

Criticality Analysis for DOE Standardized Canisters

National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program

Philip Wheatley Idaho National Laboratory

STATES OF MERI

NRC Transportation Meeting December 6, 2006

Providing for safe, efficient transportation of DOE spent nuclear fuel

Outline

- Overview
- Analyses assumptions
- Basket and Standardized Canister
- Analyses
- Summary



Overview

- Analyses bound all spent nuclear fuels packaged in the Standardized Canister using theType 1a basket
- ATR spent nuclear fuel establishes the boundary
- Standardized Canister provides moderator exclusion for criticality analysis
- Single Standardized Canister analyses
 - Extensive analyses with varying geometries
 - Degraded fuel in a cylinder geometry provides bounding case
- Analyses of a close-packed array



Analysis Assumptions

- Each loaded Standardized Canister is treated as a closed system
 - Beginning-of-life fissile content
 - Fixed canister volume
- ATR fuel represents maximum total fissile mass
- Analyses assume 11 vol % water




Analysis Assumptions (continued)

- Loss of geometry
 - All fuel rubblized and retained within the Standardized Canister
 - Vertical Standardized Canister orientation represents most reactive system due to axial reconfiguration
- Effects of neutron poisons minimized




Type 1a 18-inch Diameter Basket





Standardized Canister and Basket Loading






Criticality Analyses Matrix

Single Canister#	Inc
Fuel is horizontally reconfigured and settled	Increasing
Fuel is vertically reconfigured and settled	sing
Basket compartment plates reconfigured - horz. drop	
Basket compartment plates & fuel reconfigured - vert. drop	Degradation
Baskets w/ Gd separated from fuel - fissile sphere formed	dati
Baskets w/ Gd separated from fuel - fissile cylinder formed	on
9-Canister Array	
No water leakage into cask cavity	
10% water density within cask cavity	
Cask cavity flooded	




Fuel Rubblization Forming a Cylinder



9

Flooded transport cask with nine Standardized Canisters







Based on leak-tight Standardized Canister criticality safety analysis demonstrates significant safety margins



Meeting Agenda

- 10:00 a.m. Introductions
- 10:10 a.m. Meeting Objectives
- 10:30 a.m. DOE-EM SNF Canister Integrity
- 11:00 a.m. DOE-EM Canister Criticality Safety
- 11:15 a.m. Summary and Conclusions
- 11:30 a.m. Staff Feedback
- 11:45 a.m. Public Comments
- 12:00 p.m. Adjourn

