

JK

C. M. Crane

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If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-3733.

Sincerely,

Robert F. Kuntz for

Robert F. Kuntz, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch III-2
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN 50-455,
STN 50-456, and STN 50-457

Enclosures:

- 1. Revised Pages of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37, NPF-66, NPF-72, and NPF-77
- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/o atts to Encl. 2: See next page

DISTRIBUTION (w/o attachments to Safety Evaluation)

PUBLIC	RidsNrrPMMFields	RidsOgcRp
LPLIII-2 Reading File	RidsNrrPMRKuntz	GHill, OIS <i>6/27</i>
RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter	RidsNrrLADBaxley	AFrazier, NSIR
RidsNrrDorl (CHaney/JLubinski)	RidsNsirDsp	RidsNrrDorlLpIII-2
RidsNrrDorlDpr	RidsRgn3MailCenter	

ADAMS Accession Nos.: Pkg ML071720009

(Letter & Encl 2: ML071720016, Encl 1: ML071760427, Attachments to SE (OUO): ML071710607 & ML071710612)

OFFICE	NRR/LPLIV/PM	NRR/PSPB/LA	NRR/DPR/PSPB	NRR/LPIII-2/PM	NRR/LPIII-2/BC
NAME	MFields <i>MF</i>	DBaxley	DNelson <i>DN</i>	RKuntz <i>RK</i>	RGibbs
DATE	<i>6-27-07</i>	6/21/07	<i>6/27/07</i>	<i>6/27/07</i>	<i>6-25</i>

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C. M. Crane

Plant-Specific Regulatory Action

The enclosed Safety Evaluation (SE) details the interactions between the NRC staff and the Exelon Generation Company, LLC, as well as the rest of the nuclear industry, related to the resolution of Section B.5.b. of the ICM Order. The outcome of these interactions is a license condition that satisfactorily captures the ICM Order Section B.5.b mitigation strategy requirements.

This proposed license condition was transmitted by the NRC to the Exelon Generation Company, LLC in letters dated October 12 and 13, 2006, for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, and the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively. By letter dated January 9, 2007, the Exelon Generation Company, LLC informed the NRC staff that it would accept the proposed license condition, with a minor change that the NRC staff finds acceptable. The effectiveness of the licensee's actions to implement the mitigative strategies contained in this license condition will be subject to future NRC review and inspection.

Consistent with the Order, administrative license changes to Facility Operating License No. NPF-37 and Facility Operating License No. NPF-66 for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively, and to Facility Operating License No. NPF-72 and Facility Operating License No. NPF-77 for the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively, are being made to incorporate the agreed upon license condition. These changes comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Chapter I. Please replace the affected pages of the Facility Operating Licenses with the enclosed pages (Enclosure 1).

The attachments to the SE are designated exempt from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1) since they contain security-related information and are Official Use Only. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-3733.

Sincerely,

Robert F. Kuntz, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch III-2
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN 50-455,
STN 50-456 and STN 50-457

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RidsNrrDorlDpr	RidsRgn3MailCenter	

ADAMS Accession Nos.: Pkg ML071720009

(Letter & Encl 2: ML071720016, Encl 1:ML07, Attachments to SE (OUO): ML07)

Comments

OFFICE	NRR/LPLIV/PM	NRR/PSPB/LA	NRR/DPP/PSPB	NRR/LP/III-2/PM	NRR/LP/III-2/BC
NAME	MFields <i>MF</i>	DBaxley	DNeilson <i>DN</i>	RKuntz <i>RK</i>	RGibbs <i>RG</i>
DATE	6/21/07	6/21/07	6/21/07	6/25/07	6/21/07

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C. M. Crane

Plant-Specific Regulatory Action

same as original

The enclosed Safety Evaluation (SE) details the interactions between the NRC staff and the Exelon Generation Company, LLC, as well as the rest of the nuclear industry, related to the resolution of Section B.5.b. of the ICM Order. The outcome of these interactions is a license condition that satisfactorily captures the ICM Order Section B.5.b mitigation strategy requirements.

