



U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

19.1 DETERMINING THE TECHNICAL ADEQUACY OF PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS FOR RISK-INFORMED ACTIVITIES

REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES

Primary - Organization responsible for the review of probabilistic risk assessment.

Secondary - None

I. AREAS OF REVIEW

Introduction

While this SRP section was primarily developed to address the technical adequacy of a baseline PRA used by a licensee to support license amendments for an operating reactor, it is also applicable to assessing the technical adequacy of a PRA used to support a design certification or combined license application. However, it needs to be recognized that in these cases there will be aspects of the plant design or operating features, e.g., emergency operating procedures, site specific external factors, that will not be fully developed. Therefore, the PRA used to support such applications will of necessity be incomplete. In using this SRP section the reviewer should focus on the determination that the baseline PRA reflects the status of the design and operational features appropriate to the application.

This SRP section relies on the existence of NRC endorsed PRA standards. The following paragraphs describe the historical development and current status of these standards, and their relevance to this SRP section.

Revision 2 - June 2007

USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

This Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, has been prepared to establish criteria that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants intends to use in evaluating whether an applicant/licensee meets the NRC's regulations. The Standard Review Plan is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the NRC regulations.

The standard review plan sections are numbered in accordance with corresponding sections in Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)." Not all sections of Regulatory Guide 1.70 have a corresponding review plan section. The SRP sections applicable to a combined license application for a new light-water reactor (LWR) are based on Regulatory Guide 1.206, "Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)."

These documents are made available to the public as part of the NRC's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Individual sections of NUREG-0800 will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information and experience. Comments may be submitted electronically by email to NRR_SRP@nrc.gov.

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In their March 1999 report, "Nuclear Regulation: Strategy Needed To Regulate Safety Using Information on Risk," GAO/RCED-99-95, the General Accounting Office (GAO) identified a number of issues that it believed required resolution for the NRC to successfully implement a risk-informed regulatory approach. Among these, GAO indicated that more was needed to "develop standards on the scope and detail of risk assessments needed for utilities to determine that changes to their plants' designs will not negatively affect safety."

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standards have been developed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and American Nuclear Society (ANS). On April 5, 2002, ASME issued a standard (ASME RA-S-2002) for a full-power, internal events (excluding fire) Level 1 and a limited Level 2 PRA. Addenda A and B to the Standard were issued in December, 2003 and December, 2005 respectively. In December 2003, ANS issued a standard for external events (ANSI/ANS-58.21-2003). ANS is developing Level 1 and limited Level 2 PRA standards for internal fire, the low power and shutdown modes of operation, and Level 2 and Level 3 PRAs. In parallel, reactor owners' groups developed a PRA peer review program documented in NEI-00-02, "Probabilistic Risk Assessment Peer Review Process Guidance," Revision A3. Over the course of several years, this peer review program was applied at all the U.S. nuclear power plants. For all but one of the plants, the criteria used to assess the technical adequacy of the PRAs had been developed to some extent independently of the development of the ASME PRA standard. Therefore, the results of the peer review could not be used directly to assess whether the PRA was in conformance with the ASME PRA standard.

On August 16, 2002, NEI submitted draft industry guidance for self-assessments (Letter A. Pietrangelo to S. Newberry) to address the use of industry peer review results in demonstrating conformance with the ASME PRA standard. This additional guidance contains:

1. Self-assessment guidance document
2. Appendix 1, actions for industry self assessment
3. Appendix 2, industry peer review subtier criteria.

