Entergy

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Palisades Nuclear Plant
27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway
Covert, MI 49043

April 25, 2007

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Palisades Nuclear Plant
Docket 50-255
License No. DPR-20

Licensee Event Report 07-003, Potential For Reduced Component Cooling Water Cooling Capability

Dear Sir or Madam:

Licensee Event Report (LER) 07-003 is enclosed. The LER describes the potential effects on the component cooling water system from radiant heat damage to associated equipment cable jackets. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B).

Summary of Commitments

This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

Christopher J. Schwarz
Site Vice President
Palisades Nuclear Plant

Enclosure (1)

CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC

IE22

ENCLOSURE 1

LER 07-003, Potential For Reduced Component Cooling Water Cooling Capability

3 Pages Follow

NRC FORM 366 (6-2004) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2007

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
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TITLE (4)

Potential for Reduced Component Cooling Water Cooling Capability

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
02	25	2007	2007	-- 003 --	00	04	25	2007	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	1
POWER LEVEL (10)	100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)

	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
	20.2201(d)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
	20.2203(a)(1)		50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		73.71(a)(4)
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)		50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)		73.71(a)(5)
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)	X	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.46(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)		
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)		
	20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		
	20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
	20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Daniel G. Malone	(269) 764-2463

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO				

ABSTRACT

On February 17, 2007, it was discovered that cables in a cable tray that are primarily associated with Component Cooling Water (CCW) and Service Water system components had sustained damage to their cable jackets from the radiant heat effects of an un-insulated hot pipe that was in close proximity to the cable tray.

On February 25, 2007, it was conservatively determined that all of the cables in the cable tray that were potentially affected by the radiant heat damage were inoperable due to loss of qualification life and the potential for cable-to-cable interaction from degradation of the cable insulation.

Subsequently, on February 25, 2007, it was recognized that a specific combination of two postulated cable faults could result in a condition in which there would be less than 100% of the required post accident CCW cooling. For this condition, Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.7.C was entered along with the specified action to enter TS LCO 3.0.3.

This occurrence is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.

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TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)* (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On February 17, 2007, it was discovered that cables in a cable tray that are primarily associated with Component Cooling Water (CCW) [CC] and Service Water [BI] system components had sustained damage to their cable jackets from the radiant heat effects of an un-insulated hot pipe that was in close proximity to the cable tray.

On February 25, 2007, at 1100 hrs, as a result of continued evaluation of the cables and the discovery of a cable with unacceptable damage, it was conservatively determined that all of the cables in the cable tray that were potentially affected by the radiant heat damage were inoperable due to loss of qualification life and the potential for cable-to-cable interaction from degradation of the cable insulation.

Subsequently, on February 25, 2007, at 1300 hrs, it was recognized that a specific combination of two postulated cable faults (resulting in the inoperability of CV-0823, CCW Heat Exchanger Service Water Outlet Valve [V;BI], and P-52B, CCW Pump [P;CC]) could result in a condition in which there would be less than 100% of the required post accident CCW cooling. For this condition, Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.7.C was entered along with the specified action to enter TS LCO 3.0.3. At 1322 hrs, following cable isolation to restore P-52B to operable, TS LCO 3.0.3 was exited.

This occurrence is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The original plant piping and insulation specifications did not require this pipe (steam generator blowdown [WI] line in the CCW room, downstream of the containment isolation valves) to be insulated. Therefore, this line has never been insulated. Over time, the hot pipe damaged the cables due to radiant heat. The proximity of the heat source to the cable tray had been previously identified in 1998. However, due in part to incorrect assumptions, the design life of the cables was not expected to be challenged.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The damaged cable sections were replaced. The steam generator blow down line was insulated to reduce heat exposure to the newly installed cable.

To address extent of condition, a systematic walkdown of other cable tray systems was completed. No additional cable repairs were necessary.

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TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)* (17)

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The safety significance of this occurrence is considered to be minimal. No actual cable faults occurred. Postulated cable faults that result in loss of control power (e.g. blown fuse) would cause affected components to fail to their safety position. Evaluation of the potential for cable-to-cable and intra-cable conductor interactions that could position an affected component in other than its safety position is continuing.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None