

WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

Stephen E. Hedges
Vice President Operations and Plant Manager

July 10, 2007

WO 07-0014

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Request for Notice of Enforcement Discretion from
Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources – Operating"

Gentlemen:

This letter confirms the results of the teleconference that was conducted between Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) and NRC Staff representatives at 0900 hours on July 8, 2007 in which WCNOC requested the NRC to exercise enforcement discretion for the Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS), regarding the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources – Operating." With the plant operating in MODE 1 at 100% Rated Thermal Power, the request was made in order to provide additional time to repair and test the "A" diesel generator (DG) before a plant shutdown would have otherwise been required.

The events leading to WCNOC's request began when the "A" DG was declared inoperable at 1406 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT) on July 5, 2007, for performance of monthly surveillance activities. During the surveillance testing, increased leakage was found on the DG engine-driven intercooler pump shaft seal. During repair to the intercooler pump shaft seal, the pump impeller, wear rings and bearings were replaced. Post maintenance checks discovered a leak on the engine-driven jacket water pump seal and the gear box that drives both the intercooler and jacket water pumps was abnormally hot. After the intercooler pump was disassembled, it was found that the sleeve bearings and shaft were damaged. The necessary parts are on hand but reassembly and testing of both engine-driven pumps and the gear box that drives them, along with subsequent restoration of the "A" DG to OPERABLE status, will result in exceeding the 72 hour Completion Time of TS 3.8.1, Required Action B.4.1.

Enforcement discretion was sought to permit non-compliance with LCO 3.8.1, i.e., to permit additional time to complete repairs and restoration of the "A" DG before a plant shutdown was required. Initially, an additional 72 hours was requested. However, it was agreed that 48 hours would be granted to restore the "A" DG to OPERABLE status such that entry into MODE 3 would not be required until 2006 hours on July 10, 2007. The requested additional time for restoring the DG had been evaluated and shown to involve a small increase in quantitative risk, offset by qualitative considerations. In addition, it has been determined that there is no net increase in radiological risk.

A001

NRR

At 1130 hours CDT on July 8, 2007, Art Howell, Director, Division Reactor Projects, Region IV, notified WCNOC that after NRC Region IV Office consideration of WCNOC's verbal request for enforcement discretion, and in consultation with the NRR technical staff, the request for a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) was approved. The approval was effective and would begin at 1406 hours on July 8, 2007 for an additional 48 hours. WCNOC is required to submit a written request for the NOED within 2 working days of the NRC verbal approval.

Attachment I provides the information documenting WCNOC's earlier verbal request for the NOED. If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact me at (620) 364-4190, or Mr. Kevin Moles at (620) 364-4126.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "William B. Hedges for". The signature is written in a cursive style.

Stephen E. Hedges

SEH/rit

Attachment: I Notice of Enforcement Discretion
II Commitment List

cc: J. N. Donohew (NRC), w/a
V. G. Gaddy (NRC), w/a
B. S. Mallett (NRC), w/a
Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/a

**Request for Notice of Enforcement Discretion Regarding Technical Specification 3.8.1,
“AC Sources – Operating”**

1. The Technical Specification (TS) or other license conditions that will be violated.

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) specifically requests enforcement discretion from the shutdown requirements of Required Action H.1 and H.2 of the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) for TS 3.8.1, to complete repairs and post maintenance testing on the “A” DG without placing the plant in MODE 5. Technical Specification 3.8.1, Required Action B.4.1 requires restoration of an inoperable DG to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. Condition H of TS 3.8.1 would require placing the unit in MODE 3 in 6 hours and MODE 5 in 36 hours if Required Action B.4.1 and its associated Completion Time is not met.

Enforcement discretion was sought such that it would allow up to an additional 48 hours for restoring the “A” DG to OPERABLE status. In effect, it would allow delayed entry into MODE 3 per Required Action H.1 such that entry into MODE 3 would not be required until 2006 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT) on July 10, 2007.

2. The circumstances surrounding the situation: including likely causes; the need for prompt action; action taken in attempt to avoid the need for an NOED; and identification of any relevant historical events.

