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MFN 06-486
Supplement 1

Docket No. 52-010

May 11, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject: **Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional Information
Letter No. 79 Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application –
Reliability Assurance Program – RAI Numbers 17.4-15 S01 and 17.4-
16 S01**

Enclosure 1 contains GE's response to the subject NRC RAIs transmitted via e-mail on April 12, 2007. GE's original response was provided in the Reference 1 letter.

If you have any questions or require additional information regarding the information provided here, please contact me.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Kathy Sedney for".

James C. Kinsey
Project Manager, ESBWR Licensing

Reference:

1. MFN 06-486, Letter from David Hinds to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, *Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional Information Letter No. 79 Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application – Reliability Assurance Program – RAI Numbers 17.4-13 through 17.4-16*, November 22, 2006

Enclosure:

1. MFN 06-486, Supplement 1 – Response to Portion of NRC Request for Additional Information Letter No. 79 Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application – Reliability Assurance Program – RAI Numbers 17.4-15 S01 and 17.4-16 S01

cc: AE Cabbage USNRC (with enclosures)
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Enclosure 1

MFN 06-486, Supplement 1

Response to Portion of NRC Request for

Additional Information Letter No. 79

Related to ESBWR Design Certification Application

Reliability Assurance Program

RAI Numbers 17.4-15 S01 and 17.4-16 S01

Original Responses previously submitted under MFN 06-486 are included without DCD updates to provide historical continuity during review.

NRC RAI 17.4-15

The staff determined that a COL applicant referencing the ESBWR should reference the guidance documents used to implement its O-RAP in DCD Tier 2, Section 17.4.9, "Operational Reliability Assurance Activities." For the Maintenance Rule element of the O-RAP, these documents include RG 1.160, "Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," which endorses NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guidance for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." In addition, if still effective at the time of the COL application, RG 1.182, "Assessing and Managing the Risk Before Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," which endorsed the revised NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, "Assessment of Risk Resulting from the Performance of Maintenance Activities," should be referenced. This information should also be added to DCD Tier 2, Section 17.4.14, "References."

GE Response:

RG 1.160, "Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guidance for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," RG 1.182, "Assessing and Managing the Risk Before Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," the revised NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, "Assessment of Risk Resulting from the Performance of Maintenance Activities," will be referenced in DCD Tier 2, Section 17.4.9.

DCD Impact

DCD Tier 2, Section 17.4 will be revised in Revision 3 as noted in the response to RAI 17.4-15.

NRC RAI 17.4-15 S01

The list of Maintenance Rule guidance documents in Section 17.4 of the ESBWR DCD, Tier 2, should include the February 22, 2000, revision to Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01. NUMARC 93-01 should also be listed as a reference in DCD Section 17.4.14.

GE Response

DCD Tier 2 Section 17.4 will be revised, as shown in the attachment, to include the February 22, 2000, revision to Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01. NUMARC 93-01 is listed as a reference in DCD Section 17.4.14.

NRC RAI 17.4-16

The staff determined that the following COL action items should be added to DCD Tier 2, Section 17.4.13:

- *The COL applicant is responsible for integrating the objectives of O-RAP into the QA program developed to implement 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. This program should also address failures of non-safety-related, risk-significant SSCs that result from design and operational errors in accordance with SECY 95-132, Item E.*
- *The COL applicant is responsible for performing the tasks necessary to maintain the reliability of risk-significant SSCs as identified in the D-RAP. The applicant may cite, for example, cost-effective maintenance enhancements, such as condition monitoring and using condition-directed maintenance as well as time directed or planned periodic maintenance.*
- *The COL applicant's Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) program is required for monitoring the effectiveness of the COL applicant's maintenance activities needed for operational reliability assurance. As such it is an important element of O-RAP.*
- *If the COL applicant proposes to use its Maintenance Rule program in O-RAP implementation, the SSCs in the scope of the Maintenance Rule program that are classified as high-safety-significant (HSS) should encompass all SSCs in the scope of the D-RAP.*
- *In addition to the specific tasks necessary to maintain SSC reliability at its required level cited above, the O-RAP activities should include:*
 - *Reliability data base - Historical data on equipment performance as available. The compilation and reduction of this data provides the plant with source of component reliability information. Data used in PRA fault-tree analyses may also be a viable initial source.*
 - *Surveillance and testing-establishes the level of performance or condition being maintained for SSCs within the scope of the RAP and identifies declining trends in between surveillances prior to performance or condition degrading to unacceptable levels undetected (or failure) to the extent possible.*
 - *Maintenance Plan - This plan describes the nature and frequency of maintenance activities to be performed on plant equipment. The plan includes the selected SSCs identified in the D-RAP.*

GE Response

COL Information Item 17.4-2:

The Combined License holder is responsible for integrating the objectives of O-RAP into the Quality Assurance Program developed to implement 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. This program will also address failures of non-safety-related, risk-significant SSCs that result from design and operational errors in accordance with SECY 95-132, Item E.

