

14.3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS - INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES

Primary - Organizations Responsible for the Review of Plant Systems

Secondary - None

AREAS OF REVIEW

This SRP section addresses inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) related to most of the fluid systems that are not part of the core reactor systems. ITAAC information is contained in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) of a combined license (COL) application or Tier 1 information from the design control document of a design certification (DC) application.

The specific areas of review are as follows:

- 1. New and spent fuel handling systems, power generation systems, air systems, cooling water systems, radioactive waste systems and heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems.
- 2. Issues which affect multiple SSCs such as equipment qualification and protection from fires, floods and tornado missiles.

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USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

This Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, has been prepared to establish criteria that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants intends to use in evaluating whether an applicant/licensee meets the NRC's regulations. The Standard Review Plan is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the NRC regulations.

The standard review plan sections are numbered in accordance with corresponding sections in Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)." Not all sections of Regulatory Guide 1.70 have a corresponding review plan section. The SRP sections applicable to a combined license application for a new light-water reactor (LWR) are based on Regulatory Guide 1.206, "Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)."

These documents are made available to the public as part of the NRC's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Individual sections of NUREG-0800 will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information and experience. Comments may be submitted electronically by email to NRR_SRP@nrc.gov.

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3. For a DC application:

- A. The staff reviews the proposed ITAAC that are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that, if the inspections, tests, and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, a plant that incorporates the design certification is built and will operate in accordance with the design certification, the Atomic Energy Act, and the NRC's regulations.
- B. The staff reviews the justification that compliance with the interface requirements is verifiable through ITAAC. The staff also reviews the method that is to be used for verification of the interface requirements.

4. For a COL application:

- A. The staff reviews the proposed ITAAC that are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that, if the inspections, tests, and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, the facility has been constructed and will operate in conformity with the combined license, the Atomic Energy Act, and the NRC's regulations.
- B. If the application references a standard design certification, the staff verifies that the ITAAC contained in the certified design apply to those portions of the facility design that are approved in the design certification.
- 5. <u>COL Action Items and Certification Requirements and Restrictions</u>. For a DC application, the review will also address COL action items and requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters).

For a COL application referencing a DC, a COL applicant must address COL action items (referred to as COL license information in certain DCs) included in the referenced DC. Additionally, a COL applicant must address requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters) included in the referenced DC.

Review Interfaces

Other SRP sections interface with this section as follows:

- 1. SRP Section 14.3 provides general guidance on ITAAC information.
- 2. Acceptability of ITAAC information regarding the ability of SSCs to withstand various natural phenomena is reviewed under SRP Section 14.3.2.
- 3. Acceptability of ITAAC information for piping design is reviewed under SRP Section 14.3.3.
- 4. Acceptability of ITAAC information for Instrumentation and Controls is reviewed under SRP Section 14.3.5.
- 5. Acceptability of ITAAC information for electrical systems and components is reviewed under SRP Section 14.3.6.

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The specific acceptance criteria and review procedures are contained in the referenced SRP sections.

II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

Requirements

Acceptance criteria are based on meeting the relevant requirements of the following Commission regulations:

- 1. 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1), which requires that a DC application contain the proposed inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) that are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that, if the inspections, tests, and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, a plant that incorporates the design certification is built and will operate in accordance with the design certification, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the NRC's regulations;
- 2. 10 CFR 52.80(a), which requires that a COL application contain the proposed inspections, tests, and analyses, including those applicable to emergency planning, that the licensee shall perform, and the acceptance criteria that are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that, if the inspections, tests, and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, the facility has been constructed and will operate in conformity with the combined license, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the NRC's regulations.

SRP Acceptance Criteria

Specific SRP acceptance criteria acceptable to meet the relevant requirements of the NRC's regulations identified above are as follows for the review described in this SRP section. The SRP is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide acceptable methods of compliance with the NRC regulations.

- 1. The reviewer should utilize the SRP in its review of Tier 1 to determine the safety significance of SSCs. Other sources include applicable rules and regulations, GDCs, RGs, USIs and GSIs, NRC generic correspondence, PRA, insights from the standard design's safety and severe accident analyses, and operating experience. Tier 1 should be reviewed for consistency with the initial test program described in DCD Tier 2 Chapter 14.2. The reviewer should also use the review checklists provided in Appendix C to SRP Section 14.3 as an aid for establishing consistency and comprehensiveness in his review of the systems. If applicable, the reviewer should utilize regulatory guidance from the Commission for selected policy and technical issues related to particular design. Examples of these are contained in SECY-93-087, "Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light-Water Reactor Designs." The SRM related to this is dated July 21, 1993.
- 2. Tier 1 should be reviewed for treatment of design information proportional to the safety significance of the SSC for that system. Many items may be judged to be important to