Concerns regarding PRA quality and the standards development effort were discussed during the March 31, 2000, Commission briefing on the Risk-Informed Regulation Implementation Plan. The Commission, in their April 18, 2000, Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) on that briefing, indicated that the staff "should provide its recommendations to the Commission for addressing the issue of PRA quality until the ASME and ANS standards have been completed, including the potential role of an industry PRA certification process." In response to the Commission's SRM dated April 18, 2000, the staff issued SECY-00-162, "Addressing PRA Quality in Risk-Informed Activities," which described an approach for addressing PRA quality, including identification of the scope and minimal functional attributes necessary to ensure that the PRA information is adequate for its intended application in decision making. The Commission, in their October 27, 2000, SRM, indicated that the ". . . the timely resolution of PRA quality requirements is necessary to support existing and developing risk-informed regulation" In response to that SRM, Regulatory Guide 1.200 was issued for trial use in February 2004. This provided the staff's position on Addendum A of the ASME Standard, and on the NEI peer review process, including the self-assessment guidance. On May 19, 2006, NEI issued a revision to the self-assessment guidance and incorporated it in NEI-00-02, to satisfy the peer review requirement(s) of the ASME PRA Standard (ASME RA-Sa-2003) as endorsed/modified by the NRC and updated by Addendum B of the ASME PRA Standard (ASME RA-Sb-2005). Regulatory Guide 1.200 and this Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 19.1 have been revised to address Addendum B of the ASME standard and the revised NEI peer review process.

In developing this SRP section, the staff considered the NRC's guidance on the use of PRA in risk-informed regulatory applications, as documented in Regulatory Guide 1.174 and the associated SRP Section 19.2. These documents make it clear that PRA information is one input into making a decision. Specifically, the decision-making process will use the results of the risk analyses in a manner that complements traditional engineering approaches, supports the defense-in-depth philosophy, and preserves safety margins. Thus, risk analysis will inform, but it will not determine regulatory decisions.

Applicability

This SRP section is applicable to any licensee request submitted for NRC review and approval for which information from a PRA plays an effective role in the decision-making process. It will be used to support application-specific SRP sections that provide guidance for several activities, including the following examples:

- applications to support a design certification or combined operating license (SRP Section 19.0)
- changes to a plant's licensing basis (SRP Section 19.2)
- changes to allowed outage times and surveillance test intervals in plant-specific technical specifications (SRP Section 16.1)
- changes in the scope and frequency of tests on pumps and valves in a licensee's inservice test program (SRP Section 3.9.7)
- changes in the scope and frequency of inspections in a licensee's inservice inspection program (SRP Section 3.9.8).

The above documents address reviewing the application in terms of some or all of the following:

- the structures, systems, and components (SSCs); operator actions; and plant operational characteristics affected by the application
- the description of the cause-effect relationships between the change and the above SSCs, operator actions, and plant operational characteristics
- mapping of the cause-effect relationships onto PRA model elements
- identification of the PRA results that will be used in the decision making
- the scope of risk contributors needed to support the decision

The documents also address issues related to limitations in scope of the PRA.

However the PRA results are used, and whatever role they play in the decision making, the PRA analysis must be of sufficient quality to support that role. The existing SRP sections give guidance on assessing the use of the PRA results, but do not give specific guidance on assessing the adequacy of the base PRA. Regulatory Guide 1.200 and this SRP section are intended to fill that gap.

This SRP section provides guidance to the NRC staff on determining the scope of review of the elements of a PRA analysis used to support a specific regulatory application, based on information provided by the licensee on the results of a comparison with an industry PRA standard or the results of a peer review performed in accordance with an industry approved peer review process. This SRP section is intended to be used in conjunction with an application-specific SRP section such as SRP Section 19.0, Section 19.2, Section 16.1, Section 3.9.7, or Section 3.9.8, which focus on the appropriate use of the PRA results in an integrated decision-making process. This SRP section may also be used to support novel applications in which the licensee is expected to identify how the PRA results are used to provide information to the decision makers.

This SRP section does not focus on the decision-making process itself, which is addressed in the application-specific SRP sections.

General

This SRP is intended to support the staff in its assessment of the technical adequacy of the PRA model used to generate results to support a risk-informed submittal. As such, it applies to all the parts¹ of a PRA that support the results.

Review Interfaces

Other SRP sections interface with this section as follows:

See applicability section.

The specific acceptance criteria and review procedures are contained in the referenced SRP sections.

