



U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

7.3 Engineered Safety Features Systems

REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES

Primary - Organization responsible for the review of instrumentation and controls

Secondary - None

I. AREAS OF REVIEW

The objective of the review is to confirm that the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) and engineered safety features (ESF) control systems satisfy regulatory acceptance criteria, guidelines and performance requirements.

1. This Standard Review Plan (SRP) section describes the review process and acceptance criteria for the ESFAS, which is a portion of the protection system used to initiate the ESF systems **and auxiliary supporting features and other auxiliary features**. The ESFAS provides both automatic and manual initiation of these systems. This SRP section also includes the review criteria for control systems that regulate the ESF systems. The ESF control systems include both the automatic and manual features.

The specific areas of review are as follows:

The review of instrumentation and control systems that regulate the operation of **auxiliary supporting features and other auxiliary features** is included in the SRP sections that address systems that implement those features. SRP Section 7.5 provides the review criteria for the

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USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

This Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, has been prepared to establish criteria that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants intends to use in evaluating whether an applicant/licensee meets the NRC's regulations. The Standard Review Plan is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the NRC regulations.

The standard review plan sections are numbered in accordance with corresponding sections in the Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)." Not all sections of the standard format have a corresponding review plan section. The SRP sections applicable to a combined license application for a new light-water reactor (LWR) will be based on Regulatory Guide 1.206, "Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)," until the SRP itself is updated.

These documents are made available to the public as part of the NRC's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Individual sections of NUREG-0800 will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information and experience. Comments may be submitted electronically by email to NRR_SRP@nrc.gov.

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information systems important to safety, which includes instrumentation that indicates the need for manual initiation and control of ESF systems. Examples of ESF systems, Auxiliary Supporting Features and Other Auxiliary Features are as follows:

Typical ESF systems are:

- A. Containment and reactor vessel isolation systems.
- B. Emergency core cooling systems.
- C. Containment heat removal and depressurization systems.
- D. Pressurized water reactor auxiliary feedwater systems.
- E. Emergency boration systems.
- F. Boiling water reactor standby gas treatment systems.
- G. Containment air purification and cleanup systems.
- H. Containment combustible gas control systems.
- I. Control room isolation and emergency heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC).

Typical auxiliary supporting features and other auxiliary features (additional information is provided in Appendix 7.1-C) are:

- A. Electric power systems.
- B. Diesel generator fuel storage and transfer systems.
- C. Instrument air systems.
- D. HVAC systems for ESF areas.
- E. Essential service water and component cooling water systems.

Figure 3 of IEEE Std 603-1991, "Examples of Equipment Fitted to Safety Systems Scope Diagram" provides a matrix with an extensive list of auxiliary supporting features and other auxiliary features.

2. Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC). For design certification (DC) and combined license (COL) reviews, the applicant's proposed information on the ITAAC associated with the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) related to this SRP section is reviewed in accordance with SRP Section 14.3. The staff recognizes that the review of ITAAC is performed after review of the rest of this portion of the application against acceptance criteria contained in the SRP section. Furthermore, the ITAAC are reviewed to assure that all SSCs in this area of review are identified and addressed as appropriate in accordance with SRP Section 14.3.

3. COL Action Items and Certification Requirements and Restrictions. COL action items may be identified in the NRC staff's final safety evaluation report (FSER) for each certified design to identify information that COL applicants must address in the application. Additionally, DCs contain requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements) that COL applicants must address in the application. For COL applications referencing a DC, the review performed under this SRP section includes information provided in response to COL action items and certification requirements and restrictions pertaining to this SRP section, as identified in the FSER for the referenced certified design.

Review Interfaces

The listed SRP sections interface with this section as follows:

1. SRP Section 7.0 describes the coordination of reviews, including the information to be reviewed and the scope required for each of the different types of applications that the Staff may review. Refer to that section for information regarding how the areas of review are affected by the type of application under consideration and for a description of coordination between the organization responsible for the review of instrumentation and control systems and other organizations.

The specific acceptance criteria and review procedures are contained in the referenced SRP sections.

II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

Requirements

Acceptance criteria for the review of the ESFAS and ESF systems are based on meeting the relevant requirements of the following Commission regulations:

Acceptance criteria applicable to any ESFAS and ESF control systems

1. 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), "Quality Standards."
2. 10 CFR 50.55a(h), "Protection and Safety Systems," requires compliance with IEEE Std 603-1991, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995. For nuclear power plants with construction permits issued before January 1, 1971, the applicant/licensee may elect to comply instead with their plant specific licensing basis. For nuclear power plants with construction permits issued between January 1, 1971, and May 13, 1999, the applicant/licensee may elect to comply instead with the requirements stated in IEEE Std 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
3. 10 CFR 50. Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 1, "Quality Standards and Records."
4. GDC 2, "Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena."
5. GDC 4, "Environmental and Missile Design Basis."