COL Information Item 17.4-3:

The Combined License holder is responsible for performing the tasks necessary to maintain the reliability of risk-significant SSCs as identified in the D-RAP. The applicant may cite, for example, cost-effective maintenance enhancements, such as condition monitoring and using condition-directed maintenance as well as time directed or planned periodic maintenance.

COL Information Item 17.4-4:

The Combined License holder's Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) program is required for monitoring the effectiveness of the COL applicant's maintenance activities needed for operational reliability assurance.

COL Information Item 17.4-5:

The Combined License holder shall consider all SSCs that are in the scope of the D-RAP as high-safety-significant (HSS) within the scope of the Maintenance Rule program, or provide Expert Panel justification for any exceptions.

Note: The Expert Panel, in accordance with common industry practice and guidance in NUMARC 93-01, develops the final list of risk significant SSCs from various inputs, including the PRA risk importance calculations and industry operating experience. It is prudent for the Expert Panel to include all SSCs that are in the scope of the D-RAP to be within the scope of the Maintenance Rule. However, risk importance calculations and other factors may change the risk significance of certain SSCs that were previously determined to be risk-significant within the bounds of the D-RAP. Therefore, exceptions between the D-RAP and O-RAP risk significance may exist, and should be evaluated and justified by the Expert Panel.

COL Information Item 17.4-6:

The Combined License holder O-RAP activities should include:

- Reliability Database - Historical data on equipment performance as available. The compilation and reduction of this data provides the plant with source of component reliability information. Data used in PRA fault-tree analyses may also be a viable initial source.
- Surveillance and Testing - Establishes the level of performance or condition being maintained for SSCs within the scope of the RAP and identifies declining trends in between surveillances prior to performance or condition degrading to unacceptable levels undetected (or failure) to the extent possible.
- Maintenance Plan - This plan describes the nature and frequency of maintenance activities to be performed on plant equipment. The plan includes the selected SSCs identified in the D-RAP.

COL Information Items 17.4-1 through 17.4-6 shall be available prior to fuel load for NRC inspection to confirm that they meet NRC regulations and guidance.

DCD Impact:

DCD Tier 2, Section 17.4 will be revised in Revision 3 as noted in the response to RAI 17.4-16.

NRC RAI 17.4-16 S01

(a) The second bullet under DCD Tier 2, Revision 3, Section 17.4.13, contains the phrase "PRA important measures." This phrase should be revised to read "PRA importance measures"

(b) The following note, or words to this effect (i.e., addressing differences between DRAP and O-RAP scope), should be included after the fifth bullet under DCD Tier 2, Revision 3, Section 17.4.13, or otherwise appropriately expressed in DCD Tier 2 Section 17.4.13:

Note: The Expert Panel, in accordance with common industry practice and guidance in NUMARC 93-01, develops the final list of risk-significant SSCs from various inputs, including the PRA risk importance calculations and industry operating experience. It is necessary for the Expert Panel to include all SSCs that are in the scope of the RAP to be included in the high-safety-significant (HSS) category of SSCs within the scope of the Maintenance Rule. However, risk importance calculations, plant specifics and other factors may change the risk significance of certain SSCs in the O-RAP that were previously determined to be risk-significant within the bounds of the D-RAP. Therefore, exceptions between the D-RAP and O-RAP risk significance may exist, and should be evaluated and justified by the Expert Panel.

Note the recommended changes to the wording of the original note.

GE Response

The recommended wording changes in (a) and (b) will be incorporated into DCD Tier 2 Section 17.4, as shown in the attachment.