This proposed license condition was transmitted by the NRC to the Exelon Generation Company, LLC in a letter dated October 12, 2006. By letter dated January 9, 2007, the Exelon Generation Company, LLC informed the NRC staff that it would accept the proposed license condition, with a minor change that the NRC staff finds acceptable. The effectiveness of the licensee's actions to implement the mitigative strategies contained in this license condition will be subject to future NRC review and inspection.

Consistent with the Order, administrative license changes to Facility Operating License No. NPF-37 and Facility Operating License No. NPF-66 for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively, and to Facility Operating License No. NPF-72 and Facility Operating License No. NPF-77 for the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively, are being made to incorporate the agreed upon license condition. These changes comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Chapter I. Please replace the affected pages of the Facility Operating Licenses with the enclosed pages (Enclosure 1).

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Sincerely,

Robert F. Kuntz, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch III-2
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN 50-455,
STN 50-456 and STN 50-457

Enclosures:

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RidsNrrDori (CHaney/JLubinski)	RidsNsirDsp	RidsNrrDoriLpIII-2
RidsNrrDoriDpr	RidsRgn3MailCenter	

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single line

ADAMS Accession Nos.: Pkg ML071720009 (Letter & Encl 2: ML071720016, Encl 1: ML071720017)

Attachments to SE (OUO): ML07

OFFICE	NRRLPLIV/PM	NRRLSPB/LA	NRRLDPR/PSPB	NRRLPIII-2/PM	NRRLPIII-2/BC
NAME	MFields	DBaxley	DNelson	RKuntz	RGibbs
DATE		6/21/07			

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 27, 2007

Mr. Christopher M. Crane
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: BYRON STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2, AND BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - CONFORMING LICENSE AMENDMENTS TO INCORPORATE THE MITIGATION STRATEGIES REQUIRED BY SECTION B.5.b. OF COMMISSION ORDER EA-02-026 (TAC NOS. MD4502, MD4503, MD4500, AND MD4501)

Dear Mr. Crane:

This letter documents the results of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's regulatory assessment of the adequacy of the actions taken by the Exelon Generation Company, LLC for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, and the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, in response to Section B.5.b. of the February 25, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order (EA-02-026) and related NRC guidance.

The ICM Order was issued following the events of September 11, 2001, as part of a comprehensive effort by the NRC, in coordination with other government agencies, to improve the capabilities of commercial nuclear reactor facilities to respond to terrorist threats. Section B.5.b. of the Order required licensees to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that could be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire, including those that an aircraft impact might create. Although it was recognized prior to September 11, 2001, that nuclear reactors already had significant capabilities to withstand a broad range of attacks, implementing these mitigation strategies would significantly enhance the plants' capabilities to withstand a broad range of threats. It should be noted that portions of the ICM Order, as well as other documents referenced in this letter, contain security-related or safeguards information, and are not publicly available.

Licensee actions to implement Section B.5.b mitigation strategies have been ongoing since the issuance of the 2002 ICM Order. In 2005, the NRC issued guidance to more fully describe the NRC staff's expectations for implementing Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. The NRC guidance relied upon lessons learned from detailed NRC engineering studies and industry best practices. Additionally, the NRC conducted two on-site team assessments at each reactor facility that identified additional mitigating strategies for preservation of core cooling, containment integrity, and spent fuel pool cooling. In total, these efforts have added defense in depth through the use of additional equipment and strategies. Moreover, these enhancements that have strengthened the interface between plant safety and security operations now include fire-fighting response strategies; plant operations to mitigate fuel damage; and actions to minimize releases.

NOTICE: The attachments to the Safety Evaluation contain Security-Related Information. Upon separation from these attachments, this letter and Enclosures 1 and 2 are DECONTROLLED.

C. M. Crane

-2-

The enclosed Safety Evaluation (SE) details the interactions between the NRC staff and the Exelon Generation Company, LLC,, as well as the rest of the nuclear industry, related to the final resolution of Section B.5.b. of the ICM Order.