Required Action B.4.1 of TS 3.8.1 was entered when the “A” DG was declared inoperable on July 5, 2007, at 1406 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), for performing surveillance testing activities. The 72 hour Completion Time for this Required Action required the inoperable DG to be restored by 1406 hours on July 8, 2007 before entering Condition H of TS 3.8.1. This Condition requires a plant shutdown such that MODE 3 must be entered within 6 hours (per Required Action H.1) and MODE 5 must be entered within 36 hours (per Required Action H.2).

During the surveillance test, increased leakage was detected on the “A” DG engine-driven intercooler pump shaft seal. At 1420 hours it was determined that the DG engine-driven intercooler pump had a seal leak of approximately 20 ml/min and the jacket/intercooler water leakage limit is 9.1 ml/min. During repair to the intercooler pump shaft seal, the pump impeller and wear rings and bearing were replaced. Post maintenance checks discovered a leak on the engine-driven jacket water pump seal and the gear box that drives both the intercooler and jacket water pumps was abnormally hot. After the intercooler pump was disassembled, it was found that the sleeve bearings and shaft were damaged. The necessary parts are on hand but reassembly and testing of both engine-driven pumps and the gear box that drives them, along with subsequent restoration of the “A” DG to OPERABLE status, will result in exceeding the 72 hour Completion Time of TS 3.8.1, Required Action B.4.1.

Failure of the initial maintenance to restore the pump to its proper condition was unexpected. Troubleshooting and repair activities were promptly commenced and worked as an emergent condition. At the time of the request, the problem is identified and the necessary repairs are underway.

On July 5, 2007, the “A” DG intercooler pump was removed from service to allow maintenance due to increased seal leakage. Indications also existed in the inboard and outboard wear rings. The “A” DG intercooler pump housing was out of alignment with the pump shaft which caused abnormal wear on the mechanical seal and the wear rings. Review of the initial repair by Engineering, Maintenance, and a vendor representative found that the pump reassembly resulted in some of the critical clearances and alignments not being correct. This led to damage of additional components that need to be replaced. Both the jacket water and

intercooler pumps use the same shaft, driven by a gear from the DG engine. Alignment of one pump could affect the alignment of the opposite pump.

Recent work activities on the "A" DG that are believed to have introduced the initial concern were performed by Work Order 05-275959-000 completed in June 2007. The work activities involved installing a gasket in the bearing housing for the engine-driven water pump drive idler. The "B" DG was rebuilt a number of months prior and has not exhibited a similar problem in subsequent surveillance testing. As such, it is believed that no common cause failure was introduced into the "B" DG.

3. Information to show that the cause and proposed path to resolve the situation are understood, such that there is a high likelihood that planned actions to resolve the situation can be completed within the proposed NOED time frame.

Review of the initial repair by Engineering, Maintenance, and a vendor representative, found that the intercooler pump reassembly resulted in some of the critical clearances and alignments not being correct. This led to damage of additional components that now need to be replaced. A vendor representative and all the necessary components are on site and the necessary repairs to restore the pumps to their proper configuration are being completed. Use of the complete set of repair parts along with the vendor's expertise will ensure that the pumps and drive will function as designed once the reassembly is complete. The original estimate is that this work and associated DG testing would be completed between 0300 and 0500 on July 9, 2007 which is comfortably within the request enforcement discretion timeframe of 2006 on July 10, 2007. However, the work and testing was actually completed at 2006 on July 9, 2007 and "A" DG returned to service.


4. The safety basis for the request, including an evaluation of the safety significance and potential consequences of the proposed course of action.

Description of Class 1E Power System at Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS)

The onsite power system is generally divided into two load groups. Each load group consists of an arrangement of buses, transformers, switching equipment, and loads fed from a common power supply. Power is supplied to loads at 13.8 kV, 4.16 kV, 480 V, 480/277 V, 208/120 V, 120 VAC, 250 VDC, and 125 VDC. The Class 1E AC system loads are accordingly separated into two load groups which, as noted above, are powered from separate ESF transformers. Each load group has power distributed by a 4.16-kV bus (NB01 or NB02), 480-V load centers, and 480-V motor control centers. Each load group is independently capable of safely bringing the plant to a cold shutdown condition, as the Class 1E electrical power distribution system is designed to satisfy the single-failure criterion.

