

SVPLTR # 07-0003

January 11, 2007

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001


Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3
Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-25
NRC Docket No. 50-249

Subject: Licensee Event Report 249/2006-001-00, "Unit 3 Main Steam Safety Valves Exceed Surveillance Setpoint"

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 249/2006-001-00, "Unit 3 Main Steam Safety Valves Exceed Surveillance Setpoint," for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications," and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(D), "Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. James Ellis, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 416-2800.

Respectfully,



Danny G. Bost
Site Vice President
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator – NRC Region III
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – Dresden Nuclear Power Station

IE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000249	3. PAGE 1 OF 3
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4. TITLE
Unit 3 Main Steam Safety Valves Exceed Surveillance Setpoint

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
11	12	2006	2006	- 001 -	00	01	11	2007	N/A	N/A
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									N/A	N/A

9. OPERATING MODE 5	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)									
10. POWER LEVEL 000	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)						
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A							

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME Dresden Nuclear Power Station – George Papanic Jr.	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (815) 416-2815
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13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
NA					NA				

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED	15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On November 12, 2006, with Unit 3 in a refuel outage, Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 was notified that vendor testing had identified three of the four Main Steam Safety Valves removed from the unit during this outage had exceeded their Technical Specification allowable as-found lift setpoint tolerance of plus or minus 1 percent. One of the valves lifted above the allowable lift setpoint tolerance by 0.1 percent and two of the valves lifted below their allowable lift setpoint tolerance by 1.4 percent and 1.5 percent. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications," and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(D), "Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The cause of the event was attributed to setpoint drift. The corrective action to address this issue had been previously initiated. On June 2, 2006, Dresden Nuclear Power Station submitted a request for a change to the Technical Specifications for Units 2 and 3 to increase the allowable as-found Main Steam Safety Valve lift setpoint tolerance from plus or minus 1 percent to 3 percent. This change is currently under review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	05000249	2006	-- 001	-- 00	2 OF 3

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) Unit 3 is a General Electric Company Boiling Water Reactor with a licensed maximum power level of 2957 megawatts thermal. The Energy Industry Identification System codes used in the text are identified as [XX].

A. Plant Conditions Prior to Event:

Unit: 03	Event Date: 11-12-2006	
Reactor Mode: 5	Mode Name: Refueling	Power Level: 00 percent
Reactor Coolant System Pressure: 0 psig		

B. Description of Event:

On November 12, 2006, with Unit 3 in a refuel outage, DNPS Unit 3 was notified that vendor testing had identified three of the four Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) [SB][V] removed from the unit during this outage had exceeded their Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.3, Safety and Relief Valves," allowable as-found lift setpoints tolerance of plus or minus (+/-) 1 percent (%). The testing was performed at the vendor's shop. One of the valves, serial number BK6530, lifted above the allowable lift setpoint tolerance by 0.1% and two of the valves, serial numbers BK6299 and BK6532, lifted below their allowable lift setpoint tolerance by 1.4% and 1.5%.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications," and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(D), "Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

C. Cause of Event:

The cause of the event was attributed to setpoint drift. The use of +/- 1% allowable as-found MSSV lift setpoint tolerance in plant TS was a generic issue in the nuclear industry. Nuclear power plant licensees have experienced difficulty in meeting the typical 1% lift setpoint tolerance for MSSVs. As a result, the BWR Owners' Group (BWROG) developed NEDC-31753P, "BWROG In-Service Pressure Relief Technical Specification Revision Licensing Topical Report," dated February 1990, to support the use of a 3% lift setpoint tolerance, which is consistent with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) OM Code requirements. On March 8, 1993, the NRC issued a safety evaluation approving NEDC-31753P (i.e., Letter from A. CC. Thadani (NRC) to C. L. Tully (BWR Owners' Group), "Acceptance for Referencing of Licensing Topical Report NEDC-31753P, 'BWROG In-Service Pressure Relief Technical Specification Revision Licensing Topical Report' (TAC No. M79265)," dated March 8, 1993).

In the safety evaluation, the NRC stated that a generic change of lift setpoint tolerance to +/- 3% is acceptable provided that it is evaluated in the analytical bases. Specific analyses required to be provided are transient analysis, design basis over pressurization event, re-evaluation of high pressure systems (i.e., motor operated valves, reactor vessel instrumentation and piping), alternate operating

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Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	05000249	2006	-- 001	-- 00	3 OF 3

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modes, containment response during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), and hydrodynamic loads on MSSV discharge lines. On June 2, 2006, DNPS submitted a request for a change to the TS for Units 2 and 3 to increase the allowable as-found MSSV lift setpoint tolerance from +/- 1% to +/- 3%. The required plant specific analyses to support the setpoint change had been performed for DNPS, and the results submitted to the NRC with the request for a change to the TS. This change is currently under review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

D. Safety Analysis:

The safety significance of the event is minimal. DNPS had previously prepared plant specific analyses for a +/- 3% tolerance for the MSSV which addressed transient analysis, design basis overpressurization event, high pressure systems, alternate operating modes, containment response during a LOCA, and hydrodynamic loads on MSSV discharge lines. These analyses bound the as-found MSSV conditions described in this event. Therefore, the consequences of this event had minimal impact on the health and safety of the public and reactor safety.

E. Corrective Actions:

On June 2, 2006, DNPS submitted a request for a change to the TS for Units 2 and 3 to increase the allowable as-found MSSV lift setpoint tolerance from +/- 1% to +/- 3%. This change is currently under review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

F. Previous Occurrences:

A review of DNPS Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for the last three years did not identify any LERs associated with multiple MSSVs removed during a refuel outage, exceeding their TS allowable as-found lift setpoints tolerance of +/- 1%.

G. Component Failure Data:

NA