The NRC is incorporating requirements for the B.5.b mitigating strategies into the facility operating licenses. This letter, therefore, also transmits the license condition that captures the ICM Order Section B.5.b mitigation strategy requirements and incorporates them into the licensing basis.

This proposed license condition was transmitted by the NRC to the Exelon Generation Company, LLC in letters dated October 12 and 13, 2006, for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, and the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively. By letter dated January 9, 2007, the Exelon Generation Company, LLC informed the NRC staff that it would accept the proposed license condition, with a minor change that the NRC staff finds acceptable. The effectiveness of the licensee's actions to implement the mitigative strategies contained in this license condition will be subject to future NRC review and inspection.

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The attachments to the SE are designated exempt from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1) since they contain security-related information and are Official Use Only.

pm

C. M. Crane

-3-

If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-3733.

Sincerely,

Christa Smith for

Robert F. Kuntz, Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch III-2
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN 50-455,
STN 50-456, and STN 50-457

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- 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/o atts to Encl. 2: See next page

RJK

Byron/Braidwood Stations

cc w/o atts to Encl. 2:

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Byron/Braidwood Stations

- 2 -

cc w/o atts to Encl. 2:

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ENCLOSURE 1

REVISED PAGES OF FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-37 AND NPF-66

DOCKET NOS. STN 50-454 AND STN 50-455

BYRON STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating Licenses. The revised pages are identified by the date of the letter issuing these pages and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE

License NPF-37
Page 4b

License NPF-66
Page 4a
Page 4b

INSERT

License NPF-37
Page 4b

License NPF-66
Page 4a
Page 4b

REVISED PAGES OF FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-72 AND NPF-77

DOCKET NOS. STN 50-456 AND STN 50-457

BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating Licenses. The revised pages are identified by the date of the letter issuing these pages and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE

License NPF-72
Page 4a
Page 4b

License NPF-77
Page 4a
Page 4b

INSERT

License NPF-72
Page 4a
Page 4b

License NPF-77
Page 4a
Page 4b

(22) Mitigation Strategy License Condition

Develop and maintain strategies for addressing large fires and explosions and that include the following key areas:

- (a) Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:
 - 1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and guidance
 - 2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting assets
 - 3. Designated staging areas for equipment and materials
 - 4. Command and control
 - 5. Training of response personnel

- (b) Operations to mitigate fuel damage considering the following:
 - 1. Protection and use of personnel assets
 - 2. Communications
 - 3. Minimizing fire spread
 - 4. Procedures for implementing integrated fire response strategy
 - 5. Identification of readily-available pre-staged equipment
 - 6. Training on integrated fire response strategy
 - 7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures

- (c) Actions to minimize release to include consideration of:
 - 1. Water spray scrubbing
 - 2. Dose to onsite responders

D. The facility requires no exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.

E. Exelon Generation Company shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822), and the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans¹, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21 is entitled: "Byron Nuclear Power Station Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 3," submitted by letter dated May 17, 2006.

¹The training and Qualification Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan are Appendices to the Security Plan

- (c) The decommissioning trust agreement for Byron, Unit 2, must provide that no disbursements or payments from the trust shall be made by the trustee unless the trustee has first given the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 30 days prior written notice of payment. The decommissioning trust agreement shall further contain a provision that no disbursements or payments from the trust shall be made if the trustee receives prior written notice of objection from the NRC.
 - (d) The decommissioning trust agreement must provide that the agreement can not be amended in any material respect without 30 days prior written notification to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 - (e) The appropriate section of the decommissioning trust agreement shall state that the trustee, investment advisor, or anyone else directing the investments made in the trust shall adhere to a "prudent investor" standard, as specified in 18 CFR 35.32(a)(3) of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's regulations.
- (10) Exelon Generation Company, LLC shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the decommissioning trust is maintained in accordance with the application for approval of the transfer of the Byron, Unit 2, license and the requirements of the Order approving the transfer, and consistent with the safety evaluation supporting the Order.
- (11) Mitigation Strategy License Condition

