

28

**NRR-2005-A-0031**

**ALLEGATION REVIEW BOARD BRIEFING  
AND MEETING SUMMARY**

---

<b>FACILITY:</b>	University of Arizona
<b>TAC NUMBER:</b>	MC8392
<b>RECEIVED:</b>	September 16, 2005
<b>150-DAY DATE:</b>	February 13, 2006

---

<b>TYPE OF ARB:</b>	Followup ARB Meeting
<b>PURPOSE OF ARB:</b>	To discuss allegation resolution
<b>DATE OF ARB:</b>	October 27, 2005

---

**CONCERN 1:**

Individuals loitered late at night near the research reactors and were not challenged.

**CONCERN 2:**

Doors to the building that houses the reactor were left unlocked, even at night.

**CONCERN 3:**

Individuals discovered two unlocked doors to the building that houses the reactor, accessible via exterior stairwells. Individuals were able to film the reactor room at length through the building's exterior windows, unchallenged.

**UPDATED INFORMATION SINCE LAST ARB IS HIGHLIGHTED**

**I. BACKGROUND:**

An investigative ABC News team provided information to NRC's Office of Public Affairs regarding issues at several research reactor sites that ABC believed to reflect violations of security measures. The ABC staff identified specific 13 colleges where interns attempted to gain access to the university research reactor facilities. The individuals videotaped portions of their attempts (the NRC staff has asked ABC for any tape they have on these issues).

A-28

Staff viewed part of the ABC videotapes, and identified 13 allegations, one for each RTR. The generic issue is addressed in allegation NRR-2005-A-0019.

At the University of Arizona, ABC provided information that there was no guard posted in the booth at the reactor building's exterior. Individuals took pictures of the empty booth late at night. No one came to question the individuals about their activities. Staff review of ABC's edited tape did not reveal any evidence of a violation at the University of Arizona.

Allegation NRR-2005-A-0019, initiated various actions, as guided by Senior Management, and the Commission. These actions include: 1) review of the security plans at the University of Arizona; 2) plans to send an RAIs to all RTR facilities with reactor fuel, including the University of Arizona. These RAIs will clarify the CALs, but do not impose any new requirements; and 3) plans to send a Response Letter to ABC. This letter will formally request more information from the broadcast company so that staff may followup on concerns for the 13 RTRs, including the University of Arizona.

On October 13, the day of the "Primetime" show, ABC published a public website listing all 25 RTRs that their interns visited. The ABC website identified the 25 colleges where interns attempted to gain access to the university research reactor facilities, and listed ABC's perceived security concerns. Staff opened allegations for the additional 12 RTRs. These are NRR-2005-A-0034 through NRR-2005-A-0045.

Staff identified two new concerns at the University of Arizona.

## II. REGULATORY REQUIREMENT(S):

NRC licensed research reactors are required to establish, maintain and follow an NRC-approved security plan and procedures for the protection of nuclear materials from threats and theft. Those measures include the ability to detect unauthorized access to the facility and delay the intruders until the designated response force is able to respond. Security requirements are based on a graded approach with increasing requirements for material that is more attractive for theft or diversion and for facilities that have a greater risk of radiological releases due to sabotage.

10 CFR 73.67, *Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance*, states, in part, "...(d) *Fixed site requirements for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance*. Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses quantities and types of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance at a fixed site (...) shall (...)

- 6) Limit access to the controlled access areas to authorized or escorted individuals who require such access in order to perform their duties,
- 7) Assure that all visitors to the controlled access area are under the constant escort of an individual who has been authorized to access this area..."

Licensee have detailed plans and procedures specifying how to meet these requirements, including specific guidance as to the criteria for searching packages and for allowing escorted access.

**III. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND BASIS: Low**

There is no evidence that unauthorized access was granted at the University of Arizona. The generic issue is a significant safety issue, and is addressed in NRR-2005-A-0019.

