


R. A. Saccone
Vice President - Nuclear Operations

PPL Susquehanna, LLC
769 Salem Boulevard
Berwick, PA 18603
Tel. 570.542.3959 Fax 570.542-1504
rasaccone@pplweb.com



MAY 08 2007

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Stop OP1-17
Washington, DC 20555

**SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-388/2007-001-00
PLA-6190**

Docket 50-388

Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-388/2007-001-00. This event was determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) in that the secondary containment bypass leakage limit for Unit 2 was exceeded during regularly scheduled Local Leak Rate Testing.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

No new regulatory commitments have been created through issuance of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. A. Saccone".

Robert A. Saccone
Vice President – Nuclear Operations

Attachment

cc: Mr. A. J. Blamey, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
Mr. R. V. Guzman, NRC Project Manager
Mr. R. R. Janati, DEP/BRP
Mr. R. Osborne, Allegheny Electric

IE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 2	05000388	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		2007	- 001	- 00	

17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 9, 2007 at 1345 hours, with Susquehanna Unit 2 in Mode 5 (Refueling) at 0% power, it was determined that the as-found minimum pathway Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage (SCBL) Technical Specification (TS) limit had been exceeded during regularly scheduled Local Leakage Rate Testing (LLRT). The TS SCBL limit is 9 scfh (4247 sccm). At the time the limit was surpassed, the station was testing the Unit 2 'A' Residual Heat Removal (EIS Code: BO) Containment Spray penetration. Despite work history that suggested leak rate failures at this penetration were not usually attributable to the isolation valve being tested (HV251F016A) but were often caused by a leaking test boundary valve (HV251F021A), PPL lubricated and stroked the tested isolation valve before boundary valve repairs could be made. This action required PPL to accept the higher than desired as-found LLRT results. Analysis has concluded that the boundary valve was, in fact, primarily responsible for the unsatisfactory LLRT results and that the event was caused by PPL's failure to rework the boundary valve and perform a second as-found leak rate test.

Total bypass leakage was determined to be 5892 sccm at the completion of the outage leak rate testing effort. The as-left SCBL total was reduced to 953 sccm following maintenance. This is well below the TS limit of 4247 sccm.

10CFR50 Appendix J minimum pathway limits were not exceeded.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The higher than desired leak rate experienced at the Unit 2 'A' Residual Heat Removal Containment Spray penetration was primarily attributable to a leaking test boundary valve. The event was caused by PPL's failure to rework the boundary valve and perform a second as-found leak rate test.

ANALYSIS / SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

This event was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) in that the total as-found minimum pathway leakage rate exceeded the TS limit.

Actual Consequences:

The purpose of primary containment (EIS Code: NH) isolation valves is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents. The SCBL TS value is established to limit the release of radioactive materials outside of secondary containment to ensure offsite and main control room doses remain within regulatory limits. No event occurred during the SCBL testing (Mode 5) or during any other plant condition over the past operating cycle to challenge 10CFR100 or 10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 19 dose limits. As such, there were no actual safety consequences resulting from this event.

Potential Consequences:

Analysis has concluded that, during a postulated design basis accident, any increase in dose related to the elevated SCBL leak rate would not have exceeded either 10CFR100 or 10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 19 dose limits.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station – Unit 2	05000388	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		2007	- 001	- 00	

17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Following valve maintenance activities, as-left SCBL values meet established TS limitations.

Corrective Actions are planned to more clearly identify those leak rate tests that contribute to SCBL in procedures, maintenance work plans, and station schedules. Troubleshooting plans will be pre-staged for SCBL related LLRT activities.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Failed Components Information:

Component: HV251F016A; 12 inch globe valve

Model: W8522332B

Manufacturer: Anchor Darling Valve Co.

Past Similar Events:

- LER 96-002-00, Docket No. 387/License No. NPF-14
- LER 96-011-00, Docket No. 387/License No. NPF-14
- LER 99-002-00, Docket No. 388/License No. NPF-22
- LER 01-003-00, Docket No. 388/License No. NPF-22