



## U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

# STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

### 3.5.1.5 SITE PROXIMITY MISSILES (EXCEPT AIRCRAFT)

#### REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES

**Primary** - Organization responsible for the review of manmade site hazards

**Secondary** - Organization responsible for the review of plant design for protection of structures, systems, and components from internal and external hazards

#### I. AREAS OF REVIEW

The specific areas of review are as follows:

1. The staff reviews the nature and extent of offsite activities identified in SRP Section 2.2.1-2.2.2 to determine whether any missiles resulting from such activities, other than aircraft (SRP Section 3.5.1.6 reviews aircraft hazards), have the potential to adversely affect structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety. In the event that an offsite activity has the potential for missile production (e.g., explosion) and is found to be a design-basis event according to SRP Section 2.2.3, the staff responsible for evaluating missile effects on SSCs will review the plant design to determine whether the plant is adequately protected against the effects of postulated missiles.

Revision 4 - March 2007

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### USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

This Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, has been prepared to establish criteria that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants intends to use in evaluating whether an applicant/licensee meets the NRC's regulations. The Standard Review Plan is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide an acceptable method of complying with the NRC regulations.

The standard review plan sections are numbered in accordance with corresponding sections in Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)." Not all sections of Regulatory Guide 1.70 have a corresponding review plan section. The SRP sections applicable to a combined license application for a new light-water reactor (LWR) are based on Regulatory Guide 1.206, "Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)."

These documents are made available to the public as part of the NRC's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Individual sections of NUREG-0800 will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information and experience. Comments may be submitted electronically by email to [NRR\\_SRP@nrc.gov](mailto:NRR_SRP@nrc.gov).

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2. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC). For design certification (DC) and combined license (COL) reviews, the staff reviews the applicant's proposed ITAAC associated with the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) related to this SRP section in accordance with SRP Section 14.3, "Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria." The staff recognizes that the review of ITAAC cannot be completed until after the rest of this portion of the application has been reviewed against acceptance criteria contained in this SRP section. Furthermore, the staff reviews the ITAAC to ensure that all SSCs in this area of review are identified and addressed as appropriate in accordance with SRP Section 14.3.
3. COL Action Items and Certification Requirements and Restrictions. For a DC application, the review will also address COL action items and requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters).

For a COL application referencing a DC, a COL applicant must address COL action items (referred to as COL license information in certain DCs) included in the referenced DC. Additionally, a COL applicant must address requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters) included in the referenced DC.

### Review Interfaces

Other SRP sections interface with this section as follows:

1. Reviews of those SSCs that should be protected against missile impact is performed under Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.5.2.
2. The acceptability of the design analysis, procedures, and criteria used to establish the ability of seismic Category I structures and/or missile barriers to withstand the effects of tornado missiles is reviewed under SRP Section 3.5.3.
3. The identification and characterization of site proximity missiles is reviewed under SRP Sections 2.2.1-2.2.2 and Section 2.2.3.

The specific acceptance criteria and review procedures are contained in the referenced SRP sections.

## II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

### Requirements

Acceptance criteria are based on meeting the relevant requirements of the following Commission regulations:

1. 10 CFR Part 100, 10 CFR 100.10, 10 CFR 100.20, 10 CFR 100.21, and 10 CFR Part 52, as they relate to the factors to be considered in the evaluation of sites, which indicate that reactors should reflect through their design, construction, and operation an extremely low probability for accidents that could result in the release of significant quantities of radioactive fission products. In addition, 10 CFR 100.10 and 10 CFR 100.20 indicate that the site location, in conjunction with other considerations, should ensure a low risk of public exposure.

2. Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4, requires that SSCs important to safety be appropriately protected against the effects of missiles that may result from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit.
3. 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1), which requires that a DC application contain the proposed inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) that are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that, if the inspections, tests, and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, a plant that incorporates the design certification is built and will operate in accordance with the design certification, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the NRC's regulations;
4. 10 CFR 52.80(a), which requires that a COL application contain the proposed inspections, tests, and analyses, including those applicable to emergency planning, that the licensee shall perform, and the acceptance criteria that are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that, if the inspections, tests, and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, the facility has been constructed and will operate in conformity with the combined license, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the NRC's regulations.

