

May 16, 2007

LICENSEE: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

FACILITY: Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON MARCH 7, 2007, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION, CONCERNING DRAFT REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation held a telephone conference call on March 7, 2007, to discuss and clarify the staff's draft requests for additional information (D-RAIs) concerning the Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1, license renewal application. The telephone conference call was useful in clarifying the intent of the staff's D-RAIs.

Enclosure 1 provides a listing of the participants and Enclosure 2 contains a listing of the D-RAIs discussed with the applicant, including a brief description on the status of the items.

The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.

/RA Yoira Diaz Sanabria for/

Verónica M. Rodríguez, Project Manager
License Renewal Branch B
Division of License Renewal
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-482

Enclosures:

1. List of Participants
2. List of Draft Requests for Additional Information

cc w/encls: See next page

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TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1
LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
MARCH 7, 2007

PARTICIPANTS

AFFILIATIONS

Verónica M. Rodríguez	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Raul Hernandez	NRC
Clifford Marks	Information Systems Laboratories (ISL)
Steve Pope	ISL
Jon Woodfield	ISL
Lorrie Bell	Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC)
Charlie Medenciya	WCNOC
Rick Foust	WCNOC
Eric Blocher	Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing Alliance (STARS)
Arden Aldridge	STARS
Tony Grenci	STARS

DRAFT REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1
LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION

MARCH 7, 2007

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) held a telephone conference call on March 7, 2007, to discuss and clarify the following Draft Requests for Additional Information (D-RAIs) concerning the WCGS License Renewal Application (LRA).

Fuel Handling - Fuel Storage and Handling System

D-RAI 2.3.3.1-1

License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-EC-M-12EC01 shows the layout of the spent fuel pool, cask loading pit, and the fuel transfer canal. These three areas are adjacent and separated by walls, except in two slots. The slots are sealed off by spent fuel gates.

Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 9.1.2.2, describes the leaktight gates in the spent fuel pool and their functions. The USAR states that the purpose of the leaktight gate is to allow drainage of the cask loading pit and fuel transfer canal while maintaining the proper water inventory in the spent fuel pool. The USAR further states that an acceptable minimum water level will be maintained in the event of loss of integrity of the gate while either the cask loading pit or fuel transfer canal is drained.

LRA Section 2.3.3.1 does not include the spent fuel gates within the scope of license renewal. The spent fuel gates do not appear elsewhere in the LRA. The spent fuel gates appear to be required as a pressure boundary to maintain correct water level above the spent fuel when the cask loading pit and the fuel transfer canal are drained. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the spent fuel gates and their sealing mechanisms from the scope of license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI. The applicant will discuss the minimum level of water that will be above the fuel in the event of loss of integrity of both gates and whether the gates will be considered as within the scope of license renewal.

Containment Cooling System

D-RAI 2.3.3.5-1

License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-GN-M-12GN01 shows containment coolers SGN01A, SGN01B, SGN01C, and SGN01D within the scope of license renewal because they are safety-related. LRA Section 2.3.3.5 states that the containment cooling system, in conjunction with the containment spray system, removes sufficient energy and subsequent decay heat from the containment atmosphere following a design basis loss of coolant accident or a main steam line break inside the containment to maintain it below the design pressure.

Enclosure 2

Each of the containment coolers has three drain lines attached to the cooler shell (air side) of the heat exchanger upstream of their respective fan unit. The drain lines are 4-inch each and join to form an 8-inch diameter line on each containment cooler. Each of the drain lines pass through a drain trap as shown on license renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-LF-M-12LF09. USAR Section 6.2.2.2.3, describes that condensate is collected and measured to identify leakage.

The drain lines are not shown to be within the scope of license renewal, although they appear to support the system intended function of the containment coolers. If the lines were to fail, then excessive flow through the containment cooler casing (through the failed drain lines), could bypass the cooling coils and defeat their intended function.

The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the drain lines from the scope of license renewal up to the drain traps.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.5-2

LRA Section 2.3.3.5 states that portions of the system support environmental qualification in accordance with Title 10 Code of *Federal Regulations* Part 54.4(a)(3) (10 CFR 54.4). Drawing LRA-WCGS-GN-M-12GN01 shows containment coolers SGN01A, SGN01B, SGN01C, and SGN01D within the scope of license renewal. However, the drawing shows the discharge ductwork from the containment coolers excluded from the scope of license renewal. During normal operation, the containment cooler discharge ductwork supplies cooled air to areas that contain safety-related equipment, such as instrumentation adjacent to the steam generator compartments.

