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GNRO-2007/00043

June 13, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk

Subject: Technical Specification Bases Update to the NRC for Period Dated
June 13, 2007

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-416
License No. NPF-29

Dear Sir and Madam:

Pursuant to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) Technical Specification 5.5.11, Entergy Operations, Inc. hereby submits an update of all changes made to GGNS Technical Specification Bases since the last submittal (GNRO-2007/00021 dated April 11, 2007 to the NRC from GGNS). This update is consistent with update frequency listed in 10CFR50.71(e).

This letter does not contain any commitments.

Should you have any questions, please contact W. B. Abraham at (601) 437-2319.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "for CA Bottemiller".

Charles A. Bottemiller
Manager, Plant Licensing

CAB/WBA

attachment: GGNS Technical Specification Bases
cc: (See Next Page)

cc:

<p>NRC Senior Resident Inspector Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Port Gibson, MS 39150</p>	
<p>U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Dr. Bruce S. Mallett (w/2) 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-4005</p>	<p>ALL LETTERS</p>
<p>U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Bhalchandra Vaidya, NRR/DORL (w/2) ATTN: ADDRESSEE ONLY ATTN: Courier Delivery Only Mail Stop OWFN/O-7D1A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2378</p>	<p>ALL LETTERS – COURIER DELIVERY (FEDEX, ETC.) ADDRESS ONLY - ****DO NOT USE FOR U.S. POSTAL SERVICE ADDRESS***** NOT USED IF EIE USED</p>

ATTACHMENT to GNRO-2007/00043

Grand Gulf Technical Specification Bases Revised Pages

dated

June 13, 2007

LDC#	BASES PAGES AFFECTED	TOPIC of CHANGE
07022	B 3.6-87	This change reflects the volume of in-leakage associated with degradation of the secondary containment between performances of surveillance requirement 3.6.4.1.3. The assumed in-leakage from building degradation was decreased from 125 SCFM to 115 SCFM as documented in revision 5 to calculation M3.9.012 via EC-0000696.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4

The SGT System exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.3 verifies that the SGT System will rapidly establish and maintain a pressure in the secondary containment that is less than the lowest postulated pressure external to the secondary containment boundary.

SR 3.6.4.1.4 demonstrates that each OPERABLE SGT subsystem can maintain a reduced pressure in the secondary containment sufficient to allow the secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. The test criterion specified by SR 3.6.4.1.4 includes an allowance for building degradation between performances of the surveillance. This allowance represents additional building in-leakage of 115 scfm.

As discussed in B 3.6.4.2, the SGT System has the capacity to maintain secondary containment negative pressure assuming the failure of all non qualified lines 2 inches and smaller plus other analyzed failures. The number and size of these assumed failures can vary as penetrations are added or removed from the secondary containment boundary. To account for the absence of these assumed failures under test conditions the test criteria specified by SRs 3.6.4.1.3 and 3.6.4.1.4 are modified. These failures could increase secondary containment in-leakage by approximately 300 scfm. To account for this additional in-leakage, the required vacuum level of SR 3.6.4.1.3 is modified to require that the secondary containment can be drawn down to ≥ 0.311 inches of vacuum water gauge in 180 seconds. For the same reason, the required vacuum level of SR 3.6.4.1.4 is also modified to require secondary containment be maintained ≥ 0.311 inches of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour using one SGT subsystem at a flow rate ≤ 4000 cfm. The vacuum level used for these surveillances represents the minimum required to ensure that the integrity of the SGT system boundary will meet its design requirement of reaching (within 180 seconds) and maintaining ≥ 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge following a postulated accident when combined with the assumed failures.

The primary purpose of these SRs is to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. The secondary purpose of

(continued)
