on compensatory action, timely repair or return to operability and, if necessary, a justification for continued operation.

Because the SSS performs a redundant fire protection function, compensatory action during periods when the SSS is inoperable relies largely on assurance of the operability of fire detection and suppression systems. Table 16.9.7-1 establishes requirements for operability of fire detection and suppression systems.

Both A&D NC Cold Leg Wide Range Temperatures are required for SSS operability. This conclusion is based on NRC Correspondence during issuance of the original operating license.

The Source Range Wide Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation was installed at the SSS Control Panel as part of NRC review of this system in the early 1980s. The indication is not required for SSS operability, based on the NRCs response to Duke dated July 12, 1983.

Controls and power to the pressurizer heater banks are included for SSF events; however, they are not required for SSS operability. NRC Generic Letter 86-10 provides that conclusion.

The Testing Requirements ensure that the SSS systems and components are capable of performing their intended functions. The testing requirements were based largely on SSS Technical Specifications for the Catawba Nuclear Station, which was approved prior to the issuance of the fuel load license for Unit 1 of that plant. Also considered in the formulation of the testing requirements were existing McGuire Technical Specifications, such as those for the 1E Diesel Generators, Refueling Water Storage Tank, Fire Protection & Detection Systems, and other Tech Specs which are related to the safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant.

The required level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank ensures sufficient fuel for 3 ½ days of uninterrupted operation. Per Appendix R requirements, the unit must be in cold shutdown within 72 hours of going to the SSF. The 3 ½ day supply of fuel oil assures this capability.

Testing has demonstrated the ability of plant operations to start the SSF diesel within 10 minutes of the recognition of an SBO event, thus satisfying the intent of NUMARC 87-00 guidance. The SSF diesel generator has sufficient capacity and capability to operate equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for a 4-hour SBO event.

BASES (continued)

Fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator is tested and maintained in accordance with the same Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program used for the 4kV emergency diesel generators (see Technical Specification 5.5.13, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.3.2 and associated Bases).

Although the Standby Makeup Pump is not nuclear safety-related and was not designed according to ASME code requirements, it is tested quarterly to ensure its OPERABILITY. The Standby Makeup Pump (SMP) functions as part of the SSF to provide makeup capacity to the reactor coolant system and cooling flow to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals. The RCP seal leak-off flow is temperature dependent (i.e., the higher the temperature the higher the leak-off flow). During normal operation the RCP seals are supplied from the Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) drawing from the Volume Control Tank (VCT). During the SSF event, the SMP draws from the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). During the SSF event there is no SFP cooling, so water injected into the RCP seals will have a higher temperature than during normal operation. The SMP is capable of providing a makeup capacity of 26 gpm. The revised SLC limit of 20 gpm total accumulative leakage is based on a calculation that was performed by Westinghouse, indicating increased RCP seal leak-off at higher seal water temperatures, to relate the SSF event leakage of 26 gpm at elevated RCP seal temperatures. This more conservative limit will ensure that the SMP will be capable of providing makeup and seal cooling flow equal to or greater than total leakage during the SSF event, increased RCP seal leak-off flow due to heat-up of the SFP, and still provide a margin of safety. As a conservative measure, during normal power operation the total accumulative system leakage (unidentified + identified + RCP seal leak-off flows) shall be limited to 20 gpm. The Testing Requirement concerning the SMP water supply ensures that an adequate water volume is available to supply the pump continuously for 72 hours.

The additional requirement that total RCP seal leak-off flow be ≤ 16.3 gpm resulted from a historical review of NRC correspondence that specified the SMP also provide for reactor coolant system makeup and boration in addition to RCP seal leakage requirements (Ref. 17). Calculations show that this upper limit for RCP seal leak-off provides sufficient margin to maintain the required unit conditions for a bounding SSS event.

The Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, in the A (Unit 1) and B (Unit 2) sumps, can be controlled and powered from the SSF. These Sump Pumps remove accumulation of groundwater, Turbine driven AFW Pump drains, and other miscellaneous sources. For the SSS to be OPERABLE, a minimum of one of these pumps must be OPERABLE. Credit is taken for the groundwater underdrain system to transport water from one sump to the other.