USAR Section 3.11(B) describes the environmental conditions and design bases for which safety systems are designed to ensure acceptable performance during normal operation and during design basis accidents environmental conditions.

USAR Section 3.11(B).2.1 describes that safety equipment (in accordance with USAR Table 3.11(B)-3) is designed for 40 years of operation in its environment during normal operation as well as in its environment following a design basis accident.

USAR Table 3.11(B)-1 describes the maximum expected temperatures in the reactor building to be 220°F at the reactor cavity. USAR Table 3.11(B)-3 identifies the equipment and instrumentation required to achieve and maintain shutdown conditions, such as pressurizer pressure and steam generator level transmitters.

The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the containment cooler discharge ductwork from the scope of license renewal and explain how cooling does not contribute towards the equipment's qualified life.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

Compressed Air System

D-RAI 2.3.3.6-1

License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-KA-M-12KA05, at location B-6, shows relief valve V0706 not color coded, which indicates it is not within the scope of license renewal and subject to aging management review (AMR). The valve is within the safety-related boundary flag and protects the safety-related accumulator, TKA05 from over pressurization. Therefore, relief valve V0706 should be within the scope of license renewal pursuant to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). The staff requests that the applicant explain why valve V0706 is not color coded in green on this drawing.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.6-2

License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-KA-M-12KA05, at locations G-7 and E-7, shows the test connections attached to valves V0676 and V0677 color coded red in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) criteria. On the same drawing, the test connections for valves V0683, V0684, V0685 and V0686, at locations H-6, F-6, D-6 and B-6, respectively, are not color coded which indicate that they are not within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The staff requests that the applicant describe what is the license renewal intended function of the test connections for valves V0676 and V0677 and why it does not apply to the test connections for valves V0683, V0684, V0685 and V0686.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

Emergency Diesel Engine Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System

D-RAI 2.3.3.15-1

License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-JE-M-12JE01, at locations G-7 and C-7, show flame arresters FA-0001A and FA-0001B on the emergency fuel oil storage tanks. The drawing also shows flame arresters FA-0002A and FA-0002B, at locations H-4 and D-4, on the emergency fuel oil day tanks which are not highlighted as within the scope of license renewal. These flame arresters may be needed for fire protection purposes. The staff requests that the applicant clarify whether these flame arresters should be within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). If not, please justify their exclusion.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

Main Steam System

D-RAI 2.3.4.2-1

License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-AB-M-12AB01, at locations D-3, D-6, H-3 and H-6, shows four atmospheric relief valves silencers that are not color coded as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. These four silencers are attached to piping which are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). If the piping's intended function is to provide a pressure boundary for the steam flow path, then the staff requests that the applicant explain why the silencers are not within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) for functional support. The staff also requests that the applicant describe the physical configuration of the silencers such that if they fail they will not prevent the atmospheric relief valves from performing their intended function.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.4.2-2

License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-AB-M-12AB03, at locations F-8, E-8, C-8, and B-8, shows steam traps ST0001, ST0002, ST0003 and ST0004 that are not color coded as within the scope of license renewal and subject to an AMR. The steam traps are attached to 2-inch lines. The staff requests that the applicant explain why these four traps are not within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) and how the lines are isolated.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.4.2-3

License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-AB-M-12AB03, at location H-5, has a note stating "to be evaluated in LRID AE, Feedwater System" which points to reference continuation flags to drawings M-12FC03 and M-12FC04. For license renewal, drawings M-12FC03 and M-12FC04 are designated as LR-WCGS-AB-M-12FC03 and LR-WCGS-AB-M-12FC04, respectively.

The staff requests that the applicant explain why the note references LRID AE, when these two drawings have been associated and evaluated within the main steam system for license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.4.2-4

License renewal drawing LRA-WCGS-AB-M-12FB01, at location G-8, has a note stating "This section is evaluated in LRID AL" which points to a reference continuation flag to drawing M-12FC02. For license renewal, drawing M-12FC02 is designated as R-WCGS-AB-M-12FC02. The staff requests that the applicant explain why the note references LRID AL, auxiliary

feedwater system, when the referenced drawing has been associated and evaluated within the main steam system for license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.4.2-5

License renewal drawings for the main steam system have lines highlighted in green indicating that they are within the scope of license renewal and are required to support the system intended functions. However, multiple lines that are sized 1-inch and under, that branch off the highlighted lines with no valve or other interfacing components, are not highlighted.

