# NRCREP - Region IV Utility Group - Comments on ROP

From:

"Ted Enos" <ted.enos@certrec.com>

To:

<nrcrep@nrc.gov>

Date:

12/01/2006 4:55 PM

Subject: Region IV Utility Group - Comments on ROP

CC:

"'Tim Hope'" <thope1@txu.com>, "'CULLEN, GREGORY V." <GVCULLEN@energy-northwest.com>

Attached as a pdf file are the comments from the Region IV Utility group in response to your Solicitation of Public Comments on the Implementation of the Reactor Oversight

Process.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide our input to this process.

You may direct any comments or questions to me or directly to

Mr. Tim Hope **RUGIV** Chairman Thope1@cpses.com

Thanks You.

**Ted Enos** 

Director, Projects

**Certrec Corporation** 

ted.enos@certrec.com 817 738-7661Office 817 939-7730 Cell

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**Created By:** 

ted.enos@certrec.com

## **Recipients**

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**NRCREP** 

energy-northwest.com

GVCULLEN CC (GREGORY V.' 'CULLEN)

txu.com

thope1 CC ('Tim Hope')

**Post Office** 

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Ref: ROP 71 FR 59539

December 1, 2006

Mr. Michael T. Lesar Chief, Rulemaking, Directives and Editing Branch Office of Administration (Nail Stop: T6-D59) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Solicitation of Public Comments on the Implementation of the Reactor Oversight

**Process** 

REFERENCE:

Federal Register Vol. 71, No. 195, Pages 59539 – 59540,

Dated October 10, 2006

Dear Mr. Lesar:

The Region IV Utility Group (RUG IV) is pleased to submit our comments regarding the implementation of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). This is the fourth year for the RUG IV Licensing Managers to respond to this federal register request. The comments included in this letter are the collective comments of the RUG IV members (shown in Attachment 1) and are not necessarily reflective of any single utility.

In general, we believe the ROP is meeting the established performance goals. Furthermore, we appreciate the opportunity to meet on a monthly basis with the NRC and the public to provide direct input to revisions and enhancements of the ROP and look forward to ongoing discussions in the coming year. Our detailed comments that may help to further improve the process are contained in Attachment 2 to this letter.

If there are any questions regarding these comments, please contact me at (254) 897-6370 or <a href="mailto:thope1@cpses.com">thope1@cpses.com</a>.

Sincerely

Tim Hope, Chairman Region IV Utility Group

Attachments

# **Attachment 1**

# **Region IV Utility Group Participating Members**

Ameren UE – Callaway Plant
Arizona Public Service – Palo Verde
Energy Northwest – Columbia Generating Station
Entergy Operations, Inc. – ANO
Entergy Operations, Inc. – Grand Gulf
Entergy Operations, Inc. – River Bend
Entergy Operations, Inc. – Waterford 3
Nebraska Public Power District – Cooper Nuclear Station
Omaha Public Power District – Ft. Calhoun Station
Pacific Gas & Electric – Diablo Canyon
Southern California Edison – San Onofre
STP Nuclear Operating Co. – South Texas Project
TXU Electric – Comanche Peak SES
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Company – Wolf Creek Generating Station

# **Attachment 2**

# RUG IV Comments on the Implementation of the Reactor Oversight Process

# 2006 Survey Form on Reactor Oversight Process

#### Contact Information:

Participant Name:	Region IV Utility Group (Tim Hope, Chairman)				
Company:	RUG IV Utilities				
Address:	4200 S Hulen; Suite 422; Ft. Worth, TX 76087				
Email:	thope1@cpses.com				
Phone Number:	254 897 6370				

Shade in the circle that most applies to your experiences:

If there are experiences that are rated as unsatisfactory, or if you have specific thoughts or concerns, please elaborate in the "Comments" section that follows the question and offer your opinion for possible improvements. If there are experiences or opinions that you would like to express that cannot be directly captured by the questions, document that in the last question of the survey.

survey.				,	1				
			Reactor Oversignific examples and						
(1) The	Performance	Indicator Prog	gram provides use	ful insights to he	elp ensure plant safety.				
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree				
	Comments:  The performance indicators have developed into performance standards that the industry strives to meet. Since the performance indicators are based on NRC defined acceptable limits, they reinforce industry and licensee safety performance. Implementation of MSPI is considered an enhancement by adding a more risk informed performance indicator to the PI program.								
Inspe	Appropriate overlap exists between the Performance Indicator Program and the Inspection Program.  Strongly  Strongly								
	Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree  Comments:  Performance indicators look at the areas where clear performance thresholds have been developed. This allows the inspection program to spend more time looking at those areas that require evaluation and investigation. The process is well integrated and, while overlap exists, the overlap seems appropriate. There appears to be more overlap in the security area between performance indicators and inspections than in the other areas.								