Table 17.0-1

Compliance With Quality Assurance Related Regulatory Guides Program Commitments

Regulatory Guide No Commitment:	Revision	Comments
RG 1.8	3	COL holder scope
RG 1.26	3	No exception Except for the alternate Quality Group Classification for the Hydraulic Control Unit per Note 8 of Table 3.2-1
RG 1.28	3	Except for NRC-accepted alternate positions in Table 2-1 of Reference 17.0-1
RG 1.29	3	No exception Except for Main Steam Piping from seismic interface restraint to turbine stop valves as identified in Table 3.2-1 and Figure 3.2-1
RG 1.30	0	No exception
RG 1.33	2	COL holder scope
RG 1.37	0	Except for NRC-accepted alternate positions in Table 2-1 of Reference 17.0-1
RG 1.38	2	Except for NRC-accepted alternate positions in Table 2-1 of Reference 17.0-1
RG 1.39	2	No exception
RG 1.54	1	No exception
RG 1.58	Withdrawn	Superseded by Regulatory Guide 1.28, Rev. 3
RG 1.64	Withdrawn	Superseded by Regulatory Guide 1.28, Rev. 3, except for NRC-accepted alternate positions in Table 2-1 of Reference 17.0-1
RG 1.74	Withdrawn	Superseded by Regulatory Guide 1.28, Rev. 3
RG 1.88	Withdrawn	Superseded by Regulatory Guide 1.28, Rev. 3
RG 1.94	1	COL holder scope
RG1.97	4	No exception
RG 1.116	0-R	No exception
RG 1.123	Withdrawn	Superseded by Regulatory Guide 1.28, Rev. 3
RG 1.143	2	No exception

Regulatory Guide <u>NoCommitment-</u>	Revision	Comments
RG 1.144	Withdrawn	Superseded by Regulatory Guide 1.28, Rev. 3
RG 1.146	Withdrawn	Superseded by Regulatory Guide 1.28, Rev. 3
RG 1.152	2	No exception
RG1.168	1	No exception
RG 1.169	9/1997	No exception
RG 1.170	9/1997	No exception
RG 1.171	9/1997	No exception
RG 1.172	9/1997	No exception
RG 1.173	9/1997	No exception
RG 1.176	0	COL holder scope
RG 4.15	1	No exception
RG 7.10	2	No exception
Subpart 2.1 of ASME NQA-1-1994	1994	Commitment through ESBWR commitment to ASME NQA-2-1983
Subpart 2.2 of ASME NQA-1-1994	1994	Commitment through ESBWR commitment to ASME NQA-2-1983
Subpart 2.3 of ASME NQA-1-1994	1994	COL holder Scope
Subpart 2.4 of ASME NQA-1-1994	1994	Commitment through ESBWR commitment to IEEE 336-1985
Subpart 2.5 of ASME NQA-1-1994	1994	Commitment through ESBWR commitment to ASME NQA-2-1983
Subpart 2.7 of ASME NQA-1-1994	1994	Commitment through ESBWR commitment to IEEE 1012-2004
Subpart 2.8 of ASME NQA-1-1994	1994	Commitment through ESBWR commitment to ASME NQA-2-1983

Regulatory Guide <u>No Commitment</u>	Revision	Comments
Subpart 2.15 of ASME NQA-1-1994	1994	Commitment through ESBWR commitment to ASME NQA-2-1983
Subpart 2.16 of ASME NQA-1-1994	1994	COL holder scope
Subpart 2.20 of ASME NQA-1-1994	1994	Commitment through ESBWR commitment to ASME NQA-2-1983
RG 1.189, Regulatory Position 1.7 "Quality Assurance"	4/2001	No exception
NRC Generic Letter 85-06	1985	No exception
Regulatory position 3.5 and Appendix A of RG 1.155	8/1988	No exception
NIRMA TG 11-1998	1998	No exception
NIRMA TG 15-1998	1998	No exception
NIRMA TG 16-1998	1998	No exception
NIRMA TG 21-1998	1998	No exception

17.1 QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN

The QA Program described in Section 17.1 is applicable to the ESBWR design activities supporting the standard design certification. Quality assurance is the responsibility of the DCD applicant for these design activities. The QA Program for design activities related to a specific plant is defined in Section 17.2.

17.1.1 Organization

“GENE QA Program Description”, NEDO-11209-04A (Reference 17.1-1) Section 1, establishes the Organization structure used during design of the ESBWR.

17.1.2 Quality Assurance Program

“GENE QA Program Description”, NEDO-11209-04A (Reference 17.1-1) Section 2, establishes the Quality Assurance Program used during design of the ESBWR.

The identification of safety-related structures, systems and components (Q list) to be controlled by the GEEN QA Program is shown in Table 3.2-1.

17.1.3 Design Control and Verification

“GENE QA Program Description”, NEDO-11209-04A (Reference 17.1-1) Section 3, establishes Design Control used during design of ESBWR. Minimum design requirements are identified in Table 3.2-2.

17.1.4 Procurement Document Control

“GENE QA Program Description”, NEDO-11209-04A (Reference 17.1-1) Section 4, establishes Procurement Document Control used during design of the ESBWR.

17.1.5 Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings

“GENE QA Program Description”, NEDO-11209-04A (Reference 17.1-1) Section 5, establishes the Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings used during design of the ESBWR.

17.1.6 Document Control

“GENE QA Program Description”, NEDO-11209-04A (Reference 17.1-1) Section 6, establishes Document Control used during design of the ESBWR.

