

MEETING (Open and Closed Session) WITH NEW PLANTS SECURITY TASK FORCE (NPSTF) ON SECURITY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH NEW REACTORS – JANUARY 31, 2007

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Agenda Items</u>	<u>Status/Action</u>
		OPEN/PUBLIC SESSION
1:00 – 1:10		Introduction/Agenda Overview - NRC
1:10 – 1:40	A	ITAAC - (NRC/NPSTF) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NRC presentation and discussion of Security Systems Hardware ITAAC to NPSTF
1:40 – 1:55	B	FSAR – (NRC/NPSTF) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NRC comments to NPSTF
1:55 – 2:10		PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD
2:10 – 2:15		BREAK – Open Meeting Ends – Closed Meeting Begins
		CLOSED SESSION
2:15 – 3:00	C	NEI 03-12 - (NRC/NPSTF) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appendix E – NRC discussion of Appendix E – NRC/NPSTF
3:00 – 3:30	D	NEI 03-12 - (NRC/NPSTF) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appendix F – NRC comment on Appendix F – NRC/NPSTF
3:30 – 3:50	E	Topical Reports - (NRC/NPSTF) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Topical Reports discussion with NPSTF – NRC/NPSTF
3:50 – 4:00		Closing comments and topics for next meeting – NRC/NPSTF

DRAFT

Security Systems Hardware—Equipment and/or features used for the physical security attributes of detection, delay, and response and to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a). Examples of security system hardware include, but are not limited to, communication systems, annunciating alarms, locks, personnel access control, physical equipment barriers, and surveillance devices.				
Requirements	Design Description	Inspections, Tests, Analysis	Acceptance Criteria	ITAAC
(c) <i>Physical barriers.</i> (1) The licensee shall locate vital equipment only within a vital area, which in turn, shall be located within a protected area such that access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers of sufficient strength to meet the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section. More than one vital area may be located within a single protected area.	Vital equipment shall be located within a vital area.	Inspections of the as-built systems will be performed so that all vital equipment as designed is located within a vital area. Access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers meeting performance requirements.	A report exists and concludes that all intended vital equipment as specified in the as-built drawings is located only within a vital area, which in turn, is located within a protected area such that access to the as-built vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers meeting performance requirements.	1
(2) The physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area shall be separated from any other barrier designated as a physical barrier for a vital area within the protected area.	Physical barriers for protected area perimeter.	An inspection of the protected area perimeter barrier will be performed to verify that physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area are separated from any other barrier designated as a physical barrier.	A report exists and concludes that as-built physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area are separated from any other barrier designated as a physical barrier.	2
(3) Isolation zones shall be maintained in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and shall be of sufficient size to permit observation of the activities of	Isolation zones	An inspection of the as-built isolation zone will be performed to verify that the isolation zones exist in outdoor areas adjacent to the	A report exists and concludes that verifies as-built isolation zones exist in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical	3

people on either side of that barrier in the event of its penetration. If parking facilities are provided for employees or visitors, they shall be located outside the isolation zone and exterior to the protected area barrier.		physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and are at least as large as specified in the design and allow observation of the activities of people on either side of the barrier in the event of its penetration or attempted penetration.	barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and are at least as large as specified in the design to permit observation of the activities of people on either side of the barrier in the event of its penetration or attempted penetration.	
(4) Detection of penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area or the isolation zone adjacent to the protected area barrier shall assure that adequate response by the security organization can be initiated.	An intrusion detection system detects penetration or attempted penetration of the Protected Area (PA) Barrier.	Inspections of the as-built PA detection systems will be performed to verify systems are installed as designed and penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area barrier is detected and annunciated in both the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).	A report exists and concludes that the intrusion detection system detects penetration or attempted penetration of the PA barrier and annunciates in the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations.	4
(5) Isolation zones and all exterior areas within the protected area shall be provided with illumination sufficient for the monitoring and observation requirements of paragraphs (c)(3), (c)(4), and (h)(4) of this section, but not less than 0.2 footcandle measured horizontally at ground level.	All exterior areas within the protected area are illuminated.	Inspection of the as-built illumination in the isolation zones of the PA and all external area within the PA is not less than 0.2 footcandle measured horizontally at ground level.	A report exists and concludes that as-built illumination in isolation zones and all exterior areas within the protected area is not less than 0.2 footcandle measured horizontally at ground level.	5
(6) The walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and any windows in the walls and in the doors of the reactor control room shall be bullet-	The walls, doors, ceiling and floors in the main control	Type test, analysis or a combination of type test and analysis of the as-built	A report exists and concludes that the reactor control room, the central	6

