

GE Energy

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MFN 07-254

Docket No. 52-010

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional Information

Letter No. 95 – RAI Number 20.0-8

Enclosure 1 contains GE's response to the subject NRC RAIs transmitted via the Reference 1 letter.

If you have any questions or require additional information regarding the information provided here, please contact me.

Sincerely,

James C. Kinsey

Project Manager, ESBWR Licensing

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Reference:

1. MFN 07-204, Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to David Hinds, Request for Additional Information Letter No. 95 Related to the ESBWR Design Certification Application, March 27, 2007

Enclosures:

- 1. MFN 07-254 Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional Information Letter No. 95 - Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application - Generic issues - RAI Number 20.0-8
- 2. MFN 07-254 Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional Information Letter No. 95 - Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application - Generic issues – RAI Number 20.0-8 – DCD Markup Pages

cc: AE Cubbage USNRC (with enclosures) GB Stramback GE/San Jose (with enclosures) BE Brown GE/ Wilmington (with enclosures)

eDRF 0067-5779

Enclosure 1

MFN 07-254

Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional Information Letter No. 95

Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application

Generic Issues

RAI Number 20.0-8

NRC RAI 20.0-8

DCD, Tier 2, Revision 3, Table 1.11-1, Discussion of Task Action Plan (TAP) A-17 refers to Note (4). Note (4) states that this TAP " ... would be addressed elsewhere in Tier 2." Please revise Table 1.11-1, A-17, to reference GE's response to RAI 19.1.0-2 dated January 30, 2007 (MFN 07-066) regarding regulatory treatment of non-safety systems (RTNSS), or reference the appropriate DCD Section containing the information in this RAI response

GE Response

GE accepts the comment and will modify Item A-17 of Table 1.11-1 to refer to DCD Tier 2 Appendix 19A, Section 19A.6. This is where the portion of the RAI 19.1.0-2 response related to Item A-17 has been incorporated into Revision 3 of the DCD.

Affected Documents

DCD Tier 2, Table 1.11-1, will be revised as noted in the attached markup for Item A-17.

Enclosure 2

MFN 07-254

Response to Portion of NRC Request for

Additional Information Letter No. 95

Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application

Generic Issues

RAI Number 20.0-8

DCD Markup Pages

Table 1.11-1 (continued)

Action Plan Item/Issue Number	Description	Associated Tier 2 Location(s) and/or Technical Resolution
		handling, or installation.
		 The snubber location, orientation, position setting, and configuration are according to design drawings and specifications.
		 Snubbers are not seized, frozen or jammed.
		 Adequate swing clearance is provided to allow snubber movements.
		 If applicable, fluid is to the recommended level and is not to be leaking from the snubber system.
		 Structural components (e.g., pins, fasteners, etc.) are installed correctly.
		If the period between the initial pre-service examination and initial system pre-operational tests exceeds 6 months, reexaminations of the first, fourth, and fifth items are performed. Snubbers that are installed incorrectly or otherwise fail to meet the above requirements will be prepared or replaced and re-examined in accordance with the above criteria.
		Refer to Subsection 3.9.3.7.1 for further details.
A-14	Flaw Detection	(3)
A-15	Primary Coolant System Decontamination and Steam Generator Chemical Cleaning	(8) Issue resolved with publication of decontamination criteria in NUREG/CR-2963.
A-16	Steam Effects on BWR Core Spray Distribution	(1) There is no core spray in the ESBWR design.
A-17	Systems Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants	(4) See Appendix 19A, Section 19A.6, for further details regarding this issue as part of the discussion of Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS).
A-18	Pipe Rupture Design Criteria	(3)