Develop and maintain strategies for addressing large fires and explosions and that include the following key areas:

- (a) Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:
 - 1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and guidance
 - 2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting assets
 - 3. Designated staging areas for equipment and materials
 - 4. Command and control
 - 5. Training of response personnel
- (b) Operations to mitigate fuel damage considering the following:
 - 1. Protection and use of personnel assets
 - 2. Communications
 - 3. Minimizing fire spread
 - 4. Procedures for implementing integrated fire response strategy
 - 5. Identification of readily-available pre-staged equipment
 - 6. Training on integrated fire response strategy
 - 7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures

- (c) Actions to minimize release to include consideration of:
1. Water spray scrubbing
 2. Dose to onsite responders

- D. The facility requires no exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.

An exemption was previously granted pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24. The exemption was granted with NRC materials license No. SNM-1916, issued March 4, 1985, and relieved the licensee from the requirement of having a criticality alarm system. Therefore, the licensee is exempted from the criticality alarm system provision of 10 CFR 70.24 so far as this section applies to the storage of fuel assemblies held under this licensee.

- E. The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the licensee's Fire Protection Report and the licensee's letters dated September 23, 1986, October 23, 1986, November 3, 1986, December 12 and 15, 1986, and January 21, 1987, and as approved in the SER dated February 1982 through Supplement No. 8, subject to the following provision:

The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

- F. Exelon Generation Company shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualifications, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822), and the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans¹, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Byron Nuclear Power Station Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 3," submitted by letter dated May 17, 2006.

- G. Deleted

¹The training and Qualification Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan are Appendices to the Security Plan

- (b) With respect to the decommissioning trust fund, investments in the securities or other obligations of Exelon Corporation or affiliates thereof, or their successors or assigns are prohibited. Except for investments tied to market indexes or other non-nuclear sector mutual funds, investments in any entity owning one or more nuclear power plants are prohibited.
 - (c) The decommissioning trust agreement for Braidwood, Unit 1, must provide that no disbursements or payments from the trust shall be made by the trustee unless the trustee has first given the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 30 days prior written notice of payment. The decommissioning trust agreement shall further contain a provision that no disbursements or payments from the trust shall be made if the trustee receives prior written notice of objection from the NRC.
 - (d) The decommissioning trust agreement must provide that the agreement can not be amended in any material respect without 30 days prior written notification to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 - (e) The appropriate section of the decommissioning trust agreement shall state that the trustee, investment advisor, or anyone else directing the investments made in the trust shall adhere to a "prudent investor" standard, as specified in 18 CFR 35.32(a)(3) of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's regulations.
- (11) Exelon Generation Company shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the decommissioning trust is maintained in accordance with the application for approval of the transfer of the Braidwood, Unit 1, license and the requirements of the Order approving the transfer, and consistent with the safety evaluation supporting the Order.

(12) Mitigation Strategy License Condition

Develop and maintain strategies for addressing large fires and explosions and that include the following key areas:

- (a) Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:
 - 1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and guidance
 - 2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting assets
 - 3. Designated staging areas for equipment and materials
 - 4. Command and control
 - 5. Training of response personnel
- (b) Operations to mitigate fuel damage considering the following:
 - 1. Protection and use of personnel assets
 - 2. Communications
 - 3. Minimizing fire spread

4. Procedures for implementing integrated fire response strategy
5. Identification of readily-available pre-staged equipment
6. Training on integrated fire response strategy
7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures

- (c) Actions to minimize release to include consideration of:
1. Water spray scrubbing
 2. Dose to onsite responders

- D. The facility requires an exemption from the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50, Paragraph III.D.2(b)(ii), the testing of containment air locks at times when containment integrity is not required (SER Section 6.2.6). This exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. This exemption is hereby granted. The special circumstances regarding this exemption are identified in the referenced section of the safety evaluation report and the supplements thereto. This exemption is granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12. With this exemption, the facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission.