17.1.7 Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services

“GENE QA Program Description”, NEDO-11209-04A (Reference 17.1-1) Section 7, establishes Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services used during design of the ESBWR.

17.1.8 Identification and Control of Materials, Parts, and Components

“GENE QA Program Description”, NEDO-11209-04A (Reference 17.1-1) Section 8, establishes Identification and Control of Materials, Parts, and Components during design of the ESBWR.

17.4 RELIABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM DURING DESIGN PHASE

This section presents the ESBWR Design Reliability Assurance Program (D-RAP).

17.4.1 Introduction

The GE ESBWR D-RAP is a program utilized during detailed design and specific equipment selection phases to assure that the important ESBWR reliability assumptions of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) are considered throughout the plant life. The PRA is used to evaluate the plant response to anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) initiating events and mitigation to ensure potential plant damage scenarios pose a very low risk to the public.

The D-RAP identifies relevant aspects of plant operation, maintenance, and performance monitoring of important plant SSCs for owner/operator consideration in assuring safety of the equipment and limiting risk to the public. An example is provided to demonstrate how the D-RAP applies to the Isolation Condenser System (ICS). The ICS example shows how the principles of D-RAP are applied to other systems identified by the PRA as being risk-significant.

17.4.2 Scope

The scope of the ESBWR D-RAP includes risk-significant SSCs, both safety-related and nonsafety-related, that provide defense-in-depth or result in significant improvement in the PRA evaluations.

A preliminary list of risk-significant SSCs within the scope of the D-RAP is developed in the design phase.

The list is updated, using a blended approach and an Expert Panel when plant-specific information is available. This information ~~forms the basis for~~ is incorporated into the Maintenance Rule program, which ensures that risk-significant SSCs operate throughout plant life with reliable performance that is consistent with the PRA. The PRA for the ESBWR, and other sources, such as historical records of BWR system and components are used to identify and prioritize those SSCs that are important to prevent or mitigate plant AOOs or other events that could present a risk to the public.

17.4.3 Purpose

The purpose of the D-RAP is to ensure that the plant safety, as estimated by the PRA, is maintained as the detailed design evolves through the implementation and procurement phases, and that pertinent information is provided in the design documentation to the future owner/operator so that equipment reliability, as it affects plant safety, is maintained through operation and maintenance during the entire plant life.

17.4.4 Objective

The objective of the D-RAP is to identify those plant SSCs that are significant contributors to risk, as shown by the PRA or other sources, and to assure that, during the implementation phase, the plant design continues to utilize risk-significant SSCs whose reliability is commensurate with the PRA assumptions. Reliability includes ensuring that risk-significant SSCs do not degrade to an unacceptable level during plant operations, and that the frequency of AOOs posing challenges to risk-significant SSCs is minimized. The D-RAP also identifies key assumptions regarding any

operation, maintenance and monitoring activities that the owner/operator should consider in implementing operational reliability assurance activities to assure that such SSCs function when challenged throughout plant life with reliability consistent with that assumed in the PRA.

17.4.5 GE Organization for D-RAP

The GE ESBWR Engineering Section is an integrated design and engineering organization that is responsible for formulating and implementing the D-RAP. The Manager, ESBWR Engineering is responsible for the design and licensing of the ESBWR, and for development of the D-RAP. The COL applicant is responsible for implementing the operations phase of the RAP.

The ESBWR Engineering organization is responsible for the design analysis and PRA engineering that is necessary to support the development of the D-RAP. PRA personnel are directly involved with the design organization and keep the design staff cognizant of risk-significant items, program needs, and project status. PRA personnel participate in the design change control process, which includes providing D-RAP related inputs in the design process.

GE ESBWR engineering design procedural controls are applied to the D-RAP. Specific procedures provide guidance on the design process, control of design changes, and storage and retrieval controls.

The design control procedure defines the process for performing, documenting, and verifying design activities. This includes developing or modifying the design of systems, engineering evaluations, analyses, calculations and documents, (e.g., specifications, drawings, reports).

The procedure for design change control defines the process for evaluating design changes in engineering controlled documents to ensure that the total effect is considered before a change is approved, and that the affected documents are identified and changed accordingly. The procedure identifies interfaces and organizations responsible for these interfaces, including PRA review. If a proposed change could affect the safety, availability or capacity factor of the ESBWR plant, system reliability is analyzed.

Several design control procedures provide guidance for developing a high quality process for reliability assurance. The documentation procedure establishes the requirements and responsibilities for the preparation, approval, and issue of documents controlled by the engineering design organizations. The quality assurance records procedure provides requirements for quality assurance record retention. The self-assessment, corrective action and audits procedure specifies the responsibilities for performing self-assessments; internal audits of the engineering organization, and prompt identification, documentation, and corrective actions on conditions that are adverse to quality.

