

Russell W. Goyette
7 Strathmere Street
Waretown, NJ 08758
December 11, 2006

Mr. Michael Masnik
US NRC MSi O-11F1
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852

Re: Oyster Creek-past correspondence

Dear Mike:

I really enjoyed talking with you this morning. Your candor, knowledge of the area and knowledge of the subject matter made you the most refreshing person I've talked to at the NRC. You gave your agency more credibility than you can believe.

Attached are more letters than you bargained for. Read them and you will pretty much be up to date. Don't read them and I will understand; you are probably very busy. I'm still trying to get a picture of the now infamous crab claw.

I wish the NRC were more believable. They appear to be a "rubber stamp" for the administration and the nuclear industry. Even the name Nuclear Regulatory Commission connotes that "nuclear" is the only path worth following. How about ethanol (Brazil uses ethanol for 100% of its fuel needs), methane (from our land-fills), wind power (look at Holland), water power (Paterson Falls is unused), solar power (promising in some parts of the country). In this country, the hotbed of technology, are we pursuing alternatives?

Until we get there, let's make nuclear power safely. Oyster Creek is no longer safe.

Sincerely,

Russell W. Goyette

Attachments: Too much reading

MY LATEST LETTER TO DYER.

Russell W. Goyette
7 Strathmere Street
Waretown, NJ 08758
December 7, 2006

Mr. J. E. Dyer, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555 - 0001

RE: Relicensing Oyster Creek

Dear Mr. Dyer:

Thank you very much for your letter dated October 10, 2006. In that letter you attempted to provide a very detailed explanation of the approval process, addressing the specific topics mentioned in my letter of August 25, 2006. I appreciate your responses.

It became apparent to me that the approval process is severely faulted. It is a piecemeal process, rather than a comprehensive one. There are two overall questions that never seem to be addressed:

1. There are simply too many people in the area to have a nuclear power plant, especially in the summer with all the vacationers.
Especially with the area's population explosion in the past 30 years, there are simply too few evacuation routes to allow evacuation in the event of a mishap nor terrorist attack. Katrina taught us one undeniable fact: evacuation plans may work on paper, but in reality, they just don't work. Current evacuation plans, prepared by State Police, are a best-case scenario. Be assured, if there is a terrorist attack, it will be coordinated; evacuation routes will be easily blocked - creating a greater loss of life.
2. Highly radioactive spent fuel rods are currently stored on-site. We need a safe depository (or depositories) for nuclear waste.
The longer Oyster Creek operates, the larger this hazzard gets. The bigger the hazzard, the better the target.

Let me respectfully suggest that the NRC / Administration take the following course of action:

- **CONTINUE TO BUILD/IMPROVE THE GRID.**

It will become increasingly important to be able to move large amounts of electricity from region to region.

- **BUILD NEW PLANTS IN ISOLATED AREAS.**

Even build new nuclear plants, to decrease our reliance on foreign oil, at least until alternate forms of energy are developed. Isolated locations should be easier to defend.

- **DEVELOP A NATIONAL DEPOSITORY (OR REGIONAL DEPOSITORIES) TO STORE NUCLEAR WASTE**

We also must have a safe means to transport this dangerous waste from plant to depository.

Thank you for taking the time to read my opinions.

Sincerely,

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

October 10, 2006

DYER'S "RESPONSE" TO MY
AUG. 25 LETTER (ATTACHED)

Mr. Russell W. Goyette
7 Strathmere Street
Waretown, NJ 08758-2651

Dear Mr. Goyette:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to your letter of August 25, 2006, in which you identify concerns related to the safe operation of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster Creek) and to the apparent absence of public hearings. We at the NRC are also concerned about the safe operation of Oyster Creek. We believe that the NRC's license renewal process, coupled with an inspection regimen implemented through our Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), provides the strong oversight necessary to ensure safe plant operations.

The NRC's mission is to protect public health and safety and we apply a fundamental defense-in-depth strategy for nuclear facilities such as Oyster Creek. The defense-in-depth strategy encompasses design, construction, operation, training, event mitigation, and contingency planning. For example, plant designs for containing the uranium fuel require embedding the uranium in fuel pellets that are encased in fuel rods, which are placed in heavy steel reactor vessels that are inside robust containment buildings. In the unlikely occurrence of a significant radioactive release, due to the failure of these three nuclear power plants have detailed emergency plans.

The NRC review of license renewal applications excludes security issues, since security systems, structures, and components (SSCs) are outside the scope of license renewal. You indicate that the NRC has ignored the real risk of terrorism. We believe that the threat of terrorism is real and continually inspect security programs at operating reactors. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC has issued orders to all nuclear power plant licensees requiring them to implement additional security measures. The NRC has verified that the Oyster Creek facility is meeting the same stringent security requirements as other NRC-licensed reactors.

The NRC review of license renewal applications excludes evacuation plans, since the plans are unaffected by component aging effects. You state that there is an absence of realistic evacuation plans. Federal regulations require that comprehensive emergency plans be prepared and periodically exercised to assure that actions can and will be taken to notify and protect the public in the vicinity of a nuclear facility in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency. Through emergency preparedness drills, NRC inspectors in conjunction with other federal, state, county, and local government officials verify the effectiveness of plant emergency plans, including Oyster Creek's plan.

You state concerns about the drywell corrosion and the need for adequate testing. We are aware of the corrosion and are concerned about the drywell being able to perform its intended function during the period of extended operation. In our Safety Evaluation Report (SER) with open items, we identified five open items associated with drywell corrosion. The NRC will not issue a renewed license until the Oyster Creek applicant fully addresses the open items. In addition, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, an independent third party that reports directly to the NRC Commissioners, will hold public meetings on the SER. You can access the Oyster Creek SER with open items on the NRC website <http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/oystercreek.html#ser>.