An exemption was previously granted pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24. The exemption was granted with NRC materials license No. SNM-1938, issued October 8, 1985, and relieved the licensee from the requirement of having a criticality alarm system. Therefore, the licensee is exempted from the criticality alarm system provision of 10 CFR 70.24 so far as this section applies to the storage of fuel assemblies held under this license.

- E. The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended, and as approved in the SER dated November 1983 and its supplements, subject to the following provision:

The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission, only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

- (c) The decommissioning trust agreement for Braidwood, Unit 2 must provide that no disbursements or payments from the trust shall be made by the trustee unless the trustee has first given the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 30 days prior written notice of payment. The decommissioning trust agreement shall further contain a provision that no disbursements or payments from the trust shall be made if the trustee receives prior written notice of objection from the NRC.
 - (d) The decommissioning trust agreement must provide that the agreement can not be amended in any material respect without 30 days prior written notification to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 - (e) The appropriate section of the decommissioning trust agreement shall state that the trustee, investment advisor, or anyone else directing the investments made in the trust shall adhere to a "prudent investor" standard, as specified in 18 CFR 35.32(a)(3) of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's regulations.
- (10) Exelon Generation Company, LLC shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the decommissioning trust is maintained in accordance with the application for approval of the transfer of the Braidwood, Unit 2, license and the requirements of the Order approving the transfer, and consistent with the safety evaluation supporting the Order.
- (11) Mitigation Strategy License Condition

Develop and maintain strategies for addressing large fires and explosions and that include the following key areas:

- (a) Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:
 - 1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and guidance
 - 2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting assets
 - 3. Designated staging areas for equipment and materials
 - 4. Command and control
 - 5. Training of response personnel
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 - 5. Identification of readily-available pre-staged equipment
 - 6. Training on integrated fire response strategy
 - 7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures

- (c) Actions to minimize release to include consideration of:
1. Water spray scrubbing
 2. Dose to onsite responders

D. The facility requires an exemption from the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50, Paragraph III.D.2(b)(ii), the testing of containment air locks at times when containment integrity is not required (SER Section 6.2.6). This exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. The staff's environmental assessment was published on May 19, 1988 (53 FR 17995). This exemption was granted in the low power license and is continued for the full power license. The special circumstances regarding this exemption are identified in the referenced section of the Safety Evaluation Report and the supplements thereto. This exemption is granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12. With this exemption, the facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission.

An exemption was previously granted pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24. The exemption was granted with NRC materials license No. SNM-1938, issued October 8, 1985, and relieved the licensee from the requirement of having a criticality alarm system. Therefore, the licensee is exempted from the criticality alarm system provision of 10 CFR 70.24 so far as this section applies to the storage of fuel assemblies held under this license.

The facility requires a temporary exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49(f) and 50.49(j).

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.49 (a) states:

Each holder of or each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power plant shall establish a program for qualifying the electric equipment defined in paragraph (b) in this section.

Section 50.49(f) of 10 CFR 50 states:

Each item of electric equipment important to safety must be qualified by one of the following methods:

1. Testing an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.
2. Testing a similar item of equipment with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY

THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO ORDER NO. EA-02-026

EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC

BYRON STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. STN 50-454, STN 50-455, STN 50-456, AND STN 50-457

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this Safety Evaluation (SE) is to document the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's regulatory assessment of the adequacy of the actions taken by the licensee in response to the February 25, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order and the subsequent NRC letter to licensees dated February 25, 2005, transmitting NRC guidance (Phase 1 guidance document). This SE describes the basis for finding licensee strategies adequate to satisfy the requirements of the ICM Order. This SE also discusses the license condition that satisfactorily captures the mitigation strategy requirements. If the licensee makes future changes to its strategies within its commitment management program, this SE will be useful to the NRC staff in determining if the changed strategies are adequate to meet the license condition. It should be noted that portions of the ICM Order, as well as other documents referenced in this SE, contain security-related or safeguards information, and are not publicly available.