In addition to the standard engineering design processes and quality controls, specific guidance is used to define and implement an effective RAP. Reference 17.4-1 describes the RAP processes for identifying and prioritizing risk significance, implementing reliability assurance strategies, and monitoring program effectiveness. It is used to incorporate reliability assurance into each aspect of the design, construction, testing, and operation of the ESBWR.

17.4.6 SSC Identification/Prioritization

A list of risk-significant SSCs is developed and controlled as a design specification document. The preliminary list is based on the results of the generic PRA. The list is updated when the plant-specific PRA is developed. At this point, a blended approach is used for identifying and prioritizing risk significant SSCs. This approach combines the various PRA analytical results with operating experience and an expert panel process to develop a comprehensive risk analysis.

The level 1 PRA is used to evaluate accident sequences from initiating events and failures of safety functions that lead to core damage. An assessment is performed for operating and shutdown conditions. The external events analysis considers events whose cause is external to systems associated with normal plant operations, including internal flooding, fire, high winds, and seismic events. The seismic events are analyzed using a seismic margins approach that provides qualitative conclusions on the ability of ESBWR SSCs to cope with seismic events. The other external events are quantified using the level 1 PRA.

Level 1 basic events representing component failures are identified as risk-significant if their importance values for Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) are greater than or equal to 5.0, or Fussell-Vesely Importance are greater than or equal to 0.01.

Level 2 risk significance is determined by identifying the dominant contributors to severe accidents and offsite release of fission products. This qualitative analysis, which is performed by the expert panel, includes the evaluation of severe accident phenomena and fission product source terms, and containment integrity strategies including pressure suppression, decay heat removal, and hydrogen generation.

SSC functions relied upon under power-operating and shutdown conditions to meet the NRC's safety goal guidelines of a CDF of less than $1.0E-4$ per reactor year and Large Release Frequency of less than $1.0E-6$ per reactor year are risk-significant. SSC functions needed to meet the containment performance goal, including containment bypass, during severe accidents are also risk-significant.

Operating experience identifies previous failures of components in similar applications, and also reveals situations where inappropriate human actions have led to functional failures of SSCs. The expert panel assesses component operating history and industry operating experience when it can be applied to assessing risk significance.

Safety-related SSCs are controlled by plant Technical Specifications. If a nonsafety-related SSC is shown through operating experience or PRA to be significant to public health and safety, then it should be controlled by Technical Specifications. In this case, "significant" equates to an SSC that is required to meet the NRC Safety Goals. If it is determined that an SSC is risk significant, but is not required for meeting the NRC Safety Goals, then performance controls should be implemented through the RAP. If the SSC is not significant, then normal controls would be implemented through the site Maintenance Rule and corrective action programs.

17.4.7 Design Considerations

The reliability of risk-significant SSCs, which are identified by the PRA and other sources, are evaluated at the detailed design stage by appropriate design reviews and reliability analyses. The procedure for design change control defines the process for evaluating design changes in

engineering controlled documents to ensure that the total effect is considered before a change is approved, and the affected documents are identified and changed accordingly.

A design reliability assessment is a process in which the design engineer builds quality and reliability into the SSC, while ensuring that the basis for SSC design is properly modeled in the PRA. Due to the preliminary nature of the PRA model during the design phase, the model relies on generic information, bounding assumptions, or design requirements as a basis for model development. This design assessment can be performed for changes that occur during the plant design phase, as well as during normal plant operations. It is a systematic method to evaluate the proposed design details with respect to PRA insights. The assessment considers reliability concepts, such as redundancy, diversity, human factors, spatial interactions, external events, etc., to enhance the system design, and considers PRA insights and assumptions. If the assessment reveals that the proposed design could conflict with results and insights calculated in the PRA, or could cause significant unavailability of a safety function, then a design change is pursued.

Proposed design changes are processed by the design change control procedure, which requires PRA review. If a design change affects the PRA model, then the PRA is revised in accordance with the PRA update process described in the PRA procedure.

17.4.8 Defining Failure Modes

The determination of dominant failure modes of risk-significant SSCs includes historical information, analytical models and existing requirements. Many BWR systems and components have compiled a significant historical record, so an evaluation of that record is performed. For those SSCs for which there is not an adequate historical basis to identify critical failure modes, an analytical approach is necessary.

Inputs may include PRA importance analysis, root cause analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, and review of operating experience. In addition, equipment performance information, including vendor manuals, ASME Section XI, technical specifications, Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS), and other regulatory requirements are reviewed to identify important safety functions.