The onsite standby power system includes Class 1E AC and DC power supply capability for equipment used to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown of the plant and to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident (DBA). With respect to Class 1E AC power, each of the two Class 1E load groups, at the 4.16-kV bus level, is capable of being powered from an independent diesel generator (one per load group) which functions to provide power in the event of a loss of the preferred power source. Undervoltage relays are provided for each 4.16-kV bus to detect an undervoltage condition. Upon recognition of a loss of voltage at the 4.16-kV buses, a logic signal generated by the load shedder and emergency load sequencer (LSELS) initiates a 1) trip of the 4.16-kV preferred normal and alternate bus feeder breakers, 2) shed of all loads from the bus except the Class 1E 480 Vac load centers and centrifugal charging pumps, and 3) an automatic diesel generator (DG) start signal.

A simplified one-line diagram of the offsite power system and 4.16-kV buses is provided below. As can be seen from the figure, and as described above, each of the two 4.16-kV Class 1E buses is normally supplied by its preferred (offsite) power source (via its respective ESF transformer) and is capable of being exclusively supplied by its associated DG (as there is no automatic connection between the redundant load groups.)



Description of the Emergency Diesel Engine Cooling Water System

The Emergency Diesel Engine Cooling Water System provides cooling water to the DG engines. This is a closed cycle system, and serves an intermediate system between the DG engines and the Essential Service Water System. Each DG engine has its own cooling water system. Each cooling water system consists of a jacket cooling water system and an intercooler cooling system.

Each intercooler cooling system consists of an engine-driven intercooler pump, intercooler heat exchanger, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. The engine-driven intercooler pump circulates water through the intercooler heat exchanger and the engine-mounted intercoolers. Turbocharged air is cooled by the intercoolers prior to its entry into the combustion air manifold, and the extracted heat is transferred to the Essential Service Water System at the intercooler heat exchanger.

Each jacket cooling water system consists of an engine-driven pump, a jacket water heat exchanger, an electric motor-driven keep-warm pump, an electric keep-warm heater, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. The engine-driven pump circulates water through the cylinder jackets and the jacket water heat exchanger, where extracted heat is transferred to the Essential Service Water System. When on standby status, the electric motor-driven pump circulates water through the electric heater and the engine cylinder jackets to keep the engine warm.

ICCDP and ICLERP Determination

The WCGS zero maintenance Revision 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model was used to quantify the impact on risk of extending the DG unavailability time an additional 48 hours. Core Damage Frequency (CDF), Large Early Release Frequency (LERF), Incremental Conditional Core Damage Probability (ICCDP), and Incremental Conditional Large Early Release Probability (ICLERP) factors are listed below. The plant configuration consisted of the "B" Train aligned and in service, followed by the removal of the "A" DG.

	CDF/yr	LERF/yr
Base Model	2.72E-05	2.09E-06
w/ "A" DG Unavailable	2.37E-04	2.50E-06
	ICCDP	ICLERP
Additional 48-hour period	1.15E-06	2.25E-09
RIS 2005-01	5.00E-07	5.00E-08

The ICCDP and ICLERP were calculated using Equations 1 and 2 below.

Equation 1: $ICCDP = (CDF_{EDG} - CDF_{Base}) \times Time_{additional}$

Equation 2: $ICLERP = (LERF_{EDG} - LERF_{Base}) \times Time_{additional}$

Where CDF_{EDG} and $LERF_{EDG}$ are the CDF and LERF values, respectively, with the EDG removed from service; CDF_{Base} and $LERF_{Base}$ are the CDF and LERF values, respectively, of the zero maintenance model; and $Time_{additional}$ is the amount of time requested beyond the existing allowed TSEO allowed outage time in years, or hours divided by 8760 hours per year.