### SRP Acceptance Criteria

Specific SRP acceptance criteria acceptable to meet the relevant requirements of the NRC's regulations identified above are as follows for the review described in this SRP section. The SRP is not a substitute for the NRC's regulations, and compliance with it is not required. However, an applicant is required to identify differences between the design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for its facility and the SRP acceptance criteria and evaluate how the proposed alternatives to the SRP acceptance criteria provide acceptable methods of compliance with the NRC regulations.

1. To meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100, the probability that site proximity missiles will impact the plant and cause radiological consequences greater than the 10 CFR Part 100 exposure guidelines must be less than an order of magnitude of  $10^{-7}$  per year (see guidance in SRP Section 2.2.3). If the review indicates that the above criterion is not met, then the acceptance criterion described in item 2 below applies.
2. The plant will meet the relevant requirements of GDC 4 and will be considered appropriately protected against site proximity missiles' design if the SSCs important to safety are capable of withstanding the effects of the postulated missiles without loss of safe-shutdown capability and without causing a release of radioactivity in excess of the 10 CFR Part 100 dose guidelines

### Technical Rationale

The technical rationale for application of these acceptance criteria to the areas of review addressed by this SRP section is discussed in the following paragraphs:

1. 10 CFR Part 100, 10 CFR 100.10, and 10 CFR 100.20 establish site requirements in conjunction with other design features to ensure a low risk of public exposure. The NRC has established a probability of less than an order of magnitude of  $10^{-7}$  per year as a staff objective for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100. In terms of missiles generated by explosions, RG 1.91 indicates that it is the judgment of the NRC staff that,

if the exposure rate can be shown to be less than about  $10^{-7}$  per year, the risk of damage from explosions is sufficiently low. Regardless of the source of site proximity missiles, missile hazards that have the potential to cause onsite accidents leading to the release of significant quantities of radioactive fission products, thus posing an undue risk of public exposure, should have a sufficiently low probability of occurrence. Meeting the probability objective for site proximity missiles and the 10 CFR Part 100 exposure guidelines provides a high level of assurance that individuals will not be exposed to excessive radiation doses.

2. Because of the low probabilities of the events under consideration, data are often not available to permit accurate calculation of probabilities. Accordingly, the expected rate of occurrence of potential exposures in excess of the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines of an order of magnitude of  $10^{-6}$  per year is acceptable if, when combined with reasonable qualitative arguments, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower (see guidance in SRP Section 2.2.3).
3. GDC 4 requires that SSCs important to safety be appropriately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles that may result from events and conditions outside the nuclear plant. Offsite activities that are determined to be a design-basis event, such as an explosion, could have the potential for missile generation. The initiation of externally generated missiles is a dynamic event and the effects of those missiles on SSCs important to safety must be evaluated. Protecting those SSC that are important to safety from the effects of externally generated missiles prevents failure of those systems required for safe-shutdown capabilities and prevents the release of radioactivity which might cause doses in excess of the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.

### III. REVIEW PROCEDURES

The reviewer will select material from the procedures described below, as may be appropriate for a particular case.

These review procedures are based on the identified SRP acceptance criteria. For deviations from these acceptance criteria, the staff should review the applicant's evaluation of how the proposed alternatives provide an acceptable method of complying with the relevant NRC requirements identified in Subsection II.

1. The identification and description of events that could possibly generate missiles is evaluated based on a review of the safety analysis report (SAR) in accordance with SRP Sections 2.2.1-2.2.2 and 2.2.3.
2. The SSCs identified in accordance with SRP Section 3.5.2 are reviewed with respect to missile vulnerability. Using experience gained from past reviews of similar SSCs on missile interactions and the evaluation of the applicant's information, a determination is made of those portions of the plant that clearly have the potential for unacceptable missile damage. If all SSCs appear to be adequately protected against the effects of the postulated missiles, then the review is terminated and the evaluation findings are written in terms of design-basis considerations (see Subsection II.2 of this SRP section).

3. The total probability of the missiles striking a vulnerable critical area of the plant is estimated. The total probability per year ( $P_T$ ) may be estimated using the following expression:

$$P_T = P_E \times P_{MR} \times P_{SC} \times P_p \times N$$

where:

$P_E$  = probability per year of design-basis event obtained from the review performed under SRP Section 2.2.3

$P_{MR}$  = probability of missiles reaching the plant

$P_{SC}$  = probability of missiles striking a vulnerable critical area of the plant

$P_p$  = probability of missiles exceeding the energies required to penetrate to vital areas (e.g., based on wall thickness provided for tornado missiles) or producing secondary missiles that could damage vital equipment

$N$  = number of missiles generated by the design-basis event

$P_p$  may be assumed to be equal to 1 as a first step in the analysis. If  $P_T$  thus calculated is greater than an order of magnitude of  $10^{-7}$  per year, then site proximity missile impact effects should be estimated, on request, by the organizational unit responsible for reviewing specific SSC. The request should be accompanied by a specified missile description, including missile size, shape, weight, energy, material properties, and trajectory.