The design engineer analyzes this information to identify dominant failure modes, such as single failures, latent failures not detected by routine monitoring, common cause failures, or failures that could cascade into more significant safety functional failures.

17.4.9 Operational Reliability Assurance Activities

Once the dominant failure modes are determined for risk-significant SSCs, an assessment is performed to identify operational reliability assurance activities that assure acceptable performance during plant life. Such activities may consist of periodic surveillance inspections or tests, monitoring of SSC performance, and/or periodic preventive maintenance. Some SSCs may require a combination of activities to assure that their performance is consistent with that assumed in the PRA.

Operational reliability assurance activities will be implemented through the COL holder's maintenance and surveillance programs, quality assurance program, and Maintenance Rule program. The COL holder shall integrate the objectives of D-RAP into the Quality Assurance Program developed to implement 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Subsection 17.4.13 lists specific COL

Information Items pertaining to operational reliability assurance activities. Guidance documents used to implement these activities include: Reg Guide 1.160, "Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," (Reference 17.4-3) NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guidance for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," including the February 22, 2000 Revision to Section 11 of NUMARC 93-11 (Reference 17.4-5) and, if still effective at the time of the COL application, RG 1.182, "Assessing and Managing the Risk Before Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." (Reference 17.4-4)

Periodic testing of SSCs may include startup of standby systems, surveillance testing of instrument circuits to assure that they respond to appropriate signals, and inspection of SSCs (such as tanks and pipes) to show that they are available to perform as designed. Performance monitoring, including condition monitoring, can consist of measurement of output (such as pump flow rate or heat exchanger temperatures), measurement of magnitude of an important variable (such as vibration or temperature), and testing for abnormal conditions (such as oil degradation or local hot spots).

Periodic preventive maintenance is an activity performed at regular intervals to preclude problems that could occur before the next preventive maintenance (PM) interval. This could be regular oil changes, replacement of seals and gaskets, or refurbishment of equipment subject to wear or age related degradation.

Planned maintenance activities will be integrated with the regular operating plans so that they do not disrupt normal operation. Maintenance that is performed more frequently than refueling outages must be planned so as to not disrupt operation or be likely to cause reactor scram, engineered safety feature actuation or AOOs. Maintenance planned for performance during refueling outages must be conducted in such a way that it has little or no effect on plant safety, outage length or other maintenance work.

Reliability monitoring information is collected from sources such as Technical Specification surveillance test data and industry operating data, if applicable. Similar reliability data is collected for RTNSS SSCs, which are within the scope of the D-RAP. Reliability estimates are also developed from basic event fault trees for risk-significant (that is, high-safety-significant) systems and components modeled in ESBWR PRA.

17.4.10 Owner/Operator's Reliability Assurance Program

Operational reliability assurance activities are implemented by the ESBWR owner/operator, and uses the information provided by GE. Elements include:

- **Problem Prioritization:** Identification for each of the risk-significant SSCs of the importance of that item as a contributor to its system unavailability and assignment of priorities to problems that are detected with such equipment.
- **Corrective Action Implementation:** Carrying out identified corrective action on risk-significant equipment to restore equipment to its intended function in such a way that plant safety is not compromised during work.
- **Plant Aging:** Some of the risk-significant equipment is expected to undergo age related degradation and require equipment replacement or refurbishment.

- **Programmatic Interfaces:** Reliability assurance interfaces related to the work of the several organizations and personnel groups working on risk-significant SSCs.
- **Maintenance Rule Program:** A procedure is developed by the COL holder to implement a Maintenance Rule program with the following scope:
 - Selecting SSCs for inclusion.
 - Establishing and applying safety significant criteria.
 - Setting performance monitoring criteria.
 - Trending the performance of applicable SSCs to demonstrate the effectiveness of maintenance activities.
 - Taking corrective action when SSC performance degrades.
 - Periodically assessing program performance.
 - Identifying documentation that is required to support the program.
 - Performing Maintenance Rule (a)(4) assessment of real-time risk profile.

Plant operational reliability assurance activities address the interfaces with construction, startup testing, operations, maintenance, engineering, safety, licensing, quality assurance and procurement of initial and replacement equipment.

17.4.11 D-RAP Implementation

The following example is based upon design and PRA details of the Isolation Condenser System (ICS) that were available during the design phase. It is used for illustration purposes only, and therefore is not updated if design or PRA details of the ICS change.

