March 19, 2007

Mr. William Levis Senior Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC - N09 Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

#### SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2, ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM (TAC NOS. MD2786 AND MD2787)

Dear Mr. Levis:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos. 277 and 260 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated August 4, 2006, as supplemented by letter dated February 20, 2007.

The amendments allow the use of blind flanges for containment isolation in the containment purge system supply and exhaust lines, and make corresponding changes to the TSs. The amendments also consolidate the containment isolation requirements by moving the requirements of TS 3/4 6.1.7, "Containment Ventilation System," to TS 3/4 6.3.1 (TS 3/4 6.3 for Unit No. 2), "Containment Isolation Valves."

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/**ra**/

Richard B. Ennis, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch I-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 277 to License No. DPR-70
- 2. Amendment No. 260 to License No. DPR-75
- 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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TS Accession No.: ML070810415 (amendment #277 for unit 1) and ML070810417 (amendment #260 for unit 2)

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Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2

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Township Clerk Lower Alloways Creek Township Municipal Building, P.O. Box 157 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Mr. Paul Bauldauf, P.E., Asst. Director Radiation Protection Programs NJ Department of Environmental Protection and Energy CN 415 Trenton, NJ 08625-0415

Mr. Brian Beam Board of Public Utilities 2 Gateway Center, Tenth Floor Newark, NJ 07102

Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406

Senior Resident Inspector Salem Nuclear Generating Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Drawer 0509 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

# PSEG NUCLEAR, LLC

# EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC

# DOCKET NO. 50-272

## SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

#### AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 277 License No. DPR-70

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment filed by PSEG Nuclear LLC, acting on behalf of itself and Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensees) dated August 4, 2006, as supplemented by letter dated February 20, 2007, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (I) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) <u>Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan</u>

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/**ra**/

Harold K. Chernoff, Chief Plant Licensing Branch I-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Facility Operating License and the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 19, 2007

### ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 277

#### FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70

#### DOCKET NO. 50-272

Replace the following page of Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 with the attached revised page as indicated. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
Page 4	Page 4

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
VI	VI
3/4 6-8a	3/4 6-8a
3/4 6-12	3/4 6-12
3/4 6-13	3/4 6-13

# PSEG NUCLEAR, LLC

# EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC

# DOCKET NO. 50-311

## SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2

### AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 260 License No. DPR-75

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment filed by PSEG Nuclear LLC, acting on behalf of itself and Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensees) dated August 4, 2006, as supplemented by letter dated February 20, 2007, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (I) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) <u>Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan</u>

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/**ra**/

Harold K. Chernoff, Chief Plant Licensing Branch I-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Facility Operating License and the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 19, 2007

### ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 260

#### FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75

#### DOCKET NO. 50-311

Replace the following page of Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 with the attached revised page as indicated. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
Page 4	Page 4

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
VI	VI
3/4 6-9	3/4 6-9
3/4 6-14	3/4 6-14
3/4 6-15	3/4 6-15

# SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

# RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 277 AND 260 TO FACILITY OPERATING

# LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75

# PSEG NUCLEAR, LLC

# EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC

# SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

# DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated August 4, 2006 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML062270486), as supplemented by letter dated February 20, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070610323), PSEG Nuclear, LLC (PSEG or the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem), Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TSs). The proposed amendment would allow the use of blind flanges for containment isolation in the containment purge system supply and exhaust lines, and make corresponding changes to the TSs. The amendment would also consolidate the containment isolation requirements by moving the requirements of TS 3/4 6.1.7, "Containment Ventilation System," to TS 3/4 6.3.1 (TS 3/4 6.3 for Unit No. 2), "Containment Isolation Valves" consistent with NUREG-1431 "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants."

The current Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for TS 3/4.6.3.1 (TS 3/4.6.3 for Unit No. 2), Action c, requires that with one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange. The proposed amendment would revise the LCO to allow a blind flange to be used for containment isolation in each of the two flow paths (supply and exhaust) of the containment purge system in Modes 1 through 4 without remaining in LCO Action c.

The licensee stated that the containment isolation valves of the containment purge system have a history of requiring repair to pass the leak rate test, and that spare parts are not readily available. The licensee is proposing to reconfigure the penetrations by replacing the inboard supply valve and the inboard exhaust valve with a double O-ring, testable, blind flange. Although TS 3/4.6.3.1 (TS 3/4.6.3 for Unit No. 2) LCO Action c has no time limit, the licensee stated that the change is being pursued so that the plant will not have to remain in Action c as a normal situation.

The supplement dated February 20, 2007, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the *Federal Register* on December 5, 2006 (71 FR 70563).