The turbine driven AFW pump can be controlled from the SSF and is utilized during an SSS event to maintain adequate secondary side heat removal. For the SSS to be OPERABLE, the turbine-driven AFW pump must be OPERABLE. The SSF has the ability to align the Condenser Circulating Water (RC) System to maintain hot standby conditions for approximately 72 hours. This makeup water source is isolated from the Auxiliary Feedwater pump suction by two dc power-operated valves (CA161C and CA162C). The procedure, that transfers control to the SSS, directs the operators to open these valves and disable the power supply to prevent spurious closure during the fire event. In addition, these valves also have a pressure switch to open automatically on low pump suction pressure.

The SSF is provided with its own 250/125 VDC power system which is independent from the normal 125 VDC and 120 VAC vital I&C power systems. The SSF batteries are charged by

the SSF diesel generator and are available to power the SSF instruments and controls necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions from the SSF control room following a station black out (SBO) event.

While the SSS 24 VDC battery charger is isolated for battery surveillance testing, the SSS Diesel Generator remains operable as long as the battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.

The SSS 125V batteries and battery chargers consist of three pairs SDSP1, SDSP2 and SDSS. Each pair consists of a battery and associated battery charger. Pair SDSS can be used to substitute for either pair SDSP1 or SDSP2. Only two of these pairs are required operable since pair SDSS is spare.

This selected licensee commitment is part of the McGuire Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C.4 (Unit 1) and C.7 (Unit 2).

REFERENCES

1. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Chapter 9.5.1
2. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 2, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix D
3. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 5, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix B
4. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 6, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix C
5. McGuire Fire Protection Review, as revised
6. McGuire Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Review
7. IEEE 308-1974, Class 1E Power Systems
8. IEEE 450-1975, Maintenance Testing & Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries
9. OP/O/B/6350/04, Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Operation
10. McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses, Unit 1 License Condition C.(4) and Unit 2 License Condition C.(7)
11. PIP 0-M-99-03926
12. PIP-M-01-3466
13. 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current
14. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 4, 1990, Requirements for Station Blackout.
15. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 17, 1989, Requirements for Station Blackout.

16. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Safety Evaluation for Station Blackout (10CFR50.63), Dated February 19, 1992.
17. SAIC-91/1265, "Technical Evaluation Report, McGuire Nuclear Station, Station Blackout Evaluation," Dated December 10, 1991.
18. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Section 18.2.4, Chemistry Control Program.
19. MCS-1465.00-00-0019, "Plant Design Basis Specification For Station Blackout Rule," Rev. 3.
20. McGuire License Renewal Commitments MCS-1274.00-00-0016, Section 4.6, Chemistry Control Program.
21. PIP M-04-3317.

June 18, 2007

MEMORANDUM

To: All McGuire Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual Holders

Subject: McGuire SLC Manual Update

Please revise your copy of the manual as follows:

REMOVE

INSERT

List of Effective Sections (Rev 78)

List of Effective Sections (Rev 79)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 72)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 89)

Revisions may skip numbers due to Regulatory Compliance Filing System.

Please call me if you have questions.

Bonnie Beaver

Bonnie Beaver
Regulatory Compliance

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES

SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION

SECTION	REVISION NUMBER	DATE
16.1	REVISION 32	12/2/02
16.2	REVISION 90	3/13/07
16.3	REVISION 48	7/31/03
16.4	Not Issued	
16.5.1	REVISION 82	6/12/06
16.5.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.4	REVISION 55	3/23/04
16.5.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.6	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.7	REVISION 53	1/13/04
16.5.8	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.10	REVISION 38	4/9/03
16.6.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.6.2	DELETED	6/11/03
16.6.3	REVISION 61	04/07/05
16.6.4	REVISION 27	06/12/02
16.7.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.2	REVISION 80	10/1/05
16.7.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.4	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.7.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.6	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.7	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.8	REVISION 77	10/12/05
16.7.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.10	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.11	REVISION 71	05/25/05
16.8.1	REVISION 93	4/30/07
16.8.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.8.3	REVISION 65	12/21/04
16.9.1	REVISION 53	1/13/04
16.9.2	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.3	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.4	REVISION 83	7/12/06
16.9.5	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.6	REVISION 92	4/4/07
16.9.7	REVISION 89	6/15/07
16.9.8	REVISION 76	7/25/05
16.9.9	REVISION 34	2/26/03
16.9.10	REVISION 13	2/26/01
16.9.11	REVISION 22	2/25/02
16.9.12	REVISION 34	2/26/03