The ICCDP shown above fits into Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants," as an activity that merits risk management considerations and activities. While the calculated value for ICCDP exceeds the Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-01, "Changes to Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) Process and Staff Guidance," guidance threshold of less than or equal to 5.0E-07, the threshold is not strictly pass-fail criteria. The calculated ICCDP value reported above does not account for various conservatisms in place including the following:

- Reduction in risk by the avoidance of shutting down the plant with only 1 available diesel generator,
- A favorable weather forecast for the duration of the requested time period.

Dominant Risk Contributors

Only three initiating events account for over 97 percent of the total conditional core damage contribution. As expected, loss of offsite power (INIT-LSP) dominates all other initiating events by contributing 91.4 percent to CDF with small LOCA (INIT-SLO) and very small LOCA (INIT-VLO) contributing a combined 5.9 percent to CDF.

Contribution of initiating events to LERF is dominated by interfacing system LOCA type events. Over 75 percent of the total LERF is due to interfacing system LOCA involving the cold leg injection. Steam generator tube rupture (INIT-SGR) contributes 11.4 percent of the total LERF and loss of offsite power contributes only 7.9 percent of total LERF.

The top 100 CDF cutsets were evaluated. A total of 78 cutsets are station blackout (SBO) sequences. These 78 cutsets have a sum total CDF contribution of 1.97E-04/yr, or approximately 83 percent of all core damage contribution.

Important operable components from the Safety Monitor™ with the “A” DG unavailable are the Class 1E DC Bus SSCs (e.g., NK001, NK054, NK004), Startup Transformer, Essential Service Water Train “B”, Class 1E Electrical Bus NB002, No. 7 Switchyard Transformer, “B” DG, “B” Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Train, and AC Busses NG04 and NG06.

Compensatory Risk Management Measures

Qualitative risk insight indicates that compensatory measures to limit the possibility of experiencing a SBO have significant impact on the risk to the plant. Such compensatory measures that are in place include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Avoidance of testing and maintenance impacting availability of the “B” train safety bus, including but not limited to, the ESW, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFP), Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP), Component Cooling Water (CCW), Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Air Conditioning Units, and all 125 Volt DC System (NK) Batteries and the associated DG to maximize the mitigative response to a Station Blackout Event (SBO),
- Ensure no switchyard work is allowed. This includes XMR01, No. 4, 5, and 7 transformers,
- Enhanced operator sensitivity to safety bus electrical power supply issues to recognize and respond expeditiously to a SBO or loss of offsite power event (e.g., posting of Protected Train signage to NK rooms),
- Control Room staff briefing to review the important risk significant manual actions as provided by the Supervisor Engineer for Fuel and Probabilistic Safety Assessment supporting the request for enforcement discretion,
- Fire Brigade briefing to review the actions to be taken due to the “B” DG fire suppression system being taken out of service,
- Continuous fire watch as a conservative action until the “A” DG is declared operable.
- Continual monitoring by the grid operator regarding grid conditions to anticipate challenges to offsite power availability, and
- Availability of the Sharpe Station to mitigate an SBO and station operator just-in-time training.

The above-mentioned compensatory measures are considered qualitatively in the risk assessment. They have no discrete impact on the quantified risk values. Therefore, it is considered that the quantified risk values are conservative in nature. In addition, there is no net increase in radiological risk.

External Events

Fire safe shutdown capability is not compromised by the unavailability of the “A” DG as the “B” train is credited in the event of a Control Room fire.

The preaction sprinkler system for the “B” DG room is currently inoperable. Heat detection in the room remains functional. WCNOG has compensatory measures and a tracking impairment for the flame detection due to in-plant obstructions. However, flame detection is functional.

Weather Forecast

The National Weather Service forecast for the duration of the request for enforcement discretion is that temperatures will be in the upper 80’s to lower 90’s for highs and upper 60’s and lower 70’s for lows. Scattered thunderstorms are possible with varying degrees of probability from 30 to 50 percent, but no severe weather or significant front is expected to be moving through the area for the duration of the “A” DG work.