The size 1-inch and under lines in the main steam system are included on license renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-AB-M-12AB03. Examples of these lines include those at locations G-8 (line 237-DBD-1), H-6 (off line 148-DBD-6), G-5 (off line 167-DBD-6), G-4 (line 317-DBD-1), H-3 (line DBD-1/2), E-8 (line 206-DBD-1), and D-7 (off line 241-DBD-36), among others.

The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the size 1-inch and under lines from the scope of license renewal. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant explain whether the impact of multiple line failures were considered on system intended functions.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

Liquid Radwaste System

D-RAI 2.3.2.5-1

License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-HB-M-12HB03, at locations A-5 and B-5, show piping from the discharge of the reactor makeup water transfer pump that is highlighted as nonsafety-related affecting safety-related based due to structural integrity of the piping lines. It is unclear where the boundary ends in the piping run going to the demineralized water degasifier. The staff requests that the applicant identify where the piping physically transitions from piping that is within the scope of license renewal and subject to aging management to piping outside the scope of license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System

D-RAI 2.3.3.2-1

License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-EC-M-12EC01, at location C-3, shows a normally closed valve (V0995) at the spent fuel pool end of the fuel transfer tube.

The fuel transfer tube is noted as being safety-related and within the scope of license renewal for providing a pressure boundary. However, the valve is not listed as being within the scope of license renewal. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of this valve from the scope of license renewal as it provides structural support for the fuel transfer tube and meets the criterion of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2).

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.2-2

License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-EC-M-12EC01, at locations E-7 and H-7, show removable spools with spacer rings installed (SS-001SR and SS-002SR). The spacer rings are replacements for startup strainers. The piping lines are highlighted as being within the scope of license renewal. However, spacer rings are not listed in LRA Table 2.3.3-2 as being within the scope of license renewal. The staff requests the applicant to justify the exclusion of these components from LRA Table 2.3.3-2.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.2-3

License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-EC-M-12EC01, at location C-7, shows strainers in the suction piping from the spent fuel pool to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps. The strainers are installed on lines 009-HCC-12 and 001-HCC-12. These lines are highlighted as within the scope of license renewal and perform an intended function in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1); however, the strainers are not highlighted. Failure of the strainers could cause damage to the pumps or valves and could prevent performance of the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system intended function. Section 54.4 of 10 CFR requires that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) whose failure could prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of a safety-related SSC intended function, be included within the scope of license renewal. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the strainers from the scope of license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

Emergency Diesel Engine System

D-RAI 2.3.3.16-1

License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ01 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ04, at locations H-5 and H-6, show standby diesel generator jacket water expansion tanks, TKJ01A and TKJ01B, respectively. The tanks are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted in green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). Each tank has several lines

extending from it that also appear to be safety-related; however, these lines are not highlighted. The lines in question are portions of 010-HBD-1, 066-HBD-1, 073-HBD-1, 011-HBD-1, 166-HBD-1, 173-HBD-1, and the chemical addition fittings.

LRA Section 2.1 states that every component meeting the scoping criterion of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1), was included within the scope of the license renewal rule. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of these lines from the scope of license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.16-2

License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ01 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ04, at locations H-5 and H-6, show the standby diesel generator jacket water expansion tanks, TKJ01A and TKJ01B, respectively. The tanks are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted in green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). Each tank has a vent line extending from them that are not highlighted in green. The vent lines in question support the operation of the tanks by allowing free exchange of air in response to level changes. In addition, the vent lines appear to be located above the tank where internal corrosion products could fall into the tank.

Section 54.4 of 10 CFR requires that SSCs whose failure could prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of a safety-related SSC intended function, be included within the scope of license renewal. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the vent lines from the scope of license renewal.

Discussion: The staff mistakenly duplicated this question. The staff's concern is addressed in D-RAI 2.3.3.16-1; therefore, this question is withdrawn and will not be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.3.16-3

License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ01 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ04, at multiple locations, show at least ten flexible connections in the standby diesel generator cooling water system. The flexible connections are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted in green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). The flexible connections are exposed to jacket cooling water and provide a pressure boundary intended function.

