

April 13, 2007

MEMORANDUM TO: Luis A. Reyes
Executive Director for Operations

FROM: James T. Wiggins, Chairman */RA/*
Lessons-Learned Oversight Board

SUBJECT: LESSONS-LEARNED OVERSIGHT BOARD: SUMMARY OF THE
MEETING HELD ON MARCH 28, 2007

The Lessons-Learned Oversight Board (LLOB) Meeting was held on March 28, 2007, with the following attendees: James Wiggins (Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research), Bruce Boger (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation), Edwin Hackett (Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards), Gary Holahan (Office of New Reactors), Loren Plisco (Region II via teleconference), Dan Dorman (Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response), Michael Johnson (Assistant for Operations), and John G. Lamb (Office of the Executive Director of Operations).

The purpose of the meeting was (1) to discuss LLOB selected recommendations from an Office of Inspector General (OIG) Audit Report, agency documents, and external reports, and (2) to discuss suggestions for improving the Lessons-Learned Program (LLP).

CONSIDERATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM REPORTS

The LLOB is responsible for ensuring that the criteria for the lessons-learned threshold are appropriately applied to all potential lessons-learned items in accordance with Management Directive 6.8, "Lessons-Learned Program."

The LLOB reviewed the recommendations in the various reports listed in the Enclosure prior to the meeting. The LLOB selected several recommendations for further discussion to determine if any of the recommendations met the lessons-learned threshold for additional oversight in the LLP. A potential lessons-learned item must meet all of the following criteria to be designated a lessons-learned item:

1. The item has significant organizational, safety, security, emergency preparedness, or generic implications;

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301-415-1727

2. A need to institutionalize corrective action for this item because the failure to do so would reasonably be expected to challenge the ability of the agency to meet any of the strategic outcomes designated in the Strategic Plan, or the corrective action would substantially improve the safety or security of NRC employees;
3. A root cause exists - or can be identified; and
4. The apparent resolution is actionable.

The LLOB determined all the recommendations can be addressed adequately by the appropriate program offices and that the threshold for additional oversight by the LLOB was not met.

NUREG-1055, "Improving Quality and the Assurance of Quality in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants - A Report to Congress," dated May 1984, was discussed at length. The LLOB members from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Office of New Reactors, and Region II agreed to look at the recommendations more closely for new construction under Part 50 and Part 52 and to bring recommendations, if any, to a future LLOB meeting for consideration into the LLP.

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE LLP

The SECY paper regarding the annual assessment of the LLP is due July 24, 2007, to the Office of the Executive Director for Operations. The LLOB acknowledged that the LLP was set up to capture high level lessons. The LLOB anticipated reviewing two or three task force report recommendations in a year. Since August 2006, the LLOB has only seen one task force report. The LLOB members will reflect on ways to improve the LLP and discuss the suggestions at the next LLOB meeting.

Enclosure: As stated

cc: Those on the Attached List

L. Reyes

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NAME	J. Lamb:mlw	W. Kane	J. Wiggins		
DATE	04/09/07	04/11/07	04/13/07		

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MEMORANDUM TO THOSE ON THE ATTACHED LIST DATED: April 13, 2007

SUBJECT: LESSONS-LEARNED OVERSIGHT BOARD: SUMMARY OF THE MEETING HELD
ON MARCH 28, 2007

	<u>E-Mail Mail Stops</u>
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Martin J. Virgilio, Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research, State and Compliance Programs, OEDO	RidsEdoMailCenter
Jacqueline E. Silber, Deputy Executive Director for Information Services and Administration, and Chief Information Officer, OEDO	RidsEdoMailCenter
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James L. Caldwell, Regional Administrator, Region III	RidsRgn3MailCenter
Bruce S. Mallett, Regional Administrator, Region IV	RidsRgn4MailCenter

Reports and Audits Considered

The table below provides the reports and audits considered by the Lessons-Learned Oversight Board (LLOB) for the March 28, 2007 meeting. The LLOB discussed in detail several of the recommendations for consideration into the Lessons-Learned Program. The threshold for all four criteria have to be met to qualify a recommendation as a lessons learned item.

Memo, Report, or Audit Title	Date	ADAMS Accession No.
Audit of NRC's Badge Access System (OIG-07-A-10)	01/23/07	ML070250483
Report of the Investigation into the Leak of Dissolver Product Liquor at the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP), Sellafield, Notified to HSE on 20 April 2005		www.hse.gov.uk
Challenges of Starting a Lessons Learned Program, BNFL, Inc.	10/24/02	www.hss.energy.gov
Building a Better Lessons Learned Program, INEEL	04/02	www.hss.energy.gov
First National comment Period on upgraded National Incident Management System, DHS	02/07	www.dhs.gov
Emergency Management and Response Information sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC), DHS	01/11/07	www.dhs.gov
Can We Talk? Public Safety and the Interoperability Challenge, National Institute of Justice	04/00	www.ncjrs.gov
Time to Act, 14 Steps in 2007 to Further Implement the 9/11 Commission Recommendations, Center for American Progress	01/07	www.americanprogress.org
NRC Information Notice 2007-12: Tactical Communications Interoperability between Nuclear Power Reactor Licensees and First Responders	03/15/07	ML070710233
Issue for Resolution 2006-026, Evaluation Regarding Forsmark 1 - Emergency Diesel Generators Failed to Start wehn the Unit was Disconnected from the Grid	03/02/07	ML070610079
Forsmark 1 - Incident Analysis - Loss of 400 kV and no Diesel start in sub A and sub B, Vattenfall	11/13/06	ML070310223
Operating Experience Brief 2007-02, Reactor Vessel Head Drop Analysis and Control of Heavy Loads	02/28/07	ML070730194

Enclosure

Memo, Report, or Audit Title	Date	ADAMS Accession No.
NRC Information Notice 2007-04: Construction Experience Related to the Assurance of Quality in Construction of Nuclear Facilities	02/05/07	ML063040426
NUREG-1055: Improving Quality and the Assurance of Quality in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants - A Report to Congress	05/31/84	ML063000293

Strategic Outcomes

- 1.1 No nuclear reactor accidents.
- 1.2 No inadvertent criticality events.
- 1.3 No acute radiation exposures resulting in fatalities.
- 1.4 No releases of radioactive materials that result in significant radiation exposures. Number of events with radiation exposures to the public and occupational workers that exceed Abnormal Occurrence Criterion I.A.
- 1.5 No releases of radioactive materials that cause significant adverse environmental impacts. Number of radiological releases to the environment that exceed applicable regulatory limits. (Releases for which a 30-day report requirement under 10 CFR 20.2203(a)(3) is required; > license limits or > 10x applicable limits for unrestricted areas)
- 2.1 No instances where licensed radioactive materials are used domestically in a manner hostile to the security of the United States.
- 3.1 Stakeholders are informed and involved in NRC processes as appropriate.
- 4.1 No significant licensing or regulatory impediments to the safe and beneficial uses of radioactive materials.
- 5.1 Continuous improvement in NRC's leadership and management effectiveness in delivering the mission.
- 5.2 A diverse, skilled workforce and an infrastructure that fully support the agency's mission and goals.