Impact on Defense in Depth

The request for enforcement discretion provides a one-time increase in the Completion Time specified in the TSs for an inoperable DG. The Completion Time is a TS provision that, as noted in the TS Bases, "takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period." In general, the TSs permit Limiting Conditions for Operation and thus the normally full complement of redundant components and trains to not be met for short periods of time on this basis. These provisions, as noted in the TSs themselves, have been determined to be reasonable based on engineering judgment, while still preserving the intent of maintaining adequate system/component availability for those systems and components assumed to function in accordance with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

In 2002, Kansas Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (KEPCo) constructed an electric generating station (Sharpe Station) that consists of ten, two-megawatt Caterpillar 3516B engine-generator sets (gensets). The gensets are sited at a single location near an existing 69 kV substation near Sharpe, Kansas, approximately two miles north of WCGS. Siting it near WCGS provides emergency back-up power for WCGS, specifically, to improve availability and reliability of sufficient AC power for planned or postulated WCGS plant conditions including planned onsite DG maintenance, complete loss of all onsite emergency AC power, and grid perturbations or loss of a normal offsite power source to WCGS. Sharpe Station is not an Alternate AC (AAC) power source as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.155, "Station Blackout." Power from the Sharpe Station enters the WCGS switchyard via the Phillips 69-kV line.

In addition to the information above WCGS has received License Amendment 163 that allows energizing Sharpe Station and providing power to the WCGS switchyard under certain conditions. This 7-day extended Completion Time can only be utilized for preplanned maintenance activities and, as such, is not applicable to this event. The Sharpe Station is not credited in this analysis but discussed only as a "defense in depth" option should extreme extenuating circumstances occur.

The "B" DG engine-driven intercooler pump, PKJ05B, was last worked on during Refueling Outage 15 (Reference WO 05-275958-000). This work was completed on 10/22/06. Surveillance history shows that "B" DG was successfully tested following this work during the refueling outage, and has been tested monthly per Technical Specifications since the outage. Additionally, the "B" DG was tested satisfactorily on May 17 and June 21, 2007 using Surveillance Procedures STS KJ-015B and STS KJ-005B. There has been no indication of any abnormalities during any of these tests and no leakage from the mechanical seal of PKJ05B has been observed. Recent testing makes it unlikely that a common cause problem exists on "B" DG that now exists on the "A" DG, or could exist for an appreciable period of time without detection.

The cause of the "A" DG engine-driven intercooler pump leakage is attributable to abnormal wear on the mechanical seal and the wear rings that surfaced within a one-month time period following last reassembly. Absence of indications of any abnormalities, no work requests on PKJ05B regarding leakage, and the successful completion of periodic testing for the previous eight months of "B" DG operation, provide high confidence that the "B" DG is not currently affected by this problem.

5. The justification for the duration of the non-compliance.

As discussed in the probabilistic risk assessment above, extending the Completion Time of TS 3.8.1, Required Action B.4.1 from 72 hours to 120 hours results in no significant increase in risk.

Activities to prepare for and perform repairs to the "A" DG engine-driven intercooler pump and jacket water pump are currently in progress and are being worked on a 24-hour schedule until completion. In addition, the following compensatory measures are being taken and will continue until the "A" DG is restored to OPERABLE status:

- During repair of the jacket cooling water system/intercooler cooler system, no other planned maintenance or testing will be performed that would render the "B" DG and associated support systems inoperable.
- High risk plant evolutions will be avoided.

6. The condition and operational status of the plant (including safety-related equipment out of service or otherwise inoperable).

Currently, the plant is operating in MODE 1 at 100% power. The current Plant Awareness Level is 2. Plant Awareness Level identifies the risk of performing work activities, by considering core damage frequency and commercially significant equipment. Plant Awareness Level 2 refers to medium core damage frequency.