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES

SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION

SECTION	REVISION NUMBER	DATE
16.9.13	Not Used - Rev 13	2/26/01
16.9.14	REVISION 22	2/25/02
16.9.15	REVISION 68	2/28/05
16.9.16	REVISION 65	12/21/04
16.9.17	REVISION 86	1/17/07
16.9.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
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16.9.22	REVISION 29	7/10/02
16.9.23	REVISION 88	1/17/07
16.9.24	Not Used - Rev 74	6/20/05
16.9.25	REVISION 87	1/17/07
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16.11.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.6	REVISION 59	6/1/04
16.11.7	REVISION 84	7/19/06
16.11.8	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.10	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.11	REVISION 41	8/21/03
16.11.12	REVISION 67	2/28/05
16.11.13	REVISION 91	3/22/07
16.11.14	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.15	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.16	REVISION 1	4/11/00
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16.11.20	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.13.1	REVISION 51	10/1/03
16.13.2	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
16.13.3	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
16.13.4	REVISION 58	5/11/04
16.14.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99

16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS - FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

16.9.7 Standby Shutdown System

COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be operable.

APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, and 3.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----

1. The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of the discovery.
2. If inoperable SSS component is located inside containment, repairs shall be made at the first outage which permits containment access.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>-----NOTE----- Not applicable to the SSS Diesel Generator or 24 V Battery Bank and Charger. -----</p>	<p>A.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in Table 16.9.7-1.</p>	1 hour
<p>A. One or more required SSS components identified in Table 16.9.7-1 inoperable.</p>	<p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2 Restore the component to OPERABLE status.</p>	7 days
<p>B. SSS Diesel Generator or 24 V Battery Bank and Charger inoperable.</p>	<p>B.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of fire detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in Table 16.9.7-1.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p>	<p>1 hour</p> <p>(continued)</p>

TESTING REQUIREMENTS

TEST	FREQUENCY
<p>TR 16.9.7.1 Verify total Identified LEAKAGE, Unidentified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff are ≤ 20 gpm.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Verify total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff ≤ 16.3 gpm.</p>	72 hours
<p>TR 16.9.7.2 Verify the requirements for spent fuel water level in Surveillance Requirement 3.7.13.1 are met and the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool is within the limits specified in the COLR.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Verify the refueling water storage tank is capable of being aligned to the SSS standby makeup pump.</p>	7 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.3 Verify fuel oil level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank is ≥ 4.0 ft.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.4 Verify the SSS diesel generator starts from ambient conditions and operates for ≥ 30 minutes at ≥ 700 kW.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.5 Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator are tested in accordance with, and maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.</p>	In accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program
<p>TR 16.9.7.6 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.7 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.8 Verify the electrolyte level of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is above the plates.</p>	31 days

(continued)

TESTING REQUIREMENTS (continued)

TEST	FREQUENCY
TR 16.9.7.9 Verify the total battery terminal voltage of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is \geq 258/129 V on float charge.	31 days
TR 16.9.7.10 Verify the average specific gravity of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is \geq 1.200.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.11 Verify the standby makeup pump's developed head and capacity is greater than or equal to that required by the Inservice Testing Supplemental Program.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.12 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V batteries and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.13 Verify SSS diesel generator 24 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, and free of corrosion.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.14 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.15 Perform inspection of SSS diesel generator in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with manufacturer's recommendations for class of service.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.16 Verify the SSS 250/125 V batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.17 Verify the SSS 250/125 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti-corrosion material.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.18 Verify the "C" solenoid to valve SA48ABC can be deenergized to provide steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.	18 months