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safety, and thus should be included in Tier 1. The following issues are identified to ensure comprehensive and consistent treatment in Tier 1 based on the safety significance of the system being reviewed:

- (1) System purpose and functions
- (2) Location of system
- (3) Key design features of the system
- (4) Seismic and ASME code classifications
- (5) System operation in various modes
- (6) Controls, alarms, and displays
- (7) Logic
- (8) Interlocks
- (9) Class 1E electrical power sources and divisions
- (10) Equipment to be qualified for harsh environments
- (11) Interface requirements
- (12) Numeric performance values
- (13) Accuracy and quality of figures
- 3. Standard ITAAC entries should be utilized to verify selected issues, where appropriate. The reviewer should ensure consistent application and treatment of the standard ITAAC entries for basic configuration ITAAC, net positive suction head, and physical separation for appropriate systems in Tier 1. In particular, the general provision for environmental qualification aspects of SSCs invoked by the basic configuration ITAAC should be reviewed to ensure appropriate treatment in Tier 1.
- 4. Environmental qualification (EQ) of safe-shutdown equipment may be verified as part of the basic configuration ITAAC for safety-related systems. EQ treatment in the ITAAC would then be discussed in the General Provisions section of Tier 1. Verification may include type tests or a combination of type tests and analyses of Class 1E electrical equipment identified in the Design Description or accompanying figures to show that the equipment can withstand the conditions associated with a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time that the function is needed.
- 5. The design features in Tier 1 should be selected to ensure that the integrity of the analyses are preserved in an as-built facility. For example, 3-hour fire boundaries and divisional separation may be shown in the building figures. Also, flooding features such as structure elevations should be specified in the site parameters, flood doors may be shown on the building figures, and elevations are shown on the buildings to verify that the approximate physical location of components and relative elevations of buildings minimize the effects of flooding. As-built reconciliation reports for fires and floods to ensure consistency with Tier 2 analyses should be required by the appropriate system ITAAC (e.g., fire protection system) and selected building ITAAC, respectively.
- Other specific issues that should be addressed include heat removal capabilities for design-basis accidents and tornado and missile protection. Heat removal capabilities may be verified through heat removal requirements for core cooling system heat exchangers and interface requirements for site-specific systems. Tornado and missile protection may be provided by inlet and outlet dampers in ventilation systems, and through the structural design of buildings.

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- 7. The areas of review for radioactive waste systems include design objectives, design criteria, identification of all expected releases of radioactive effluents, methods of treatment, methods used in calculating effluent source terms and releases of radioactive materials in the environment, and operational programs in controlling and monitoring effluent releases and for assessing associated doses to members of the public. The radioactive waste systems include the liquid waste management system (LWMS). gaseous waste management system (GWMS), and the solid waste management system (SWMS). These systems deal with the management of radioactive wastes, as liquid, wet, and dry solids, produced during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences. In addition, the review includes an evaluation of the process and effluent radiological monitoring instrumentation and sampling systems (PERMISS) which are used to monitor liquid and gaseous process streams and effluents and solid wastes generated by these systems. The PERMISS includes subsystems used to collect process and effluent samples during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and under post-accident conditions. The lead branch responsible in implementing the review should coordinate the review of these systems and operational programs and receive input on the design and compliance with acceptance criteria listed in SRP Sections 11.2 to 11.5 from other branches, including, balance of plant, structural, instrumentation and controls, HVAC, quality assurance, technical specifications, and emergency planning.
- 8. The reviewer should receive inputs on the treatment of issues identified above from other branches such as the structural, electrical and I&C branches. In addition, the secondary review branches specified in SRP Section 14.3 should provide inputs on selected issues. These issues include key insights and assumptions from PRA and severe accident analyses, as well as inputs for issues such as treatment of alarms, displays and controls, and functionality of MOVs. Cross-references from Tier 2 to Tier 1 for key insights and assumptions from PRA and severe accidents should be provided by applicants in Tier 2 together with these analyses.
- 9. Tier 1 should address and verify at least the minimum inventory of alarms, controls, and indications as derived from the Emergency Procedure Guidelines, the requirements of RG 1.97, and probabilistic risk assessment insights. These may be specified in the MCR and the Remote Shutdown System (RSS) ITAAC, or addressed in the appropriate ITAAC, and verified to exist. Other controls, indications and alarms should be identified in the system ITAAC based on their safety significance. Locations for these should be shown on system figures if important to system design and function. The ability of these controls, indications, and alarms to function should be checked during operation of the system for the functional tests required by the system ITAAC. Because the intent of the ITAAC is to verify the final as-built condition of the plant, the operation of the system during the completion of the functional tests required in the system ITAAC should be conducted from the MCR. Therefore, the verification that the system can be operated from the MCR need not be a separate ITAAC. Also, because the operation of the equipment from the control room demonstrates the control function, continuity checks between the RSS and the equipment demonstrates that the control signal will be received by the component and provides adequate assurance that the equipment can be operated by the RSS. The results of the pre-operational test program may be utilized to demonstrate the ability to operate plant equipment by the RSS.