There is no evidence that the University violated NRC approved security procedures, plans or measures. NRC has evaluated security plans, procedures and systems and has verified that appropriate security measures are in place to protect the public health and safety from the potential radiological effects of postulated theft or sabotage. Therefore, the safety significance is low.

**IV. TECHNICAL REVIEW PRIORITY AND BASIS: Low**

Based on the above safety significance.

**V. ACTIONS:**

**A. PROPOSED INVESTIGATIONS, PRIORITY LEVEL: No**

The issues identified did not appear to violate NRC requirements for security at research reactors.

**B. REFERRAL: No**

**C. PROPOSED INSPECTIONS AND DUE DATES: No**

**D. OTHER ACTIONS: Yes**

As a result of allegation NRR-2005-A-0019, the Research and Test Reactor Section (RTRS) coordinated their proposed actions with OI, DIPM, OPA and OGC. For the University of Arizona, RTRS performed a review of security plans, and relevant documents. Their review did not identify any violations of the approved security plan. Due Date: Completed.

RTRS assessment states the licensee security plan dated February 2003, defines the controlled access area as within certain rooms. The plan does not require control access to and around the building. These areas are public access area.

Staff plans to review the ABC show to determine if additional issues are identified. Any new issues will be brought to the ARB.

Further, the staff will request complete unedited tapes of the interns' visits to the University of Arizona from ABC. ABC has verbally agreed to release the tapes following airing of the show. If the tapes identify new issues, staff will return to the ARB.

If the show and unedited tapes do not identify any further information, the staff will close the allegation.

RTRS identified two new concerns, and based on their review of the University's Physical Security Plan and Compensatory Measures did not identify any violations. Their assessment for the new concerns states:

Concern 2: The reactor facility and Controlled Access Area is a defined set of rooms in the Engineering building. There is no requirement in the Physical Security Plan to security in the Engineering building. This area is open to the public. The staff did not identify any violations.

Concern 3: The reactor facility and Controlled Access Area is a defined set of rooms in the Engineering building. There is no requirement in the Physical Security Plan to security in the Engineering building. This area is open to the public. There are no restrictions against filming through windows. The staff did not identify any violations.

Staff reviewed the ABC "Primetime" show, and did not identify any new relevant information. Staff plans to request complete unedited tapes from ABC to determine if additional issues are identified. Any new issues indicating a possible violation of NRC regulations will be brought to the ARB.

Based on RTRS review, the staff plans to close this allegation. If additional information is received indicating a possible violation of NRC regulations (i.e. from ABC's unedited tapes) then staff will re-open the allegation. Due Date: December 31, 2005.

**VI. NON-NRR ISSUES (OGC, OE, NMSS, REGION, ETC.): None**

**NRR-2005-A-0031**

**ALLEGATION REVIEW BOARD SECTION**

**ARB DECISION (and comments):**

The ARB agreed with the safety significance, technical review priority, and proposed resolution plan.

<b>ARB CHAIRMAN:</b>	<b>M. Case</b>
<b>ARB MEMBER:</b>	<b>H. Berkow</b>
<b>ALLEGATION COORDINATOR:</b>	<b>G. Cwalina</b>
<b>OI REPRESENTATIVE:</b>	<b>K. Monroe</b>
<b>OE REPRESENTATIVE:</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>OGC REPRESENTATIVE:</b>	<b>G. Longo</b>
<b>IPSB LEAD REVIEWER:</b>	<b>V. Hall</b>
<b>TECHNICAL BRANCH LEAD REVIEWER:</b>	<b>M. Mendonca</b>
<b>RECORDING SECRETARY:</b>	<b>K. Richards</b>
<b>ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS:</b>	<b>R. Barnes, E. Brenner, M. Brooks, M. Marshall, T. Quay F. Talbot, D. Terao, B. Thomas</b>

**DISTRIBUTION:**

**B. Sheron, NRR  
B. Jones, OGC  
G. Caputo, OI**

D:\2005-31\Followup ARB Briefing Sheet\_2005-0031.wpd