TABLE 16.9.7-1

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS VERIFICATION⁽¹⁾

INOPERABLE SSS COMPONENT	FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS LOCATION								
	EL 716 EE-KK	EL 733 EE-KK	EL 750 EE-KK	Control Room	Battery Room	Cable Rooms	Turbine Driven AFW Pump	Motor Driven AFW Pump	Containment
SSS Diesel Generator ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
SSS DG Starting 24 V Battery Bank and Charger ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
Standby Makeup Pump and Water Supply	X	X	X						
SSS 250/125V Battery and Charger ⁽³⁾				X	X	X			Note 2
Turbine Driven AFW Pump and Water Supply								X	
Turbine Driven AFW Pump Solenoid "C"								X	
Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump A AND Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump B								X	
INSTRUMENTATION:									
1. RCS Pressure				X	X	X			Note 2
2. Pressurizer Level				X	X	X			Note 2
3. SG Level				X	X	X			Note 2
4. Incore Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2
5. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2

NOTES:

1. If fire detection and/or suppression systems are inoperable, then the ACTION statement(s) of the applicable fire detection and/or suppression SLC shall be complied with.
2. Monitor containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations specified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1 or 3.6.5.2, in lieu of verification of operability of systems inside containment
3. With this component inoperable, then denoted areas of both units are affected.

TABLE 16.9.7-2

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
INSTRUMENTATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	REQUIRED CHANNELS	TESTING REQUIREMENTS	READOUT LOCATION
1. Reactor Coolant Pressure	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
2. Pressurizer Level	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
3. Steam Generator Level (Wide Range)	1 per SG	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
4. Incore Temperature	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
5. Standby Makeup Pump Flow	1	TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
6. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature	1 per 2 Cold Legs	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel

BASES

The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) is designed to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated fire incidents, sabotage, or station blackout events by providing capability to maintain HOT STANDBY conditions and by controlling and monitoring vital systems from locations external to the main control room. The facility is credited with the ability to cope with a station black out (SBO) event of 4 hour duration. This capability is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and 10 CFR 50.63.

By design, the SSS is intended to respond to those low-probability events which render both the control room and automatic safety systems inoperable. Because of the low probability of occurrence of these events, the remedial actions rely on compensatory action, timely repair or return to operability and, if necessary, a justification for continued operation.

Because the SSS performs a redundant fire protection function, compensatory action during periods when the SSS is inoperable relies largely on assurance of the operability of fire detection and suppression systems. Table 16.9.7-1 establishes requirements for operability of fire detection and suppression systems.

Both A&D NC Cold Leg Wide Range Temperatures are required for SSS operability. This conclusion is based on NRC Correspondence during issuance of the original operating license.

The Source Range Wide Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation was installed at the SSS Control Panel as part of NRC review of this system in the early 1980s. The indication is not required for SSS operability, based on the NRC's response to Duke dated July 12, 1983.

Controls and power to the pressurizer heater banks are included for SSF events; however, they are not required for SSS operability. NRC Generic Letter 86-10 provides that conclusion.

The Testing Requirements ensure that the SSS systems and components are capable of performing their intended functions. The testing requirements were based largely on SSS Technical Specifications for the Catawba Nuclear Station, which was approved prior to the issuance of the fuel load license for Unit 1 of that plant. Also considered in the formulation of the testing requirements were existing McGuire Technical Specifications, such as those for the 1E Diesel Generators, Refueling Water Storage Tank, Fire Protection & Detection Systems, and other Tech Specs which are related to the safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant.

The required level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank ensures sufficient fuel for 3 ½ days of uninterrupted operation. Per Appendix R requirements, the unit must be in cold shutdown within 72 hours of going to the SSF. The 3 ½ day supply of fuel oil assures this capability.

Testing has demonstrated the ability of plant operations to start the SSF diesel within 10 minutes of the recognition of an SBO event, thus satisfying the intent of NUMARC 87-00 guidance. The SSF diesel generator has sufficient capacity and capability to operate equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for a 4-hour SBO event.

BASES (continued)

Fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator is tested and maintained in accordance with the same Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program used for the 4kV emergency diesel generators (see Technical Specification 5.5.13, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.3.2 and associated Bases).