1.2 Background

The February 25, 2002, ICM Order that imposed interim compensatory measures on power reactor licensees required in Section B.5.b, Mitigative Measures, the development of "specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of plant due to explosions or fire." These actions were to be implemented by the end of August 2002. Inspections of the implementation of the Section B.5.b requirements were conducted in 2002 and 2003 (Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/148). The inspections identified

NOTICE: The attachments to the Safety Evaluation contain Security-Related Information. Upon separation from these attachments, this Safety Evaluation is DECONTROLLED.

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large variabilities in scope and depth of the enhancements made by licensees. As a result, the NRC determined that additional guidance and clarification was needed for nuclear power plant licensees.

Subsequent to the conduct of the TI 2515/148 inspections, engineering studies conducted by the NRC Office of Regulatory Research (RES) provided insights into the implementation of mitigation strategies to address the loss of large areas of a plant due to explosions or fire, including those that an aircraft impact might create. The NRC actions resulting from these studies included: (1) inspections of licensee actions that address plant-specific consequences, (2) issuance of advisories that involve processes and protocols for licensee notification of an imminent aircraft threat, and (3) identification of mitigative measures to enhance plant response to explosions or fire.

On November 24, 2004, the NRC issued a letter to licensees providing information on the Commission's phased approach for enhancing reactor mitigative measures and strategies for responding to Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. On February 25, 2005, the NRC issued guidance (Phase 1 guidance document) to describe more fully the NRC staff's expectations for implementing Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. Determination of the specific strategies required to satisfy the Order, elaborated on by the Phase 1 guidance document, was termed Phase 1. Further information on the Commission's phased approach and its reliance on the Phase 1 guidance document and related workshop was described in an NRC letter to licensees dated January 14, 2005.

The NRC Phase 1 guidance document relied upon lessons learned from recent NRC engineering studies involving plant assessments, as well as industry best practices. This guidance also included the spent fuel pool mitigative measures described in a NRC letter to licensees dated July 29, 2004, "Issuance of Spent Fuel Pool Mitigative Measures." These best practices were identified during the inspections conducted in 2002 and 2003. The Phase 1 guidance document also incorporated industry comments made at two B.5.b-related workshops held on January 14, 2005, and February 2, 2005.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Section B.5.b of the ICM Order required licensees to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily-available resources (equipment and personnel) that can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. Determination of the specific strategies required to satisfy the Order, elaborated on in the Phase 1 guidance document, was termed Phase 1.

In order to assure adequate protection of public health and safety and common defense and security, the NRC determined that differences in plant design and configuration warranted independent assessments to verify that the likelihood of damage to the reactor core, containment, and spent fuel pools and the release of radioactivity is low at each nuclear power plant. The Commission directed the NRC staff to conduct site-specific security and safety assessments to further identify enhanced mitigation capabilities. Site-specific assessments of spent fuel pools was deemed Phase 2 and site-specific assessments of reactor core and containments was deemed Phase 3.

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The goal of the Phase 2 and 3 mitigation strategy assessments was for the NRC and the licensees to achieve a new level of cognition of safety and security through a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the plants under normal, abnormal, and severe circumstances (from whatever cause). Based on this improved understanding, licensees could take reasonable steps to strengthen their capabilities and reduce their limitations. The NRC expected that safety and security would be well served by further enhancing the licensee's severe accident management strategies for mitigating a wide spectrum of events through the use of readily-available resources and by identifying potential practicable areas for the use of beyond-readily-available resources.

During 2005, the NRC staff performed inspections (TI 2515/164) to determine licensees' compliance with Section B.5.b of the ICM Order (Phase 1). Subsequent meetings were held with licensees to resolve identified open issues. Confirmatory B.5.b Phase 1 inspections (TI 2515/168) were conducted during the period of June to December 2006. The NRC staff conducted site visits as part of the Phase 2 assessments during 2005. In 2006, the NRC staff observed licensee Phase 3 studies and conducted independent Phase 3 assessments.