The following list of safety-related components are currently inoperable or out of service:

KKJ01A, Diesel Generator "A"
GNAE0028, Containment Humidity Detector
SGAE003A, Accumulator Tank Base (Technical Requirement Manual Seismic Instrument)

7. The status and potential challenges to off-site and on-site power sources.

Currently, the plant is operating providing power to the offsite power grid and all the onsite and offsite power sources are OPERABLE. According to System Operations (Westar Energy Transmission Services), the transmission system is loaded to approximately 79% capacity, and currently, there are no problems stressing the grid. Grid voltage is required to be maintained between 97% and 105% of nominal value. The current voltage is at 101.3% and WCNOG has an off normal procedure (OFN AF-025, "Unit Limitations," Attachment E) should this voltage deviate during the time allotted by the request for enforcement discretion. The System Operator relayed that if WCGS were to go off line, grid stability would remain acceptable (i.e., voltages well above OFN AF-025 Actual or Predicted Voltage Degradation Limits). However, should another Westar unit go offline, particularly the Jeffrey Station, they could not ensure voltage degradation below OFN AF-025 limits would not be exceeded.

At 0533 hours CDT on July 7, 2007, Control Room Personnel noticed a spike in MW output of approximately 60 MWe up and 40 MWe down on trend recorder MAJR-1. System Operations was contacted and they advised that a line had opened up and they were working to get it re-energized. System Operations did not identify which line had opened, only that it was not one of the WCGS lines, but it was close enough to have caused spike indications on the WCGS recorder. Generator output is stable now and there is no other noticeable impact other than the spike on the recorder.

8. The basis for the conclusion that the noncompliance will not be of potential detriment to the public health and safety.

The request for enforcement discretion is to allow an additional 48 hours to TS 3.8.1, Required Action B.4.1, to effect repairs and post-maintenance testing on the "A" DG engine-driven intercooler pump/jacket water pump to preclude a unit shutdown. The proposed additional time does not involve a significant hazards consideration based on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as discussed below:

- (i) Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. The protection systems (RTS and ESFAS) will continue to function in a manner consistent with the plant design basis. This additional allowed time does not result in a condition where the design, material, and construction standards that were applicable prior to the change are altered. The proposed change will not modify any system interface. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators. There will be no change to normal plant operating parameters or accident mitigation performance. The proposed change will not alter any assumptions or change any mitigation actions in the radiological consequence evaluations in the USAR.

Implementation of the proposed change will minimize risk impact. The proposed one-time only change to the TS 3.8.1 Required Action B.4.1 Completion Time does not, of itself, increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change will not result in an increase in the risk of plant operation. The difference of the incremental conditional core damage probabilities (ICCDP) and incremental conditional large early release probabilities (ICLERP) are $1.15E-06$ and $2.25E-09$, respectively. The ICCDP does exceed the guidance threshold of less than or equal to $5.0E-07$, however, this does not consider the implied risk of shutting down the plant with only one available DG, the availability of the Sharpe Station to mitigate a station blackout event, and the favorable weather forecast. The risk insight is to continue with repairs at-power as opposed to completing the repairs at shutdown.

The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions or the manner in which the plant is normally operated and maintained. The proposed change does not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change is consistent with safety analysis assumptions, which apply when the plant is operating in compliance with LCO requirements.

Therefore, the proposed request does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

- (ii) Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The proposed change does not result in a change in the manner in which the electrical distribution subsystems provide plant protection. The availability of the Sharpe Station provides another AC power source in the event of emergent inoperability of a WCGS DG or a complete loss of all WCGS emergency AC power. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. The one-time extension of the Completion Time does not change any existing accident scenarios, nor create any new or different accident scenarios. The proposed change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and current plant operating practice.

Therefore, the proposed request does not create a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

(iii) Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No

The proposed change does not affect the acceptance criteria for any analyzed event nor is there a change to any Safety Analysis Limit (SAL). There will be no effect on the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined nor will there be any effect on those plant systems necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection functions. There will be no impact on the overpower limit, Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) limits, F_Q , $F_{\Delta H}$, LOCA peak centerline temperature (PCT), peak local power density, or any other margin of safety. The radiological dose consequence acceptance criteria listed in the Standard Review Plan will continue to be met.