II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

Requirements

Acceptance criteria are based on meeting the relevant requirements of the following Commission regulations:

The underlying regulations are identified in the SRP sections which invoke this SRP section.

SRP Acceptance Criteria

Specific SRP acceptance criteria acceptable to meet the relevant requirements of the NRC's regulations identified above are as follows for the review described in this SRP section. The SRP is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide acceptable methods of compliance with the NRC regulations.

¹ In this SRP, a part of a PRA can be understood as being equivalent to that piece of the analysis for which an applicable PRA standard identifies a supporting level requirement.

In order for the NRC staff to conclude that a PRA is of sufficient technical adequacy to support an application, the staff needs to be assured that (1) the parts of the PRA needed to support the application have been appropriately identified and (2) those parts have been performed in a manner consistent with current good PRA practice. The former needs to be addressed as part of the assessment of the application. The latter can be met by determining that the necessary parts of the PRA have been performed in accordance with the staff position on consensus PRA standards or industry programs as documented in the appendices to Regulatory Guide 1.200. Where there are differences in approach to performing a specific part, the staff must determine that the approach used by the applicant is either equivalent to, or better than, that supported by the staff position.

III. REVIEW PROCEDURES

The reviewer should select material from the procedures described below, as may be appropriate for a particular case.

These review procedures are based on the identified SRP acceptance criteria. For deviations from these acceptance criteria, the staff should review the applicant's evaluation of how the proposed alternatives provide an acceptable method of complying with the relevant NRC requirements identified in Subsection II.

The objective of this SRP is to provide guidance to the NRC staff on how to determine that the PRA results being used in a decision are supported by the underlying analysis. It must be clear that the elements of the model used to generate those results are of sufficient technical quality and that the assumptions and uncertainties that have the potential to affect the results have been evaluated as being appropriate.

III.1 **Scope of Review**

In order to perform the review for quality, the reviewer should first understand the context in which the PRA is being used.

III.1.1 **Use of the PRA in the Application**

The reviewer should become familiar with the way the PRA is used in the application. This includes:

- identification of the SSCs, operator actions, and plant operational characteristics affected by or important to the application
- a description of the cause-effect relationships between the change and the above SSCs, operator actions, and plant operational characteristics (when applicable, e.g., for licence amendment applications)
- mapping of the cause-effect relationships onto PRA model elements (when applicable)
- definition of the acceptance criteria or guidelines, including identification of the PRA results that will be used to compare against the acceptance criteria or guidelines and how the comparison is to be made.

III.1.2 Scope of Risk Contributors Addressed in the PRA Model

Based on the definition of the application, the scope of risk contributors (internal and external initiating events, modes of plant operation) of the PRA can be identified. For example, if the application is designed around using the acceptance guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.174, the evaluations of core damage frequency (CDF), the change in CDF (Δ CDF), large early release frequency (LERF), and the change in LERF (Δ LERF) should be performed with a full-scope PRA, including external initiating events and all modes of operation. However, since most PRAs do not address this full scope, the decision makers must make allowances for these omissions. Examples of allowances include the introduction of compensatory measures, restriction of the implementation of the proposed change to the aspects of the plant covered by the risk model, and use of bounding arguments to cover the risk contributions not addressed by the model. This SRP section does not address this aspect of decision making but is focused on what information should be provided. The reviewer's responsibility is to understand the scope of the PRA used in the decision making so that the appropriate appendices to Regulatory Guide 1.200 are identified as references for the review.

III.1.3 Parts of the PRA Model Used in Application

To assess the quality of the PRA input for a decision, the licensee identifies which parts of the PRA are used to provide the PRA results called for by the acceptance criteria. For license amendments these include not only the logic model events onto which the cause-effect relationships are mapped, but also all the events that appear together with those events in the affected accident sequences, and the parts of the analysis required to evaluate the necessary results. For some applications, this may be a limited set, but for others, e.g., risk-informing the scope of special treatment requirements, all parts of the PRA model are relevant. In addition, when the assessed impact of a proposed change, measured in terms of Δ CDF or Δ LERF, is greater than $1E-06$ /yr or $1E-07$ /yr respectively, the total CDF and LERF are required to be estimated, broadening the scope of review for technical adequacy.