<p>resisting.</p>	<p>room, central alarm station, bullet-resistant enclosures, and the last access control function for access to the protected area are bullet resistant.</p>	<p>systems of the walls, doors, ceilings, floors, and any windows in the walls, for the enclosure that houses the individual that has the last access control function for access into the PA are installed as designed.</p>	<p>alarm station, and the location within which the last access control function for access to the protected area is performed are installed as designed.</p>	
<p>(7) Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. (8) Each licensee shall compare the vehicle control measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) to the Commission's design goals (i.e., to protect equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure of which could directly or indirectly endanger public health and safety by exposure to radiation) and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb. Each licensee shall either: (i) Confirm to the Commission that the vehicle control measures meet the design goals and criteria specified; or (ii) Propose alternative measures, in addition to the measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7), describe the level of protection that these measures would provide against a land</p>	<p>Vehicle control measures which include vehicle barrier systems</p>	<p>Inspections, analysis or a combination of inspections and analysis of the as-built systems will be performed for vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, to ensure they have been constructed in accordance with their design.</p>	<p>A report exists and concludes that as-built vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, have been constructed in accordance with their design.</p>	<p>7</p>

<p>vehicle bomb, and compare the costs of the alternative measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the design goals and criteria. The Commission will approve the proposed alternative measures if they provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb, and it is determined by an analysis, using the essential elements of 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided.</p>				
<p>(d) <i>Access Requirements.</i> (1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of all individuals unless otherwise provided in this section must be made and authorization must be checked at these points. The search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be accomplished through the use of both firearms and explosive detection equipment capable of detecting those devices.</p>	<p>(i) Personnel and vehicle access points. (ii) Firearms and Explosive detection equipment.</p>	<p>Inspections of the as-built systems will be performed to verify that: (i) All personnel and vehicle access into the protected area is controlled. (ii) Detection equipment is capable of detecting explosives, incendiary devices, and firearms.</p>	<p>A report exists and concludes that: (i) All access points are configured as designed. (ii) Equipment used for detection of firearms, explosives functions as designed.</p>	<p>8</p>
<p>(5)(i) A numbered picture badge identification system must be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort.</p>	<p>A numbered picture badge identification system</p>	<p>An inspection of the numbered picture badge identification system is performed to verify that unescorted access to protected areas is granted only to personnel possessing</p>	<p>A report exists and concludes that a numbered picture badge identification system is used for authorized access to protected areas without escort.</p>	<p>9</p>

		a numbered picture badge.		
(7) The licensee shall: (D) Lock and protect by an activated intrusion alarm system all unoccupied vital areas.	Unoccupied vital areas are locked and alarmed with activated intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations upon intrusion into a vital area.	A test, inspection, or a combination of tests or inspections to verify that the as-built unoccupied vital areas are locked and that intrusion will be detected and annunciated in both the CAS and SAS.	A report exists and concludes that the as-built unoccupied vital areas are locked and that intrusion will be detected and annunciated in both the CAS and SAS.	10
(e) <i>Detection aids.</i> (1) All alarms required pursuant to this part must annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned station not necessarily onsite, so that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm. The onsite central alarm station must be considered a vital area and its walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and any windows in the walls and in the doors must be bullet-resisting. The onsite central alarm station must be located within a building in such a manner that the interior of the central alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area. This station must not contain any operational activities that would interfere with the execution of the alarm response function.	Alarm annunciation occurs in the central alarm station and in at least one other continuously manned station not necessarily onsite. The central alarm station is considered a vital area and its walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and any windows in the walls and in the doors is bullet-resisting. The central alarm station is located within a building in	Type test, analysis or a combination of type test and analysis of the as-built systems will be performed to ensure that all alarms annunciate in the central alarm station.	A report exists and concludes that all alarms required pursuant to this part annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned station.	11

	such a manner that the interior of the central alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area.			
(e)(1) Onsite secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment as required in paragraph (f) of this section must be located within vital areas.	Secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment is located within a vital area.	Inspections, type test, analysis or a combination of inspections, type test and analysis of the as-built systems will be performed to ensure that onsite secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment system capacity and capability is verified to meet design by testing. Location of equipment within a vital area is verified by inspection.	A report exists and concludes that (1) onsite secondary power supply systems for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment meet system design capacity and capability and, (2) equipment is located within a vital area.	12
(2) All alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators shall be tamper indicating and self-checking e.g., an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when the system is on standby power. The annunciation of an alarm at the alarm stations shall indicate the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarms, emergency exit alarm, etc.) and location.	All alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators are tamper indicating and self-checking, (e.g. an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a	An test is performed to verify that all alarms including transmission lines are tamper indicating and self-checking, e.g. an automatic indication, is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when on standby power.	A report exists and concludes that all alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators provide tamper indicating and self-checking e.g., an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or	13