Although the Standby Makeup Pump is not nuclear safety-related and was not designed according to ASME code requirements, it is tested quarterly to ensure its OPERABILITY. The Standby Makeup Pump (SMP) functions as part of the SSF to provide makeup capacity to the reactor coolant system and cooling flow to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals. The RCP seal leak-off flow is temperature dependent (i.e., the higher the temperature the higher the leak-off flow). During normal operation the RCP seals are supplied from the Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) drawing from the Volume Control Tank (VCT). During the SSF event, the SMP draws from the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). During the SSF event there is no SFP cooling, so water injected into the RCP seals will have a higher temperature than during normal operation. The SMP is capable of providing a makeup capacity of 26 gpm. The revised SLC limit of 20 gpm total accumulative leakage is based on a calculation that was performed by Westinghouse, indicating increased RCP seal leak-off at higher seal water temperatures, to relate the SSF event leakage of 26 gpm at elevated RCP seal temperatures. This more conservative limit will ensure that the SMP will be capable of providing makeup and seal cooling flow equal to or greater than total leakage during the SSF event, increased RCP seal leak-off flow due to heat-up of the SFP, and still provide a margin of safety. As a conservative measure, during normal power operation the total accumulative system leakage (unidentified + identified + RCP seal leak-off flows) shall be limited to 20 gpm. The Testing Requirement concerning the SMP water supply ensures that an adequate water volume is available to supply the pump continuously for 72 hours.

The additional requirement that total RCP seal leak-off flow be ≤ 16.3 gpm resulted from a historical review of NRC correspondence that specified the SMP also provide for reactor coolant system makeup and boration in addition to RCP seal leakage requirements (Ref. 17). Calculations show that this upper limit for RCP seal leak-off provides sufficient margin to maintain the required unit conditions for a bounding SSS event.

The Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, in the A (Unit 1) and B (Unit 2) sumps, can be controlled and powered from the SSF. These Sump Pumps remove accumulation of groundwater, Turbine driven AFW Pump drains, and other miscellaneous sources. For the SSS to be OPERABLE, a minimum of one of these pumps must be OPERABLE. Credit is taken for the groundwater underdrain system to transport water from one sump to the other.

The turbine driven AFW pump can be controlled from the SSF and is utilized during an SSS event to maintain adequate secondary side heat removal. For the SSS to be OPERABLE, the turbine driven AFW pump must be OPERABLE. The SSF has the ability to align the Condenser Circulating Water (RC) System to maintain hot standby conditions for approximately 72 hours. This makeup water source is isolated from the Auxiliary Feedwater pump suction by two dc power-operated valves (CA161C and CA162C). The procedure, that transfers control to the SSS, directs the operators to open these valves and disable the power supply to prevent spurious closure during the fire event. In addition, these valves also have a pressure switch to open automatically on low pump suction pressure.

The SSF is provided with its own 250/125 VDC power system which is independent from the normal 125 VDC and 120 VAC vital I&C power systems. The SSF batteries are charged by

the SSF diesel generator and are available to power the SSF instruments and controls necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions from the SSF control room following a station black out (SBO) event.

While the SSS 24 VDC battery charger is isolated for battery surveillance testing, the SSS Diesel Generator remains operable as long as the battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.

The SSS 125V batteries and battery chargers consist of three pairs SDSP1, SDSP2 and SDSS. Each pair consists of a battery and associated battery charger. Pair SDSS can be used to substitute for either pair SDSP1 or SDSP2. Only two of these pairs are required operable since pair SDSS is spare.

This selected licensee commitment is part of the McGuire Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C.4 (Unit 1) and C.7 (Unit 2).

REFERENCES

1. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Chapter 9.5.1
2. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 2, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix D
3. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 5, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix B
4. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 6, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix C
5. McGuire Fire Protection Review, as revised
6. McGuire Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Review
7. IEEE 308-1974, Class 1E Power Systems
8. IEEE 450-1975, Maintenance Testing & Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries
9. OP/O/B/6350/04, Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Operation
10. McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses, Unit 1 License Condition C.(4) and Unit 2 License Condition C.(7)
11. PIP 0-M-99-03926
12. PIP-M-01-3466
13. 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current
14. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 4, 1990, Requirements for Station Blackout.
15. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 17, 1989, Requirements for Station Blackout.

16. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Safety Evaluation for Station Blackout (10CFR50.63), Dated February 19, 1992.
17. SAIC-91/1265, "Technical Evaluation Report, McGuire Nuclear Station, Station Blackout Evaluation," Dated December 10, 1991.
18. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Section 18.2.4, Chemistry Control Program.
19. MCS-1465.00-00-0019, "Plant Design Basis Specification For Station Blackout Rule," Rev. 3.
20. McGuire License Renewal Commitments MCS-1274.00-00-0016, Section 4.6, Chemistry Control Program.
21. PIP M-04-3317.

June 18, 2007

MEMORANDUM

To: All McGuire Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual Holders

Subject: McGuire SLC Manual Update

Please revise your copy of the manual as follows:

REMOVE

INSERT

List of Effective Sections (Rev 78)

List of Effective Sections (Rev 79)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 72)

SLC 16.9.7 (entire section) (Rev 89)

Revisions may skip numbers due to Regulatory Compliance Filing System.

Please call me if you have questions.

Bonnie Beaver

Bonnie Beaver
Regulatory Compliance

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES

SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION

SECTION	REVISION NUMBER	DATE
16.1	REVISION 32	12/2/02
16.2	REVISION 90	3/13/07
16.3	REVISION 48	7/31/03
16.4	Not Issued	
16.5.1	REVISION 82	6/12/06
16.5.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.4	REVISION 55	3/23/04
16.5.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.6	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.7	REVISION 53	1/13/04
16.5.8	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.5.10	REVISION 38	4/9/03
16.6.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.6.2	DELETED	6/11/03
16.6.3	REVISION 61	04/07/05
16.6.4	REVISION 27	06/12/02
16.7.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.2	REVISION 80	10/1/05
16.7.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.4	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.7.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.6	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.7	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.8	REVISION 77	10/12/05
16.7.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.10	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.7.11	REVISION 71	05/25/05
16.8.1	REVISION 93	4/30/07
16.8.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.8.3	REVISION 65	12/21/04
16.9.1	REVISION 53	1/13/04
16.9.2	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.3	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.4	REVISION 83	7/12/06
16.9.5	REVISION 81	6/15/06
16.9.6	REVISION 92	4/4/07
16.9.7	REVISION 89	6/15/07
16.9.8	REVISION 76	7/25/05
16.9.9	REVISION 34	2/26/03
16.9.10	REVISION 13	2/26/01
16.9.11	REVISION 22	2/25/02
16.9.12	REVISION 34	2/26/03

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES

SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION

SECTION	REVISION NUMBER	DATE
16.9.13	Not Used - Rev 13	2/26/01
16.9.14	REVISION 22	2/25/02
16.9.15	REVISION 68	2/28/05
16.9.16	REVISION 65	12/21/04
16.9.17	REVISION 86	1/17/07
16.9.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.9.19	REVISION 48	7/31/03
16.9.20	REVISION 8	11/30/00
16.9.21	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.9.22	REVISION 29	7/10/02
16.9.23	REVISION 88	1/17/07
16.9.24	Not Used - Rev 74	6/20/05
16.9.25	REVISION 87	1/17/07
16.10.1	REVISION 56	4/6/04
16.11.1	REVISION 9	2/1/01
16.11.2	REVISION 84	7/19/06
16.11.3	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.4	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.5	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.6	REVISION 59	6/1/04
16.11.7	REVISION 84	7/19/06
16.11.8	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.9	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.10	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.11	REVISION 41	8/21/03
16.11.12	REVISION 67	2/28/05
16.11.13	REVISION 91	3/22/07
16.11.14	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.15	REVISION 21	1/17/02
16.11.16	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.17	REVISION 1	4/11/00
16.11.18	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.19	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.11.20	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.12.2	REVISION 0	12/14/99
16.13.1	REVISION 51	10/1/03
16.13.2	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
16.13.3	Not Used - Rev 75	8/05
16.13.4	REVISION 58	5/11/04
16.14.1	REVISION 0	12/14/99