On January 24, 2006, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted a letter (M. Fertel to L. Reyes) describing an industry proposal for resolving ("closing") Phase 2 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML060260220). The industry proposed high level functional mitigating strategies for a spectrum of potential scenarios involving spent fuel pools. In a letter to all Holders of Licenses for Operating Power Reactors dated June 21, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML061670146), the NRC accepted the Phase 2 proposal pending review of site-specific details of its application and implementation. In arriving at this conclusion, the NRC staff placed significant weight on portions of the proposal that rely on industry commitments to provide beyond-readily-available resources not previously available. These additions will significantly enhance licensees' mitigating strategies capabilities.

On June 27, 2006, the NEI submitted two letters (M. Fertel to W. Kane). In one of the letters, the NEI proposed a license condition to capture the Section B.5.b requirements and addressed items deferred from Phase 1 to Phase 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML061790400). The license condition includes 14 items in the same broad categories as the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document; fire fighting response strategy, plant operations to mitigate fuel damage, and actions to minimize releases. The proposal suggested that the implementing details found to be an acceptable means of meeting the license condition would be treated as commitments, and managed in accordance with NEI 99-04, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes." In the second letter, the NEI proposed generic strategies for closure of Phase 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML061860753). The required strategies for all three phases would be covered by the license condition and all implementing details would be managed by NEI 99-04.

The February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document included 34 expectations. Two of these items were deferred to Phase 2 and seven items (i.e., six expectations and one element of a seventh expectation) were deferred to Phase 3. The NRC staff reached agreement with licensees on the non-deferred items under Phase 1.

Table 1 provides a cross reference of how the 34 elements of the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document and Phases 2 and 3 mitigating strategies correspond to the sections of the license condition.

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On June 29, 2006, the NRC staff issued a letter to the NEI conditionally accepting its proposed license condition and strategies (ADAMS Accession No. ML061790306). The letter reiterated that mitigation strategies in NEI's proposals that were identified during the Phase 2 and 3 assessments, which utilize reasonable, evident, readily-available resources (as identified in the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document) are required pursuant to Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. The implementing details of the required strategies will be implemented by commitment and managed in accordance with the NEI commitment management guideline, NEI 99-04. The NRC staff believes the NEI proposal reasonably justifies excluding from formal regulatory controls those additional strategies identified during the site-specific Phases 2 and 3 assessments that the NRC previously deemed required under Section B.5.b of the ICM Order, but not identified in NEI's proposals. Inherent in this conclusion is recognition of the addition of beyond-readily-available resources included in the proposals. The implementing details of mitigation strategies included in the proposal, including those that utilize beyond-readily-available resources, will be treated as commitments, which will become part of the licensing basis of the plant. Additional strategies identified during site-specific assessments which licensees deem acceptable and valuable to promote diversification and survivability, will be incorporated into licensees' Severe Accident Management Guidelines, Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines, or appended to other site implementation guidance. To verify compliance, the NRC staff evaluated the site-specific implementation and documentation of the proposed Phases 2 and 3 mitigating strategies for each U.S. nuclear power plant.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff's technical evaluation for strategies identified in Phase 1 of Section B.5.b is found in Appendix A. The NRC staff's technical evaluation for strategies identified in Phases 2 and 3 of Section B.5.b is found in Appendix B.

The Mitigating Strategies Table (MST) is included as Appendix C. The purpose of the MST is to capture, at the functional level, a summary of licensee strategies for compliance with the 34 measures presented in the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document and to indicate how the 34 items correlate to the 14 items in the license condition.

4.0 REGULATORY COMMITMENTS

The implementing details of the mitigating strategies required by the license condition are identified in licensee submittals dated January 9, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070170524), and May 16, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML071420301). These details will be implemented by commitment and managed in accordance with the NEI commitment management guideline, NEI 99-04. The NRC staff concludes this provides reasonable controls for mitigating strategy implementation and for subsequent evaluation of licensee-identified changes.

Because the 14 items required by the license condition correlate to the 34 items presented in the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document and the mitigating strategies within NEI's Phase 2 and 3 proposals, and because the implementing details will be managed under NEI 99-04, the NRC staff is satisfied that there will be sufficient controls to ensure that the strategies are adequately maintained.