	component occurs, or when on standby power.) Alarm annunciation shall indicate the type of alarm, (e.g., intrusion alarms, emergency exit alarm, etc.) and location.		when the system is on standby power.	
73.70(f) A record at each onsite alarm annunciation location of each alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication that identifies the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time. In addition, details of response by facility guards and watchmen to each alarm, intrusion, or other security incident shall be recorded. The license shall retain each record for three years after the record is made.	Record onsite alarm annunciation location of each alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication that identifies the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.	Type test, analysis or a combination of type test and analysis of the as-built systems will be performed to ensure that each onsite alarm annunciation location of each alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication records and identifies the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.	A report exists and concludes that a record of each onsite alarm annunciation identifies the location of each alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication to include the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.	
(3) All emergency exits in each protected area and each vital area shall be alarmed.	All emergency exits in each protected area and each vital area shall be alarmed.	An inspection, analysis or a combination of inspection and analysis is performed to verify that all emergency exits in each protected area and each vital area are alarmed.	A report exists and concludes that all emergency exits in all protected areas and all vital area are alarmed.	14
(f) <i>Communication requirements.</i> (1) Each security officer, watchman or armed response individual on duty shall be capable of maintaining continuous	Communication requirements.	An inspection will be performed to verify that the alarm stations: (1) have conventional telephone	A report exists and concludes that the alarm stations: (1) have conventional telephone	15

<p>communication with an individual in each continuously manned alarm station required by paragraph (e)(1) of this section, who shall be capable of calling for assistance from other security officers, watchmen, and armed response personnel and from local law enforcement authorities.</p> <p>(2) The alarm stations required by paragraph (e)(1) of this section shall have conventional telephone service for communication with the law enforcement authorities as described in paragraph (f)(1) of this section.</p> <p>(3) To provide the capability of continuous communication, radio or microwave transmitted two-way voice communication, either directly or through an intermediary, shall be established, in addition to conventional telephone service, between local law enforcement authorities and the facility and shall terminate in each continuously manned alarm station required by paragraph (e)(1) of this section.</p>		<p>service and other means for communication with the law enforcement authorities and (2) are capable of continuous communication with each security officer, watchman or armed response individual, or any security personnel that have responsibilities during a contingency event.</p>	<p>service and other means for communication with the law enforcement authorities and (2) are capable of continuous communication with each security officer, watchman or armed response individual, or any security personnel that have responsibilities during a contingency event.</p>	
---	--	---	---	--

DRAFT

Enclosure (b)



NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE

Adrian P. Heymer
SENIOR DIRECTOR, NEW PLANT DEPLOYMENT
NUCLEAR GENERATION DIVISION

August 18, 2006

Mr. Roy P. Zimmerman
Director
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: Technical Reports on Template for FSAR Section 13.6, *Physical Security*; and the Generic Security Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria for New Plants

PROJECT NUMBER: 689

Dear Mr. Zimmerman:

In support of combined license application preparations, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is submitting two technical reports for NRC review and endorsement:

- A template for Section 13.6 of a Final Safety Analyses Report (FSAR) for a combined license application (Enclosure 1), and
- Generic Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) for Physical Security (Enclosure 2).

The FSAR section for Physical Security and the Generic Security ITAAC are important documents for the design, licensing and construction of new plants. The industry has discussed these two new plant topics with the NRC staff. The Section 13.6 template and the Generic Security ITAAC have been developed based on insights from these meetings.

These generic documents are being used by combined license applicants as guidance in preparing combined license applications and technical reports that will be submitted in 2007. As a result, we request NRC endorsement by the end of November 2006. We understand that, following the NRC review, the NRC will either issue a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) or a letter documenting the NRC's conclusions. This will enable the template and ITAAC report to be incorporated by reference into a new plant combined license application.

Mr. Roy P. Zimmerman
August 18, 2006
Page 2

If you have any questions, please contact Jim Fisicaro at (202) 739-8018; jf@nei.org
or me.