In applying this SRP section, the reviewer need only address those parts identified as being required to support the PRA results used.

III.2 Assessment of the PRA

The part of the PRA used for the application is assessed to determine whether it is of sufficient technical quality. There are two aspects to assessing the acceptability and adequacy of the PRA results. First, the underlying PRA must be technically sound. This implies that (1) the PRA model, or the parts of the model required to support the application, represent the as-built and as-operated plant, which in turn implies that the PRA is up to date and reflects the current design and operating practices, (2) the PRA logic model has been developed in a manner consistent with current good practice and it correctly reflects the dependencies of systems on one another and on operator actions, and (3) the probabilities and frequencies are estimated consistently with the definitions of the corresponding events of the logic model.

Second, the engineering analyses, assumptions, and approximations used in developing the PRA model must be appropriate and must demonstrate the robustness of the conclusions with respect to the uncertainties in the analysis. There are issues for which there is no consensus on analytical models or methods of analysis. Furthermore, PRAs are models, and in that sense the developers of those models rely on certain approximations to make the models manageable

and on certain assumptions to address the uncertainties concerning the modeling of certain issues. This is recognized in regulatory guides such as Regulatory Guide 1.174, which give guidance on how to address the uncertainties by, for instance, performing appropriate sensitivity analyses. This aspect is expected to be addressed in the application-specific regulatory guides and associated SRP sections.

III.2.1 Determination That the PRA Model Is Current

When using risk insights based on a PRA model, the PRA model must be up to date and represent the current plant configuration and operating practices. The reviewer should confirm that the licensee has a process for updating and maintaining the PRA model that is consistent with the staff position on the process in the ASME PRA standard. The reviewer should confirm that the PRA has been revised to reflect any significant changes in design or operational practices (including operating procedures), and that the data used to estimate the parameters are current. This may be achieved by reviewing the licensee's description of their updating process and ascertaining that the licensee has adequately addressed recent plant modifications and operational changes that could have a significant impact on the results of the specific application that are not reflected in the current PRA model.

III.2.2 Assessment of the Technical Adequacy of the PRA Required by the Application

The parts of the PRA required by the application are to be assessed for technical adequacy. Implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.200 should obviate the need for staff review of the base PRA for a risk contributor (e.g., internal events, internal fires, external events) for which a standard and a corresponding appendix to Regulatory Guide 1.200 exist. A staff review of those PRAs for the risk contributors significant to the decision and for which no standard has been endorsed in Regulatory Guide 1.200 will be necessary to the extent needed to support the decision. However, even for the risk contributors addressed by standards, the staff may, under certain circumstances, decide to perform an audit to verify the technical adequacy of the PRA. An audit may be initiated for a number of reasons, some of which are identified below:

- Lack of evidence that the self-assessment actions² that are most relevant to the application have been adequately performed.
- Concerns about the resolution of peer review findings associated with the technical requirements that are most relevant to the application.
- Contributors (e.g., accident sequences, cutsets, operator actions) to the results that differ from those seen at other, similar plants, and for which no plant specific design features can be identified that would explain the differences.
- Results that seem to be counterintuitive, e.g., a decrease in CDF when equipment is taken out of service.
- Estimates of CDF or LERF that differ significantly from those in prior submittals from the same licensee, without a sufficient explanation.

²Self assessment actions are relevant for current operating reactor applications when the original peer review was performed using the NEI 00-02 subtier criteria.

It is expected that a licensee using a PRA standard or standards, and/or the industry peer review process has taken account of the exceptions and clarifications found in the appendices of Regulatory Guide 1.200 and has documented the comparison with the relevant documents as endorsed.

The reviewer should determine that the peer review and self-assessment have been performed in conformance with the relevant documents with the exceptions and clarifications found in the Appendices to Regulatory Guide 1.200.