6. GDC 13, "Instrumentation and Control."
7. GDC 19, "Control Room."
8. 10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(vi), as it relates to ITAAC (for design certification) sufficient to ensure that the SSCs in this area of review will operate in accordance with the certification.
9. 10.CFR 52.97(b)(1), as it relates to ITAAC (for combined licenses) sufficient to ensure that the SSCs in this area of review have been constructed and will be operated in conformity with the license and NRC regulations.

Additional acceptance criteria applicable to the ESFAS

1. 10 CFR 50.34(f)m "Additional TMI-Related Requirements," or equivalent TMI action requirements imposed by Generic Letters.

(2)(v), "Bypass and Inoperable Status Indication."
(2)(xii), "Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication."
(2)(xiv), "Containment Isolation Systems."
2. GDC 20, "Protection Systems Function."
3. GDC 21, "Protection System Reliability and Testability."
4. GDC 22, "Protective System Independence."
5. GDC 23, "Protection System Failure Modes."
6. GDC 24, "Separation of Protection and Control Systems."
7. GDC 29, "Protection against Anticipated Operational Occurrences."

Additional acceptance criteria applicable to ESF control systems

1. GDC 34, "Residual Heat Removal."
2. GDC 35, "Emergency Core Cooling."
3. GDC 38, "Containment Heat Removal."
4. GDC 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup."

SRP Acceptance Criteria

Specific SRP acceptance criteria acceptable to meet the relevant requirements of the NRC's regulations identified above are contained in SRP Section 7.1, SRP Table 7-1 and SRP Appendix 7.1-A which list standards, regulatory guides, and branch technical positions (BTPs). The SRP is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria

and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide acceptable methods of compliance with the NRC regulations.

1. SRP Appendix 7.1-C provides SRP acceptance criteria for safety system compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a(h).
2. SRP Appendix 7.1-B provides SRP acceptance criteria for protection system compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a(h).
3. IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations," as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.152, Revision 2, "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," provides guidance on applying the safety system criteria to computer-based safety systems. SRP Appendix 7.1-D provides SRP acceptance criteria for safety and protection systems using digital computer-based technology.
4. Item II.Q, "Defense Against Common-Mode Failures in Digital Instrument and Control Systems," of the Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-93-087, "Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs," provides guidance on Diversity and Defense-in-Depth. SRP BTP 7-19 provides additional guidance.

III. REVIEW PROCEDURES

The reviewer will select and emphasize material from the procedures described below, as may be appropriate for a particular case.

For each area of review specified in subsection I of this SRP section, the review procedure is identified below. These review procedures are based on the identified SRP acceptance criteria. For deviations from these specific acceptance criteria, the staff should review the applicant's evaluation of how the proposed alternatives to the SRP criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the relevant NRC requirements identified in subsection II.

SRP Section 7.1 describes the general procedures to be followed in reviewing any instrumentation and control system. This part of SRP Section 7.3 highlights specific topics that should be emphasized in the ESFAS review.

1. The review should include an evaluation of the ESFAS design against the requirements of IEEE Std 603-1991 or IEEE Std 279-1971, depending upon the applicant/licensee's commitment regarding these design criteria. For computer-based ESFAS, guidance is provided by IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003 as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.152, Revision 2. These procedures are detailed in SRP Appendix 7.1-B for IEEE Std 279-1971, SRP Appendix 7.1-C for IEEE Std 603-1991, and SRP Appendix 7.1-D for IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003.

SRP Appendices 7.1-B and 7.1-C discuss the requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971 and IEEE Std 603-1991 and how they are used in the review of the ESFAS. SRP Appendix 7.1-D discusses the criteria of IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003 and how they are used in the review of the ESFAS. Although the primary emphasis is on the equipment comprising the ESFAS, the reviewer must consider the overall ESF functions at the system level. The ESFAS design should be compatible with the accident analyses. It is not sufficient

to evaluate the adequacy of the ESFAS only on the basis of the design meeting the specific requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971 or IEEE Std 603-1991.

The ESFAS review should address the applicable topics identified as applicable in SRP Table 7-1. SRP Appendix 7.1-A describes review methods for each topic. Major design considerations that should be emphasized in the ESFAS review are identified below.