Sincerely,



Adrian P. Heymer

Enclosures

c: Mr. Glenn M. Tracy, NRC
Mr. Scott Morris, NRC
Mr. Douglas Huyck, NRC
Document Control Desk

FSAR 13.6

13.6 PHYSICAL SECURITY

The physical security program consists of the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan and will be implemented prior to initial fuel arriving on-site. The program satisfies the regulatory requirements for fixed commercial nuclear power plants set forth in 10 CFR 50.34 (c) and (d), 10 CFR 52.79, 10 CFR 26 and 10 CFR 73. Details of the program are included in the plans and are classified as Safeguards Information in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21. The program includes descriptions of and provisions for the following:

- Security organization
- Physical barriers for vehicles and personnel
- Bullet resisting barriers
- Access control for vehicles and personnel
- Fitness for Duty Program
- Searches of personnel, vehicles and packages
- Intrusion alarm systems and detecting unauthorized intrusions
- Security power supply system
- Provisions for monitoring the access to vital equipment
- Selection of security personnel
- Security communications systems
- Testing and maintenance
- Law enforcement assistance
- Training of security personnel
- Response to contingencies
- Security assessment

13.6.1 Security Organization

The security organization provides a management infrastructure to protect the facility against radiological sabotage. The organization includes a management system to support the development and maintenance of security plans and procedures for the effective implementation of the physical security program. The organization is based on a command structure with implementing procedures and is staffed by appropriately trained and equipped security personnel for the protection against threats as described in the Design Basis Threat (DBT).

13.6.2 Physical Barriers for Vehicles and Personnel

Physical barriers are installed and designed to protect and control access to the facility. Vehicle barrier systems are installed to prevent the entry of vehicles carrying explosives as defined in the DBT beyond the safe standoff. A protected area barrier is installed to prevent access of unauthorized personnel into the protected area. Personnel access of authorized individuals to the protected area is permitted through designated personnel access portals through the barrier after positive identification is verified. Vital area access is controlled by allowing only authorized personnel and by requiring passage through at least two physical barriers. Access

points to vital areas are locked and alarmed with activated intrusion detection systems.

13.6.3 Bullet Resisting Barriers

The doors, walls, floor and ceiling of the main control room and the continuously manned central alarm station are designed to be bullet resisting in accordance with applicable design criteria.

13.6.4 Access Control for Vehicles and Personnel

An access authorization program provides high assurance that individuals who are permitted unescorted access to the protected area are trustworthy and reliable. All individuals allowed unescorted access to the protected area are issued a photo identification badge, which is displayed while inside the protected area. Access to the protected area is controlled through designated portals to ensure only authorized vehicles, personnel and packages are allowed entry. Vital area access is controlled to permit access to authorized personnel. Vehicle passage through the vehicle barrier system is controlled through designated access points to ensure only authorized vehicles are allowed entry.

13.6.5 Fitness for Duty Program

A fitness for duty program in accordance with 10 CFR 26 provides reasonable assurance that personnel permitted unescorted access to protected and vital areas are not mentally or physically impaired to perform their assigned duties.

13.6.6 Searches of Personnel, Vehicles and Packages

Prior to entry into the protected area personnel, vehicles, packages and materials are searched for firearms, explosives and incendiary devices. This may be accomplished by physical searches and/or the use of detection devices such as metal detectors, explosive detectors and x-ray machines. A secondary physical search is conducted if there is reason to believe an individual is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives or incendiary devices into the protected area or whenever search equipment is out of service.

13.6.7 Intrusion Alarm Systems and Detecting Unauthorized Intrusions

Isolation zones and exterior areas of the protected area are provided with sufficient illumination to permit the observation of these areas during hours of darkness. Surveillance is accomplished by security personnel or surveillance technology. Intrusion alarm equipment detects penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area and vital area barriers. Intrusion detection alarms annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station and in another continuously manned station so that a single act can not remove the capability of calling for assistance or responding to an intrusion alarm.

13.6.8 Security Power Supply System

Site security systems are powered from a reliable power supply meeting the requirements of IEEE-692, "Standard Criteria for Security Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." Security equipment that supports critical monitoring functions, such as intrusion detection, alarm assessment and the security communication system, receives power from the security power supply system. The security power supply system is capable of sustaining operation for a minimum of 24 hours.

13.6.9 Provisions for Monitoring the Access to Vital Equipment

An access authorization system is established to limit access to vital areas to only those individuals who require access to perform their duties. The access list is validated at least once every thirty-one days to confirm a continued need for access to vital areas.