The reviewer is to focus on the elements that have deviations from, or discrepancies with, the technical requirements of the endorsed documents. The reviewer may make a judgment that the deviation or discrepancy leads to an acceptable equivalent to the requirements of the endorsed documents. Alternatively, the reviewer may determine that the issue has been addressed adequately if the licensee has given reasons as to why the discrepancies are not important, or provided a demonstration that the discrepancy has no significant impact on the results used in the decision.

III.2.3 Assessment of Engineering Analyses, Assumptions, and Approximations

Since the standards and industry PRA programs are not (or are not expected to be) prescriptive, there is some freedom on how to model certain issues in the PRA, so that different analysts may make different assumptions regarding these issues, yet the issues still meet the requirements of the standard or have been accepted by the peer review. The choice of a specific assumption or a particular approximation may, however, influence the results of the PRA. The NRC staff needs to be confident that the conclusions drawn from the PRA are not invalidated by the use of specific assumptions. This is addressed primarily in the application-specific assessment through the use of sensitivity analyses. However, the staff should review the licensee's basis for those assumptions and their justification, taking into account the peer reviewers' assessment. The staff should determine that the assumptions have been characterized appropriately so that there is sufficient information to conclude that the sensitivity studies performed to test the robustness of the conclusions are reasonable with respect to what is seen in current PRA practice. The staff's focus should be on assessing the licensee's approach to the identification of the key assumptions, which are those made in response to key sources of uncertainty (see Regulatory Guide 1.200, Footnote 7 and Table A-1), and on assessing the appropriateness of the key assumptions.

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

The reviewer should provide documentation to conclude that the elements of the PRA required to produce the results have been performed in such a way that the PRA results are fully supportable.

IV.1 Assessment of PRA Against Current Good PRA Practice

The PRA elements are assessed to determine that they have been performed in a technically correct manner that conforms with current good PRA practices. This can be determined by an assessment that the PRA elements are performed consistently with the standard or peer review process as endorsed in the appendices to Regulatory Guide 1.200, or that, where a discrepancy exists, the approach used is equivalent to, or is superior to that referenced in the standard or peer review process document. Alternatively, the reviewer may rely on a demonstration that the impact on the results used in the application is not significant.

IV.2 Key Assumptions and Approximations Assessed

The reviewer should be satisfied that the key assumptions and approximations made to address the sources of uncertainty identified as having the potential to significantly impact the particular PRA results have been characterized in an acceptable manner given the current state of knowledge, and that the characterization has taken into account the results of the peer review.

V. IMPLEMENTATION

This SRP is intended to be used in conjunction with, and in support of, an application-specific SRP such as SRP Section 19.0, Section 19.2, Section 16.1, Section 3.9.7, or Section 3.9.8.

VI. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities."
2. 10 CFR Part 52, "Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants."
3. American Nuclear Society. "External-Events PRA Methodology." ANSI/ANS-58.21-2003. ANS: La Grange Park, IL. December 2003.
4. American Society of Mechanical Engineers. "Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications." ASME RA-S-2002. ASME: New York, NY. April 5, 2002.
5. American Society of Mechanical Engineers. "Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications." ASME RA-Sa-2003 (Addendum A to RA-S-2002). ASME: New York, NY. December 5, 2003.
6. American Society of Mechanical Engineers. "Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications." ASME RA-Sb-2005 (addendum B to RA-S-2002). ASME: New York, NY. December 30, 2005.
7. Nuclear Energy Institute. "Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Peer Review Process Guidance." NEI-00-02, Revision A3. NEI: Washington, DC. March 20, 2000.
8. Pietrangelo, A. (NEI) Director of Risk and Performance Based Regulation Nuclear Generation, to S. Newberry (NRC) Director of the Division of Risk Analysis and Applications. Letter dated August 16, 2002.
9. Pietrangelo, A. (NEI) Senior Director, Risk Regulation, to Mary Drouin (NRC). Letter dated May 19, 2006.
10. Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 3, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)." November 1978.
11. Regulatory Guide 1.174, Revision 1, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis." July 2002.