LRA Tables 2.3.3-16 and 3.3.2-16 do not identify flexible connections as a component type exposed to a water environment. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the flexible connections from the scope of license renewal in the jacket cooling water portion of the emergency diesel engine system.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be renumbered and sent as formal RAI 2.3.3.16-2.

D-RAI 2.3.3.16-4

License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ01 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ04, at multiple locations, show at least three flow orifices in the standby diesel generator cooling water system. The flow orifices are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted in green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). The flow orifices are exposed to jacket cooling water and provide a pressure boundary and flow restriction (throttling) intended functions.

LRA Tables 2.3.3-16 and 3.3.2-16 do not identify flow orifices as a component type exposed to a water environment. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the flow orifices from the scope of license renewal in the jacket cooling water portion of the emergency diesel engine system.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be renumbered and sent as formal RAI 2.3.3.16-3.

D-RAI 2.3.3.16-5

License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ03 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ06, at locations H-6 and H-7, show the lube oil auxiliary tanks for the standby diesel generator lube oil system TKJ04A and TKJ04B, respectively. These tanks are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted in green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). Each tank has several lines extending from them that also appear to be safety-related; however, these lines are not highlighted in green. The lines in question are portions of 071-HBD-1, 072-HBD-1, 052-HBD-1 1/2, 171-HBD-1, 172-HBD-1, and 152-HBD-1 1/2.

LRA Section 2.1 states that every component meeting the scoping criterion of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) was included within the scope of the license renewal rule. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of these lines from the scope of license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be renumbered and sent as formal RAI 2.3.3.16-4.

D-RAI 2.3.3.16-6

License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ03 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ06, at locations H-5 and H-6, show standby diesel generator lube oil expansion tanks TKJ04A and TKJ04B, respectively. These tanks are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted in green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1).

Each tank has a vent line extending from them that lead to the outside atmosphere that are not highlighted in green. The vent lines in question support the operation of the tanks by allowing free exchange of air in response to level changes in the tank. In addition, the vent lines appear to be located above the tank where internal corrosion products could fall into the tank.

Failure of the vent lines could also allow moisture from the outside atmosphere to contaminate the lube oil.

Section 54.4 of 10 CFR requires that SSCs whose failure could prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of a safety-related SSC intended function, be included within the scope of license renewal. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the vent lines from the scope of license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be renumbered and sent as formal RAI 2.3.3.16-5.

D-RAI 2.3.3.16-7

License renewal drawings LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ03 and LRA-WCGS-KJ-M-12KJ06, at multiple locations, show at least three flexible connections in the standby diesel generator lube oil system. The flexible connections are within the safety-related boundary and are highlighted in green for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1). The flexible connections are exposed to lubricating oil and provide a pressure boundary intended function.

LRA Tables 2.3.3-16 and 3.3.2-16 do not identify flexible connections as a component type exposed to a lubricating oil environment. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the flexible connections from the scope of license renewal in the lube oil portion of the emergency diesel engine system.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be renumbered and sent as formal RAI 2.3.3.16-6.

Oily Waste System

D-RAI 2.3.3.18-1

License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-LE-M-12LE01 and LR-WCGS-LE-M-12LE02 show piping from the discharge of the auxiliary feed pump room sump pumps PLE12A and PLE12B, and the diesel generator building sump pumps PLE06A and PLE06B highlighted in red as nonsafety-related components affecting safety-related components due to spatial interaction. However, the pumps are not highlighted even though they appear to be in close proximity to safety-related components. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the nonsafety-related oily waste system that are within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where indicated.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

Miscellaneous Auxiliary Systems In-scope Only for Criterion 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2)

D-RAI 2.3.3.21-1

LRA Section 2.3.3.21 states that systems meeting the criterion of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) are within the scope of license renewal. The LRA states that each mechanical system was reviewed to

determine whether safety-related systems could be adversely impacted by nonsafety-related portions of systems.