- A. Design basis - See SRP Appendix 7.1-B subsection 3 or SRP Appendix 7.1-C subsection 4.
- B. Single-failure criterion - See SRP Appendix 7.1-B subsection 4.2 or SRP Appendix 7.1-C subsection 5.1.
- C. Quality of components and modules - See SRP Appendix 7.1-B subsection 4.3 or SRP Appendix 7.1-C subsection 5.3.
- D. Independence - See SRP Appendix 7.1-B subsections 4.6 and 4.7 or SRP Appendix 7.1-C subsections 5.6 and 6.3.
- E. Completion of protective action - See SRP Appendix 7.1-B subsection 4.16 or SRP Appendix 7.1-C subsection 5.2.
- F. Diversity and defense-in-depth - ESFAS should incorporate multiple means for responding to each event discussed in the SAR Chapter 15, "Transient and Accident Analyses." At least one pair of these means for each event should have the property of signal diversity, i.e., the use of different sensed parameters to initiate protective action, in which any of the parameters may independently indicate an abnormal condition, even if the other parameters are sensed incorrectly (see NUREG/CR-6303, "Method for Performing Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Analyses of Reactor Protection Systems"). The diverse means may actuate the same protective function or different protective functions, and may be automatically or manually activated, consistent with the response time requirements of the function. For digital computer-based ESFAS systems, the applicant/licensee should have performed a defense-in-depth and diversity analysis. Additionally, for advanced reactor design under 10 CFR Part 52, the design should provide for manual, system-level actuation of critical safety functions. SRP BTP 7-19 provides guidance for the review of diversity and defense-in-depth.
- G. System testing and inoperable surveillance - See SRP Appendix SRP 7.1-B subsections 4.9 and 4.10 or SRP Appendix 7.1-C subsections 5.7, 5.8, and 6.5.
- H. Use of digital systems - See SRP Appendix 7.0-A and SRP Appendix 7.1-D.
- I. Setpoint determination - See Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," and SRP BTP 7-12, BTP 7-3, Appendix 7.1-B subsection 4.18, and Appendix 7.1-C subsection 6.8.
- J. ESF control systems - Conformance to the single-failure criterion on a system basis, and operability from onsite and offsite electrical power as required by GDC 34, 35, 38, and 41.

2. For reviews of DC and COL applications under 10 CFR 52, the reviewer should follow the above procedures to verify that the design set forth in the SAR, and if applicable, site interface requirements meet the acceptance criteria. For DC applications, the reviewer should identify necessary COL action items. With respect to COL applications, the scope of the review is dependent on whether the COL applicant references a DC, an early site permit, or other NRC-approved material, applications, and/or reports. After this review, SRP Section 14.3 should be followed for the review of Tier 1 information for the design, including the postulated site parameters, interface criteria, and ITAAC.

In certain instances, it will be the reviewer's judgment that, for a specific case under review, emphasis should be placed on specific aspects of the design, while other aspects of the design need not receive the same emphasis and in-depth review. Typical reasons for such a non-uniform emphasis are the introduction of new design features or the utilization in the design of features previously reviewed and found acceptable. For deviations from these specific acceptance criteria, the staff should review the applicant's evaluation of how the proposed alternatives to the SRP criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the relevant NRC requirements identified in subsection II above.

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

The reviewer verifies that the applicant has provided sufficient information and that the review and calculations (if applicable) support conclusions of the following type to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report. The reviewer also states the bases for those conclusions.

The review of the instrumentation and control aspects of the engineered safety feature (ESF) systems includes the engineered safety features actuation systems (ESFAS) and the ESF control systems. The ESFAS detects a plant condition requiring the operation of an ESF system and/or auxiliary supporting features and other auxiliary features and initiates operation of the systems. The ESF control systems regulate the operation of the ESF systems following automatic initiation by the protection system or manual initiation by the plant operator.

The NRC staff concludes that the design of the ESFAS is acceptable and meets the relevant requirements of General Design Criteria (GDC) 1, 2, 4, 13, 19-24, 29, 34, 35, 38, and 41 and 10 CFR 50.34(f), 50.55a(a)(1), and 10 CFR 50.55a(h).

The staff conducted a review of these systems for conformance to the guidelines in the regulatory guides, industry standards and branch technical positions applicable to these systems. The staff concludes that the applicant/licensee acceptably identified the guidelines applicable to these systems. Based upon the review of the system design for conformance to the guidelines, the staff concludes that the systems conform to the guidelines applicable to these systems. Therefore, the staff finds that the requirements of GDC 1 and 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1) have been met.