13.6.10 Selection of Security Personnel

Prior to employment or assignment to the security organization, personnel must meet minimum requirements with regard to age and education and have no felony convictions that involve the use of a weapon or that would reflect adversely on the individual's reliability. Personnel assigned to the security organization are screened to ensure they have no physical weaknesses or abnormalities that would adversely affect their performance of security duties.

13.6.11 Security Communications Systems

Communications systems are established within the security organization to ensure the ability of security personnel to communicate with an individual in each continuously manned alarm station. The alarm stations have the ability to communicate with law enforcement agencies to summon assistance. Non-portable communications equipment can be powered from the security power supply system so that it remains operable in the event of the loss of normal power.

13.6.12 Testing and Maintenance

Security systems are maintained by trained personnel to ensure proper functionality and operability. Intrusion detection alarms and communications equipment are tested at an appropriate frequency to verify continued operability and performance effectiveness.

13.6.13 Law Enforcement Assistance

Liaison is established and maintained with local law enforcement agencies to provide assistance to the station when required during a security incident.

13.6.14 Training of Security Personnel

Prior to initial fuel arriving on-site and assignment to security duties, security personnel are trained and qualified in accordance with the Training and Qualification Plan. The Training and Qualification Plan identifies critical tasks applicable to each security position. Through qualification in the applicable critical tasks, security personnel demonstrate the required knowledge, skills and abilities

to perform their assigned position. There is also an annual requalification on selected critical skills.

13.6.15 Response to Contingencies

The Safeguards Contingency Plan provides guidance on responding to contingencies and threats as defined in the DBT. The plan provides a framework of predetermined responses to various safeguards contingencies with the objective of organizing resources to facilitate a coordinated response. A protective strategy that integrates responses of the security force, plant operations personnel and law enforcement agencies is established to prevent radiological sabotage.

13.6.16 Security Assessment

A Security Assessment Report covers target set analysis, the plant protective measures and strategy to address the elements of the DBT and evaluation of the safety/security interface. This report is categorized as Safeguards Information in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21.

**Generic Security ITAAC
Non-System Based Design Description & ITAAC**

Table 3 . 6 (cont. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment	Inspections, Tests, Analyses	Acceptance Criteria
<p>The walls, doors, ceiling and floors in the main control room and Central Alarm Station are bullet-resistant to a UL level 4 round.</p> <p>Central Alarm Station and main control room are defined as vital areas.</p>	<p>Type test, analysis or a combination of type test and analysis will be performed for the walls, doors, ceiling and floors in the main control room and Central Alarm Station.</p> <p>An inspection of the as-built central alarm station and main control room will be performed.</p>	<p>A report exists and concludes that the walls, doors, ceiling and floors in the main control room and Central Alarm Station are bullet-resistant to a UL level 4 round.</p> <p>Access to the Central Alarm Station and main control room is through at least two security hardened barriers and an intrusion alarm system.</p>
<p>Secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment is located within a vital area.</p>	<p>An inspection of the as-built location of the secondary security power supply for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment will be performed.</p>	<p>Access to the secondary security power supply for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment is through an intrusion detection system and at least two security hardened barriers.</p>
<p>Unoccupied vital areas are locked and alarmed with activated intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations upon intrusion into a vital area.</p> <p>The locks used for the protection of the vital areas are manipulative-resistant.</p>	<p>A test of the as-built unoccupied vital area door alarms to the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations will be performed.</p> <p>Type test, analysis or a combination of type test and analysis will be performed for the locks used in the protection of the vital areas.</p>	<p>The unoccupied vital area doors are locked. The intrusion detection systems annunciate in the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations upon intrusion into each unoccupied vital area.</p> <p>A report exists and concludes that the locks used for the protection of the vital areas are manipulative-resistant.</p>
<p>The Vehicle Barrier System is installed and located at the necessary stand-off distance to protect against the DBT vehicle bombs.</p>	<p>Type test, analysis or a combination of type test and analysis will be performed for the vehicle barrier system used to protect against the DBT vehicle bombs.</p>	<p>A report exists and concludes that the vehicle barrier system will protect against the DBT vehicle bombs based upon the as-built stand-off distance of the system.</p>
<p>An intrusion detection system is installed to detect penetration or attempted penetration of the Protected Area Barrier and Vital Area Barriers.</p>	<p>Tests will be performed for the as-built intrusion detection system used to detect penetration or attempted penetration of the Protected Area barrier and the Vital Area Barriers.</p>	<p>The intrusion detection system annunciates in the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations upon penetration or attempted penetration into the protected area or vital area.</p>