4. For review of a DC application, the reviewer should follow the above procedures to verify that the design, including requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters), set forth in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) meets the acceptance criteria. DCs have referred to the FSAR as the design control document (DCD). The reviewer should also consider the appropriateness of identified COL action items. The reviewer may identify additional COL action items; however, to ensure these COL action items are addressed during a COL application, they should be added to the DC FSAR.

For review of a COL application, the scope of the review is dependent on whether the COL applicant references a DC, an early site permit (ESP) or other NRC approvals (e.g., manufacturing license, site suitability report or topical report).

For review of both DC and COL applications, SRP Section 14.3 should be followed for the review of ITAAC. The review of ITAAC cannot be completed until after the completion of this section.

#### IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

The reviewer verifies that the applicant has provided sufficient information and that the review and calculations (if applicable) support conclusions of the following type to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report. The reviewer also states the bases for those conclusions.

For CP, OL, DC and COL reviews, a conclusion of one of the following types may be prepared for the staff's safety evaluation report:

1. The staff concludes that the protection for SSCs important to safety is acceptable and meets the requirements of GDC 4. This conclusion is based on the information provided by the applicant and reviewed by the staff which identified potential missiles that could adversely affect safety-related SSCs requiring protection from externally generated missiles and which demonstrates that these SSCs have adequate barriers protecting them from the effects of missiles such that radiation exposures in excess of those given in 10 CFR Part 100 will not be exceeded.
2. Information provided by the applicant and reviewed by the staff has led to the identification of potential missiles that could adversely affect safety-related SSCs important to safety which warrant detailed evaluation of their protection against such externally generated missiles. However, some of these SSCs have adequate barriers protecting them from the effects of such missiles in accordance with the requirements of GDC 4 such that radiation exposures in excess of the limits given in 10 CFR Part 100 will not be exceeded. The remaining safety-related SSCs, although vulnerable to the potential effects of identified missiles, have a sufficiently low probability (within the criteria given in SRP Section 2.2.3) of unacceptable damage (on the basis of considerations such as low strike probability or adequate separation and redundancy) such that the risk of public exposure is low and the design meets the requirements of 10 CFR 100.20.

For DC and COL reviews, the findings will also summarize the staff's evaluation of requirements and restrictions (e.g., interface requirements and site parameters) and COL action items relevant to this SRP section.

In addition, to the extent that the review is not discussed in other SER sections, the findings will summarize the staff's evaluation of the ITAAC, including design acceptance criteria, as applicable.

#### V. IMPLEMENTATION

The staff will use this SRP section in performing safety evaluations of DC applications and license applications submitted by applicants pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 52. Except when the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the staff will use the method described herein to evaluate conformance with Commission regulations.

The provisions of this SRP section apply to reviews of applications submitted six months or more after the date of issuance of this SRP section, unless superseded by a later revision.

## VI. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria," Subpart A, "Evaluation Factors for Stationary Power Reactor Site Applications Before January 10, 1997 and for Testing Reactors,"
2. 10 CFR 100.10, "Factors To Be Considered When Evaluating Sites."
3. 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria," Subpart B, "Evaluation Factors for Stationary Power Reactor Site Applications on or After January 10, 1997,"
4. 10 CFR 100.20, "Factors To Be Considered When Evaluating Sites."
5. 10 CFR Part 52, "Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants," Subpart A, "Early Site Permits,"
6. 10 CFR 52.17, "Contents of Applications."
7. 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria," Subpart B, "Evaluation Factors for Stationary Power Reactor Site Applications on or After January 10, 1997,"
8. 10 CFR 100.21, "Non-Seismic Siting Criteria."
9. 10 CFR Part 50.34(a)(1)(ii) "Contents of Application, Technical Information."
10. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 4, " Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Basis
11. Regulatory Guide 1.117, "Tornado Design Classification,"
12. Regulatory Guide 1.91, "Evaluations of Explosions Postulated To Occur on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants,"

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### **PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT**

The information collections contained in the Standard Review Plan are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, and were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0011 and 3150-0151.

### **PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION**

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