17.4.11.1 Example: Isolation Condenser System (ICS)

The ICS is used as an example to demonstrate how the reliability assurance processes are used to identify, analyze, and develop effective reliability assurance strategies. ICS is a safety-related system that removes reactor decay heat following events involving reactor shutdown and containment isolation. It also prevents unnecessary reactor depressurization, and precludes the need for operation of other Engineered Safety Features to bring the reactor to a safe and stable condition. In the event of a LOCA, ICS provides additional liquid inventory by opening the condensate return valves to actuate the system. ICS also assists with initial depressurization of the reactor before ADS in event of loss of feed water, so that the automatic depressurization can take place from a lower pressure.

The ICS consists of four totally independent trains, each containing an isolation condenser that condenses steam on the tube side and transfers heat to the IC/PCC pool, which is vented to the atmosphere. The isolation condensers are connected by piping to the reactor pressure vessel, and are placed at an elevation above the source of steam (that is, vessel). When the steam is condensed, the condensate is returned to the vessel via a condensate return line. A detailed description of ICS is located in Subsection 5.4.6.

The major differences between the ESBWR ICS and the conventional BWR ICS are:

- Use of four heat exchangers instead of one or two in conventional BWRs.
- Parallel path for condensate return to the vessel instead of single injection path.
- Use of both Nitrogen-Operated and Motor-Operated Valves (MOVs) for condensate return instead of only MOVs.
- Use of large cooling pools instead of shell-side heat exchangers.

The design features of the ESBWR ICS contain significant improvements in reliability and availability that are risk-based. The number of heat exchangers is increased for redundancy. The condensate return line to the vessel has two paths for success and each path uses a diverse isolation valve. The large capacity IC pools provide cooling capacity for 72 hours following a reactor scram. Conventional BWRs typically have 20 to 30 minutes of cooling water capacity.

17.4.11.2 Identifying Risk Information

In order to examine the relative importance or dominance of failures of ICS components, a fault tree has been developed with the top gate defined as failure of the ICS to inject water into the RPV upon demand. This tree considers the worst-case scenario with respect to AOOs and accidents, which involves a success criterion that three of four ICS subsystems must function. This requires a condensate return path and a vent path for non-condensables for each functioning subsystem. This fault tree is quantified to identify the relative importance of ICS components as they contribute to system unreliability.

A risk ranking of the ICS basic events has been performed to identify SSCs with the greatest importance. The ranking is performed using the ICS top event model, described above. In addition, a risk ranking is performed using the CDF top event (PRA) model to provide further perspective on the importance of ICS components. The results of the risk rankings are provided in Table 17.4-1.

17.4.11.3 Failure Mode Identification

The importance analysis results indicate that no single SSC has a dominant effect on ICS system unavailability. Therefore, the design and selection of ICS components appears to be reasonable.

The dominant failures, as shown in Table 17.4-1, involve valves. Operating experience indicates that valves, in general, are subject to mechanical problems such as valve stem failure, separation of stem from disk, and failure to stroke. In addition, remote actuated valves can experience actuator failures, electrical failures in the motor winding or motor internals, and problem with torque limit switches and switch settings.

For ICS, the dominant failures involve the condensate return nitrogen-operated isolation valves (B32-F006A, B, C, D). The parallel condensate return valves, B32-F005A, B, C, D are not considered to be dominant failures due to their dependency on AC power and the relative importance of loss of preferred power sequences.

According to the design specifications, the condensate return valve, (F006) is a spring-loaded, pneumatic, piston-operated globe valve, designed to fail open on loss of pneumatic pressure to the valve actuator. This valve is also signaled to open when reactor water level drops to Level 2. A pneumatic accumulator is located close to the valve to provide pneumatic pressure for the purpose of assisting in valve closure when both pilots are energized or in the event of failure of

pneumatic supply pressure to the valve operator. Examples of the types of failure that could affect valve reliability are shown in Table 17.4-2. Because the design details are not finalized, this table is not a comprehensive listing. It is intended to indicate the types of failures that are considered for the purpose of providing an example.

17.4.11.4 Identification of Maintenance Requirements

Maintenance activities are developed to assure that the dominant failure modes are reduced, or kept to an acceptably low probability. The types of maintenance and the maintenance frequencies are both important aspects of ensuring that the equipment failure rate will be consistent with that assumed in the PRA model. The designer considers periodic or condition-based testing and maintenance activities to keep the unreliability to an acceptable level.

In this example, the D-RAP analytical process results in a preliminary recommendation for quarterly valve testing of the B32-F006 valves, along with flow testing during each refueling outage. This helps to preserve the unreliability values used in the PRA model. In addition, the B32-F005 valves, which are in the parallel path, are recommended to receive the same testing requirements. This will ensure that these valves do not experience degraded performance that could increase their risk significance.

The recommended maintenance activities and performance monitoring will be governed by the QA and Maintenance Rule Program.