	guidance regarding Performance Indicators.									
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree					
	questions. T		then updated per		s responsive to those on the FAQs to enhance					
Inc	(4) The Performance Indicator Program, including the Mitigating Systems Performance Index, can effectively identify performance outliers based on risk informed, objective, and predictable indicators.									
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree					
	based/inform the systems significant v	ned indicator a monitored. Ot when they are n NRC staff sho	her indicators ma ot, because of the	conditions based by falsely indicate c limited risk insi	good risk- on risk implications for e conditions as risk ights in the PI. The k informed elements for					
			ely covers areas mpt correction of		ty, and is effective in e deficiencies.					
	Strongly Agree	Agree \	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree					
	appropriately communicated stakeholder potentially howould seem assessment of during inspe	y addressed. To ions for inspections for inspection involvement in ave generic imappropriate). It post-fire safections that involves	tion trends. A protection the identification plications (a process amples include shut down equipolve developments)	consider enhancing ocess is needed to and resolution ocess similar to the emanual actions oment, and technic of new regulato	ng the use of generic					

	(6) The information contained in inspection reports is relevant, useful, and written in plain English.							
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree			
(7) Th	however, tha Preliminary e cutting aspec	t the reports are experience with t ts associated wit	growing in size a the NRC's Safety th inspection find	and detail with mand de	English. We note, ninimal added value. ye, indicates cross riately documented.			
		ROP cornerstor		appropriate and c	consistent regulatory			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree			
	Comments:  There are too many SDPs that are not based on risk or actual effect thresholds. The Radiation Protection, Security, and Emergency Preparedness, and other deterministically based SDPs, are very subjective (and commonly aggregate multiple non-significant findings into a single significant finding). As a result, a white finding under these SDPs is not the same significance as a white finding in the more risk-informed SDPs - (covered by IMC 0609 Appendix A). These deterministic SDPs do not always produce consistent results because of the dependence on the subjective views of the individuals applying the SDP guidance. The industry and NRC staff should strive to improve these SDPs by including more risk-based elements thus helping to limit the subjectiveness in the process.							
(8) The NRC takes appropriate actions to address performance issues for those plants outside of the Licensee Response Column of the Action Matrix.								
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree			
	Comments:  The NRC action in accordance with the Action Matrix is clear and consistent for single White findings, but appears less consistent for more complex issues. There is evidence that process is not always followed (or may be deviated from) when circumstances should result in moving a licensee to a lower action state. Once a deviation from the process has occurred, it becomes unclear how to exit from the overall process.							

	glish.	contained in ass	sessment reports	is relevant, useru	n, and written in plain				
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree				
	Comments:								
	The recent work by the NRC staff to clarify the exit process for a Substantive Cross Cutting Issue was very effective. The documented analysis of cross cutting aspect inputs to the assessment process could be improved. The current assessment guidance permits the cross cutting aspect to be changed if additional insights are available following publication of the associated inspection report. Given the regulatory principles that guided the development of the ROP (that overall assessments of licensee performance remain transparent, understandable, objective, predictable, risk-informed, and performance-based), any change in the assigned								
	aspect shou	ld be readily av	ailable to the lice	nsee as well as o	ther stakeholders.				
	Questions related to the efficacy of the overall ROP. (As appropriate, please provide specific examples and suggestions for improvement.)								
re	(10) The ROP oversight activities are predictable (i.e., controlled by the process) and reasonably objective (i.e., based on supported facts, rather than relying on subjective judgement).								
	Strongly				Strongly				
	Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Disagree				
	Comments:		41 - D - C	D.C.: 1.C					
	The most recent revision to the Performance Deficiency definition is an improvement, however, additional improvements could be realized (e.g., defining the scope of "self imposed"). We recommend that this definition include a condition that the self imposed standard must have been incorporated into plant procedures prior to being considered for a performance deficiency.								
	the self imp				plant procedures prior to				
	the self imp being consid A number o reason for the	dered for a perform f potential findine issue being g	ormance deficien	cy.  ffects the corners  Additional exa	tone objective" as the amples in IMC 0612				

			t the NRC's action of the theorem of	ons and outcome	s are appropriately					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree					
	Comments:	the Action Ma	trix is oraduated	hased on increa	sed significance					
	We agree that the Action Matrix is graduated based on increased significance.  While also true for findings in the Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity cornerstones, it is not true for findings in the other cornerstones since the outcomes are not risk informed. For example, findings in the Radiation Protection cornerstone that should be considered minor are often conservatively treated as green due to the limited number of applicable examples of minor violations available in IMC 0612, Appendix E.									
			is not found, the nciples used in d		he screening questions amples.					
•	See also respo	onses to items 7	and 10 as applic	cable to this item	<b>1.</b>					
	e ROP is under plain English.	standable and t	he processes, pro	ocedures and pro	oducts are clear and written					
	Strongly	A	Novemal	Diggorage	Strongly					
	Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Disagree					
,	Comments:									
	and/or changi	ng interpretatio	ally clear and un- ns of implement ne final product.		owever, inconsistent an impact the					
ı		addressing gen		tion issues would	d be helpful. Please see					
				•						
			llatory assurance are being operate		d with other NRC ed safely.					
	Strongly				Strongly					
	Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Disagree					
	Comments:									
[	No Comments	S.			1					