You state that the data submitted by the applicant for Barnegat Bay is 35 years old. We recognize that some of the data is out of date. However, more recent data is available. We will provide the results of the NRC assessment in the final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS), which will be published next year. We are basing our assessment on a variety of data sources including data collected over the past year at the Oyster Creek plant. You can access the draft SEIS and the SEIS, when it is published, on the NRC Website <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1437/supplement28/index.html>.

You state that public hearings simply do not take place. To the contrary, the NRC affords interested persons the opportunity to participate in NRC licensing hearings, provided a petitioner meets certain formal requirements. In the case of Oyster Creek, the NRC convened an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) that received petitions submitted, in November 2005, by the State of New Jersey and six organizations raising contentions associated with the license renewal application. Although denied intervention, the State of New Jersey has an appeal pending before the Commission. The six organizations have contentions pending before the ASLB.

In addition, the NRC follows a formal and public process that affords the public the opportunity to participate in the review of license renewal applications. We hold public meetings near each plant, for which a renewed license is requested, and encourage public participation. In addition to reviewing license renewal applications, we maintain vigilance over safety performance of operating reactors through ongoing licensing reviews and inspections and expanded oversight. Whether or not the Oyster Creek license is renewed, we will continue these inspections in a manner that protects public health and safety and the environment, and provides for regulatory actions that are open, effective, efficient, realistic, and timely.

I hope this letter has provided you with additional information about the license renewal process to assuage your concerns.

Sincerely,



J. E. Dyer, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

MY LETTER TO NJ DEP. RE: CRAB CLAW.

Russell W. Goyette
7 Strathmere Street
Waretown, NJ, 08758
October 3, 2006

Ms. Lisa P. Jackson
NJ DEP Commissioner
401 East State Street
7th Floor, East Wing
P.O. Box 402
Trenton, NJ 08625-0402

RE: Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant- Marine Pollution

Dear Ms. Jackson:

I would like to bring to your attention the fact that I have a crab claw, taken from the discharge waters of Oyster Creek, which is severely deformed by, I believe, radiation released from the plant. I believe that the radiation that caused this deformity also affects other marine life in these waters.

As we both know, crabs are unlike many other forms of marine life, in that they do not leave the area in cold weather months. Rather than migrate to warmer water, like fish, crabs bury themselves in mud for protection from the cold.

The crab in question was caught by a friend who once worked at the plant. He was reluctant to come forward with his find, for fear that coming forward may jeopardize his pension out of retaliation. After catching this crab, he vowed to never again fish or crab in these waters. He never did.

This crab claw was presented and photographed at the Men's Club meeting at the Greenbriar Oceanaire clubhouse on Sept. 25.

Please let me know if you have any interest in this find.

Sincerely,

MY LETTER OF OCT. 4 ASKING FOR A RESPONSE

Russell W. Goyette
7 Strathmere Street
Waretown, NJ 08758
October 4, 2006

Mr. J. E. Dyer, Director
Office of Nuclear Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

RE: Oyster Creek Relicensing
The Hidden Agenda of the NRC

Dear Mr. Dyer:

I called your office last week (on Sept. 27) to get your response to my letter to you dated August 25. You were not available, but in your absence, I spoke to Frank Gillespie. He was unable to allay my fears about the NRC's faulty review process. He did however buy you a week; however, to date, no response.

The fact that the NRC chooses to ignore relevant information and accepts faulty (and outdated) data in its review to "ensure protection of public health and safety and the environment" confirms that the NRC must be pursuing a hidden agenda.

I cite two key considerations: **The Absence of a Realistic Evacuation Plan and Evidence the Plant's Discharge Waters are Harming The Environment.** Hurricane Katrina taught us that an evacuation plan might work on paper, but in reality it may not work in practice. The NJ state police provided a paper evacuation plan, but it was a "best-case" scenario. One thing we can be assured of is that if terrorists are involved, they will be well organized. It is easy to see how one of the three evacuation routes could be blocked by terrorists. No blockage is planned for.

I have irrefutable proof that radiation from the plant has created deformed marine life. No one from the NRC cares to even see my evidence. Why? A hidden agenda? What safety?

If you are too busy, have someone contact me.

Sincerely,

Cc ~~Frank Gillespie (NRC)~~

Russell W. Goyette
7 Strathmere Street
Waretown, NJ 08758
August 25, 2006

Mr. J. E. Dyer, Director
Office of Nuclear Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Mr. Dyer:

This letter relates to your letter to me, dated July 17, 2006. In your letter you state "NRC licensing reviews are conducted to ensure protection of public health and safety and the environment." Apparently, this has not been so.

In its application review, the NRC apparently has ignored the following:

- The real risk of terrorism, especially after 9/11, and with a plant never designed to thwart terrorist attack.
- The storage of highly dangerous radioactive waste in a vulnerable location on plant grounds.
- The absence of a realistic evacuation plan, jeopardizing the safety of thousands of people, especially seniors who have moved to the area since initial plant approval.
- The dry-wall liner, which protects the public from possible radiation, has suffered serious corrosion and will not receive adequate testing.
- The data submitted to evaluate damage to nearby Barnegat Bay is 35 years old. How about something more current?

Public hearings simply do not take place. The absence of public hearings is undemocratic. Responsible people, like the state governor, local elected officials, the DEP Commissioner, are shoved aside, for fear of what they might say and "to move the approval process" along for the nuclear industry.

The review process is clearly a sham. Public Safety? Not here!

Please respond

I TALKED TO LINDA

9/27/06 4:20 P.M.

+ Frank Gillespie

Sincerely,