TESTING REQUIREMENTS

TEST	FREQUENCY
<p>TR 16.9.7.1 Verify total Identified LEAKAGE, Unidentified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff are ≤ 20 gpm.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Verify total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff ≤ 16.3 gpm.</p>	72 hours
<p>TR 16.9.7.2 Verify the requirements for spent fuel water level in Surveillance Requirement 3.7.13.1 are met and the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool is within the limits specified in the COLR.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Verify the refueling water storage tank is capable of being aligned to the SSS standby makeup pump.</p>	7 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.3 Verify fuel oil level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank is ≥ 4.0 ft.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.4 Verify the SSS diesel generator starts from ambient conditions and operates for ≥ 30 minutes at ≥ 700 kW.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.5 Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator are tested in accordance with, and maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.</p>	In accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program
<p>TR 16.9.7.6 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V battery voltage is ≥ 24 volts.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.7 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.</p>	31 days
<p>TR 16.9.7.8 Verify the electrolyte level of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is above the plates.</p>	31 days

(continued)

TESTING REQUIREMENTS (continued)

TEST	FREQUENCY
TR 16.9.7.9 Verify the total battery terminal voltage of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is \geq 258/129 V on float charge.	31 days
TR 16.9.7.10 Verify the average specific gravity of each SSS 250/125 V battery bank is \geq 1.200.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.11 Verify the standby makeup pump's developed head and capacity is greater than or equal to that required by the Inservice Testing Supplemental Program.	92 days
TR 16.9.7.12 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V batteries and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.13 Verify SSS diesel generator 24 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, and free of corrosion.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.14 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the SSS Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.15 Perform inspection of SSS diesel generator in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with manufacturer's recommendations for class of service.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.16 Verify the SSS 250/125 V batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.17 Verify the SSS 250/125 V battery to battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti-corrosion material.	18 months
TR 16.9.7.18 Verify the "C" solenoid to valve SA48ABC can be deenergized to provide steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.	18 months

TABLE 16.9.7-1

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS VERIFICATION⁽¹⁾

INOPERABLE SSS COMPONENT	FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS LOCATION								
	EL 716 EE-KK	EL 733 EE-KK	EL 750 EE-KK	Control Room	Battery Room	Cable Rooms	Turbine Driven AFW Pump	Motor Driven AFW Pump	Containment
SSS Diesel Generator ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
SSS DG Starting 24 V Battery Bank and Charger ⁽³⁾	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Note 2
Standby Makeup Pump and Water Supply	X	X	X						
SSS 250/125V Battery and Charger ⁽³⁾				X	X	X			Note 2
Turbine Driven AFW Pump and Water Supply								X	
Turbine Driven AFW Pump Solenoid "C"								X	
Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump A AND Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump B								X	
INSTRUMENTATION:									
1. RCS Pressure				X	X	X			Note 2
2. Pressurizer Level				X	X	X			Note 2
3. SG Level				X	X	X			Note 2
4. Incore Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2
5. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature				X	X	X			Note 2

NOTES:

1. If fire detection and/or suppression systems are inoperable, then the ACTION statement(s) of the applicable fire detection and/or suppression SLC shall be complied with.
2. Monitor containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations specified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1 or 3.6.5.2, in lieu of verification of operability of systems inside containment
3. With this component inoperable, then denoted areas of both units are affected.

TABLE 16.9.7-2

STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM
INSTRUMENTATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	REQUIRED CHANNELS	TESTING REQUIREMENTS	READOUT LOCATION
1. Reactor Coolant Pressure	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
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4. Incore Temperature	1	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
5. Standby Makeup Pump Flow	1	TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel
6. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature	1 per 2 Cold Legs	TR 16.9.7.7 TR 16.9.7.14	SSF Control Panel

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BASES (continued)

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This selected licensee commitment is part of the McGuire Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C.4 (Unit 1) and C.7 (Unit 2).

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12. PIP-M-01-3466
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