	(14) The ROP safety culture enhancements help identify licensee safety culture weaknesses and focus licensee and NRC attention appropriately.							
	Strongly				Strongly			
	Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Disagree			
	Comments:							
	licensees are to direct insper mangement a realized. Cor appreciate NI important me	spending an ina ection of plant a nd licensees is rasistent applicated. SC's support of a sure to help lices.	ctivities. Continequired to ensure to of the cross can be RUG IV and	at of time in this used monitoring as the intended en utting aspects is other industry we do the Safety Cul	effort when compared and oversight by NRC hancements are critical. We			
<i>.</i>								
(15) T	he ROP is effec	tive, efficient, re	ealistic, and time	y.				
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree			
	consuming su opportunity to maintianing the seem to support and periodicite inspections.	bstantial license of improve the efficiency of the level of ray of the CDBI because exits are significant.	ee resources. The ficiency of this pare number and sign esource the inspectors.	ere appears to be rocess by applying ificance of the ction requires. Seed on results of a time from close	ng more discipline to findings to date do not We suggest that scope the first round of			
(16) T	ha DOD anguras	ononnogo in the						
(16) 1.	ne KOP ensures	openness in the	regulatory proce	ess.				
	Strongly		N7 . 1	ъ.	Strongly			
	Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Disagree			
	Comments:							
	The ROP process with its many public meetings and opportunities for involvment ensures openness not available in the previous process. The NRC website is useful and open to the public.							

	(17) The public has been afforded adequate opportunity to participate in the ROP and to provide inputs and comments.							
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree			
	It is import are properl	ant to closely fo	ollow process and	l ensure that all cl	ne monthly ROP meeting. The manges to ROP elements C 0612 definition of			
	(18) The NRC has t	oeen responsive	to public inputs a	and comments on	the ROP.			
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree			
	stakeholder	rs played a large We also appreci		ng the safety cult	s. The outside ure initiaitve program of feedback provided in			
	(19) The NRC has i	mplemented the	ROP as defined	by program docu	ments.			
· ·	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree			
	Comments: See our con	nments on Item	s 5 and 12 above.					

20) The	ROP minimize	es unintended co	onsequences.						
	trongly gree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree				
1	minor issues. I	mproved discip	line in this area		time is expended on uce the unnecessary used.				
t i	Press releases are typically made in advance of NRC special inspections. However, there are not always press releases or followups made by NRC upon closure of the inspection informing the public of the results. This has the potential unintended consequence of raising an issue to public attention without resolving the issue in the same public arena.								
					vey from annually to a SECY-06-0074.				
	trongly gree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree				
	safety culture e nvolvement th collecting feedl	nhancements. This survey afford	There is a need f s. Allowing isso consisent with	or the continued ues to go for two					

(22) Please provide any additional information or comments related to the Reactor Oversight Process.

#### Comments:

The NRC staff and external stakeholders should develop project plan to review the ROP over the next few years. This review should look at all areas and seek areas for improvement in resource utilization. Some specific areas to review include:

- An effectiveness review of the Component Design Basis Inspection.
- A review of overall inspection hour utilization. An effectiveness review of each inspection area should be considered.
- A review of consistency between NRC regions should be performed that considers 1) the number of findings, 2) percent of findings with cross cutting aspects assigned,
- 3) inspection issues that appear to be confined to one region.
- Consider an improved process for more timely sharing of inspection issues with potential generic implementation interest. (See comment on Item 5.) RUGIV would be pleased to participate in a working group/task force with NRC staff and other industry stakeholders to develop such a process.
- A review of the deterministically based SDPs to make them more risk-informed.
- A review of current performance indicators for effectiveness and possible improvement or elimination.
- A review of crediting self assessments and external assessments instead of performing direct inspection.

A new oversight process should be developed to address new plant construction, utilizing a similar process for stakeholder involvement that was successfully used for the current ROP.

Discussions need to be held to define the interactions between the various NRC staff organizations and the licensee when the licensee has both an operating plant and plants under licensing/construction at the same site.