Among the systems included in this LRA Section are nonsafety-related systems that have a potential for spatial interaction with safety-related portions of other systems. These system portions are shown in the drawings with a red highlight. The staff requests that the applicant address the following:

- (1) License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-EA-M-12EA01, for the nonsafety-related service water system, shows system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the nonsafety-related service water system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where indicated.
- (2) License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-LD-M-12LD01, for the chemical and detergent waste system, shows system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the chemical and detergent waste system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where indicated.
- (3) License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-AN-M-12AN01, for the demineralized water makeup storage and transfer system, shows system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the demineralized water makeup storage and transfer system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where indicated.
- (4) License renewal drawings LR-WCGS-KD-M-12KD01 and LR-WCGS-KD-M-12KD02, for the domestic water system, show system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the domestic water system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where indicated.
- (5) License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-GA-M-12GA02, for the plant heating system, shows system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation. Additionally, references are made to drawings showing more detail of the boundaries, which are not included in the LRA. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the plant heating system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where indicated. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant provide the drawings referenced in LR-WCGS-GA-M-12GA02.

- (6) License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-GB-M-12GB01, for the central chilled water system, shows system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the central chilled water system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where indicated.
- (7) License renewal drawings LR-WCGS-HF-M-12HF01, LR-WCGS-HF-M-12HF02 and LR-WCGS-HF-M-12HF03, for the secondary liquid waste system, show system portions highlighted in red and ending with no further explanation. Additionally, references are made to drawings showing more detail of the boundaries, which are not included in the LRA. The staff requests that the applicant provide a description of the portions of the secondary liquid waste system that are within the scope of license renewal for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to spatial interaction. In addition, the staff requests that the applicant discuss the reason for terminating the scoping boundaries where indicated. Also, the applicant is requested to provide the drawings referenced in LR-WCGS-HF-M-12HF01, LR-WCGS-HF-M-12HF02 and LR-WCGS-HF-M-12HF03.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

Condensate System

D-RAI 2.3.4.4-1

License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-AD-M-12AP01, at locations D-3, D-4, E-3, E-4, and G-3, shows penetrations to the condensate storage tank TAP01 that are not highlighted in green. However, the tank shell is highlighted in green indicating that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). The penetrations are for LT-0004, TE-0005, LSL-0010, low pressure N2, and LSH-007.

USAR Section 8.3A.3.4 states that the coping duration for a station blackout is four hours. Further, USAR Section 8.3A.5.1 states that a minimum of 156,300 gallons of condensate storage tank inventory is required for decay heat removal for the four hour coping period. Failure of a tank penetration could cause drainage of the inventory below the required minimum. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the penetrations from the scope of license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.4.4-2

License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-AD-M-12AP01, at locations G-2, G-3, and G-4, shows vents and vacuum relief valves on the condensate storage tank TAP01 that are not highlighted in green. However, the tank shell is highlighted in green indicating that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). The vent lines in question support the operation of the tanks by allowing free exchange of air in response to level changes in the tank. In addition, the

vent lines appear to be located above the tank where internal corrosion products could fall into the tank. Failure of the vents could cause damage to the condensate storage tank. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of the vents from the scope of license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

D-RAI 2.3.4.4-3

License renewal drawing LR-WCGS-AD-M-12AP01, at locations F-3 and F-4, show external steam heating coils EAP01A, EAP01B, and EAP01C attached to the condensate storage tank not highlighted in green. The steam heating coil steam and drainage lines and their controls are also not highlighted in green. However, the tank shell is highlighted in green indicating that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3).

USAR Section 8.3A.3.4 states that the coping duration for a station blackout is four hours. Further, USAR Section 8.3A.5.1 states that a minimum of 156,300 gallons of condensate storage tank inventory is required for decay heat removal for the four hour coping period. Additionally, USAR Section 9.2.6.2.2 states that freeze protection is provided by thermal insulation and external steam heating coils. USAR Section 9.2.6.5 states that the nominal minimum temperature for the condensate storage tank is 50°F. The steam supply to the steam heating coils is from the nonsafety-related auxiliary steam system and would not be available during a station blackout. The staff requests that the applicant justify the exclusion of either the steam heating coils and/or the tank insulation from LRA Tables 2.3.4-4 and 3.4.4-4 as a component types within the scope of license renewal.

Discussion: The applicant indicated that the question is clear. This D-RAI will be sent as a formal RAI.

Letter to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, from V. Rodriguez, dated May 16, 2007

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON MARCH 7, 2007, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION, CONCERNING DRAFT REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION

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