



January 23, 2007

L-PI-07-002
10 CFR 50.73

U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 2
Docket 50-306
License No. DPR-60

Licensee Event Report (LER) 2-06-02, Unit 2 Event Monitoring Instrument Inoperable
Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications

LER 2-06-02 is enclosed. The LER describes Unit 2 operation with two channels of neutron flux monitors inoperable. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

Summary of Commitments

This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

Thomas J. Palmisano
Site Vice President, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Enclosure

cc: Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Prairie Island, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Prairie Island, USNRC
Glenn Wilson, State of Minnesota

ENCLOSURE

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-06-02

3 Pages Follow

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION <small>(6-2004)</small>	APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2007
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)	Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov , and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0066), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1) Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000 306	PAGE (3) 1 of 3
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TITLE (4)
Unit 2 Event Monitoring Instrument Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
11	27	06	06	-- 02 --	0	01	23	07	Prairie Island Unit 1	50-282
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
OPERATING MODE (9)		NA	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 37. (Check all that apply) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		0	20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
			20.2201(d)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
			20.2203(a)(1)			50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	73.71(a)(4)
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)			50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(5)
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.46(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(v)		X	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(vi)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Jeff Kivi	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 651.388.1121
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).			X	NO			

ABSTRACT

During the Unit 2 refueling outage, Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) staff were inspecting the cables for Unit 2 neutron flux monitor channels 2N51 and 2N52 in response to an improper splice identified on the Unit 1 cables for neutron flux monitors earlier in 2006 (see Licensee Event Report (LER) 1-06-03). NMC staff found that neither 2N51 nor 2N52 had the required shim in the sleeves for the splice connection on their respective cables. The gap due to the missing shims could have exposed the associated connectors to accident environments and is an untested configuration for environmental qualification purposes. As a result of the improper Raychem splice installation, 2N51 was declared inoperable on November 27, 2006 and 2N52 was declared inoperable on November 28, 2006.

Technical Specification 3.3.3, Condition D, requires that if one or more functions with two required channels are inoperable, one channel is to be restored to operable status within seven days. Condition H requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within six hours if Condition D is not met. The potential exists that the subject splices were inoperable from the time they were installed (several years before), and that Unit 2 had been operating in a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.3.3.

The subject splices were corrected prior to returning Unit 2 to Mode 2.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 2	05000306	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 of 3
		06	-- 02 --	0	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

During the Unit 2 refueling outage, Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) staff were inspecting the cables¹ for Unit 2 neutron flux monitor² channels 2N51 and 2N52 in response to an improper splice identified on the Unit 1 cables for neutron flux monitors earlier in 2006 (see Licensee Event Report (LER) 1-06-03). NMC staff found that neither 2N51 nor 2N52 had the required shim in the sleeves for the splice connection on their respective cables. The gap due to the missing shims could have exposed the associated connectors³ to accident environments and is an untested configuration for environmental qualification purposes. As a result of the improper Raychem splice installation, 2N51 was declared inoperable on November 27, 2006 and 2N52 was declared inoperable on November 28, 2006.

EVENT ANALYSIS

Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3, EM (Event Monitoring) Instrumentation⁴, Table 3.3.3-1, requires the neutron flux monitors 2N51 and 2N52 to be operable. LCO 3.3.3, Condition D, requires that if one or more functions with two required channels are inoperable, one channel is to be restored to operable status within seven days. Condition H requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within six hours if Condition D is not met. The potential exists that the subject splices were inoperable from the time they were installed (several years before) and that Unit 2 had been operating in a condition prohibited by Technical Specification LCO 3.3.3. Thus, this condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Impact on Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator

The as-found condition did result in inoperability of 2N51 and 2N52. However, these neutron flux monitors are for post-accident indication only and provide no automatic safety function. They are Regulatory Guide 1.97 Type B, Category 1 variables. They are used only to warn the operator with no credit taken for them in any safety analysis. Therefore, this event does not represent a loss of safety function. Consequently, this event is not reportable per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).

¹ EIIS Component Identifier: CAB
² EIIS Component Identifier: MON
³ EIIS Component Identifier: CON
⁴ EIIS System Code: IP

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 2	05000306	06	-- 02	-- 0	3 of 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

This event did not result in a loss of any automatic safety system function, since the neutron flux monitors are used for post-accident indication only. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is considered minimal.

CAUSE

The cause of this condition is believed to be the same as that reported in LER 1-06-03, where 1N51 and 1N52 were found in the same condition. As noted in LER 1-06-03, historical work orders for 1N51 and 1N52 were reviewed. The work orders removed the Raychem splice and did not specify installation of the shim when reinstalling the splice.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The subject splices were corrected prior to returning Unit 2 to Mode 2.

Extent of condition was reviewed for the condition reported in LER 1-06-03. This particular connector configuration is unique to the neutron flux monitors.

The technical manual for the neutron flux monitors will be revised to include the Raychem splice installation instructions provided by the vendor.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

LER 1-06-03 reported a similar condition for the Unit 1 neutron flux monitors. Review of the other LERs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 since 2003 found previous events related to operation or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, but no other LERs were related to neutron flux monitors or improperly installed splices.