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Technical Rationale

The technical rationale for application of these acceptance criteria to the areas of review addressed by this SRP section is discussed in the following paragraphs:

- 1. Application of 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1), as it relates to ITAAC (for design certification) provides reasonable assurance that the SSCs in this area of review will operate in accordance with the design certification, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the NRC's regulations.
- Application of 10 CFR 52.80(a), as it relates to ITAAC (for combined licenses) provides reasonable assurance that the SSCs in this area of review have been constructed and will be operated in conformity with the combined license, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the NRC's regulations.

III. REVIEW PROCEDURES

The reviewer will select material from the procedures described below, as may be appropriate for a particular case.

These review procedures are based on the identified SRP acceptance criteria. For deviations from these acceptance criteria, the staff should review the applicant's evaluation of how the proposed alternatives provide an acceptable method of complying with the relevant NRC requirements identified in Subsection II.

- 1. Follow the general procedures for review of Tier 1 contained in the Review Procedures section of SRP Section 14.3. Ensure that the DCD is consistent with Appendix A to SRP Section 14.3.
- 2. Ensure that all Tier 1 information is consistent with Tier 2 information. Figures and diagrams should be reviewed to ensure that they accurately depict the functional arrangement and requirements of the systems. Reviewers should use the Review Checklists in Appendix C to SRP Section 14.3 as an aid in establishing consistent and comprehensive treatment of issues.
- 3. Ensure that the plant systems are clearly described in Tier 1, including the key performance characteristics and safety functions of SSCs based on their safety significance.
- 4. The reviewer should ensure that appropriate guidance is provided to other branches such that plant systems issues in Tier 1 are treated in a consistent manner among branches.
- 5. Ensure that the standard ITAAC entries related to plant systems items are included in the appropriate systems of the standard design. In particular, the reviewer should review the basic configuration ITAAC for verification of environmental qualification. The reviewer should ensure consistent application and treatment of the standard ITAAC entries for basic configuration ITAAC, net positive suction head, and physical separation for appropriate systems in Tier 1.

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- 6. Ensure that design features from the resolutions of selected policy and technical issues are adequately addressed in Tier 1, based on safety significance. Ensure that the appropriate Commission guidance, requirements, bases and resolutions for these items are documented clearly in the SER.
- 7. Ensure that definitions, legends, interface requirements, and site parameters that pertain to plant systems issues are treated consistently and appropriately in Tier 1.
- 8. For review of a DC application, the reviewer should follow the above procedures to verify that the design, including requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters), set forth in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) meets the acceptance criteria. DCs have referred to the FSAR as the design control document (DCD). The reviewer should also consider the appropriateness of identified COL action items. The reviewer may identify additional COL action items; however, to ensure these COL action items are addressed during a COL application, they should be added to the DC FSAR.

For review of a COL application, the scope of the review is dependent on whether the COL applicant references a DC, an early site permit (ESP) or other NRC approvals (e.g., manufacturing license, site suitability report or topical report).

9. Implementation of ITAAC will be inspected in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter IMC-2503, "Construction Inspection Program - ITAAC Inspections."

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

The reviewer verifies that the applicant has provided sufficient information and that the review and calculations (if applicable) support conclusions of the following type to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report. The reviewer also states the bases for those conclusions.

- 1. The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided to satisfy SRP Section 14.3 and this SRP section, and concludes that the ITAAC is acceptable. A finding similar to that in the Evaluation Findings section of SRP Section 14.3 should be provided in a separate section of the SER.
- 2. For DC and COL reviews, the findings will also summarize the staff's evaluation of requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters) and COL action items relevant to this SRP section.

V. IMPLEMENTATION

The staff will use this SRP section in performing safety evaluations of DC applications and license applications submitted by applicants pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 52. Except when the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the staff will use the method described herein to evaluate conformance with Commission regulations.

The provisions of this SRP section apply to reviews of applications submitted six months or more after the date of issuance of this SRP section, unless superseded by a later revision.

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VI. REFERENCES

- 1. 10 CFR 52.47, "Contents of Applications."
- 2. 10 CFR 52.80(a), "Contents of Applications."
- 3. 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection."
- 4. 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants."
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident."
- 6. NUREG-1503, "Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Certification of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor," Volumes 1 and 2, July 1994.
- 7. NUREG-1462, "Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Certification of the System 80+ Design," Volumes 1 and 2, August 1994.
- 8. NRC Inspection Manual Chapter IMC-2503, "Construction Inspection Program ITAAC Inspections," issued April 26, 2006.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

The information collections contained in the Standard Review Plan are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, and were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0011 and 3150-0151.

PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

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