



U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
**STANDARD REVIEW PLAN**

**BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION 6-5**

**CURRENTLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF REACTOR SYSTEMS PIPING FROM THE RWST (OR BWST) AND CONTAINMENT SUMP(S) TO THE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS**

**REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES**

**Primary** - Organization responsible for the review of Containment Integrity

**Secondary** - None

**A. BACKGROUND**

Current PWRs utilize the refueling water storage tank (RWST) or the borated water storage tank (BWST) as the sole source of water for the safety injection pumps during the first 20 to 40 minutes of any accident that trips a safety injection signal. Since acceptable results of safety analyses of the accidents are based on the operation of a minimum number of these pumps interruption of this water supply for even a short period of time could result in unacceptably high fuel and cladding temperatures if the safety injection pumps fail because of cavitation or overheating.

1. General Design Criteria 35 requires that the emergency core cooling system have suitable redundancy in components and features and suitable interconnections to assure the system safety function can be accomplished assuming a single failure. The principal problem appears to be a definition of single failure. ANSI N658, "Single Failure Criteria for PWR Fluid Systems," defines an active failure as:

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**USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN**

This Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, has been prepared to establish criteria that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants intends to use in evaluating whether an applicant/licensee meets the NRC's regulations. The Standard Review Plan is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the NRC regulations.

The standard review plan sections are numbered in accordance with corresponding sections in Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)." Not all sections of Regulatory Guide 1.70 have a corresponding review plan section. The SRP sections applicable to a combined license application for a new light-water reactor (LWR) are based on Regulatory Guide 1.206, "Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)."

These documents are made available to the public as part of the NRC's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Individual sections of NUREG-0800 will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information and experience. Comments may be submitted electronically by email to [NRR\\_SRP@nrc.gov](mailto:NRR_SRP@nrc.gov).

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- A. An active failure is a malfunction, excluding passive failures, of a component which relies on mechanical movement to complete its intended function upon demand.”
- B. “Spurious action of a powered component originating within its actuation or control system shall be regarded as an active failure unless specific design features or operating restrictions preclude such spurious action.”

This branch position on the availability of the RWST is based on the above criteria and the recognition that water supplied from the RWST system to the ECCS system is absolutely essential in the event of a LOCA.

## 2. Branch Position

- A. The single active failure criterion defined in (a) and (b) above will be applied in evaluating the design of the piping systems that connect the safety injection pumps to the RWST (BWST) and the containment sumps.
- B. The piping systems, including valves, shall be designed to satisfy the requirements listed below without the need to disconnect the power to any valve.
- C. The valves and piping between the RWST (or BWST) and the safety injection pumps must be arranged so that no single failure will prevent the minimum flow to the core required to satisfy 10 CFR 50.46.
- D. The valves and piping between the RWST (or BWST) and safety injection pumps must be arranged so that no single active failure will result in damage to pumps such that the minimum flow requirements for long-term core and containment cooling after a LOCA are not satisfied.
- E. The valves and piping that connect the RWST (or BWST) and the containment sump(s) to the safety injection pumps must be arranged so as not to preclude automatic switchover from the injection mode of ECCS operation to recirculation cooling from the sump. These piping systems must be arranged so that the differential pressure between the sump and the RWST (or BWST), even if there is a single active failure, will not result in a loss of core cooling or a path that permits release of radioactive material from the containment to the environment.

## 3. Implementation

- A. Applicants for a construction permit for which an SER was published prior to April 16, 1975 will not be required to comply with the provisions of this item.
- B. For plants with an operating license issued prior to July 1981 and operating license applications docketed prior to July 1981 the position will not be completely applied. Specifically, locking out power to valves will be permitted. For most plants it is expected that this will be sufficient to meet the single failure criteria. However, in other plants changes to the piping and valving arrangements may be required to satisfy the single failure criteria.

- C. Applications docketed on or after July 1981 will be reviewed according to the provisions of this item.

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**PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT**

The information collections contained in the Standard Review Plan are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, and were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0011 and 3150-0151.

**PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION**

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