The quantified risk ICCDP impact is small and offset by qualitative considerations. The proposed change seeks to reduce the risk in returning to normal plant status.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Based on the above evaluations, WCNOG concludes that the activities associated with the above described enforcement discretion request present no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 and as such, would not be a potential detriment to the public health and safety.

9. The basis for the conclusion that the noncompliance will not involve adverse consequences to the environment.

WCNOG has determined that the proposed NOED would change requirements with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. This request for enforcement discretion meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) as specified below:

(i) Involves no significant hazards consideration.

As demonstrated in Section 8 above, this request does not involve any significant hazards consideration.

(ii) There is no significant change in the types of or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite,

The request does not involve a change to the facility or operating procedures that would cause an increase in the amounts of effluents or create new types of effluents.

(iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The request would not adversely affect the operation of the reactor and would not affect any system that would affect occupational radiation exposure. The proposed request does not create additional exposure to utility personnel nor affect radiation levels that are present. The request will not result in any increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental assessment of the proposed change is not required.

10. A statement that the request has been approved by the facility organization that normally reviews safety issues (Plant Safety Review Committee).

The WCGS Plant Safety Review Committee approved this request for enforcement discretion at 0545, July 8, 2007.

11. The request must specifically address which of the NOED criteria for appropriate plant conditions specified in Section B of Part 9900, "Operations – Notices of Enforcement Discretion," is satisfied and how it is satisfied

This request is made under the criteria in Section B, Paragraph 2.1, Item 1.a in Part 9900: Technical Guidance, "Operations – Notices of Enforcement Discretion." This NOED criteria states:

1. For a plant in power operation, an NOED is intended to:
 - a. avoid unnecessary transients as a result of compliance with the license condition and, thus, minimize potential safety consequences and operational risks; or

The type of NOED required per this request was identified to be a "regular" NOED, i.e., one that does not involve severe weather or other natural phenomena. It involves a nonrecurring noncompliance as it only involves a single request for extending the period of time that an inoperable plant component must be restored to OPERABLE status as specified per the plant Technical Specifications. As such, it involves a plant condition whereby the plant would be returned to compliance with the plant operating license within a short period of time.

With WCGS currently in MODE 1 at 100 % power, this request is for an operating plant. The intent is to avoid an unnecessary plant shutdown, thereby avoiding the increased potential for a transient associated with plant shutdown, consistent with criterion 2.1.1(a) above.

12. Unless otherwise agreed as discussed in Section B of Part 9900, a commitment is required that the written NOED request will be submitted within 2 working days and the follow-up amendment will be submitted within 4 working days of verbally granting the NOED.

This request for enforcement discretion is a one-time only extension of the Completion Time to complete restoration activities on the "A" DG. As such, a follow-up license amendment is not required.

13. For a severe weather NOED request provide the following information:

The name, organization and telephone number of the official in the government or independent entity who made the emergency situation determination.

Details of the basis and nature of the emergency situation, including, but not limited to, its effect on:

- i. on-site and off-site emergency preparedness**
- ii. plant and site ingress and egress**
- iii. off-site and on-site power sources**
- iv. grid stability; and**
- v. actions taken to avert and/or alleviate the emergency situation (e.g., coordinating with other utilities and the load dispatcher organization for buying additional power or for cycling load, or shedding interruptible industrial or non-emergency loads).**

Potential consequences of compliance with existing license requirements (e.g., plant trip, controlled shutdown).

The impact of the emergency situation on plant safety including the capability of the ultimate heat sink.

Potential adverse effects on public health and safety from enforcing compliance with specific license requirements during the emergency situation.

Not applicable.

LIST OF COMMITMENTS

The following table identifies those actions committed to by Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr. Kevin J. Moles Manager Regulatory Affairs at Wolf Creek Generating Station, (620) 364-4126.

COMMITMENT	Due Date/Event
WCNOC was required to submit a written request for the NOED within 2 working days of the NRC verbal approval.	July 10, 2007
Compensatory risk management measures taken for the period of enforcement discretion	July 8, 2007