The review included the identification of those systems and components for the ESFAS and ESF control systems that are designed to survive the effects of earthquakes, other natural phenomena, abnormal environments, and missiles. Based upon the review, the staff concludes that the applicant/licensee has identified those systems and components consistent with the design bases for those systems. Sections 3.10 and 3.11 of the SER address the qualification programs to demonstrate the capability of these systems and components to survive the above

effects. Therefore, the staff finds that the identification of these systems and components satisfies the requirements of GDC 2 and 4.

Based on the review of ESFAS and ESF control system status information, manual initiation capabilities, control capabilities, and provisions to support safe shutdown, the staff concludes that information is provided to monitor the system over the anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety. Appropriate controls are provided for manual initiation and control of ESF functions. ESF controls appropriately support actions to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions and to achieve and maintain a safe condition under accident conditions. Therefore, the staff finds that the ESFAS and ESF control design satisfies the requirements of GDC 13 and 19.

Based on the review of system functions, the staff concludes that the ESFAS conforms to the requirements of [IEEE Std 279-1971 or IEEE Std 603-1991] and 10 CFR 50.34(f). The ESFAS setpoint methodology conforms to the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.105. Based upon this review and coordination with those having primary review responsibility for the accident analysis, the staff concludes that the ESFAS includes the provision to sense accident conditions and anticipated operational occurrences consistent with the accident analysis presented in Chapter 15 of the SAR and evaluated in the SER. Therefore, the staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of GDC 20.

The ESFAS conforms to the guidelines for periodic testing in Regulatory Guide 1.22, "Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions," and Regulatory Guide 1.118, "Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems." The bypassed and inoperable status indication conforms to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.47, "Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems." The ESFAS conforms to the guidelines on the application of the single-failure criterion in IEEE Std 379-2000, "IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems," as supplemented by Regulatory Guide 1.53, "Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Safety Systems." Based on the review, the staff concludes that the ESFAS satisfies the requirement of [IEEE Std 279-1971 or IEEE Std 603-1991] with regard to the system reliability and testability. Therefore, the staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies these requirements of GDC 21.

The ESFAS conforms to the guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.75, "Criteria for Independence of Electrical Safety Systems," for the protection system independence. Based on the review, the staff concludes that the ESFAS satisfies the requirement of [IEEE Std 279-1971 or IEEE Std 603-1991] with regard to the system's independence. Therefore, the staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of GDC 22.

Based on the review of the failure modes and effects analysis for the ESFAS, the staff concludes that the system is designed to fail into a safe state if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of energy, or a postulated adverse environment are experienced. Therefore, the staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of GDC 23.

Based on the review of the interfaces between the ESFAS and plant operating control systems, the staff concludes that the system satisfies the requirements of [IEEE Std 279-1971 or IEEE Std 603-1991] with regard to control and protection system interactions. Therefore, the staff finds the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of GDC 24.

Based on the review of the ESFAS, the Staff concludes that the system satisfies the protection system requirements for malfunctions of the reactivity control system such as accidental withdrawal of control rods. Chapter 15 of the SAR and SER address the capability of the system to ensure that fuel design limits are not exceeded for such events. Therefore, the staff finds that the RTS satisfies the requirements of GDC 25.

The staff conducted a review of the ESF control systems for conformance to the requirements for testability, operability with onsite and offsite electrical power, and single failures. The staff concludes that the ESF control systems are testable and are operable using either onsite or offsite power (assuming only one source is available). Additionally, the controls associated with redundant ESF systems are independent and satisfy the single-failure criterion and, therefore, meet the relevant requirements of GDC 34, 35, 38, and 41.

The conclusions noted above are based upon the requirements of [IEEE Std 279-1971 or IEEE Std 603-1991] with respect to the design of the ESFAS. Therefore, the staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(h).

The applicant/licensee has also incorporated in the system design the [recommendations of the TMI task action plan items OR the requirements of 10 CFR 50.34(f)], [identify item number and how implemented] which the staff has reviewed and found acceptable.

In the review of the ESFAS, the staff examined the dependence of this system on the availability of essential auxiliary systems. Based on this review and coordination with those having primary review responsibility of auxiliary supporting features and other auxiliary features systems, the staff concludes that the design of the ESFAS is compatible with the functional requirements of auxiliary supporting features and other auxiliary features systems.

Note: The following finding applies to systems involving computer-based components.

Based on the review of software development plans and the review of the computer software development process and design outputs, the staff concludes that the computer systems meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.152. Therefore, the special characteristics of computer systems have been adequately addressed, and the staff finds that the ESFAS satisfies these requirements of GDC 1 and 21.