### 2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The following General Design Criteria (GDC) in Appendix A to Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) are applicable to the proposed amendment:

- GDC 2, "Design bases for protection against natural phenomena," insofar as it requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes.
- GDC 16, "Containment design," insofar as it requires that the containment and its associated systems (e.g., penetrations) be provided to establish an essentially leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment.
- GDC 50, "Containment design basis," insofar as it requires that the containment and its penetrations accommodate without exceeding the design leakage rate, and with sufficient margin, the calculated pressure and temperature conditions resulting from any loss-ofcoolant accident (LOCA).
- GDC 52, "Capability for containment leakage rate testing" and GDC 53, "Provisions for containment testing and inspection" insofar as they require periodic leakage rate testing of the containment.
- GDC 54, "Piping systems penetrating containment," insofar as it requires that piping systems penetrating containment be designed with the capability to test the operability of the isolation valves and associated apparatus to determine if valve leakage is within acceptable limits.

Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors," specifies requirements for periodic testing of the leaktightness of the containment and its penetrations. Appendix J includes requirements for three types of tests. Type A tests are intended to measure the overall integrated leakage rate of the containment. Type B tests are intended to measure leakage for certain types of containment penetrations (e.g., penetrations whose design includes resilient seals, gaskets, or sealant compounds). Type C tests are intended to measure containment isolation valve leakage rates. Appendix J includes two options (Options A or Option B) for meeting the requirements of the appendix. Option A provides prescriptive requirements while Option B provides a performance-based approach. As discussed in TS 6.8.4.f, the Salem Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program utilizes Option B to Appendix J for the Type A, B, and C testing.

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September 1995, endorses Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance NEI 94-01, Revision 0, dated July 26, 1995, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J," as providing methods acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the provisions of Option B in Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50, subject to certain provisions. As discussed in TS 6.8.4.f, the Salem Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program utilizes the guidance in RG 1.163.

# 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

As discussed in Section 9.4.4.1.7 of the Salem Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), the containment purge system is a part of the containment ventilation system designed to "refresh the containment atmosphere as required to maintain doses to operating personnel within acceptable limits during inservice and shutdown maintenance and/or inspections." The containment purge system is a normally-closed, deactivated system that is manually energized as required to perform purging the containment atmosphere during normal plant shutdown. All exhaust is directed to the plant vent where it is monitored to assure the releases are within the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20.

Each of the containment purge supply and exhaust penetrations is equipped with two pneumatically-operated, quick-closing, butterfly-type isolation valves in series, one on each side of the containment wall. As described in UFSAR, Section 9.4.4.3.1, the actuator torque values for the containment purge isolation valves are not sufficient to move the valves from the full open position to the closed position at the differential pressure across the valves that could potentially exist during design-basis accident conditions. Therefore, TS requirements were added to keep the valves closed in all operating modes except cold shutdown and refueling. Specifically, current TS 3.6.1.7 requires that the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves be closed (valves immobilized in the shut position with control air to the valve operators isolated and tagged out of service) in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Currently, the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are leak tested in accordance with Unit No. 1 TS Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 4.6.3.1.6, 4.6.3.1.5, and 4.6.1.2.b and Unit No. 2 TS SRs 4.6.3.6, 4.6.3.5, and 4.6.1.2.b. As discussed previously, the licensee stated in the application that the containment isolation valves of the containment purge system have a history of requiring repair to pass the leak rate test, and that spare parts are not readily available. The licensee is proposing to reconfigure the containment penetrations by replacing the inboard supply valve and inboard exhaust valve with a double O-ring, testable, blind flange, with the intent of eliminating Type C leak rate testing of the containment purge outboard isolation valves altogether.

The proposed changes to the TSs include:

- New Note 2 to LCO 3.6.3.1 (LCO 3.6.3 for Unit No. 2) would be added, stating, in part, that "A containment purge valve is not a *required* containment isolation valve when its flow path is isolated with a testable blind flange tested in accordance with SR 4.6.1.2.b" [emphasis added]. The use of the terminology "required containment isolation valve" defines a containment purge valve to be a containment isolation valve only when the blind flange is not in place.
- The word "required" would be applied to all references to containment purge isolation valves in Unit No. 1 TS SRs 4.6.3.1.2.d, 4.6.3.1.5, 4.6.3.1.6.a, and Unit No. 2 TS SRs 4.6.3.2.d, 4.6.3.5, and 4.6.3.6.a.

The requirements for containment purge valves in TS 3/4.6.1.7 would be moved to the TS sections dealing with containment isolation valves (TS 3/4.6.3.1 for Unit No. 1 and TS 3/4.6.3 for Unit No. 2. The word "required" will be added in front of all references to containment purge isolation valves in these sections.

