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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
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Our ref: LTR-RAC-07-23
March 22, 2007

SUBJECT: REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION
REFERENCE: REPORT NO: 70-1151/2006-205

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Westinghouse Electric Company herein provides formal response to your letter of February 15, 2007, regarding your inspection of the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility conducted during the period of December 18 – 21, 2006.

Appendix A provides the response to the violation of NRC requirements specified in the Notice of Violation.

I hereby affirm that the statements made in this response are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Should you have any questions or require additional information, please telephone Marc A. Rosser of my Staff at (803) 647-3174.

Sincerely,

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Cary D. Alstadt', written over the printed name.

Cary D. Alstadt, Manager
Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility

Attachments: Appendix A

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regional Administrator, Region II
Atlanta Federal Center
61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3415

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Melanie A. Galloway, Chief
Technical Support Branch
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety
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APPENDIX A

WESTINGHOUSE RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION

- A.1** The following information is provided in response to Violation (VIO) 70-1151/2006-205-01 for failure to (a) remove a criticality safety posting from a residue hood when implementing Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE) -04-A on November 13, 2006, and (b) remove a process tank from service upon implementing Revision 2 of CSE-07-A on December 8, 2006.

A.1.a ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE VIOLATION

The violation is correct as stated in the Notice of Violation.

A.1.b REASON FOR THE VIOLATION

The reason for the first example of the violation is a communications error between two Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineers. The NCS engineer who originated the CSE was not the NCS engineer who performed the implementation of CSE-04-A, and the notes that instructed the second engineer on actions to be taken to implement CSE-04-A referred to an incorrect posting (i.e., the notes instructed the NCS engineer to remove posting URRS 28 instead of URRS 29).

The second example of the violation occurred due to a procedure being followed incorrectly when removing a process tank from service. The NCS engineer had completed a CSE demonstrating that the final configuration had no NCS concerns. The engineer mistakenly thought that the CSE was required to be implemented prior to removal of the tanks, and therefore implemented the revised CSE out of sequence.

A.1.c CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

Posting URRS 29 was removed from the residue hood resulting in proper implementation of the CSE, and proper implementation of posting URRS 28 was confirmed on December 20, 2006 .

A revision to the CSE was issued and implemented to reflect the current plant configuration with the process tanks that had not yet been removed from service, (CSE-07-A, Revision 3).

A.1.d ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

All NCS engineers were disqualified and subsequently retrained on procedure RA-314, *Implementation of Criticality Safety Evaluations*, which governs implementation of CSE's for use in the field. In addition, Procedure RA-314 and accompanying forms were revised to clearly identify the requirements and flow for CSE implementation with regard to physical changes being performed in the field. A meeting was held with all NCS engineers to clarify management

expectations and requirements for CSE implementation. The issue was entered into the Corrective Action Process System (CAPS) to enable tracking of the corrective actions and to allow trending to be performed (CAPS # 06-355-C001).

A.1.e DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

Full compliance was achieved on January 29, 2007 when Revision 3 of CSE-07-A was implemented.