Based on the review of the applicant/licensee's defense-in-depth and diversity analysis, the staff concludes that the ESFAS complies with the criteria for defense against common-cause failure in digital instrumentation and control systems. Therefore, the staff finds that adequate diversity and defense against common-cause failure have been provided to satisfy these requirements of GDC 21 and 22, and the Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-93-087.

Note: The following findings apply to DC and COL reviews.

For DC and COL reviews, the findings will also summarize (to the extent that the review is not discussed in other SAR sections) the staff's evaluation of the ITAAC, including design acceptance criteria, as applicable, and interface requirements and COL action items relevant to this SRP section.

Note: The following conclusion is applicable to all applications.

The conclusions noted above for the ESFAS are applicable to all portions of the systems except

for the following, for which acceptance is based upon prior NRC review and approval as noted [list applicable system or topics and identify references].

V. IMPLEMENTATION

The staff will use this SRP section in performing safety evaluations of DC applications and license applications submitted by applicants pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 52. Except when the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the staff will use the method described herein to evaluate conformance with Commission regulations.

The provisions of this SRP section apply to reviews of applications docketed six months or more after the date of issuance of this SRP section, unless superceded by a later revision.

VI. REFERENCES

1. IEEE Std 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
2. IEEE Std 379-2000, "IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems."
3. IEEE Std 603-1991, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
4. IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
5. NUREG/CR-6303, "Method for Performing Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Analyses of Reactor Protection Systems." December 1994.
6. Regulatory Guide 1.105. "Setpoints for Safety-related Instrumentation." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1999.
7. Regulatory Guide 1.118. "Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear regulatory Commission, 1995.
8. Regulatory Guide 1.152. "Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2006.
9. Regulatory Guide 1.22. "Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions," Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1972.
10. Regulatory Guide 1.47. "Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems," Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1973.
11. Regulatory Guide 1.53. "Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Safety Systems." Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2003.

12. Regulatory Guide 1.75. "Criteria for Independence of Electrical Safety Systems," Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2005.
13. SECY-93-087. "Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs." April 2, 1993.
14. Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-93-087, "Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs." July 15, 1993.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

The information collections contained in the Standard Review Plan are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, and were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0011 and 3150-0151.

PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

SRP Section 7.3

Description of Changes

This SRP section affirms the technical accuracy and adequacy of the guidance previously provided in Revision 4, dated June 1997, of this SRP. See ADAMS accession number ML052500503.

In addition, this SRP section was administratively updated in accordance with NRR Office Instruction, LIC-200, Revision 1, "Standard Review Plan (SRP) Process." The revision also adds standard paragraphs to extend application of the updated SRP section to prospective submittals by applicants pursuant to 10 CFR 52.

The technical changes are incorporated in Revision 5, dated XXXXXX.

Review Responsibilities - Reflects changes in review branches resulting from reorganization and branch consolidation. Changes are reflected throughout the SRP.

I. AREAS OF REVIEW

1. Replaced term "essential auxiliary systems" with the IEEE 603-1991 terminology "auxiliary supporting features and other auxiliary features."
2. Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) were made explicit within the scope, as were combined operating license (COL) review action items and certification requirements and restrictions.

II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

1. Updated acceptance criteria to meet the 1999 revision of 10 CFR 50.55a(h), "Protection and Safety Systems."
2. Revised discussion of 10 CFR 52 for consistency with NRC SRP update instruction, LIC-200.
3. Added references to SRP Appendices 7.1-B and 7.1-C.
4. Added references to Regulatory Guide 1.152, IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003, and new SRP Appendix 7.1-D.
5. Deleted reference to Regulatory Guide 1.153.

III. REVIEW PROCEDURES

1. Added references to Regulatory Guide 1.152, IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003, and new SRP Appendix 7.1-D.
2. Revised discussion of 10 CFR 52 for consistency with NRC SRP update instruction, LIC-200.
3. Deleted reference to Regulatory Guide 1.153.

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

1. Replaced term “essential auxiliary systems” with the IEEE 603-1991 terminology “auxiliary supporting features and other auxiliary features.”
2. Revised discussion of 10 CFR 52 for consistency with NRC SRP update instruction, LIC-200.

V. IMPLEMENTATION

1. Revised discussion of 10 CFR 52 for consistency with NRC SRP update instruction, LIC-200.

VI. REFERENCES

1. Updated to cite current versions of regulatory guides and endorsed standards.
2. Added references to IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003, Regulatory Guide 1.53, and SECY-03-087.
3. Deleted reference to Regulatory Guide 1.153.