This used of the word "required" when referring to the containment purge isolation valves would allow the design changes in a consecutive manner, with Unit No. 1 changes scheduled for spring 2007 and Unit No. 2 changes for spring 2008. This proposed change keeps the current TS requirements in place until the installation of the blind flanges. The proposed changes will also make the current requirements effective with removal of the blind flanges at any future time. The NRC staff finds this aspect of the proposed amendment acceptable since design changes for installation or removal of the blind flanges would be controlled under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

The current LCO for TS 3/4.6.3.1 (TS 3/4.6.3 for Unit No. 2), Action c, requires that "with one or more of the containment isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and isolate each affected penetration within four hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange." In Section 5.2 of Attachment 1 to the licensee's application dated August 4, 2006, the licensee stated that "Currently, TS 3.6.3.1 (TS 3.6.3 for Unit 2), Action C allows a blind flange to be used to isolate a purge flow path when one or both of the purge valves in that flow path is not within leakage limits" [emphasis added]. In response to an NRC staff request for additional information, the licensee clarified that the words "or both" were inadvertently included. The licensee further clarified that under the current TS, if a blind flange is used in place of one inoperable valve, the remaining valve is tested and verified operable. For the proposed modification, the blind flanges will replace the inboard containment purge supply valve and inboard containment purge exhaust valve to allow operation in Modes 1 through 4 without relying on the outboard valves or remaining in the TS-required action. The blind flanges will have a double O-ring with provisions for testing to meet containment leak testing requirements. The licensee stated that with the testable blind flanges installed, the containment purge penetrations become Appendix J, Type B boundaries (containment penetrations whose design incorporates resilient seals. gaskets, or sealant compounds), instead of Type C boundaries with two isolation valves, and therefore, the outboard valves will no longer be containment isolation valves. As such, the licensee concluded that the Appendix J, Type C testing would no longer apply to these penetrations. The NRC staff agrees that, with the blind flanges installed, the containment purge penetrations should be tested according to the requirements for Type B tests in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B.

Section 10.2.1.3 of NEI 94-01 requires that an as-left Type B test shall be performed on the blind flanges following any maintenance, repair, modifications or adjustments which could affect the leak rate. Since the licensee intends to remove these blind flanges during shutdown and refueling operations, Type B testing must be performed prior entry into Mode 4.

Based on its review, the NRC concludes that the proposed change to utilize blind flanges will continue to meet the requirements of GDCs, 2, 16, 50, 52, 53, and 54 as follows. GDC 2 is satisfied since the licensee states that the installed flanges will meet seismic criteria. The proposed change satisfies GDC 16 since surveillance testing will demonstrate that the flanges are "essentially leaktight." GDC 50 is satisfied since the blind flanges are passive devices not

susceptible to an active failure or malfunction that could result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analysis. In addition, the conditions predicted by the accident analysis remain unchanged. GDC 52 and GDC 53 are satisfied since the containment purge penetrations will be Type B tested in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B. When blind flanges are installed, which are passive components, the affected purge flow paths are not required to be tested in accordance with GDC 54 which requires the capability to test if isolation valve leakage is within acceptable limits.

The blind flanges will be removed in Modes 5 and 6, to allow containment purge system operation as a means of refreshing containment atmosphere and maintain doses to operating personnel within allowable limits. The requirements for the containment purge isolation valves during movement of irradiated fuel in containment are contained in TS 3.9.4. LCO 3.9.4.c requires that each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either; closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or capable of being closed by the Containment Purge and Pressure-Vacuum Relief Isolation System. TS SR 4.9.4.3 requires verification, once per 18 months, that each required containment purge isolation valve actuates to the isolation position on a manual actuation signal. The TS requirements governing the containment building penetrations during movement of irradiated fuel within the containment will remain the same. However, post-implementation, there will be only one containment purge isolation valve available in each of the purge supply and exhaust penetrations. The Bases for TS 3.9.4 require only one isolation valve in this mode since closure requirements during movement of irradiated fuel in containment are much less stringent than the isolation requirements in Modes 1 through 4. The NRC staff finds the licensee's compliance with the closure requirements in Modes 5 and 6 are acceptable since they remain unchanged.

The amendment would also consolidate the containment isolation requirements by moving the requirements of TS 3/4 6.1.7, "Containment Ventilation System," to TS 3/4 6.3.1 (TS 3/4 6.3 for Unit No. 2), "Containment Isolation Valves" consistent with NUREG-1431 "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants." The requirements remain unchanged, except for the insertion of the terminology "required containment isolation valve" as previously discussed. The proposed changes do not modify any other categorization of valves and/or penetrations that serve the purpose of containment integrity and are, therefore, acceptable to the NRC staff.

Based on the above evaluation, the NRC staff concludes the proposed amendment is acceptable.

## 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

## 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative

occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (71 FR 70563). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

### 6.0 <u>CONCLUSION</u>

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: N. Karipineni R. Ennis

Date: March 19, 2007