12. Regulatory Guide 1.200 For Trial Use, "An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-informed Activities." February 2004.
13. Regulatory Guide 1.200, "An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-informed Activities." Revision 1. January 2007.
14. Regulatory Guide 1.206, "Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)." June 2007.
15. U.S. General Accounting Office. "Nuclear Regulation: Strategy Needed To Regulate Safety Using Information on Risk." GAO/RCED-99-95. GAO: Washington, DC. March 19, 1999.
16. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. SECY-00-0162. "Addressing PRA Quality in Risk-Informed Activities." NRC: Washington, DC. July 28, 2000.
17. Vietti-Cook, A. (NRC) to W.D. Travers (NRC). *Staff Requirements Memorandum*. "Staff Requirements - Briefing on Risk-Informed Regulation Implementation Plan (SECY-00-0062), March 31, 2000." NRC: Washington, DC. April 18, 2000.
18. Vietti-Cook, A. (NRC) to W.D. Travers (NRC). *Staff Requirements Memorandum*. "Staff Requirements - Addressing PRA Quality In Risk-Informed Activities." NRC: Washington, DC. October 27, 2000.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

The information collections contained in the Standard Review Plan are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, and were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0011 and 3150-0151.

PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

SRP Section 19.1

Description of Changes

This SRP section affirms the technical accuracy and adequacy of the guidance previously provided in Revision 1, dated September 2006 of this SRP. See ADAMS accession number ML062510220.

In addition, this SRP section was administratively updated in accordance with NRR Office Instruction, LIC-200, Revision 1, "Standard Review Plan (SRP) Process." The revision also adds standard paragraphs to extend application of the updated SRP section to prospective submittals by applicants pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52.

The technical changes are incorporated in Revision 2, dated **Month**, 2007:

Review Responsibilities - Reflects changes in review branches resulting from reorganization and branch consolidation. Changes is reflected throughout the SRP.

I. AREAS OF REVIEW

1. Updated the introduction to indicate that SRP 19.1 applies to PRAs that support design certifications and combined operating licenses, in addition to PRAs used to support license amendment requests.
2. Revised references to SRP Chapter 19.0 to SRP Section 19.2 to reflect change in SRP numbering.
3. Updated text to indicate that SRP 19.1 relies on the existence of NRC-endorsed PRA standards.
4. Updated the development history of the ASME and ANS standards.
5. Updated text to indicate the development and issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.200.
6. Updated text to indicate the revision of NEI-00-02 to incorporate self-assessment guidance.
7. Added the Applicability subheading.
8. Added the General subheading and moved the text under former Section I beneath it.
9. Added the Review Interfaces subheading.

II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

1. Added the Requirements subheading and standardized SRP text.
2. Added the SRP Acceptance Criteria subheading and standardized SRP text (as the first paragraph).

III. REVIEW PROCEDURES

1. Review Procedures, added first two paragraphs of standardized SRP text.

2. Added text to indicate when review of the total CDF and LERF is required.
3. Added guidance to determine when an audit is needed to verify the technical adequacy of the PRA.
4. Added guidance for reviewers to determine that PRA peer reviews and self-assessments have been performed in conformance with the relevant documents, and have considered the exceptions and clarifications in Regulatory Guide 1.200.
5. Clarified guidance about the review of key assumptions.

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

1. Revised the heading of Section IV.2 (changed “significant” to “key”).

V. IMPLEMENTATION

None

VI. REFERENCES

1. Updated references to reflect the issuance of addenda to the ASME standard.
2. Added the ANS standard on external events to references.
3. Added letter from NEI dated May 19, 2006 to references.
4. Added Regulatory Guide 1.200 to references.
5. Deleted SECY-99-256 from the references.
6. Deleted NEI letter dated December 18, 2001 from the references.
7. Deleted SRP Chapter 19 from the references.
8. Deleted SRP Section 16.1 from the references.
9. Deleted SRP Section 3.9.7 from the references.
10. Deleted SRP Section 3.9.8 from the references.