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17.4.12 Glossary of Terms

Design Reliability Assurance Program — Performed by the plant designer to assure the plant is designed so that it can be operated and maintained in such a way that the reliability assumptions of the probabilistic risk assessment apply throughout plant life.

Fussell-Vesely Importance — A measure of the component contribution to core damage frequency. Numerically, the percentage contribution of the component to CDF.

Owner/Operator — The utility or other organization that owns and operates the ESBWR following construction.

Operational Reliability Assurance Program — Performed by the plant owner/operator to assure the plant is operated and maintained safely and in such a way that the reliability assumptions of the PRA apply throughout plant life.

Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS) — A process to determine whether regulatory oversight for certain nonsafety-related systems is needed, and to determine an appropriate level of regulatory oversight commensurate with their risk significance.

Risk-Significant — Those structures, systems and components that are identified as contributing significantly to the core damage frequency.

17.4.13 COL Information

Operational reliability assurance activities shall be incorporated into the COL holder's programs, with the following requirements:

- The objectives of operational reliability assurance activities shall be integrated into the QA program, developed to implement 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. This program shall address failures of non-safety-related, risk-significant SSCs that result from design and operational errors in accordance with SECY 95-132, Item E.
- Establish PRA importance measures, the expert panel process, and deterministic methods to determine the site-specific list of risk-significant SSCs under the scope of the D-RAP.
- Evaluate and maintain the reliability of risk-significant SSCs as identified in the D-RAP. The holder may cite, for example, reliability analysis, cost-effective maintenance enhancements, such as condition monitoring and using condition-directed maintenance as well as time directed or planned periodic maintenance.
- Use the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) program to monitor the effectiveness of the COL applicant's maintenance activities needed for operational reliability assurance.
- Consider all SSCs that are in the scope of the D-RAP as high-safety-significant (HSS) within the scope of the Maintenance Rule program, or provide Expert Panel justification for any exceptions.
- Reliability Database - Historical data on equipment performance as available. The compilation and reduction of this data provides the plant with source of component reliability information. Data used in PRA fault-tree analyses may also be a viable initial source.

Note: The Expert Panel, in accordance with common industry practice and guidance in NUMARC 93-01, develops the final list of risk significant SSCs from various inputs, including the PRA risk importance calculations and industry operating experience. It is necessary for the Expert Panel to include all SSCs that are in the scope of the RAP to be included in the high-safety-significant (HSS) category of SSCs within the scope of the Maintenance Rule. However, risk importance calculations, plant specifics and other factors may change the risk significance of certain SSCs in the operational RAP that were previously determined to be risk-significant within the bounds of the D-RAP. Therefore, exceptions between the D-RAP and operational RAP risk significance may exist, and should be evaluated and justified by the Expert Panel.

- Surveillance and Testing - Establishes the level of performance or condition being maintained for SSCs within the scope of the RAP and identifies declining trends in between surveillances prior to performance or condition degrading to unacceptable levels undetected (or failure) to the extent possible.
- Maintenance Plan - This plan describes the nature and frequency of maintenance activities to be performed on plant equipment. The plan includes the selected SSCs identified in the D-RAP.

17.4.14 References

17.4-1 GE Energy Nuclear, "Reliability Assurance Program Plan", NEDO-33289, October 2006.

17.4-2 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Policy and Technical Issues Associated With the Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS) in Passive Plant Designs (SECY-94-084)", SECY-95-132, May 1995.

17.4-3 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," Reg Guide 1.160, March 1997.

17.4-4 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Assessing and Managing the Risk Before Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," Reg Guide 1.182, May 2000.

17.4-5 NEI, "Industry Guidance for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," NUMARC 93-01 April 1996.

Table 17.4-1
ICS Example Importance Analysis

Component	Description	Fussell-Vesely Importance	Risk Achievement Worth
B32-F006B	Air Operated Valve F006B Fails To Open	8.27E-04	1.41
B32-F006C	Air Operated Valve F006C Fails To Open	8.27E-04	1.41
B32-F006D	Air Operated Valve F006D Fails To Open	8.27E-04	1.41
B32-F006A	Air Operated Valve F006A Fails To Open	1.04E-04	1.05

Table 17.4-2
ICS Example Failure Modes and Reliability Strategy

Component	Failure Mode	Cause	Reliability Strategy
B32-F006A, B, C, D	Failure to Open due to mechanical problems	Binding, fatigue failure, foreign material	Inspect Valve Internals, System Flow Test, Valve Stroke Test
	Failure to Open due to electrical problems with valve operator	Windings, Wiring, Relays, Contacts	Logic System Functional Test, Valve Stroke Test