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5.0 CONCLUSION

Based on the NRC staff's review described in Appendices A, B, and C of this SE, the licensee's responses to the February 25, 2005, Phase 1 guidance document and the spent fuel pool and reactor core and containment mitigating strategy assessments meet the requirements of Section B.5.b, Mitigative Measures, of the February 25, 2002, ICM Order that imposed interim compensatory measures on power reactor licensees. The NRC staff concludes that full implementation of the licensee's enhancements in the submittals identified in Section 4.0, above, constitutes satisfactory compliance with Section B.5.b and the licensee condition, and represents reasonable measures to enhance the licensee's effectiveness in maintaining reactor core and spent fuel pool cooling and containment integrity under circumstances involving the loss of large areas of the plant due to fires or explosions.

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Attachments (Official Use Only - Security-Related Information)
(ADAMS Accession No. ML071710607 & ML071710612):

1. Phase 1 Assessment for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2
2. Phases 2 and 3 Assessment for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2
3. Mitigating Strategies Table for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2
4. Phase 1 Assessment for the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2
5. Phases 2 and 3 Assessment for the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2
6. Mitigating Strategies Table for the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2

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Date: June 27, 2007

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Table 1

CROSS REFERENCE BETWEEN LICENSE CONDITION AND
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT ELEMENTS

License Condition section	Guidance Document Elements
A. Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:	
1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and guidance	B.1.b Staging of personnel B.1.e Outside organization Support B.1.j Treatment of casualties B.1.k Site assembly areas (mass casualties) B.1.m Industry best practice - feeding fire protection ring header
2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting assets	B.1.c Airlifted resources B.1.f Mobilization of fire fighting resources - existing or new MOUs B.1.g Mobilization of fire fighting resources - coordination with other than local mutual aid fire fighting resources (i.e, Industrial facilities, large municipal fire departments, airports, and military bases)
3. Designated staging areas for equipment and materials	B.1.a Staging of equipment B.1.h Controlling emergency response vehicles (includes rad monitoring)
4. Command and Control	B.1.d Command and control B.1.i Communications enhancements
5. Training of response personnel	B.1.l Training considerations

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<p>B. Operations to mitigate fuel damage considering the following:</p>	
<p>1. Protection and use of personnel assets</p>	<p>B.2.a Personnel considerations</p>
<p>2. Communications</p>	<p>B.2.b Communications measures</p>
<p>3. Minimizing fire spread</p>	<p>B.2.h Compartmentalization of plant areas</p>
<p>4. Procedures for implementing integrated fire response strategy</p>	<p>B.2.c Procedures (Included in Phase 3 strategies) B.2.d Evaluation of vulnerable buildings and equipment (Included in Phase 3 strategies) B.2.e Industry best practice - Containment venting and vessel flooding B.2.f Industry best practice for compensatory function (Included in Phase 3 strategies) B.2.g Best practice for use of plant equipment B.2.i Best practice involving plant areas potentially affected by fire or explosions (Included in Phase 3 strategies) B.2.k Best practice for establishing supplemental response capabilities B.2.l Best practice for establishing supplemental response capabilities</p>
<p>5. Identification of readily-available, pre-staged equipment</p>	<p>B.2.g Best practice for use of plant equipment - portable generator and transformer (Included in Phase 3 strategies) B.2.j Best practice involving reliance on portable and offsite equipment (Included in Phase 3 strategies)</p>

6. Training on integrated fire response strategy	B.2.n Training considerations
7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures	B.2.m.1 Dispersal of Fuel B.2.m.2 Hot fuel over rack feet B.2.m.3 Downcomer area B.2.m.4 Enhanced air circulation (Included in Phase 2 strategies) B.2.m.5 Emergency pool makeup, leak reduction/repair (Included in Phase 2 strategies)
C. Actions to minimize release to include considerations of:	
1. Water spray scrubbing	B.3.a Water spray scrubbing B.3.b Prestaging of equipment
2. Dose to onsite responders	B.3.c Dose projection models (Included in Phase 3 strategies)