

Waterford III Draft Outline Comments

1. Scenario 1 Event 3: Should RWSP be RWST?
2. Scenario 1 Event 4: Should BOP receive credit for this as component failure?
3. Scenario 2: What common fault would keep both charging pumps from auto starting?
4. Which Scenarios are new or modified?
5. Admin JPM RO Conduct of Operations: Is there a lesson objective or JTA for RO knowledge of overtime calculations?
6. Admin JPM RO Control of Equipment: How does Containment Pressure Calculation fit equipment control?
7. Simulator JPMs JPM h: What system does this interface with in Safety function 8 category?
8. Only two modified JPM's. Need to see original and modified versions to verify they meet requirements.
9. Written exam outline looks good.

Waterford III 2006 SRO/RO Initial License Examination Justifications for changes from Initial Approved Outlines.

Written Examination

RO Written:

1. Question 14; Tier 1/1 4.1-055-G 2.4.20 Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions and notes.
No credible discriminatory RO level tie exists; OP-902-005 Station Blackout notes and cautions are very limited. Replaced with Generic 2.4.12 Knowledge of general operating crew responsibilities during emergency operations.
2. Question 33 Tier 2/1 RO 007/A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRTS controls including: Maintaining Quench Tank water level within limits. Rejected due to this K/A being too similar to question 87 on the SRO portion of this exam. Replaced system with 013, but maintained A1.01.
3. Question 47; Tier 2/1 3.6-063-A4.03 Battery discharge rate cannot be monitored in the Control room the only indication available is DC bus voltage which is not a true indicator of discharge rate. Overlap between other written questions dealing with reducing DC loads in the event of a SBO. Replaced with 3.4-005-A4.01 Controls and indications for RHR pump.
4. Question 50, Typo - changed CFR 43.12 to 41.12
5. Question 55; Tier 2/1 3.5-103-G2.1.29; Knowledge of how to conduct and verify valve lineups. The only credible discriminatory tie to be made would be for containment integrity or closure which is used on previous questions. Replaced with 2.1.27 Knowledge of system purpose and or function.
6. Question 57, Typo – changed A4.03 to A4.02. Description accurate, mis-numbered K/A.
7. Question 61; 2/2 3.8-029-A2.04 A2.04 - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Containment Purge System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Health physics sampling of containment atmosphere No discriminatory RO level tie for malfunction of HP sampling of containment effect of Containment Purge (CFR: 41.9) Replaced with 3.1-014-A2.07 RPIS loss of reed switch.
8. Question 70; Tier 3 2.2.34 Knowledge of the process for determining the internal and external effects on core reactivity. Duplicated for Question 2 Replaced with: 2.2.22 Knowledge for limiting conditions for operations and Safety Limits.

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SRO written:

1. SRO Question 81; Tier 1/1. Rejecting E55/2.2.25: **Knowledge of bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits**

Rejected due to no technical specification bases relating to SBO. Replaced with 2.4.47 **Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.** (kept E55).

2. SRO Question 88: Tier 2/1. Rejecting 3.2-013-A2.04: **Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of instrument bus)**

Rejected due to topic being too similar to question 16. Replaced with A2.06: **Inadvertent ESFAS actuation** (kept 013).

3. SRO Question 91: Tier 2/2. Rejecting 3.8-034-K5.02, **Fuel Handling Equipment Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the fuel handling system: Limiting of Load.**

Rejected due to topic being too similar to question 69. Replaced with A2.01: **Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fuel Handling System; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Dropped fuel element.**

4. SRO Question 99: Tier 3. Rejecting 2.3.6: Knowledge of requirements for reviewing and approving release permits.

Rejected due to being too similar to question 23. Replaced with 2.3.9: **Knowledge of the process for performing a containment purge.**

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Operating Test

RO Admin JPM

1. RO Admin JPM 2; Evaluate proposed Work Schedule against Established Overtime Guidelines. Could not be written to a discriminatory RO level more of an SRO task. Replaced with Calculate Shutdown Margin.
2. RO Admin JPM 4; Radiation control; Determine Stay Times to Operate Equipment in a High Dose Field. Duplication of written question. Changed to Review RWP prior to entering the CAA.

SRO Admin JPM

1. SRO Admin JPM 4; Changed from perform OP-901-131 Attachment 1 Containment closure checklist. Unable to develop discriminatory SRO level conditions. Changed to Review and approve Gaseous release permit.

Control Room/In-plant JPM

1. RO JPM H; Restoration from Control Room isolation, did not meet requirements for safety function 8. Changed to perform actions in response to CCW leakage. New JPM, JPM acceptance criteria verified.
2. RO JPM C changed from Alternate Path to non-faulted. Alternate path designation chosen for fire in the control room which is covered in the procedure and does not justify alternate path. Verified required number of alternate path JPMs within acceptable limits.

Simulator

Scenario 1

Added EFW B fails to auto start in event 8 to provide verifiable action for critical task. After EDG B breaker is closed sequencer will run and auto start EFW B and begin feeding S/Gs this provides identifiable actions for the crew to meet Heat sink safety function.

Scenario 3

Replaced EFW B failure to autostart with Main Generator Exciter Field Breaker fail to open on trip. EFW B fail to start added to Scenario 1 for critical task swapped to prevent duplication between Scenarios.